FOREWORD

This "Information Service" has been initiated and established by the Chief of Naval Personnel for the benefit of officers unable to attend the Naval War College.

In this and subsequent issues will be found selected articles of value to all officers. Many of these articles will be outstanding lectures delivered at the Naval War College and other service institutions.
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A Board recently met in the Navy Department to select a group of officers of demonstrated ability to attend the next 10-month course at the Naval War College. This course will start at Newport, Rhode Island, on August 12, 1949. Here, while free from the pressure of everyday military duties, the selected officers will study the art and science of war in its broadest aspects. Through the study and solution of military problems they will have the opportunity to improve their ability to think, to increase their professional stature, and thus to prepare themselves for the duties and responsibilities of high command. Any officer fortunate enough to be selected for this assignment can look forward to one of the most interesting and profitable years of his entire career.

Perhaps it is significant that when the Naval War College was established in 1884 the Industrial Revolution was just hitting its stride. The full impact of steam, electricity and the internal combustion engine was only beginning to be felt. There followed a swift march of scientific and industrial events that brought with it the telephone, radio and the fulfillment of Man's long urge to fly. This coupled with the development of mass armies, powerful navies of great mobility, great air fleets, and later, atomic energy, has resulted in revolutionary changes in the techniques of warfare. The total effect of all these factors threatens to overwhelm military thought and cause it to lose pace. The military student is tempted

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Admiral Beary is President of the Naval War College. Prior to assuming his duties at the Naval War College he served as Commandant Twelfth Naval District and Commander Western Sea Frontier. During the war he commanded Service Squadron Six in the Pacific and the Operational Training Command in the Atlantic.
to become so preoccupied with the study of technical developments in weapons that he is in danger of losing his breadth of vision. Under these circumstances military thinkers may forget that weapons are merely the implements of war and ignore the continued need for a profound understanding of the overall strategy of war. They may overlook the fact that, throughout the remarkable scientific and industrial advance of the past few generations, two factors have remained constant—the human mind and the geography of the Globe.

The mind of Man is still the motivating force behind all weapons, and our preoccupation with atomic energy should not blind us to this fact. The pattern of future victories and defeats will continue to originate in that imperfect human machine which has followed much the same pattern of behavior since Man first learned to fight.

The second constant, the geography of the Globe, is also most important. Land is still the habitat of Man, and so long as it remains so, the final objectives of war will be land objectives. Nor have the seas that cover three-fourths of the surface of the Earth ceased to be an important factor in modern civilization. Sea power is the instrument with which Man has been able to adapt the broad sea expanses of the Globe to his own uses. Sea power means ships—ships that carry airplanes, ships that carry projectiles (and, in the foreseeable future, guided missiles), ships that carry armies and the logistics necessary to support war; and above all, ships that carry the great bulk of world trade, the backbone of modern civilization in peace and in war.

The decisive weapon of modern sea power is air power. That decisive combination known as sea-air power is a weapon whose potentialities have only begun to become apparent. Today no section of the Globe, however remote, can be considered insulated from
the influence of this sea-air weapon. As our technological know-how continues to expand, the ways in which the broad sea areas of the Globe can be used in peace and in war will inevitably multiply.

Thus in an age when our attention is centered on spectacular scientific advances there is greater need than ever to clarify our thinking on the fundamentals of war and the problems of command. The quality of the commander is a decisive factor in the conduct of war. It is still he, the commander, who must do the planning for war. It is still he who must direct and coordinate the weapons of war. It is still he upon whose ability will hinge victory or defeat. The Naval War College has long been dedicated to the task of insuring that qualified officers of all services who attend its courses are given the opportunity to attain the breadth of understanding and vision so essential to victory in war. While there, our future commanders are able to study the strategy, tactics and logistics of sea power and to relate the role of sea power to the broader field of global warfare.

The Naval War College conducts three courses, the Senior and Junior courses in Strategy and Tactics and, of equal importance, the Logistics course. All courses are closely integrated with one another. The curriculum includes a study of weapons, geography, international relations, intelligence, communications, all phases of logistics, and atomic energy. The strategic problems are joint problems, involving not only all branches of the armed services but also various other agencies of government.

New developments and new ideas are weighed and discussed in an atmosphere of complete freedom of thought and speech. No dogma, doctrine or preconceived formulae with which to achieve victory are taught. Officers of all services are encouraged to express themselves freely in the numerous critiques and discussion periods scheduled throughout the course. Differences of opinion and divided
conclusions are encouraged rather than discouraged. They are considered stimulating and helpful in our search for solutions to the pressing and puzzling problems we face today. Without these honest differences, freely expressed, there would exist a fatal weakness within our entire military establishment. No individual or group of individuals is expected to go along with the popular current of opinion. Each is free to reach his own conclusion based on his own logic and the facts as he has been able to determine them. Each is required to think for himself and to apply his own reasoning power to the solution of military problems.

The philosophy of the Naval War College can be summed up in the simple statement that we must never permit our thinking to become static. There must be a constant boil and ferment of new ideas. Old ideas and concepts must be subjected to the most careful scrutiny. Newer and better solutions to our problems must always be sought, and when they are found, there must still be the dissatisfaction of knowing there are better answers yet to be found.

The Naval War College is the catalytic agent through which officers, who possess the energy and the perspective, can achieve that mental stature so essential to the exercise of high command.

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ECONOMIC WARFARE - THE ATTACK

A lecture delivered by
Prof. Charles Cortez Abbott
at the Naval War College
October 21, 1948

Professor Spiegel in his book, The Economics of Total War, defines this subject as follows:

"Economic warfare is designed to destroy the enemy's economic war potential by physically destroying war essential assets and by blockading supplies from abroad. . . . . . . It "requires the coordinated blending of military and economic measures."

Colonel Clabaugh of the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in a recent lecture in that college's Economic Mobilization course said:

"...so far as the literal and figurative meaning of the words is concerned, the term 'economic warfare' could have been applied to economic mobilization for war or to production or even to commercial rivalry in peace. But custom and usage make language as well as law. Long before we entered the war, in fact before the outbreak of war in Europe, economic warfare had come to mean the strangulation of the enemy—blockade, literally, by ships at sea and figuratively, by diplomatic and economic measures. 'Economic warfare' should be used only in the special meaning given to it by custom and usage. . . . Briefly, it is 'the sum of all those measures which injure the enemy's war potential.'"

In order to place economic warfare in some perspective, it may serve a useful purpose at this point to make a number of observations regarding it. Economic warfare of course is not a new

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Professor Abbott has been on the faculty of Harvard University since 1932—for the past several years as Professor of Business Economics.
development. It is probably as old as warfare itself. Certainly in Plutarch's account of the wars of the Greeks and the Persians there are numerous happenings which we would characterize as falling within the orbit of economic warfare. In the Napoleonic wars measures of economic attack and defense played a prominent part, and in our own Civil War the blockade of the South was of very great consequence.

With the passage of time, the realignment of nations, and the development of new weapons, economic warfare continually changes its form. The development of air power and of submarine warfare has of course greatly widened its scope and objectives. On the other hand, total war on a global scale has tended to diminish the feasibility of naval blockade in the older, narrower sense of blockading a hostile coast line and has fostered a growth of new measures which I will speak of in a moment.

It has been commonly observed that economic warfare encompasses many ordinary peacetime practices of business, such as foreign investment, patent interchange agreements, establishment of branch plants in foreign countries, and commercial relationships of many kinds. At the other extreme are operations of a strictly military character, undertaken in wartime, that possess an economic purpose, such as submarine warfare and the air attacks on the German synthetic oil plants at Leuna in the last war. In between these extremes come such operations as our efforts to deprive the Axis of Spanish and Portuguese wolfram through preclusive buying, or our efforts through the use of ship warrants and denial of bunkering facilities to force the Argentines to employ their merchant tonnage in shipping services advantageous to us.

In general, the effectiveness of economic warfare increases or decreases directly in proportion to the military strength and success of the nation or alliance. Many illustrations of the validity of
this proposition can be found. For example, the character of the trade agreements which the United States was able to negotiate with neutrals—Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey—changed rapidly and in our favor between 1942 and 1944 as allied military successes increased. As fortune favored our arms it was possible to put increasing pressure on neutral countries and areas and, consequently, progressively to deprive the Axis of essential raw materials. This observation perhaps is nothing more than a further confirmation of the fact that economic warfare in itself can probably never be a decisive factor independent of military action, although it can very substantially contribute to military successes.

Probably economic warfare is most successful when a particular action is undertaken on such a scale and so rapidly that the economy attacked has no chance to accommodate itself to the blow or to develop substitute materials or alternative trade routes or connections, with the result that the effects of a sudden and unexpected action tend to become cumulative. If the country is suddenly and completely cut off from some item such as ball bearings, or if all foreign trade relationships with neutrals are swiftly and violently distorted, the effects on a country's economy will be very far reaching, particularly in a military sense. Reasoning of this type is of course one of the bases for apprehension regarding a sneak attack on industrial areas in the United States.

On the other hand, it is easy to overestimate the effects of particular operations designed to accomplish economic dislocation. The strategic bombing of German industry and transport prior to the spring of 1944, for example, seemingly injured the German economy much less than was currently believed in this country. A commonly quoted judgment of one of the officials of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare is to the effect that MEW did not underestimate Germany's needs or resources, but that German in-
genuity in developing substitutes for critical materials and components was greatly underestimated.

It is clear, of course, that there are two bases for economic warfare. The first may be described as the economic and business facts characteristic of a nation's economy. Economic and commercial geography, sources of raw materials, peacetime trade flows, commercial and banking connections of important companies, the location of key plants and industries—these determine the points in a nation's position that are susceptible to economic attack. Great Britain, for example, was vulnerable to a food shortage; Nazi Germany was vulnerable to a shortage of gasoline. The second basis is economic intelligence, or knowledge of these facts. The focus of such intelligence must be to determine the shortages that exist in the economy at the outbreak of war or that appear during hostilities.

In order to prosecute economic warfare successfully the necessity for the collection, collation, and analysis of economic intelligence is self-evident. Its importance can hardly be overestimated and it is essential in every phase of this type of operation, from the selection of targets for strategic bombing to knowledge of shortages in the enemy's territory.

A great deal, probably a major portion, of the information needed for an effective system of economic intelligence can be gleaned from published sources. The problem is one of organizing to do the job, especially in peacetime. In the last war there was a great deal of overlapping, confusion, and duplication among the agencies concerned with this task, and there is no question that far too much time elapsed before an effective economic intelligence organization was achieved. The inescapable conclusion is that much of the job of collecting economic intelligence can and should be done prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
A very large part though perhaps not all of the necessary information that is not available from published sources probably exists in the files of government departments and of business concerns in this country. The logic of the problem of assembling data for economic warfare requires that any particular country base its intelligence system on the organizations and sources of information at its command. (Traditionally, Great Britain has used shipping concerns, banks, foreign trade connections, and its control of the international news organizations for this purpose, in addition to its diplomatic and consular representatives; Germany, as we all know, used German companies or plants located abroad, patent interchange agreements, and the various kinds of German emigrant societies; Russia clearly uses the Communist Party and its fellow travelers for this purpose). It is doubtful if any systematic effort has been made to collect and collate information in the hands of leading American business corporations with far-flung foreign connections, such as the large banks, General Motors, Standard of New Jersey, International Harvester, and so on. The omission is a matter of great regret, since if such information were collected and collated it would certainly be very comprehensive.

The need for this kind of effort appears to be the greater since, insofar as I understand these matters, there is relatively little knowledge of the workings of the Russian economy in this country, at least as compared with other major powers. This lack of an integrated body of data makes offensive economic warfare against the Soviet considerably more difficult than would otherwise be the case. Incidentally, I believe that careful analysis of the trade agreements that Russia has concluded since V-J Day, and is concluding, both with countries inside and with countries outside the Iron Curtain, should be one of the more fruitful sources of this kind of knowledge, in that such agreements might suggest actual or potential shortages in the Russian economy.
We come now to the techniques of economic warfare—blockade, export licensing, preclusive buying, control of shipping, blacklists, blocking of foreign assets, and all the rest.

Historically, the backbone of economic warfare has been the naval blockade in the strict sense of the word. Reliance has been placed on the stationing of naval vessels on an enemy coast and outside enemy harbors, on patrol of the sea lanes, on observation of shipping in neutral roadsteads, and on the careful designation of contraband and, when possible, its seizure. During the two World Wars this pattern has been altered by three well-defined developments. The first was the growth of the navicert system, a system which resulted in great economies in the use of warships in supervising neutral shipping. The second has been the development of the long distance or paper blockade, which in its more advanced form seeks not only to cut off all supplies for the enemy at the point of origin, namely, in neutral countries, but even goes so far as to mould the economy of neutral territory to your own use. The third circumstance has been the breakdown of distinctions between contraband and noncontraband goods, whatever the lawyers may say.

The reasons for these changes are clear. Global warfare and conflicts between world-wide alliances, together with the development of new weapons such as the airplane and the submarine, have greatly increased the need for employing naval vessels in strictly naval operations and on convoy duty. Conversely, the amount of naval vessels’ time available for blockade purposes has been reduced. Furthermore, the larger the land mass and the volume of resources controlled by the enemy, the fewer are the objectives that can be achieved by a close blockade. The number of strategic items in short supply for the Nazis in 1942 was really very small—petroleum was perhaps the only item in which shortage ever became acute. Moreover, the logics of total war on a global scale
make useless any distinctions between contraband and noncontraband items. Finally, the necessities of total war require that a combatant not only devote all of his resources to the war effort but also, so far as is possible, compel neutral nations to devote their resources also to purposes advantageous to him. In pursuit of this objective the combatant, of course, makes use of shipping controls, trade agreements, preclusive buying, financial measures, and any other procedures available to him.

An ancillary purpose sought in the effort to control the trade of neutrals is to deprive the enemy of any advantages of trade with other countries or the use of any assets that he owns located outside his own boundaries. The ultimate goal is to deprive him of the benefits that arise from the fact that he is a member of a community of nations.

With reference to the navicert system, it should be pointed out that the Navy has three, perhaps four functions to perform under this procedure: the issue of the navicert, although this can perhaps be done by other agencies; apprehension of blockade runners; the enforcement of the rules of blockade at control points; and periodic spot checks of merchant vessels on the high seas to ensure that the blockade rules are being observed.

Should a condition of open hostilities develop between this country and the Soviet there can be little doubt that the measures of economic warfare existing at the end of World War II would be quickly reimposed. The export control measures which, as you know, were originally instituted under the Export Control Act of July, 1940 as a means of conserving scarce items, would be re-instituted. They would be reimposed partly for their original purpose of conservation, partly as a means of putting pressure on and bargaining with neutral areas or with areas producing resources
essential to our own effort, and partly to ensure that no products of American fabrication were exported and fell into enemy hands.

War Trade Agreements, which are essentially a mechanism for rationing noncombatant areas and for bringing the operation of their economies into conformance with your own needs, would be quickly negotiated. The rationing of neutral or noncombatant areas has a number of separate aspects, each one of which merits attention. In the first place, you cannot afford to give these areas all they want of many commodities, or even all the shipping space that they want. In the last war, the East Coast of South America was not only severely rationed as regards its receipts of newsprint and steel but also as regards shipping space allocated to it. In the second place, it is important that only the essential needs of neutral areas be satisfied; otherwise it is entirely possible that scarce items may be reexported to the enemy. In the third place, rationing of the items that these areas want from you is the best lever for assuring that you get the supplies from them that are needed in your war program. In the last war it was made very explicit by the Belgian Congo that continued shipments of scarce minerals, fats and oils and fibers were contingent upon the Congo’s receipt of manufactured goods and such picturesque items as old clothes and tinware essential for trade with the natives.

The injury to the Russian war effort that such measures might inflict would in general be determined by the extent to which the Russian economy and war potential is dependent upon imports of raw materials, components, and technical skills from abroad. I will not attempt to appraise this matter, since the Russian war potential is the subject of another lecture in your course.

I would like to suggest, however, that the effect of these measures might be influenced to some extent by another factor, namely, the amount of territory controlled by the Russians. The
greater the size of the land mass controlled by a military economy the less it tends to be subject to the pressures of economic warfare. When Nazi Germany overran Poland, the Balkans, and Norway she greatly increased the resources at her command, not the least of which was man power. On the other hand, the addition of territory may lead to greater shortages of certain kinds. For example, Holland is a deficit food area, and the fact that the Nazis overran the Netherlands must have increased the pressure on their own food supplies. One may presume that the use of French industrial capacity by the Germans increased the pressure on German petroleum resources. The fact that the United States welded Latin America to our war economy—insofar as we did—required that we supply Latin America with minimum amounts of shipping services, newsprint, flour and so forth. As is well known, our efforts to service the Caribbean and the East Coast of South America resulted in a number of submarine sinkings that might not otherwise have taken place and consequently intensified the shortage of merchant shipping. In short, if Russia overran Western Europe it would increase her war potential, but it would also increase her vulnerability to certain types of economic pressure, though probably not in equal degree.

If war between the United States and the Soviet should break out, the long distance or so-called paper blockade, with its three basic instruments, the navicert, the ship's navicert, and the ship's warrant, would certainly be imposed immediately.

As you know, the navicert originated in the First World War while the United States was still a neutral. It was originally a device for expediting the shipment of noncontraband goods from one neutral country to another, a sort of permit for passage through the blockade, given at the point of origin. It speedily developed into a system of controlling all goods passing in trade between the neutral countries.
A ship’s navicert which was a logical outgrowth of the navicert for a particular consignment, was given when all the items in a ship’s manifest had been navicerted, and permitted a vessel to make a single voyage through naval controls. The ship’s navicert provided a description of the ship and its proposed itinerary; a list of officers, crew, and passengers; a description of the cargo, ship’s stores, mail, and money; and an account of the source, destination, consignor, and consignee of the cargo. When the application for a ship’s navicert was received, the crew and passenger lists were checked, and objectionable persons were removed before the issue of the navicert. The effect of the navicert system was that all unnavicerted ships and cargo became subject to immediate seizure.

A ship’s warrant entitled a vessel to the use of British and Allied port facilities—bunkering, ship stores, repairs, and so forth. In order to receive a warrant the owner agreed that no vessel owned or operated by him would sail to or from the navicert area without a ship’s navicert, that he would not sell or part with effective control of any vessel owned by him without the approval of the proper authorities, and that he would not employ any enemy company for the purpose of obtaining insurance or other facilities. In addition, fleet owners were generally required to charter portions of their fleets to the issuing authority; in the last war that meant either the British Ministry of War Transport or the War Shipping Administration. I have always been under the impression that the presence of Swedish vessels in the Pacific in services designated by the British was a result of this kind of lever on neutral shipping.

The extent to which the imposition of shipping controls may directly injure the Soviets seems to me very problematical. On the other hand, the use of these controls would clearly increase the re-
sources at the command of this country and of Great Britain, and it is in this respect that they would be chiefly useful.

If the cold war should turn into a hot war, it seems certain that proclaimed lists of individuals and of business concerns commercially "untouchable" would be speedily developed and that Russian-owned funds and other assets in territories under our control would be sequestered. Here again the direct injury to the Russians would be doubtful. Certainly there would be no important body of Russian assets owned in this country to sequester—nothing like the $7,955,000,000 of assets that were blocked in this country during the last war.

In short, the ocean-borne commerce of Russia, particularly that part that could be reached by the navicert system or the proclaimed list, seems to be very important to the Soviet. Her land boundaries to the Near East and the Far East would be difficult if not impossible to seal through measures of economic warfare. The conclusion is, I think, that strategic bombing would be far more effective in breaking down the Russian war potential than would these other mechanisms.

By way of conclusion let us consider some of the economic aspects of the cold war. These considerations are important on their own merits. More importantly, the degree of success with which the United States and the Soviets prosecute their respective programs of economic warfare prior to the time hostilities break out—if they do—will greatly influence the possibilities of economic warfare after the event.

The general pattern is clear. The Soviets have their policy of economic erosion; the United States has the Marshall Plan.

The chief, the most interesting, and the most baffling charac-
teristic of the Russian policy is its destructive character. The erosion, undermining and collapse of other economies serves the Soviet purpose. Only in minor degree, apparently, are the Russians interested in preserving the productive capacity or trade connections of territories under their control and in adapting these facilities for their own use. In this respect Russian policy largely differs from other types of economic penetration that the world has seen. On the whole, and notwithstanding some well-known exceptions, the British and the Germans have traditionally sought to preserve the economic potential of an area being penetrated, and even to build upon it. Their purpose for the most part was to turn the productive capacity and facilities in such territories to their own use, not to destroy them.

As I have said, Russian policy is furthered by the spread of economic chaos, by civil disturbance, the diminution of production and trade, inflation of currency, dislocation of channels of trade, and the disappearance of plants and individual business concerns. One of my friends points out that the Russians are masters of "economic cannibalism," the absorption or destruction of economic activity outside Russia, leaving the Russian economy, poor as it may be, without a rival.

In this policy, especially in its early stages, manipulation of the monetary and banking structure is a key element. As we all know, inflation of the currency and prostitution of the banking system in a given area is the quickest way to check the economic processes of production and distribution and to discourage businessmen and the spirit of enterprise. The importance of money and credit was recognized by Lenin. Both Nazis and Communists have used control of money and banking mechanisms as a means of breaking down the economies of satellite, peripheral states, and the position that control of the currency has assumed in the Berlin situation seems to be not wholly accidental.
As against this program the United States has as a countermeasure the Marshall Plan, with all the implications and ramifications covered by that phrase. It is commonly said that this plan is designed for the economic restoration of Europe, but this seems to be not a wholly adequate statement. In an immediate sense the plan was designed to check economic deterioration in western Europe; in a larger sense it is presumably intended to restore an economic balance of power in Europe, a *sine qua non* of the restoration of a military balance of power.


It does not seem to be valid to look on the Marshall Plan as a means of restoring European industrial production to prewar levels. Such a restoration had in fact been substantially achieved before the end of 1947. Industrial production of 14 major nations of Europe, excluding Germany, in the latter half of that year was on the average 99% of prewar production; 8 nations* which in 1938 accounted for 34% of European production had exceeded prewar output, in some instances by considerable margins. This level of production seems to have been achieved in large measure because of the increased labor supply in Europe and by a more

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* Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
complete use of the supply than was the case in 1938, since European postwar output per man-hour has been much lower than in the prewar period. The conclusion is, I think, that in the field of industrial production the logical aim of the Marshall Plan must be to raise output above prewar levels. This can take place only over a period of time, as capital equipment is increased. It is also probable that an increase in facilities is a necessary condition for a rise in the man-hour output to something like its prewar level.

In the field of trade the picture is very different. In current prices, European trade is above the prewar level, but in terms of 1938 prices it remains substantially below that of 1939. The Bank of International Settlements Report states: “Expressed in real value, the trade of European countries with one another in 1947 represented only 56% of the prewar volume, while Europe’s trade in the non-European countries amounted to 78% as regards exports and 106% as regards imports......” The relatively high level of imports of course is in good part attributable to American generosity.

The chief area in which this “deficiency” in intra-European trade appears is in the drop in German trade with Western Europe (something like one billion dollars of trade in each direction having disappeared), and secondarily in the shrinkage of trade flowing between western Europe and central and eastern European countries. The conclusion appears to be that a major objective of American policies must be an increased volume of European trade. Accomplishment of this goal will in turn be largely dependent upon the establishment of sound monetary conditions, balanced budgets, and relaxation of controls upon foreign exchange and international commerce. These problems of course are chiefly domestic problems for the countries concerned. Insofar as the Marshall Plan does not induce or force attainment of these conditions it will not realize its potentialities.
In some ways the major European problem is the loss to Europe, as the result of the war, of “invisible receipts” from foreign investments, shipping, insurance, and so forth. The Bank of International Settlements Report states that in the period 1933-1938, “The net income from Europe’s investment in non-European countries was equal to about $1.4 milliard.....and accounted for about one-quarter of Europe’s total imports from non-European countries; in 1947 the corresponding net income would seem to have been only $400 million, some 30 percent of what it was before the war.” Here again the conclusion is plain. Unless Europe, during the period in which this country supplies aid, so reorganizes its economy as to adapt itself to these new conditions the Marshall Plan will fall short of its purposes. But this adaptation is again essentially a domestic problem, or perhaps a complex of domestic problems, for European countries. The Marshall Plan in and of itself here can do little more than buy time—time for the European economy to adjust itself.
THE NEAR EAST

A lecture delivered by
Professor Hans Kohn
at the Naval War College
November 5, 1948

As you know from my lecture on Russia, I am convinced that we cannot approach any problem today except by seeing it in its historical perspective. It was exactly one hundred fifty years ago that the Near or Middle Eastern question was opened up for Western Europe. For we may say that before 1798 the Near and Middle East entered the attention of Europe or the Western world little, if at all. The Mediterranean, the Middle East, which had been the center of world politics and the center of world civilization until about 1450 of our era, disappeared entirely from our sight after that. It may be said that Columbus went to discover America, (which as you know he never intended to do) because of the very fact that the Mediterranean had been closed, the Near East had been obliterated, and with the Near East the two great Asiatic trade routes, the two trade routes from Europe to the Far East, one leading through Alexandria and the Red Sea, the second through Antioch and the Persian Gulf. These two trade routes, from antiquity until 1400 had been the most important commercial routes of history, those on which depended the importance of Italy. Both in antiquity and in the middle ages, the vitality and leadership of Italy, of Rome and later of Venice and Genoa, and the phenomenon of the Renaissance would have been impossible without Italy's geographic strategic position in relation to these two trade routes. In the 15th century the victory of the Turks closed these trade routes to Western mankind. With that

Professor Kohn is Professor of History at Smith College. His lecture on "Russia" appeared in a previous issue of the "Information Service."

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moment began the decay of Italy, the decay of the Mediterranean and the rise of the Atlantic powers.

It was one hundred fifty years ago that the strategic genius of Napoleon reopened the Middle East and discovered what is in my mind the most important fact in the world situation today, namely: that the Middle East is the strategic hub of the Old World. Whoever controls the Middle East undoubtedly controls the Old World. General Bonaparte who, as you all know, was a Mediterranean, born in Corsica, was keenly aware of it. He was never a Frenchman by geographic loyalty; his only real loyalty belonged to the Mediterranean. He dreamt, as in our own time his small imitator Mussolini did, of the resurrection of the Mediterranean empire, not anymore for its own sake but as a key for the control of the world. In 1798, Bonaparte had the immensely daring conception, a conception similar to that of Alexander the Great, to land an expeditionary force in Egypt and to push on from Egypt through Syria, Iraq and Iran into India. He was fascinated by the idea which, since then, all world conquerors have had, whether it was Hitler, Mussolini or Stalin, to destroy the British Empire as the only bulwark standing between, on the one hand, the aspiration to world domination, and on the other hand, the world of liberty. He wished to deal the British Empire a deadly blow by going across the ancient land route to India. You know he pushed on from Egypt to Palestine and Haifa, as we call it today, and it was only because of the pestilence in camp and because of certain news coming from France that he had to call off his venture and return to France. From this moment two things remained. One is what I would call "the regeneration of Islam." Napoleon's administration in Egypt, though very short-lived, left deep traces. There was a man of energy, ruthlessness, strength. His name was Mohamed Ali, a simple soldier in the Turkish Army, an Albanian by birth. By his intelligence, and by his unscrupulous ruthlessness he made
himself governor or pasha of Egypt, then a Turkish province. As pasha he learned enough from French influence to wish to modernize Egypt, to create a modern army, even to begin a modern navy, to introduce modern economy. Islam was awakened from hundreds of years of lethargy, apathy and sleep. The present king of Egypt, Farouk is a descendant of the Mohamed Ali whom I have just mentioned.

But the second, and more important consideration for us is that Napoleon drew attention to the long forgotten trade routes and the strategic position of the Middle East and drew the attention of the British there, and from that moment on it has been British policy to make sure that the Middle East does not fall into the hands of any great military power and that the Middle East will be kept open. From 1798 until today, all British foreign policy and all British strategy has been dominated by the one conviction not to allow any great military power to establish itself in the Middle East. Today we have inherited the British task both politically and strategically. It is, in my opinion, our foremost consideration not to allow any great military power to claim exclusive control of the Middle East, because whoever holds the Middle East, holds Africa, Asia and Europe. This has been shown very clearly in the two wars which have been fought, since Napoleon, for world control.

The two wars fought for world control, World War I, and World War II, both had one of the decisive battlefields in the Near East. It was much less noticed in the United States, yet in World War I the Germans made a very determined effort, with the help of the Turks, to capture the Suez Canal and to drive the British out of the Middle East. At that time the attempt was made from the east, with the help of Turkey, to the Suez Canal. The British defeated the attempt and, in a counter-attack, occupied Jerusalem and later drove up to Syria. There is one im-
important point in this struggle in World War I against Germany and Turkey: the British tried to enlist the cooperation of the Arabs. The Turks were then the enemies of Britain and allied with Germany. The only people who could be organized against the Turks were the Arabs. The Arabs were the first great force in Islam, the first great conquering race of the Mohammedan religion. They had been obscured and dominated by the Turks, and the British now tried to reawaken their national pride, the memory of the centuries of Arab greatness. They were quite successfully supported in that indirectly by Americans since the most important educational institutions in the Arab world were the American institutions, especially the American University of Beirut in Lebanon, the greatest educational institution in the Near East. The American missionaries there tried to arouse an Arab awakening which had no connection with that provoked by the British. The American one had been more on the intellectual side, educational; the British one more on the military, political side. The British appealed above all to the Arab ruler, to the Arab sheik in Mecca, in the capital of Islam, in the foremost city of Mohammedan tradition, where a descendant of Mohammed himself, by the name of Hussein Ibn Ali was then the leading member of the aristocracy, or as the Arabs called it, the Sharif of Mecca. His son is Abdullah, King of Trans-Jordan at present, and from that fact we can understand both the long lasting British ties with Abdullah of Trans-Jordan and Abdullah's ambition to play a great role in the Arabic or Mohammedan world—for Abdullah is the only surviving son of Hussein of Mecca. It was a romantic Englishman, one of the strange figures with which the otherwise generally "dull" British stock is quite rich, this rather strange exotic figure, T. E. Lawrence, who went out to Arabia and started what he described as the "revolt in the desert." The British succeeded, with the help of the Arabs in defeating the Turks and the German attempt to dominate the Middle East.
In World War II the Middle East was again a decisive battlefield. You gentlemen will remember as much as I do the fateful month of June 1940 when the German armies had triumphed all over Europe; when Hitler and Stalin were close friends and allies, when France lay crushed and when Italy had joined the war on the side of Germany to be in for the kill of the French and British empires; when Marshal Petain, certainly a soldier of some knowledge, expected that within three weeks Britain would fall. At that moment the question was for me, who knew the Middle East very well, not what would happen in the British Isles but what would happen in the Middle East, because if the Hitler-Mussolini combination had taken hold of the Middle East, then there was no doubt with me that Asia was lost to Hitler and the Japanese. Lost, I am entirely convinced, irrevocably for any foreseeable future. At that moment Mussolini entered the war, and at that time we did not know, though some of us suspected, that the famous Fascist army, navy, and air force did not exist really. We all were impressed by Mussolini. You remember his picture in the papers then, with open mouth, his jaw forward, declaring that "In the next war, Italian bayonets will decide the war and Italian airplanes will blacken the skies." It was in 1938 that he declared that to the Italian senate. You may remember that the air force impressed us when Balbo flew over with his flyers to Chicago, so much so that I think even today an avenue in Chicago is called Avenue Balbo. In any case, it impressed us tremendously. And now in June 1940 the British had 30,000 men along the Suez canal with about 500 second rate planes. The 30,000 men were mostly imperial colonial troops, Australians, with some Negroes from Africa, and others. Mussolini had 150,000 men of the best soldiers in Eritrea and the same number under the Duke of Aosta in Ethiopia. I was afraid then that the superior Italian air force and the two armies, could move in a pin...
cer movement on Egypt and the Suez canal, liquidate the British situation there, and establish an impregnable situation for the Axis from Morocco to China. If that had happened, our landing in Africa would not have succeeded.

It was because of the unique luck and the courage of the British that the Italians, and later Rommel, were defeated. I am entirely convinced that, should a next war come, and I have good reasons to believe that it will not come if the West becomes really united and prepared, that the decisive spot will again be the Middle East. That is the reason why we must make sure, and are making sure I think successfully, that the Middle East does not fall into Russian hands. The Russians have tried to gain control of the Middle East since the days of Catherine the II, who conquered the Crimea, the North Shore of the Black Sea. Catherine hated her son, the future Czar Paul, but loved her grandchildren. She selected their names, not Paul, and she named her oldest grandchild Alexander, in memory of Alexander the Great who conquered Asia, and named her second son Constantine in memory of Constantine the First, who established Constantinople, Byzantium, as the seat of the world empire. From the days of Catherine II to the days of Stalin, the Middle East has been the prime ambition of the Russians. The British never tried to occupy or rule the Middle East. Primarily they wished to exclude Russia and Napoleon and the Germans. Our policy is the same. We are interested in excluding Russia, and so far we have done well. I can assure you from a close knowledge of the Middle East, where I lived for eight years, and from a study of the situation in the Middle East, that we have succeeded beyond anybody's expectations, with relatively small cost so far, in averting an imminent threat to the Middle East which two years ago seemed unavertable.

If we could achieve in China what we have done in the
Middle East, I think we could begin to feel much more secure than we do now.

Two years ago Greece was threatened from Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Greece is important for us because the Greeks are the only sea-faring people in the Near and Middle East. Neither the Russians nor the Turks nor the Arabs nor the Persians are a sea-faring people. The Greeks are, by their history and by their whole geography. Their islands are strategic islands and Greece is destined to be the key to further Russian penetration. East of Greece is Turkey and two years ago the Russians put forward strong demands for a large part of Eastern Anatolia. There is a claim, which is not unfounded, that centuries ago Armenians lived there. But you can't turn the wheel of history back centuries, though many nationalists are trying it. Three Soviet professors proved to their own satisfaction and that of Mr. Stalin that northern Turkey, on the shore of the Black Sea, had once been Georgian territory that should be annexed to Soviet Georgia. Turkey would thus lose all Kurdistan, these commanding heights from which the road to the Persian Gulf lies open. Secondly the Russians claimed then the right to put their bases into the Dardanelles, which would have practically meant domination of Istanbul or Constantinople and of Turkey. The third important thing is that, two years ago a Soviet puppet government, backed by Soviet troops, was established in Iran, in Azerbaijan. This government was a threat to Turkey and to the Persian Gulf. That was the situation two years ago, and everybody was convinced that if Russian armed columns break through to the Persian Gulf, that means to our oil fields there, nothing could stop them.

Now two years have gone by. There is no actual threat whatsoever at present to Greece or Turkey or to Iran. The Soviet government in Azerbaijan has been liquidated. All Russian troops are out of Iran. No new demands for Turkish territory are voiced.
although the situation in Greece is rotten and will remain rotten, for the very simple reason that the Greek nation has never yet learned to work together without being at the brink of a civil war. In spite of that, no Russian or Yugoslav or Bulgarian soldier has transgressed into Greece; on the other hand the front of Stalin on the frontiers of Greece has been broken. Yugoslavia is today no longer an entirely dependable satellite of Russia, an astonishing change. Two years ago Greece was Russia's; today Stalin cannot be very certain of Tito's Yugoslavia. So I would say that, so far as I can see, the situation in the Middle East, with rather little expenditure, has been immensely strengthened.

That is important, not only for strategic reasons, but also for the oil. You all know about the British oil which exists in southwestern Persia. The concession in northern Iraq is one half British, one fourth American and one fourth French. By far the most important concession of all, those in Saudi Arabia, are entirely American. This oil is needed for three purposes. One is for the economic recovery of Europe under the Marshall plan. We can't send oil from the U.S. The Europeans have no oil; theirs comes from the Middle East. The Russians don't wish Europe to recover. They would like to cut up the Middle Eastern oil. Second, the British navy depends upon the Middle Eastern oil and the British navy is as much our interest as our navy is. And third, even our navy depends on Middle Eastern oil.

Now some people here in the United States tell you "Why should we worry about the profits of the Standard Oil Company?" I must tell you that they are right. We should not worry about the profits of the Standard Oil Company. But the whole question thus put, is pure demagogy. We need the oil from the Middle East, irrespective of any profit or not, for our strategic survival. If people come and tell you that the State Department is following a certain policy in the Middle East because it is
suffered to the oil interests, that is the barest nonsense! We must hold the Middle East for our survival—strategically, and because we need the oil, not for the profits for the Standard Oil Company. Our vital national interests are involved there.

That is one point, and the second point is that we cannot hold these regions without close cooperation with the native peoples. That is what the British learned. The British did not know it fifty years ago; the British learned that they cannot rely on India or Pakistan, on Arabia or Turkey, without the sympathy and cooperation of the native populations. These native populations, the Turk, Arab, Iranian or Persian, are today in a state of national awakening, of the awakening of political consciousness, in a feeling of immense pride which can be very easily hurt. They are not like the British or ourselves, so secure that they would not mind pin-pricks or anything like that. They are immensely jealous of their national position. And I am entirely convinced that we cannot hold these regions without the sympathy of the native populations on our side. The British enlisted the sympathy of the Arabs in World War II, especially of the two most important Arab rulers. One was Ibn Saud, the king of Saudi Arabia, a very strong personality, a man of unusual power as you probably know. King Ibn Saud is a man of about sixty-eight just now. King Ibn Saud began his life as a small sheikh. He was a small potentate leading fanatical Mohammedans called the Wahhabis. It was through their fanaticism and his genius of leadership that he conquered the whole of Arabia. For the first time since Mohammed, he united the whole of Arabia and brought peace and order there. Ibn Saud is undoubtedly a person of unusual strength, a commanding personality, who created in the desert, in the immense poverty of the nomadic tribes what was, for the first time, a progressive orderly government. The second man is King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, the only
surviving son of Hussein of Mecca. The British understood that they had to enlist the friendship of these two men, and it was due to their friendship that in World War II, in the most tragic situation in the Middle East, the Arabs did not cut the British communications. Though the Arab could have never waged open war, they could have been very damaging if they wanted to, but they stood loyally with Britain. Britain cannot forget that. Britain knows that her security and by her security, our security, depends on establishing friendship with the Arabs and with the Turks.

And now in the last few words I wish to talk about the Turks because there is nothing more astonishing and nothing more indicative of the future of the Middle East than the transformation of Turkey. Some of you may have been to Turkey before World War I. Some American ships sailing there remember the entirely oriental, backward, medieval country then ruled by a Sultan, a ruler who was at the same time the spiritual head of the state. Turkey was entirely ruled by Mohammedan medieval law. The women had to go veiled; polygamy existed; there was no modern social life whatsoever. After World War I, Turkey under a great military leader Mustafa Kemal (or as he was called later Kemal Ataturk) drove out the invading Greeks, and for the first time in one hundred fifty years Turkey became entirely independent from the intrigues and controls of foreign powers. Mustafa Kemal now began what I regard as the most successful process of modernization done anywhere in Asia. Much more successful than not only the other Asiatic peoples but also than the Communists, because Mustafa Kemal did it without any superfluous cruelty, without barbarizing the land. He tried to establish there something like a modern European nation and he has succeeded to an astonishing degree. Greece today is torn by internal dissension, Greece is not a nation. Persia is a backward country, certainly not a nation, and the Russians could cut through Persia.
like a knife cuts through butter. Turkey is different; Turkey is an organic, integrated nation since Mustafa Kemal. It would be a tremendous task for the Russians to conquer Turkey, and they know it very well. The “secularization” of Turkey took her away from her ancient Mohammedan medieval order to be modernized and to be equipped as a modern nation. Think only of the position of the women; there is no polygamy in Turkey anymore. In Turkey today modern European law absolutely prevails. Women are no longer veiled; women can participate fully in all social and political life, a tremendous change in a few years time. I am convinced that in that direction all the Middle Eastern people will go. It will take much longer with the Arabs, or with the Persians. The Arabs are today disunited; still not a modern nation like the Turks but they are on the way to it and it is immensely important, as the British have understood, to help this development forward instead of trying to hinder it.

I am optimistic about the Middle East. Our position in the Middle East, or the British one, which is for all practical purposes one and the same, is strategically sound and can be and will be, in my opinion, politically sound, because we need the Middle East and ultimately the Middle East needs us, needs us not only for protection against Russia. The Middle East cannot enter by its own strength upon a sound policy of economic and social modernization—only American and British capital and American and British educational and technical help can provide the means. One hundred fifty years ago the Middle East was opened up. Since then it has formed a bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa. I’m convinced it is a strong bridge, one which can easily become a very important factor in the defense system of Western civilization and world peace.
THE HERITAGE OF TYRE

A lecture delivered by
Rear Admiral Charles R. Brown, U. S. N.
at the Naval War College
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Since man first sat astride a floating log and propelled himself with a piece of driftwood, the waterways have served not only as frontiers but as areas of conflict and avenues of intercourse between peoples. It is, for instance, the ocean routes and not the impassable land barriers between them which truly join North and South America. The same was true in the old world. The Mediterranean, though separating three continents, was the chief means of contact, conflict and the spread of the civilization which grew up along its shores. Here trade, piracy, and organized sea warfare seemed to have flourished from pre-historic times.

The first great seafaring people were apparently the Cretans or Minoans, but Phoenicia with her great port of Tyre was the first maritime nation of which we know the history. Phoenician ships more than 12 centuries before Christ were receiving the wealth of the East, and distributing it along the shores of the Mediterranean. It is hard to overstress the importance of these early mariners as builders of civilization. The venturesome explorer who brought his ship into some uncharted port not only opened up a new source of wealth for himself but also quickened civilization at both ends of his route. The cargo ships that left the Nile Delta distributed the arts of Egypt as well as her wheat.

Greece, was the next nation after Phoenicia to become a sea power, and her great victory over Xerxes navy at Salamis was

Admiral Brown is Chief of Staff to the President, Naval War College. During the war he served as Chief of Staff to Commander Carrier Division One, and commanded the Kalinin Bay and the Hornet.

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what really ended the menace of Persia on European soil. Upon its issue depended the Golden Age of Athens which reached its flower in the 80 years following, and which could hardly have come had Greece fallen under the demoralizing influence of oriental rule. Salamis was therefore a victory not only for Greece but for all of mankind.

Two centuries elapsed between the Greek victory at Salamis and the Punic Wars, a second great struggle between alien races for Mediterranean control. Here again it can be said that the welfare of mankind rode with victory in that struggle. Compared with the culture of Rome, with its law, engineering and ideals of practical efficiency, the civilization of Carthage was barren and sterile.

Carthage, herself a Phoenician colony, had centuries of experience in seafaring and sea fighting while Rome was predominantly a land power. But Rome was young, lean and hard while Carthage was old, and ripe for plucking. So Rome took to the sea and, after a long struggle, destroyed Carthaginian sea power.

Thus was Rome forced reluctantly upon the sea. Rome then, in turn, became dominant on every Mediterranean shore and, through sea power she gained the world. For the next six centuries the Mediterranean was to remain for the Romans *mare nostrum* (our sea).

In the year 328 A. D., the Emperor Constantine the Great shifted his capitol from Rome to Byzantium now known as Istanbul but best known to us as Constantinople. It is a strange commentary upon the indifference of us of the western world that we could owe an incalculable debt to the eastern Roman Empire and yet remain so ignorant on the subject. While Rome fell apart and Europe broke up in chaos and descended into the Dark Ages, a single citadel of western culture stood fast at Constantinople, a preserver...
of Christianity and the cultural heritage of Greece and Rome, as well as a civilizing influence upon Slavic people to the northward. For a period of over 700 years, a time longer than from her final fall in 1453 until today, Byzantium alone stayed the westward sweep of Mohammedanism under first the Saracen and then the Turk until the weak states of Europe could grow strong enough to finally halt the sons of the prophet at the gates of Vienna. Again, it is a story of the East against the West, of the struggle of alien peoples for the Mediterranean. And it is a story of sea power.

During her 1000 years of life, Byzantium stood firm only as long as she kept hold on the sea. Each time she failed to do this her strength dwindled until at last she had shrunk to a mere city fortress the doom of which was assured long before it fell. The Turks finally took Constantinople after a brief siege of seven weeks.

The resulting Turkish supremacy in the Mediterranean was the direct cause of the great voyages of discovery. Blocked by the Turks from the old caravan trade routes to China, the West turned toward the open sea to seek Cathay west across the Atlantic and south around Africa.

The rise of Portugal was a spectacular phenomenon of the Age of Discovery. Her intrepid navigators rounded Africa to open a sea route to the Indies and made Portugal the richest nation in Europe, with a great colonial empire and claims to dominion over half the seas of the world. But the Portuguese system of colonial administration or rather exploitation, was even worse than Spain's and Portugal fell back into the ranks of lesser states.

The rise and fall of Spain is a tragic parallel of Portugal's. As Portugal first turned south and east, Spain was to go westward
to Mexico and Peru to carry her pillage and her conquest. From the ancient Aztec and Inca empires Spain was to wring the gold and silver with which to finance the next centuries of wars, wars whose outcomes were to give racial, religious, and political form to the world in which we live. But Spain, too, was to fail due to many causes which may be roughly summed up as a lack of maritime genius.

Next it was Holland whose turn it was to flash dramatically across the pages of history. Her rise to wealth and power was a tribute to Dutch character, integrity, hard-headed business sense and native maritime genius, for it was the sea alone which gave Holland an avenue to greatness. Her fall came after she had spent herself against the maritime strength of England.

France too was to make her bid for sea power and French naval history is a story of promise alternating with disappointment. The French navy has known periods of great glory and, in its lowest estate, never dishonored the military reputation so dear to that nation. Yet as a maritime nation, France has never held more than a respectable position.

Some peculiar quirk of national character seemed to color the naval strategy of France. Her officers sought to economize their fleet, to use it in commerce warfare rather than in battle. Even when fortune favored France, she lost golden opportunities due to this fatal weakness which corrupted her officers. The English officer, on the contrary, sought out the enemy and took the offensive, retrieving many a blunder in strategy and tactics by sheer hard hitting.

This brings us to England where we will pick up the threads of our story and tie them together, for the true story of modern sea power until after the turn of this the 20th century has been the history of England. While others rose to shine but briefly
though often brilliantly, she was to climb steadily until she became the acknowledged mistress of the seas. This control of the sea exercised by England was not the gift of fortune. It was a prize gained, in the main, by wise policy in peace and hard fighting in war.

England first defeated the Spanish Navy, and then it was Holland who must meet the challenge of the British Isles. There followed three great wars in which the Dutch fought with epic gallantry. But in the Third Dutch War France teamed up with England, and Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Faced on the land by France, the dominating military power, and on the sea by the combined might of the British and French navies, all seemed lost. And yet Holland was not defeated. She opened her dikes to check the armies of invasion and, under her great Admiral deRyder, fought the navies of France and England to a standstill. When peace eventually came all honors were hers but she was an exhausted and prostrate land, and Holland, like Spain, settled back in slow decline.

This enmity of the French king for the Dutch which led him to team up with the English had gained nothing for France and everything for England. Unwittingly Louis XIV had built up the only country that could become the greatest colonial and maritime rival of France. A series of wars were now to blaze forth between England and France with such frequency that the two nations were to remain at daggers’ points for the next century and a quarter.

Time permits only the barest mention of a few of these wars, important though they be. In the Seven Years’ War, the British Fleet was to prove a priceless weapon. Teamed up with Wolfe, that 18th century master of amphibious warfare, it was
to wreck the French colonial empire. The Seven Years’ War finally ended in terms of deepest humiliation to France. She was compelled to renounce to England all of Canada, the Ohio Valley and the entire area east of the Mississippi, except the then sickly little settlement at New Orleans.

No peace such as that following the Seven Years’ Wars could be permanent. Every patriotic Frenchman burned with a passion for revenge. The opportunity came with the American Revolution. From the outset France was unneutral and, after the capture of Burgoyne, she decided to enter the war openly. It may seem startlingly to say, but the Revolutionary War was as much naval as it was military. Before the entry of France, the English kept their army supplied by sea and forced Washington into the cruel depths of Valley Forge. George Washington, himself, acknowledged it was the French Navy that really saved America. And the final victory, which was assured when Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown, came from a temporary loss of control of Cornwallis’ sea communications.

Ten years after the American Revolution British sea power was drawn into a more prolonged and desperate conflict with France following the French Revolution. As the war dragged on, Spain and Holland were to add their navies to that of France and the rise of Bonaparte was to make France supreme on the Continent. But the magnitude of these events on land during which Napoleon fought a hundred bloody campaigns, overthrew kingdoms, and remade the map of Europe, obscures the prime importance of the warfare that went on the sea. For it was Great Britain by virtue of her navy and insular position that remained Napoleon’s least vulnerable and most obstinate opponent, forcing him to ever renewed and exhausting campaigns, reviving continental opposition and supporting it with subsidies made possible by control of sea trade.
Finally, at Trafalgar, the English won a signal victory against a much larger French fleet in what is universally accounted one of the decisive battles of the world. Napoleon who had been planning an invasion of England faced his army back towards the Continent saying: “It will be Britain that forces us to conquer Europe.” The great conqueror had set his feet on the path leading to Moscow and Waterloo.

It was in that same June of 1812 when Napoleon gathered his “army of twenty nations” for the Russian Campaign that the United States declared war on Great Britain. The tiny American Navy fought brilliantly but was inevitably smothered by weight of numbers and the final peace settled none of the differences that had begun the war.

The remainder of the 19th century was to be a period of relative peace thanks to the British naval predominance which had broken the Napoleonic hegemony, stripped France of practically all of her American possessions and made America north of the Rio Grande English in speech, laws and traditions. The Union blockade crippled the finances of the South, shut out munitions and food stuffs, and was a major factor in the downfall of the Confederacy. The Japanese defeat of the Chinese Navy in the Battle of the Yalu in 1894, marked the emergence of Japan as a formidable force in international affairs and brought in a period of intensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far East. And finally in 1898, the last sorry act was played out in dying Spanish sea power. Spain was ignominiously defeated in both the Battles of Manila Bay and Santiago.

In 1904 the Russo-Japanese War broke out in best Japanese tradition by a vicious attack without declaration of war. This war was marked by two great Japanese naval victories; the first off Port Arthur on August 10, 1904 and the second in Tsushima Straits on the 27th of May, 1905.
The Russo-Japanese War greatly weakened Russia's position in Europe, leaving the dual alliance of France and Russia outweighed by that of Germany and Austria. This upsetting of the European balance of power coupled with Germany's commercial rivalry and the growing might of the German navy forced England to abandon her neutral position in between and the First World War was to find her on the side of France and Russia.

World War I was fundamentally akin to the Napoleonic Wars, a struggle between land power predominant on the Continent and naval power supreme on the seas. The English blockade was soon to make its strangling power felt. As had the French before them, the Germans retaliated with commerce raiding. But unlike France, Germany had the submarine, which was soon to prove one of the greatest perils of the sea. Its effectiveness was to be deeply underscored by the almost complete English dependency upon the sea. The battle against the submarine was finally won but the margin was dangerously close.

We need not concern ourselves too closely with the various naval actions of the First World War. The English fleet was to keep the sea while the German fleet found it impossible to break out through the steel ring of Britain. However, we should briefly review the one great naval battle of the war which was fought at Jutland. Here England won at least a strategic victory but failed to destroy the German fleet. Had England won an epic victory, Jutland would have marked the turning point of the war instead of leading, in Churchill's own words, "Directly to the submarine peril of 1917." The German submarine campaign could never have attained the effectiveness it did. But most important of all, Russia could have been kept in the war. For, paradoxically, the first victim of sea power in World War I was not Germany, but Eng-
land's ally Russia who succumbed to the German Navy. Ninety percent of Russia's imports were cut off by the combined efforts of the German navy, which blockaded the Baltic, and Germany's Turkish ally who held the Dardanelles. Russia suffered terrible losses from the resulting lack of munitions, and this desperate plight of Russia was the most compelling reason for the British Dardanelles' Campaign. Unfortunately, however, the Campaign was a tragic failure, and Russia fell into ruins.

So much for the First World War. The Second World War, with some justification, has been called a continuation of that First World War which had been interrupted by a period of armed truce. Certainly the twenty-five years which began in 1914, have the qualities of a great tragedy. The League of Nations proved to be an unhappy failure and the world was to watch the clouds of war grow ever more ominous. France by her unwillingness to make timely concessions to a moderate German government hastened that government's fall which brought into power the elements of extreme dissatisfaction. England, disturbed by French predominance, which overthrew the balance of power, was not altogether unsympathetic towards a resurgent Germany. America resolutely turned her back on the world, determined to regain her historic isolation. Germany, far from penitent, wished only to correct mistakes which had somehow robbed her superior war machine of the fruits of victory and hoped yet to wrench rich spoils from decadent neighbors. Japan, the most recent and most irresponsible recruit to Imperialism, was determined to follow her destiny towards a dream of world domination; while Italy, steeped in nostalgic dreams of an ancient glory, skulked like a greedy jackal in the trail of the jungle giants.

By 1933 it was evident that the three nations, Japan, Italy and Germany, were set upon paths leading inevitably and fatally to war. Thereafter, events were to transpire with increasing fre-
quency which were to carry the whole world into another mortal conflict. It was now too plain that the forces of aggression could only be stopped by force, but out of an anarchy of compromise, a policy of appeasement had been born and Germany’s opponents were to absorb even ruder shocks before their deep-rooted anti-war sentiments could be overcome. Finally in 1938, the world saw the supreme humiliation of England at Munich, and when on September 1st, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, England and France, pushed beyond all limits, declared war two days later. The Second World War had begun. Or had it begun in 1937 with the Japanese invasion of China; or earlier still, in 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria? Indeed, had the troubled peace—begun by the Armistice and unsolved by the vengeful treaty of Versailles—been other than an armed truce while nations realigned and re­armed to continue the struggle to see which one could claw its way to the top?

In the beginning German victories on the Continent came with such clock-like regularity that, in less than a year, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France had been overrun. On the 22nd of June, 1940, France signed an humiliating armistice which was to reduce her to virtual slavery throughout the remainder of the war.

But across the Channel the British people seemed to suddenly discover a new reservoir of power and confidence. The Chamberlain government fell and behind the courageous and dynamic leadership of Winston Churchill, the English rallied to show a deathless courage, a stamina and fortitude worthy of Englishmen of any other age. An outnumbered Royal Air Force fought back the horde of German aircraft which, with increasing intensity throughout the summer, sought to drive it from the skies as a prelude to invasion.
Finally, defeated in the air over Britain, Germany was to again turn to the Continent and the Balkan states were overrun or forced into vassalage. Then on June the 22nd, 1941, Hitler, like Napoleon before him, was to begin his fateful Russian adventure. For a while the German army swept all before it and, in October and November, victory seemed imminent. Japan decided that time was ripe for her complete entrance into a struggle bidding fair to recarve the world into totalitarian empires and on December 7, 1941, began war without warning by an air raid against the American Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

What of sea power during this titanic struggle of land and air warfare, which, in a little over two years, had swept across the face of the earth?

This time a wiser Germany was able to soften the effects of blockade by stockpiling, the development of synthetics, and through conquest, the acquisition of the stockpiles of neighboring states and the incorporation into her economy of vast areas with their sources of raw materials. Thus the negative effect of sea power's denial of commerce was, temporarily at least, defeated; but England and her Allies were to continue to enjoy the positive boon of huge imports throughout the duration of the war.

Germany, recognizing England's complete dependence on the sea, was to bend every effort to accomplish what she had failed to do before—sever the British lifeline. The struggle was to be a seesaw with the submarine finally going down in defeat, but again the margin was dangerously close.

Later as America found her strength the sea was to supply a crushing bomber offensive and make possible a series of amphibious operations which finally liberated Europe and destroyed the German army. It was sea power which won at El Alamein and in the
later North African invasion. It was the same story in Sicily and in Italy when the foes of Germany were to return to the Continent at last. And, again, it was the long arm of sea power that, in the early dawn of June the 6th, 1944, supported the invasion of France which was to set the final seal of bankruptcy on German strategy.

But it was in the Pacific that sea power more than ever was to prove the handmaiden of victory. Fought across the largest body of water in the world, an ocean only sparsely dotted with small islands, the war in the Pacific was obviously from the start a naval war. For no other reason, Japan’s first and choice objective was the American fleet.

You know the rest of the story as well as I. Japan received her first check in the Coral Sea when a seaborne invasion aimed at the capture of Port Moresby was forced to turn back. Then came Midway. Many informed Japanese saw in Midway the turning point of the war, and so calamitous were the results considered, that the story was never announced in the homeland until after final surrender.

Many famous battles were fought and many epic and gallant deeds were done which have added rich pages to our history. I wish I had the time to discuss them. But I must rest content by saying that the United States succeeded in welding land, sea and air forces into an amphibious machine which moved amphibiously across the most forbidding distances in the world and succeeded in severing Japan from her sources of supply and provided the bases and the logistic support required by the Air Force in its great bomber offensive against Japan.

And so to sum up this little thumbnail sketch which covers all of written history, we find that the prime importance of sea power is clearly demonstrable from the days of Tyre until today.
Sea power denies the enemy the sinews of war and provides them for one's self. Sea power permits us to carry war to the enemy thus forcing him to fight at home where it hurts. This will also ease our own defense requirements, for the enemy will have to expend precious resources in defense that he might otherwise use in attacking us. Worse than that (from his point of view), he will grow to live in constant dread of our landings and will have to spread his forces so thin in order to protect himself in all directions that no matter how big his army and air force, he will find they are never big enough. For the choice of the point of attack is always given to that nation which controls the sea.

"But why seize and build these bases?" I am asked. "Cannot our airplanes fly there, bomb the enemy, and then get back?" No, they cannot; that is, none we have built yet can do it. Nor do our scientists hold out any promise of airplanes that can do so at any time soon. Of course we can refuel them in the air, but that is an expensive way to do it. Besides fighters cannot go along to protect the bombers, and bombers must have their fighter cover.

But, even if we had super long-range bombers and fighters, there is another compelling reason why we must have our bomber bases close to the enemy. If we cut the distance a bomber must fly in half, we multiply its effectiveness by four. If we cut the distance down to one-fourth, we will multiply its effectiveness by sixteen.

This old law of mathematics applies to all weapons, including the guided missile. The day of the long range guided missile is still many years in the future but when it comes, navies will still be needed to take it closer to the enemy so that we can enjoy this enormous advantage of multiplying its effectiveness by many, many fold.
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But what about the atomic bomb? Hasn’t this changed the whole complexion of war?

Of course it has. I would be the last to deprecate the terrible potentialities of this weapon which can only be described in words of horror. But nothing has changed our fundamental laws. The way to win a war is still the same and will continue to be the same. To be victorious war must be carried to the enemy. Atomic bombs are tremendously expensive. The number will always be too limited to waste any trying to hit a target thousands of miles away when we have the means of getting much closer. Germany alone absorbed the equivalent of 200 atomic bombs in the last war. Indeed Mr. P. M. S. Plunkett, Nobel prize winner and famous physicist, puts the number in the thousands, but choosing the lesser number, we do not now have that many nor does it appear that we have any expectation of ever having that many in the future. But, even if we do, we must not waste them in a long range effort.

And so, in conclusion, we find that the face of the globe has not changed, though many have chosen to ignore the continued existence of the oceans and seas. Even the pictures in our magazines which so vividly portray the world as round are actually misleading. They usually show the part of the world that is land. They make us forget that three-fourths of the earth’s surface is covered by water, and only one-quarter by land.

New weapons and the increased efficiency of land, sea and air transportation, have all served to complicate modern living, but they have not changed the basic facts of life, either in peace or war. The coming of age of air power as a decisive weapon of war, is of enormous and far reaching consequences. I, as one who has spent a quarter of a century in aviation, would be the last to deprecate this fact. But the case for sea power was never so strong as it is today. We can lose another war if we ever permit ourselves to forget it.