INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICERS
FOREWORD

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Volume II, like Volume I, will contain lectures and articles considered of professional interest to officers of the naval service. Opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Navy Department or the Naval War College.

The many valuable suggestions offered by readers of Volume I are acknowledged. These have been carefully considered and many will be incorporated in Volume II.
I am certainly grateful to the Admiral for his introduction. Speech-making is bad enough in any event—it's a terrible thing—but I don't know that it's any worse than speech-listening. The worst thing about it is having what is known as a Who's Who introduction. Some man with an edition of Who's Who about ten years old gets up and gives everybody your biography from Who's Who, and by the time he gets through you say to yourself, “Well God knows there is but one thing left to do and that is to bury me.” Of course when I get up, there are a good many who think that if I have not been buried and dug up, at least I am what they sometimes call me at Army and Navy schools, “the Rip Van Winkle of the armed services.” That is because I have had the pleasure of studying the history of our armed forces for a period of now almost forty years.

When I was a lad I had the great pleasure, the infinite honor, of seeing some of the great men of the war between the states. Strange as it seems, I can remember Jubal Early. What a somber (I almost said a sinister) figure he was as he walked around town, chewing tobacco fiercely and leaning on a long staff. As soon as we little lads would see him we would run away because it was thoroughly understood among all of us lads of about five years old or thereabouts that General Early ate a little boy for breakfast every day.

I remember John B. Gordon; I remember Fitzhugh Lee; I remember James Longstreet. I knew well a number of the younger
staff officers of General Lee and General Jackson. I knew personally and talked often with three of General Lee's staff officers, one of them his Assistant Adjutant General, and of course I knew the leaders of the Spanish War, of the First World War and of the Second World War. Many of these men of the Second World War I taught at the War College. And it was amusing beyond expression to go to headquarters immediately after hostilities, to go to General Eisenhower's headquarters, or to General Clark's headquarters, or to General MacArthur's headquarters and see some of these men I had known as majors at the War College, stand up and say, "My God, am I going to have my historical photograph taken now?" So those are the circumstances that make me feel, as it were, that I am the Rip Van Winkle of the armed services.

But no man can go through this long stretch of years and have the honor of seeing these great men without having an admiration for them, an admiration for the service and a reverence for the leadership that these men exemplify. I have seen a new chapter of it during the last year because I have been studying George Washington after he came to the command of the American Army in June 1775. Nothing that he had ever done before showed the qualities that he then displayed. I don't think anybody who studied Washington as he was in 1759 is prepared for what Washington was in 1775. I think strangely enough, that out of his civilian training, out of all the difficulties he had to endure, there developed the patience, the maturity of judgment, the essential sanity that were the hallmark of the remarkable ability of that man.

You know we look at Washington usually through the silly, stupid pages of Parson Weems or as we see him in the portraits of Gilbert Stuart. I think either approach is wrong. Washington wasn't the stupid prig that he is made out to be by Weems, nor was he the embalmed celebrity that he appears to be in Gilbert
Stuart’s portraits. Of course, many of the portraits of Gilbert Stuart are pretty good works of art of the type and of the age (he made a good living in portraits of George Washington), but personally, except for the one at the Boston Art Museum, I’d like to see all the Gilbert Stuart’s of Washington destroyed. I wish they were all burned up because they give such a false impression of the man. The Peal portraits of him, even the Trumbull portraits, have so much more of the vitality that was Washington—the sanity, the judgment, the humanity that was his. You who are older used to see George Washington presented to you in front of the East Portico of the Capitol. Washington, being a modest man, I think would have been very much embarrassed if he had seen how nearly naked he was presented in that statue of him in front of the Capitol where he sits in a Roman toga which would suit Washington weather in July and no other weather in the world. And he sits there with his hand outstretched as if saying, as Lorado Taft used to put it, “My body lies over at Mount Vernon—my clothes in the Pension Office.

He exemplified leadership which is not anything like as complicated as some of the psychologists would make it out to be. Psychology is going to be a great subject one of these days. Now it’s just in its infancy, and when we try to apply it in the abstract to problems of leadership we usually make monkeys of ourselves; we don’t get very far. Leadership is fundamentally common-sense and mankind. Maybe I’m going to over-simplify it for you this afternoon, because I’m going to say that it consists fundamentally of three things and three only. If a man meets these three conditions he is going to be a leader; if he fails to meet them he may be on the roster as the head of a command, but he will never be at the head of that command when it marches down the pages of history—never!

First, know your stuff. Know your stuff, just that. If you
are an aviator, know it. And know something else besides. We are entirely too much disposed in the American armed services now to have men who begin their professional career on too narrow a foundation and they go up and up and up, and the higher they go the thinner their knowledge is. We have to have specialists but very few of them can afford to be primarily the leaders of men. Our advanced specialists, they must be men who know something about leadership but they are primarily laboratory men—research men. The leader must have a broad foundation if he is going to keep his position. Know—know your own branch, know the related arms of the service; you can’t know too much if you are going to be a successful leader. And know the yesterdays. I have always said, and said many times here at the War College through the years, “Don’t rely on us military historical writers too much. We don’t know but so much. We can’t fight wars.” But after all don’t ignore the yesterdays of war in your study of today and of tomorrow.

I always thought that one of the finest things that ever was said about MacArthur was that when he had a period in which he was relieved of active administrative duties and was for three months able to do as he pleased, he took those three months and caught up on everything that he could read in order to bring his knowledge of today into line with the yesterdays of war. The same thing is true of Marshall. Marshall is one of the most avid readers of military history that I know. The same thing is true of Nimitz. Of course Nimitz sometimes made bad choices of his reading. He said to me one time for example, “Ah, Doctor, you never will know how grateful I am to you,” and he mentioned one of my books that he had read at Guam while he was in command there. I said, “How is that, Admiral?” “Well,” he replied, “every night after I had finished my duties I would go to bed and turn on the light and I would read for about half an hour of some of General
Lee's problems in dealing with his subordinates. Then I would go peacefully to sleep, because I would reason then that General Lee's problems of command were infinitely greater than mine were, and that I had a far easier time with my subordinates than he had with his.” I said, “Admiral, you never were more mistaken in your life; you had “cuckoos” and some “prima donnas” with you and I’ll not argue with you about that, but what put you to sleep was not peace of mind—it was my style.”

Know your stuff—know your specialty, know the background of military history. Know it so that when the man comes up to you and says, “What do I do in these circumstances, with this weapon, with this gun?”, you can tell him, and if you don’t know and want to be a leader, then for Heaven’s sake tell him honestly, “I don’t know.” A man very seldom loses the respect of his men if he says he doesn’t know something when he can demonstrate that he knows something else, but look out for that man who tries to bluff about his knowledge.

I was dealing one time with a very tough audience and I happened during the course of my remarks to say something about Iwo Jima. I didn’t think I was doing so hot myself. I wasn’t getting on so well, but when we came around to the question period, some man way back in the audience said, “Doctor, you have been talking about Iwo Jima; would you mind discoursing for a minute on what you think of the tactics of small landing parties as they were employed at Iwo.” I said, “I don’t know a thing in God’s world about it.” I saw my audience was very much relieved from that minute. If you don’t know, say so and try to find out.

Know your stuff. Now that means a lot in the way of the utilization of your time. And it means a lot in the way of utilization of a Navy wife or an Army wife. You boys think you have a hard life to lead. You don’t have any tougher life to
lead than the life of a Navy wife. And both the Navy husband and the Navy wife need to learn all they can, when they can. I'd like to give you a little motto on that question. I gave it to one of my historical secretaries. She happens to be the one who came up with me this morning. She said it was the most useful thing I'd ever told her. It came from Oliver Wendell Holmes, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, who should have been Chief Justice. Holmes would get a boy from Harvard Law School every year, and that boy would have one year as Holmes' law clerk, a magnificent training, out of which in their generation have come some of the best lawyers in public service in America. And one of the favorite things that he would tell these boys was, "Young man, make the most of the scraps of time." Now, believe me, if you want to know your stuff and know it better than the other man, you've got to spend more time on it, and if you are going to spend more time on it you've got to make the most of the scraps of time. The difference between mediocrity and distinction in many a professional career is the organization of your time. Do you organize it, do you make the most of the scraps of time? Bless my soul, I don't suppose that the Admiral with his dignity and justice and regard for all the amenities says "no" to you about playing bridge, but there is many a man who would have three more stripes on his sleeve if he gave to study the time that he gives to bridge. Don't say that you have to have the recreation. You have to have enough recreation, but diversification of work is the surest recreation of the mind. You don't have to go and forget the whole world. You have to work different brain centers and that is all you need to do. If you do it you get the recreation and out of the recreation you will get the training. Write it down, my young seamen, my young mariners (I love the word "mariner")—write it down, "Make the most of the scraps of time."

If we have another war, which Almighty God forbid, and I
know not one single leader in the armed services who does not
say Amen to that—if we have another war it is going to be a
highly technical war, but the older principles of leadership will stand.
Number one will remain—know your stuff.

I have not a record of a single American soldier, a single
American admiral who, when all was said and done, was not pro­
ficient in the knowledge of his specialty. Don't think the time spent
at schools is lost either. Professional training for war is a cate­
gorical imperative of efficiency. In history I believe I knew General
Lee's Brigadier, Major, and Lieutenant Generals pretty well. I think
I have written about most of them, however poorly. Of all that com­
pany there were only two who became distinguished division com­
mmanders who had not had professional training.

This idea of the inspiration of the soldier is nonsense. The
idea that out of the great body of our people, you are going to get
soldiers of high emminence—there is absolutely nothing to it. If you
require professional training to save the lives of men in peace,
and you call the man who does it a physician—are you not likewise
called upon to have professional training for war in order to save the
lives of men in war? And that man you call an Admiral or you call
him a General. Professional training is worthwhile. The best
money that ever was spent on the Navy of this country has been
the money that was spent here at Newport. I don't believe any
man can contradict that.

Know your stuff—and be a man. That is number two. Be
a man. We have had some leaders in American history who may
not have been all they ought to have been in their regard for some of
the amenities of life, but I never knew a great American seaman,
I never knew a great American soldier, or read about one, who was
not fundamentally a man. And that means a man of character; it
means a man of industry; it means a man of fair play. We were
talking at the house of the President of this College a little while ago about the matter of courage. And the Admiral said to me, “Doctor, have you ever found in history any process by which you can tell whether a man is going to show courage in action?” I said, “No, you never can; I don’t believe you ever will. If we do, it will be thousands of years hence and by that time, please God, we may have sense enough not to fight wars.” But this is a fact—the type of courage that keeps a man from turning his back on his adversaries and running away is one thing. That is not so uncommon. But the type of courage that is shown by a leader who will take his part of the load in all circumstances—that’s a much rarer type of courage.

What is the coward? Who is the coward in the high rank? He is not apt to be a physical craven but he is a man who sometimes tries to pass on to the other fellow the more difficult job and won’t do his own. You take that great Captain of the state from which I have the honor of coming. You can see beautiful stories of the physical courage of General Robert E Lee. I never go to Washington from Richmond on Highway No. 1 that I don’t see the house where he was standing one day on the porch, with a glass of buttermilk between the table and his mouth, when a round shot came within four feet of him and shattered the lintel of the door. You can see the place there today, and it was said that no man observed a quiver when the glass went to his mouth. I have read the story of how he conducted himself on that bloody field of Spotsylvania Courthouse. That is fine, but if you want to see what courage is, what the real test of the man is, you read Lee’s farewell to Jackson on the 2nd of May 1863. When Jackson, called upon to make the great turning movement there at Chancellorsville, was asked by General Lee, “What troops do you propose to make this movement with?” Jackson said, “My whole corps, sir.” Lee then had about fifty thousand men. Jackson wanted to take twenty-eight thousand of them, put them in motion around the flank and leave
Lee twenty-two thousand men with which to face the Federals while Jackson was out of action and making that movement around the flank. Lee could have said, “Why those are impossible figures. Take fourteen thousand men, and leave me enough at least with which to defend this line against these seventy-five thousand Federals here in the wilderness.” Not so. Lee knew what concentration of force meant; Lee knew the doctrine of superiority of force at the point of contact. Lee had the courage to take his chance in order that his comrade might have superiority of force for difficult offensive operations. In that, gentlemen—and it is repeated gloriously a hundred times in American history—in that you see what I mean by the word courage. What I mean by the words: be a man.

Aye. Be a man who is disciplined in spirit. Be a man who is observant. How many fine persons there are who go through this world. Never forget and, as God gives me might, I shall never fail on a lecture to mention Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox—Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox and his observation of a string over the shoulder of the Federals in that same battle of Chancellorsville. Remember Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox? What a name. Cadmus had his orders, “You move when the Federals do. You’ve got one little brigade here; you are holding Banks Ford and when they move, you move.” Cadmus went out the next morning early. (Every good seaman ought to be out early. People talk about what you ought to do for the redemption of the American people. The American people need nothing in this world more than they need to get up earlier and to go to bed earlier.) Cadmus Marcellus got up earlier than most men, and he went out and looked, which a great many people never do, and over Banks Ford he saw that Federal sentinel walking his post, and another and another down the line, in plain view. Well there is nothing uncommon about a sentinel walking his post is there? But Marcellus wasn’t content with that; Marcellus took his glasses and he looked at that sentinel who may have been thinking about anything
under the sun other than his military duties; and Marcellus observed that over that sentinel's shoulder there was a string, and behind that sentinel's left hip as he looked at the end of the string was his haversack. And Marcellus looked at the next sentinel and he had on his haversack and the next and the next and Marcellus said to himself, "Those birds are getting ready to move because if they were simply in camp they wouldn't have on their haversacks and their haversacks wouldn't be full. They have got their rations on them because they are getting ready to move." He ordered his artillery hitched, got his infantry in position and within fifteen minutes after those Federals started their withdrawal, Marcellus was in the road and he hadn't gone three miles before he had the great opportunity of his career to stop a Federal offensive.

Observation! Be a man, not a blind man. Might as well go down in the engine room and stay there if you are not going to look and see.

Last of all, the third point. Look after your men. Look after your men. What a simple thing you are saying, Rip Van Winkle! Here you have three-fourths of the brass and nine-tenths of the brains of the American Navy before you and you are saying that leadership is three things and you have listed those things so simply. Know your stuff—be a man—and look after your men. We came a long way to hear you Rip Van Winkle and is that all you have to say? Yes! That is all, because that is the sum observation of my travels. Look after your men.

I mention to you the fact that as a youth I saw those gray columns moving up the street and I heard the clatter of cavalry forty years after. I saw those men who had thrust through the wilderness, those men who had stood at Second Manassas, and those who had climbed the hill at Gettysburg and had their red
banners with them until twenty-two of those flags were there on one acre in the Federal position. I saw them; I knew many of them, and often I asked them, "Tell me, that great man who is our southern demagogue, this Lee, what was there about him that made you revere him? What was there in him that made you tell us that next to the love of God and His Son, there had to be reverence for him?" An incredibly simple answer, my friends, they gave me. "Oh," they said, over and over again, "he looked after his men! We knew that when he demanded anything of us, it was because he had to. And when he said, 'Men, you must take that height', we took it, because we knew that was the cheapest thing to do." He looked after his men. So did the Lieutenants—some of the men to you unknown. Did you ever hear of the name of John R. Cooke? Some of you did; just a Brigadier General in the Confederate Army. I remember him well, an old man running a grocery store, an unprosperous grocery store. He had in his head the most beautiful bullet hole you ever saw in your life. He must have been hard-headed—it never cracked his skull. One day when he was in his thirties he was commanding two little regiments at Sharpsburg. On his left early in the morning something had happened. Something had gone wrong even with Stonewall Jackson, and the flank had been swept back. The Federals were at the Dunker Church, and Hood's great Texans, the Grenadier Guard of the Confederacy were panting in the woods. The tide swept around to the center on that segmented battlefield. There an impression was made, not too deep. Cooke stood there, a little salient—two regiments; and against his fire, with the supporting artillery around the Dunker Church a Federal corps broke itself in vain. During the fight Longstreet sent word to him and asked him if he wanted help, and I am told that of all the classic cussing that ever has been heard in the American Army—and the American Army sometimes casts reflections on its adversary's ancestry back six or eight generations—there never had been heard such words as
those that Cooke sent back. “Give him help! Not until every man he
had was pursuing through hell the last Yankee in front of him!”
Or words to that effect. I said to myself, “What is in that man?
What made that Twenty-seventh North Carolina regiment that
way? This Third Arkansas—Arkansas is a good state, good fight­
ers. They have some mighty long-winded politicians among them,
but what made that Third Arkansas regiment do that?” And I
took the pains to go back and I found that from the very time
that Cooke had taken over that regiment (he had been a captain
in the regular army before the war) he had done everything he
could to tell those men, “I am going to demand the maximum of
you and I am going to do the maximum for you.” He held them
to the highest standards and he did for them everything that a
man could to protect them from casualties.

Look after your men—it means many things; it means
many things that you don’t think about. It means mail facilities;
it means food. General Lee, no matter how much impoverished
his commissariat was, never failed to increase his men’s rations
after they had won a fight. Hot food is one of the greatest
builders of morale in the history of war. Looking after your men
means looking after their clothes. I was telling one of the of­
ficers today how much emphasis George Washington laid on the
cleanliness of person. That great builder of morale, that same
Lee, when he got his men out of a dirty campaign always
tried to put them by a stream where they could wash. And the
most valiant men were the men who, if they needed it, got the
new uniforms. Look after your men and your men will look after
you. I don’t believe there has ever been an exception to that
dictum.

I said one day to MacArthur, “You know, I think when
I come to write the history of your campaign, there from the

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss7/1
Solomons northward, one of the things I am going to find the most difficult to understand is how you did so much with so little.” Well he lighted his corn-cob pipe for the four hundred and fifty-third time that afternoon, and made the seventeenth oration that he had delivered to me that day, and he said many things that were absolutely true and sound. And we talked about his casualties, about how few there were in terms of what was done. I said, “Difficult as it was, you looked after your men.” And I quoted him some of the things I told you. He said, “Well if there was economy of life, it is something for which”—and he dropped all his theatrical manner—“something for which I will be grateful to the end of my days.” He said, “When I thought about the number who were killed, nothing could console me except the thought that maybe by God’s grace and hard effort we had saved some that might otherwise have been slain.” He is a tall man; he got up and walked the floor as he sometimes did when he spoke, but believe me he grew taller and taller in my eyes as he spoke those words.

Gentlemen, have I over-simplified this case? I think sometimes we over-complicate it. I think sometimes we take these book’s on psychology, we take all the arts of salesmanship and we try to apply them to the armed services in a manner that is too elaborate. I don’t believe I’m over-simplifying when I say to you, know your stuff, be a man, look after your men.

Remember you may in God’s mercy have had your day of battle. You who were there in the Arctic night—you who flew across the hump—you who went from South America to Africa—you who fought those submarines up and down our coast—you who went out from Pearl Harbor never knowing whether that submarine would come back again or whether your burial place ever would be known to men—you who were in the supply service—you who
were in the battlefield—you who had the immortal honor of serv-
ing with Spruance, with Kinkaid, with Halsey—you may have
had your day, you may live until over it all comes the glamour
of the years and you may tell the tale so often that you'll hardly
be able to distinguish the fabric from the embroidery. Such things
happen. On the other hand your challenge may lie ahead—the era
of atomic warfare may bring us problems vaster than anybody
ever faced before.

I covet but one thing for you and that is, if you come to
the final day which must for America always be the day of vic-
tory, I covet for you nothing more than that in the day of victory
you can say with a clear conscience what was said by the van-
quished as he rode back through those thin gray ranks across
the red hills of Appomattox one day in April 1865. The men
knew that something had happened because he had been in the
midst of the Federal lines. They broke ranks, they thronged
the road, they gathered around him, they put up their hands.
"General!" they said, "General! Are we surrendered? General!
Give us another chance, we'll fight them now." He said "No, my
men. I've done for you the best I knew how to do." Your nation
demands of you no less than that; your conscience should ask no
more than that you do the best.
Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to have the person who introduces you as a lecturer not only state the text on which you are to speak but also the conclusion at which you are going to arrive. This is not entirely astonishing to me because I am aware that the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles have been household words in the Navy Department ever since 1800, when Admiral Bainbridge very unwillingly sailed the Washington up through those straits and passed the batteries on the Dardanelles.

To carry you back for a moment to the days of sail (which I understand is not always unwelcome to sailors), Bainbridge was ordered by the Dey of Algiers to take a special emissary to his overlord, the Sultan of Turkey. The Dey threatened to blow the Washington out of the sea with his shore batteries if Bainbridge refused. He therefore started under duress flying the Algerian flag, but as soon as he got out of range of the batteries he sent a sailor up the mast and took the flag down, and thereafter he sailed under the Stars and Stripes. When he got to the entrance of the Dardanelles, where there were great forts on either side, he knew that a strange and unknown flag would be fired upon. He wasn’t going to strike the American flag so he had to find a solution. The solution was this: he headed straight in toward the anchorage near one of these forts, and as he

The late Professor Wright spent many years in the Near East as an instructor in the American University of Beirut, Syria, and as President of the American College for Girls and Robert College, both in Istanbul, Turkey.

The Naval War College takes this opportunity of expressing its deep regret at the death of Professor Wright, May 16th, 1949.
went in he began furling sail and firing a salute. Of course the salute was fired with black powder and there was plenty of smoke. As soon as he had a good smoke screen in the air, he began unfurling sail, and the first thing the Turkish artillerymen on shore knew, the Washington under full sail was emerging from her cloud of smoke, already out of range of their guns, which were in fixed emplacements and couldn't be shifted as the ship moved. So, to American sailors, these are familiar waters—the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporous. You don't need, therefore, to be told a great deal about the general strategic importance of Turkey, which is the possessor of these narrow seas, these straits leading from the Black Sea into the Aegean.

There has been a good deal of talk since 1939 to the effect that these straits have lost their importance; that the range of air bombardment is such that the Aegean Sea in itself is a sufficiently narrow area to make the use of naval forces in any great number impossible, and there is, of course, a good deal of truth in this statement. Certainly the Aegean Sea, which is nowhere more than two hundred miles wide, offers very little opportunity for maneuver when you can get an air force out there any hour of the day. On the other hand, the crucial point within this narrow area has simply been lengthened by the addition of air force and the possibility of air attack. The tightest point in the long narrow passage is still the straits leading from the Black Sea to the Marmara and into the Aegean.

I suppose that it's appropriate to mention one major strategic point which I will refer to later. From the point of view of those who are most concerned with the straits, their major importance formerly was that behind the straits lay a body of water large enough for the training of a massive fleet, which might, if the straits were opened to it, emerge fully prepared for battle in
the Mediterranean or even in the Atlantic. That was the basic consideration, undoubtedly, in British naval thinking in the nineteenth century. I think it’s still true. It’s still true, but it is also true that, in order to have this facility, a power which might build such a fleet (which might be at the present time the Soviet Union) would have to possess far more territory than merely the straits themselves. It would be necessary for that power to possess at least the coasts of Asiatic Turkey, because only in that way could it provide the necessary air cover for its ships going from the Aegean to the Eastern Mediterranean. Some of these points will come up again later so I shall not unduly stress them at the present moment.

The country, Turkey, with which I’m dealing this morning is by present day count a small country. It has approximately the same area as the two American states of California and Montana. The area is about two hundred and ninety four thousand square miles, and those two states are a little bit larger than that. It has very much the same topography. If you look at the map, you’ll realize that all of the coast of Turkey is mountainous, that the entire peninsula is surrounded by a wall of mountains, and on the seaward side of those mountains there are a certain number of plains, for the most part small plains, and in many cases very badly connected with the interior of the country. Only one of the major sea-coasts of Turkey has any good ports in it. On the entire northern coast, on the Black Sea, there is not one single port which could accommodate a naval vessel of any importance whatsoever. There is a great dearth even of beaches which could be used for beach landings. The northern coastal range of mountains starting with Mount Olympus, which rises to a height of eighty four hundred feet, continues to rise in height all the way along, up to the Caucasus peaks, thirteen to fourteen thousand feet high. Of course the final high point of the country is Mt. Ararat which is approximately seventeen thousand feet in height.
From Istanbul, in the Bosphorus, down to the southwestern corner of the peninsula you have a great succession of very fine natural ports. There is only one developed port (and when I say developed, I use the word with reservation) and that is the partially developed port of Izmir, formerly called Smyrna.

On the southern coast again you have a mountain range running right along the shore, and no developed ports whatever until you get down to Alexandretta (which the Turks call Iskenderun) in the extreme south corner—the southern extension of Turkey.

Now you realize from looking at the map that the mass of the population is in the Aegean river valleys which are very fertile. This is the region of Smyrna figs and Smyrna raisins. There is also a thick population along the Black Sea coast, in spite of the fact that there is only a small amount of arable ground. That is because this region is the only region in Turkey which has a very heavy rainfall. In the extreme eastern part of the Black Sea coast you have a rainfall such as you have in Sitka, Alaska—extremely heavy rainfall with rain practically every day.

The communications from the coasts to the interior of Turkey are, by modern reckoning, very poor at every point, but the best communications that do exist are rail communications and we have these running in from the port of Alexandretta, then through the Cilician plain and through the great Taurus mountain range up into the central plateau. Between Mersin on the Cilician coast and Smyrna there is no railway reaching the sea. Between Smyrna and Istanbul, there is no other railway connecting a port with the interior. Along the Black Sea coast there are two railways running from the coast inland. One starts at Zonguldak, which is the area in which Turkish coal is produced. Here is a very sizeable coal
field, with a very adequate quality of bituminous coal. The railway runs from there up to the capital of the country, high on the interior plateau at Ankara. A second railway starting from Sam­sun, the great tobacco port on the Black Sea, connects with the internal system of railways which form a sort of very loose net around practically the whole country.

You realize, then, that this peninsula, surrounded by mountains on every side, with narrow coastal plains, with few communications with the interior, with very few ports of any con­sequence, is not what you would call exactly an attractive place on which one could land forces in the face of opposition. Nevertheless, unattractive as it is, it’s an area which must be studied. It must be studied, basically because of the position which it occupies in the world. Turkey is a finger pointing westward. It lies at the point where Asia and Europe meet; it lies surrounded by seas; it has as central a location in the geography of the world as any country you could mention. It’s not marginal, it isn’t merely on the edge of the Asiatic continent. It is the link which joins the Asiatic continent to Europe which is, itself, nothing more than a peninsula of the vast mass of Asia.

You know your maps, I’m sure, as well as I, so it’s hardly appropriate for me to enlarge too much on this fact. But I think it’s well to call your attention to the increase in the importance of this territory as a result of modern developments in warfare. As I pictured it to you, it is obviously a sort of a natural fortress. Not only is it surrounded by mountains, but it is large enough to have within that wall of mountains plenty of room for the building of airfields—for the servicing of armies. In other words, it is a big enough fortress to serve as a base of operations in any direction—and the directions which are attractive are very obvious.

Let me look at it first of all from the Kremlin; it is very
obvious that one of the most important things we have to do is use our imagination and put ourselves in the position of the people with whom we may have violent disagreements. From the point of view of the Kremlin, here is this potentially great fortress, lying about two hundred miles from Russian territory across the Black Sea. Not just any Russian territory, but the industrial heart of Russia, built around the Donets coal basin. That two to three hundred miles is no distance at all from the point of view of modern bombing, as you are very well aware. Not only is that a very vulnerable part of Russia which would be in danger of attack if Turkey were in unfriendly hands, but, no further away from Turkish territory and on the western shore of the Caspian Sea is the greatest of the existing Russian oil fields, the great Baku oil field. It isn’t producing what it did a few years ago, but, so far as we know, it is still the major producing oil field of Russia. These are very vital objectives, and I think it is very apparent, therefore, why the Soviet Union is anxious to make sure that Turkey is not being used as the base for an attack, nor in a position to be used as a base for an attack, on the Soviet Union. And, pushing that just a little bit further, it is also clear why it would be a great advantage to Russia if Turkey were in Russia’s possession, a satellite state, or under Russian domination. Because, just as bombing planes could operate from Turkish territory, just as navies could operate through the straits into the Black Sea (as they did in the Crimean War—the one case in modern times in which Russia was successfully invaded)—by the same token, this fortress, being just as defensible from the south and east as it is from the north and west, could be the base for large scale air, land, and sea operations.

It’s a bit farther from Turkey to the Persian Gulf and its great reservoir of oil (at least 40% of the world’s known oil supply is in that area) but it’s not beyond effective bombing range.
of Turkish territory. The Mosul oil field is practically in sight of the Turkish frontier (I must say, within sight of a highly mountainous area with very little land on which airfields could be built, but nevertheless within easy range of other areas from which air attacks might be mounted).

The possession, then, of this territory by either of two opposing world powers (the Soviet Union or the United States) would be a peril to the other. And I think it's only fair to follow our imagination a little further and say that the policies of the United States with respect to Turkey must be governed to a considerable degree by the foreseeable reactions to this or that move which we can expect the Russians to have. Consequently you are brought to this conclusion: if the United States embarked on a policy of the kind of imperialism which we called "old fashioned," and undertook, through annoyance with the inefficiency of the native inhabitants or for some other reason, to take over and operate Turkey, all Russian statesmen and strategists would have a completely legitimate feeling that we were threatening their security. Therefore, it is obviously appropriate that we should make every effort, while maintaining our security in this area, not to push our policy to the point where the Soviet planners and strategists would have legitimate grounds to feel that we were aiming a dagger at their heart (an expression which they would no doubt come to use).

I'm happy to say that, up to the present time, the policy which the United States has followed with respect to Turkey has been along the lines which I have just explained. The policy of the United States has been to form what is, in effect, an informal alliance with Turkey. It is an alliance which doesn't require that we send military forces to this or that point, under this or that contingency, but an alliance in the sense that we are confident of Turkey's
being on our side in any dispute between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Therefore it is to our interest to have this small country in a position to defend itself against attack which might come from the Soviet Union. Consequently, the couple of hundred million dollars of aid to Turkey which the United States is paying, is being used to build up the defensive strength of the Turkish Republic. Some of it is being used for longer range, and some for shorter range purposes.

One of the most long range is the appropriation which is being spent on the improvement of Turkish road communications and transportation. There, our representatives have been able to persuade the Turkish government to spend the ten million dollars appropriated almost entirely for road making machinery; whereas the Turkish government itself, from its own local resources, is providing the labor and the material necessary for the construction of a system of highways. This program will not make Turkey a country like Rhode Island or Connecticut from the point of view of roads, but will represent several hundred percent improvement in the existing situation.

So our relations with Turkey amount, at the present time, to an informal alliance. Now, if Turkey is an ally, it's very fair to ask, "What kind of an ally?" I'll give you an example of what I mean. In 1914, Russia had an ally in Serbia, and the adventurous policy which was followed by the Serbian government led to a world war in which the Russian empire was destroyed. We, in our relations with Turkey, are in a somewhat similar position: here is a small nation which is our ally; what kind of an ally? If that ally follows an adventurous policy, the first thing we know we are going to find ourselves involved in its quarrels with its neighbors—quarrels which may not be of any particular interest to us, just as it was of no immediate importance to the Russian government in 1914 to have the Archduke of Austria assassinated in Sarajevo.
I'm merely bringing this out to show you how dangerous the small ally can be to the greater ally. As far as Turkey is concerned, the most important fact in this connection is that the men who are ruling Turkey at the present time are ruling that small country with the wisdom which they acquired in the process of losing a large empire. The statesmen of Turkey are not peasants; they are not newcomers on the scene of international politics; they, as they would put it themselves, are "well cooked". They know their business: they know what works in international politics; and they know what doesn't work. They are very well aware that the worst thing they could do, granted the informal nature of their alliance with the United States, would be to stir up unnecessary friction with their neighbors (particularly with the Soviet Union). In our own country, with our foreign policy dependent upon public opinion—not just on the decisions of a few people in positions of high command—we might be faced by the question "Will we save this small ally from its own mistakes; will we go to war in a cause for which we have very little sympathy?" Well, you and I know what the answer would be. Under those circumstances, the United States wouldn't go to war; the American people are not that kind of warmongers. They've been accused of it from the other side of the Atlantic and the Urals, but they are not that kind of war makers. Fortunately the men who are operating the Turkish state are fully aware of this, and they are determined to follow a policy with respect to their greater and smaller neighbors which is one hundred percent "correct" in the diplomatic sense. They are not going to start any unnecessary rows.

What are the aims and policies, the resources and population of the Turks? They believe, rightly or wrongly, that they have a country capable of supporting a much larger population than is at present in Turkey, and at a much higher standard of living than they now enjoy. They want peace for survival, peace for develop-
ment of their resources. I've used the word development, and I think it should be defined a little more closely. What kind of development, what kind of ideals, do these people have before them, of the society into which they want to develop? What kind of nation do they want to be? A decision was reached by them twenty-five years ago. At that time they chose between the society sponsored by Russia and the sort of society which Western Europe and the United States represented. During the intervening years they have consistently maintained the same point of view. What they want, as a people, is to become a nation like the highly developed nations of Western Europe or like the United States. They have no territorial ambitions at the present time. They don't want to take any land from their neighbors. They want to live, to survive in peace, to develop their resources, to work out the many problems with which they are faced internally and become a nation as much like this country as they are able to become.

We are, to a certain extent, responsible for their having this point of view. I hope that, since I was president of the American colleges in Turkey, I may be allowed to do a little advertising for a moment. The existence of American schools and colleges, paid for by Americans (first by missionary-minded Americans and later by the simple humanitarian type of benefactor and philanthropist) has had a good deal to do with persuading the Turkish people that they want to live the way Americans and British and Western Europeans live.

Well, I've spoken again and again of the people. There are about eighteen million people living in Turkey, and all of them haven't been Turks. They have at present in their country, a number of minorities. The one which is large enough to be significant, amounting to a million and a half people out of the eighteen million, is the Kurdish minority. The Kurd tribesmen speak a language
related to Persian. Each tribe has been an independent nation ever since the beginning of history. They live in the territory extending from a point near Alexandretta out to the Russian frontier. They comprise about one million and a half people, living mostly in the mountains. No previous Turkish government, in fact no government of any kind, had ever subdued these people. Their mountains were so rugged, and so high, and so miserably poor, that it wasn't worth the investment in money and lives necessary to subdue these people. The Turkish Republic, however, has subdued them, that is, all of those who live within Turkey. There are considerable groups, half a million or more, living in Iran and Iraq. But those living in Turkey are completely subjected at the present time. They are not only subjected, but the Turks, with that wisdom which they learned from losing an empire, having subdued them in the military sense, having occupied every valley and every hamlet in the whole country with considerable cost of life, then said to the Kurds, “Now you are licked, you are Turks.” It is the same policy, in general, which the British government followed in dealing with the Boers in South Africa, but proving in Turkey much more effective than any one had thought possible.

I travelled through that entire country last summer; talked with hundreds of people in the region, and I came away with the impression that the one big minority problem of Turkey is licked and that within a few years there won't be any people in Turkey who consider themselves Kurds. The young men are all going into the military service and they like it. They come back proud of their service ribbons. They come back with the title of Sergeant, which they wear throughout life. They tell the people in the mountain villages in which the governments have forced them to settle, “We are smarter than the Turks are; we should all go out into Western Turkey and make our fortunes and then come back here and live happily.” They have come to think of themselves as members of the Turkish community.
There are other minorities; one consists of Greek-speaking people, about one hundred thousand, all of whom live near or in the city of Istanbul or Constantinople. An Armenian-speaking minority live in the same area, and the eighty thousand or more Jews in the country are scattered through a few of the larger cities. The Greeks, who are not noted for their love of Turks, nevertheless regard conditions in Turkey today (and quite rightly so) as much superior to conditions in Greece at the present moment. They are not making any effort to leave, or making any trouble in Turkey.

The Armenians are in an extremely difficult position. They are not regarded as first-class citizens (any more than the Greeks or Jews are) in this Moslem country, but there is not much they can do about it, so they are adjusting themselves to a position somewhat like that which the Negroes occupy in the United States. A good many Armenians were encouraged by the Soviet government to leave Turkey, to leave Syria, even the United States, and go to the Soviet Republic of Armenia. I was up there in that region last summer (I don't mean on the Russian side of it but on the Turkish side) and I saw what was happening. A good many of these Armenians who have gone there as settlers in the Soviet-Armenian republic, flee from that country; they flee to Turkey for safety and security. If any of you know of the relations between Turks and Armenians, you'll realize that the last place you would expect an Armenian to go, seeking security, is Turkey. That, perhaps, will give you some idea of how terrible conditions are within Soviet-Armenia.

I'll take a moment to tell you what these people say—these refugees. They say that on arrival at Batumi, on the Black Sea coast, they are immediately sent to labor camps. The younger children are separated and are sent to special schools; families are broken up. The older people, whom the Soviet-Communists don't
expect to be able to convert to whole-hearted Communism, are sent to labor camps where they get a full ration only if they do a full day's work (and a full ration consists of bread and cabbage soup). In the various shifts around the country, all their goods were stolen from them. Several boasted, when they came into Turkey, that they were wearing suits which they had stolen from the Russian guards. Those who can do a good day's work get a full ration; those who can't, get a half ration, and they die of starvation before long. A good many, who have enough ambition and energy left, try to escape, and they escape into Turkey. When they come to the frontier they find in most places a barbed wire fence to hold them in, and sentry boxes one hundred to one hundred and fifty meters apart with sentries who shoot anyone crossing the frontier. But, as is usually the case in these authoritarian regimes, the authorities can't trust their subordinates. And so another organization, other than the sentries, rakes the soil between these sentry posts every morning; rakes it so that it's smooth; then if they find any foot prints there, they shoot the sentries. Now the refugees who do get out, get out through that as well as all the other controls inside the country. That gives you some idea of what conditions must be like behind the frontier for these immigrants.

I've spoken of the minority populations in Turkey. What about the politics of Turkey? Now politics is the business of power internally, within the country. What is the situation? Up until two and one half years ago, Turkey was ruled by one party, a monolithic party. It was ruled this way: the President of the Republic was also President of the Party. As President of the Party, he chose all the party's candidates for parliament. The members of parliament, whom he had chosen, elected him President. That's what you might call a complete circle; perhaps not a vicious one, but nevertheless it's a complete circle. It was hard to distinguish
between the Ministry of the Interior, which controls the police, and the officials of the party. The local governor in a province was appointed by the central government in Istanbul, not elected. Usually the local governor was also head of the local party organization.

Two and one half years ago, Turkey was not as yet an informal ally of the United States. Turkey had the idea of becoming a Western country—Western in politics as well as in economy and society. But the people who were in charge of the government were not in a hurry to make any moves which would result in the loss of their jobs. They realized the status of General Franco in his relations with the United States, and of a few other countries with which alliance could not be contracted by the United States government because of the bad press which they enjoyed as a result of their having a fascist or semi-fascist type of regime. When the President of Turkey and his advisers realized the situation, they decided to move, more rapidly than they had planned, in the direction of a genuine democratic system. And consequently you had the emergence of a new party, the second party. This had been tried a couple of times in the past, but the results had not been happy for the people who tried it. This time the new party was founded under the leadership of a former Prime Minister, with the obvious approval and consent of the President of the Republic. Shortly thereafter, there was a general election. In that election the new party won only about sixty members of the parliament, whereas the old established party won over three hundred members. The opposition party claimed that the elections were finagled—that there was all kinds of skull-duggery practiced. From what I was able to discover in talking to a great many people last summer, in the big coastal cities, where there were plenty of foreign observers around, the elections were absolutely honest. As you went away from the coast, and left the foreign
observers behind, there was increasing government police pressure upon people to vote in favor of the party in power. Those of you who have cruised around South American waters are very familiar with the type of proceeding which I am hinting at. The government saw to it, in other words, that there wasn't too much open scuffle, but that it was a good sized majority—in fact a very, very effective majority indeed.

This has been done partly because of the aims of the Turkish government and people, partly because of their desire to have a good press in the United States, in order to make alliance with Turkey possible not only for American soldiers and sailors but for the American man in the street. And they are succeeding; the process is going on, and I suspect that if you had an election tomorrow the opposition party would perhaps not win the election, but it would win a vastly larger number of the parliamentary seats. In Turkish politics, there is no argument on foreign policy. The foreign policy of all parties is identical. It calls for cooperation with the United States and the allies of the United States, and for maintenance against every threat against the independence of the country.

Perhaps I might say a word here as to the morale of the Turkish people. The best illustration I can think of came from the newspaper yesterday. One of the leading writers of Turkey turned communist, was prosecuted and, when he was indicted, he disappeared. He was tried in absentia and condemned to three or four months in prison. (I might say that all known communists in Turkey are lodged permanently at government expense, in prison. There are very few of them; they are not a great burden to the finances.) This man disappeared and nothing was heard of him until the police caught a man who made it his business to spirit people away from Turkey to Bulgaria and vice-versa. When they
gave the usual third degree treatment to this gentleman, they discovered that he had killed this prominent writer. His story was that the prominent writer had come to him, offered him money to be taken over into Bulgaria. The brigand didn't know who his customer was until he got very close to the frontier, and then he said, "I realized suddenly that this was the wicked communist writer. I may have had some faults in the past but no one can claim that I'm not a patriotic Turk. Under these circumstances what could I do? I couldn't take this man to a foreign country, where he could safely attack the fatherland, so I killed him."

Now if the brigands and thieves talk this way, it gives you some idea of the force, of the determination, of these people to maintain themselves as an independent nation. I might say it turned out later, after this gentleman had received some more third degree, that the writer had exhibited a very large roll of paper money which may have had something to do with the murder.

I shall not go on further with this, but I'll ask you to believe that the vast majority of these people, close to one hundred percent, are united, completely united, in foreign policy. The differences between the political parties are domestic differences about the rate at which changes should take place, about the kind of reforms that should be adopted, and so on.

Now let's turn to this question, "What does Turkey expect of its relations with the United States?" First of all they expect to get supplies, and they are getting them. They have bought largely war surplus material and they got it very cheap indeed, at least in the earlier shipments. They want arms for their Army and Navy. Their Army is always going to be more important to them than either their Navy or Air Force, because they do not have the technical facilities, they don't have the industry to support as complicated an instrument as either a navy or an air force.
They can't build ships, they can't build airplanes and they can't even repair them because of their lack of technological development. What they expect of us in navy and air force is minimum weapons; enough to put on a show. Of course the Navy men want bigger and better ships, and they are always asking for them, but they don't really expect to get anything bigger than a light cruiser. They know that they couldn't make any real use of anything except destroyers, submarines, gunboats and that sort of thing.

In the event of war between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the Turks don't expect massive American forces to be sent to their aid. They believe that their Army, which is obviously their strongest and most numerous group, if supplied with weapons and ammunition, and if provided with a moderate amount of air cover, will be able to defend the heart of the country until the Russians are so busy elsewhere that they will be able to stabilize the situation to Turkey's advantage.

So if a crisis should arise, the first thing that the Turks would expect of us would be air support. And it's quite obvious that the kind of air support that they would expect, first of all, would be the kind that could be delivered on carriers. Whether or not it's feasible to send carrier aircraft there to operate in the Black Sea or short of the Black Sea, is a technical question which you gentlemen can answer much better than I.

What would we expect from this informal alliance which seems to exist? Turkey, as you see, wants to survive; that's the motive all the way through. What we want, it seems to me, is first of all to keep Turkey out of the hands of the Soviet Union. If Turkey were occupied and held by the Soviets, the entire Eastern Mediterranean would be shut off as far as we are concerned. It would permit attack, both by air and by land, against the great oil-bearing
territories around the Persian Gulf and, although we could fight a war without that oil, we don’t have any allies in Europe who could fight a war without the oil of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, our first point is to keep Turkey within the area that we can do business with and preclude the Russians’ taking it over.

More specific, what can we expect the Turks to do in a military way? Again there are technical questions which you’ll know better how to answer than I, but obviously it’s going to take time; time is going to be an important factor. Can we so prepare the Turks that they could maintain themselves until such time as we could bring forces to the Persian Gulf area (which is the most vital of all these areas as far as I can see), so that we could bring forces there adequate to defend them even if the Turks were wiped out? That’s a militarily important question, but evidently we think there is some possibility, militarily, or else we wouldn’t be engaged in sending arms to Turkey and in training Turkish officers and men for defense.

Now another point, which I think is a very moot point but one which we should discuss and understand clearly. Although we have an arrangement with Greece, and an informal alliance with Turkey, we have no formal or informal arrangement with Iran. That leaves open the possibility that Iran might be used to outflank Turkey, and a Russian attack might pass down toward the Persian Gulf, first through Iran, and then Iraq to the Persian Gulf. If there were a strong Turkish Army to the West, capable of receiving extensive reinforcements, particularly in air power, I very much doubt that any Russian commanding officer would want to send forces down there within range of Turkish air fields.

Again there is the question: “Would the Turks be prepared to let us use their airfields?” That too depends upon imponderable
factors—the development of relations between the Turks and their neighbors and between the Turks and ourselves. As matters are now moving, I think it is not probable, but very possible, that we would be in a position, through the arms which we have given to Turkey, to make that outflanking movement too risky for the Soviet to undertake.

Well, what are the hopes, what are the fears of the moment? Obviously, from the Turkish point of view, the hope is that if they are involved in a war with Russia, the only nation they fear, it will be a war of a kind which will inevitably involve both Great Britain and the United States. As far as the United States is concerned, we hope that our arming of Turkey will deter the Russians from an attack, and that the contingency against which we are preparing will never arise.

And finally, I think we have to face this question, "How long will the type of arrangements, which we now have, last? Is it just a short-term policy or is it a long-term policy?" Long term policies depend upon community of interests between nations; not sentiments, but common interests. And, as I said earlier, our interest is not to occupy and administer Turkey, but to make Turkey strong enough to occupy and administer herself and prevent any outside power from taking over. We want an independent nation that will add to our security in the Near East. It has to be Turkey, because it is from Turkey that the oil, which is essential to our having any effective allies, can be defended. So with this community of interest which exists, namely, survival of the Turks as an independent nation (that interest being the same for them as for us) I think that there is every prospect of a long duration to the present type of informal alliance.

And I can say this as a final word. Last summer I talked with thousands of Turks, and with dozens of Americans, includ-
ing the heads of the Naval and Army missions in Turkey, the Ambassadors and many of the Ministers of the Turkish Cabinet. Thus far our people, military and civilian, have been operating with a high degree of good sense and tact and understanding, pushing ahead with their work, obviously not interested in taking over Turkey as a conquered state. They have been doing all this with such success that there is not yet any serious cloud on the horizon as far as Turko-American relations are concerned.

Turkey is important because of its position, because of its morale, because of its point of view. It is important to the United States and the United States is important to Turkey. Our informal alliance is working and is working very well indeed, and I think we have every reason to be satisfied with the present state of affairs.
LIGHT WITHOUT HEAT

An article by
Lieut. Commander R. E. Williams (SC) USN

The fact that modern warfare is everybody’s business was distinctly underscored by the proceedings of the War College Round-Table Discussions held during the first week of May, 1949. These conferences, conceived with a view to obtaining the very best in current strategic thinking, were attended by outstanding men in civilian life and high ranking officers from all branches of the Armed Forces.

To the officers of the Naval War College the discussions summarized everything that had gone before in ten months’ work on tactical problems, employment of forces, weapon capabilities, war potential, mobilization and grand strategy. To the civilian guests they represented an opportunity to participate in a stimulating exchange of ideas in an atmosphere of professional competence rather than one of amateur speculation. To everyone they offered the priceless advantage of access to all other participants, whether across the conference table, over a cup of coffee, or simply in the wardroom of the USS Kearsarge, aboard which many of the guests were billeted.

The discussion groups, as finally constituted, included representatives of four principal experience categories:

(a) Staff and student officers of the Naval War College;
(b) Representatives of other Service Colleges;
(c) Outstanding Naval Reserves Officers on temporary active duty;

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Lieut. Commander Williams is a member of the Naval War College Staff. His article is an appraisal of the Round Table Discussions conducted by the War College during the week 4-11 May, 1949.
(d) Prominent authors and newspapermen, business and industrial leaders, and noted public servants.

From a body composed of such diverse elements, the Naval War College was justified in expecting a notable amount of worthwhile fact, opinion and conclusions which it did indeed receive in gospel measure. The wholehearted participation of the War College guests was a particularly gratifying feature of these discussions.

Organized into nineteen small discussion groups, each a representative cross section of the guest list, and presided over by a War College student moderator, officers and civilians alike sat down together to examine the factors influencing the national strategy of the United States. In an atmosphere of complete academic freedom, without rivalry or rancour and in a spirit of dispassionate inquiry, they spent six days in friendly, constructive discussion of problems common to all of them as American citizens: What are the fundamental issues involved in the struggle between countries separated by the “Iron Curtain”? What factors exert a major influence in determining the world situation? What are, or should be, our own national objectives? How do we attain them? What are the means—military, political, economic, ideological—at our disposal for attaining those objectives?

Other questions, proceeding out of the answers to these original ones, were carefully scrutinized. Each group appeared to absorb, almost without consciously realizing it, the philosophy stressed in the keynote address: “What we are seeking most earnestly is to demonstrate that it is possible for men of good will to sit down together regardless of the color of, or the lack of, a uniform.”
Thus it was that each of the discussion groups proceeded through six days, examining our national objectives and the means, both military and otherwise, of obtaining them, and ending with a concept of the future strategy of the United States. It is perhaps inaccurate to state that any of the groups actually derived its own "concept". The exercise was essentially an individual one, and it is more nearly accurate to say that the participating members arrived at their individual concepts, which generally agreed in principle with the others, but differed in various particulars. This was to be expected, for the purpose of the Naval War College is not to determine national strategy. That is the duty of the planning staffs in Washington. The War College seeks to develop the thinkers who will eventually do that kind of planning.

It is worthwhile noting that if the individual concepts differed in the methods of our strategy they were solidly agreed on its philosophy; that by no possible stretch of the imagination or conscience could we bring ourselves to initiate an aggressive "preventive" war; that the rank and file of a Communist-dominated country, far from being the exponents of their government, are its principal victims; that our Armed Forces, if it is necessary to use them, must be employed as an instrument of liberation rather than annihilation; that our Military Establishment remains—for all its size and power—only a part of the forces at our command and therefore it must be regarded at all times as the tool of state policy, not its master.

Out of the conferences came many valuable lessons and enlightening experiences, but perhaps more gratifying than anything else was the circumstance under which men from all over the country and of many stations and occupations could freely assemble, freely speak and write, could lay aside prejudices and differences and could demonstrate that all of them were first and above all else, American Citizens.
RECOMMENDED READING

For those officers wishing to pursue a course in professional reading, the Naval War College Reading List is published here-where. The list contains books and articles in many varied fields totaling over 13,000 pages. Officers at the Naval War College are urged to read selectively from the many categories during their ten months’ course for a total of 5,000 pages.

GEOPOLITICS

Most Of The World

Linton

873 pp.

Descriptions of the geography, natural resources, populations, and of political and other basic factors in most of the countries of the world.

New Compass Of The World

Weigert and Stefansson

375 pp.

A symposium on world political geography which includes articles by many noted authors on the influence of geography on the course of history.

The Geography Of Air Transport

Van Zandt

64 pp.

The first of three volumes dealing with problems of world air transport. This volume (Vol. 1) deals with the purely geographical aspects of air transport, evaluating the world’s air routes as to economic, military and linear factors.
Foundations Of National Power
(Selections)
Sprout
Readings on world politics and American security; speeches, papers, and essays from books by Lippman, Welles, Chamberlin and many others.

Democratic Ideals And Reality
Mackinder
This book, first published in 1919 and reissued unchanged in 1942, deals with “Grand Strategy”—the integration of the military, political, economic, geographic, and psychological factors of national power. Emphasis is placed on the development of the “Heartland” theory and the conflict between land power and sea power.

Geopolitics
Strausz-Hupe
This book traces with keen insight the trend of thought from Mahan and Mackinder through Homer Lea and Ratzel to Haushofer and the Munich Work-Group for Geopolitik.

GEOGRAPHY

The Mediterranean, Its Role In America’s Foreign Policy
Reitzel
A study of foreign relations and power politics in the Mediterranean area, with the main emphasis on U. S., British and Soviet relations in recent years.

Latin America
Josephs
A report on the present political and economic situation in Cuba and in each of the South American countries except Paraguay. A straight-forward and apparently unbiased report.

The United States and China

Fairbank


Professor Fairbank states that his purpose is “to indicate some of the major currents which now form the tide of social change in China” and “to summarize the major patterns of thought and conduct, the major political and economic forms” which are ingrained in Chinese society. This purpose he accomplishes admirably.

The United States And The Near East

Speiser


Brief explanation of the geographic and cultural background of the Near East, followed by a summary of political developments in that area up to the present time. Concise, scholarly and unbiased.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Britain: Partner For Peace

Corbett


A thorough study of the position of England with respect to the United Kingdom, the Empire, the Commonwealth, and the world.

The Charter Of The United States

Goodrich-Hambro


Recognized as the best work on the Charter of the United Nations. A comprehensive discussion and interpretation of each article of the Charter. Very valuable for reference pur-

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss7/1
poses and recommended for study by those with a particular interest in international relations.

**Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy**


An excellent survey of the basic questions of foreign policy. Published annually. Monthly supplements, entitled “Summary of Developments in Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy”, are issued by the publishers.

**The North Atlantic Treaty**


Department of State Publication 3464. The preamble and text of the North Atlantic Treaty.

**The Western Hemisphere Defense Pact**


The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Executive Report No. 11.

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**MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE**

**Air Power In War**


A distinguished officer of the Royal Air Force discusses some of the effects of the impact of air power on the course of World War II.

**Bombing And Strategy**

In this short book the author analyzes and criticizes British aerial strategy (particularly strategic bombing) of World War II, and reaches several important conclusions concerning the use of the armed forces of a maritime power.

**Mahan On Sea Power**
Livesey

300 pp.

An interpretation and evaluation of Admiral Mahan's theories of sea power and its effect on history. The list of Mahan's writings, which is included, is complete and provides a useful guide for anyone who desires to study the development of these theories.

**The Future Employment Of Naval Forces**
Nimitz

U. S. Department of the Navy, 1948
12 pp.

A short paper expressing the views of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz on the function of naval forces in maintaining the future security of the United States.

**Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy**
Corbett

New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911
278 pp.

A classic work on naval strategy by a distinguished British naval writer.

**The Atom Bomb**

96 pp.

Part II (pages 324-418) of the March 1947 issue of “Air Affairs”. Articles by officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force and by distinguished civilians dealing with the impact of the atomic bomb on society.

**The Role Of Sea Power In Global Warfare Of The Future**
Rosinski

From Brassey's Naval Annual, 1947.
14 pp.
A brief article in which Dr. Rosinski develops the thesis that sea power will continue to be a fundamental and decisive historical force.

**The Place Of War In History**

Rosinski


A critical analysis of Cyril Fall's short sixteen page booklet entitled "The Place of War in History", which booklet should be read in conjunction.

**The Art Of War**

Sun Tzu


A 1944 edition of the Giles translation. The book comprises thirteen short chapters. In the first paragraph Sun Tzu writes: "The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected". From that point he proceeds to an enunciation of the principles of war, and to an examination of their application.

**Psychological Warfare**

Linebarger


Covers the historical background, functions, limitations, and applications of the science of psychology to the conduct of war.

**Airborne Warfare**

Gavin


A very interesting, well written book by an officer of long and varied experience. It goes briefly into the history of airborne operations, reviews some of the highlights of the major airborne operations of World War II, and then delves into the future.
The Price Of Power

Baldwin


Produced by a group of specialists brought together by the Council on Foreign Relations. The book considers the relative positions (present and potential) of the United States and Russia as regards political, economic, and strategic strengths, resources, man power, ideologies, and vulnerability.

Makers Of Modern Strategy (Selections)

Earle


This book is an outgrowth of a seminar on military affairs which was conducted at the Institute for Advanced Study. Twenty well known historians trace the development of modern military thought in brief, and in some cases brilliant studies of the contributions of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet, and Foch (among others) to current military thinking.

Naval Strategy

Mahan


This book is substantially a compilation of lectures delivered by Captain Mahan at the Naval War College between the years 1887 and 1911. Naval strategy is compared and contrasted with the principles and practice of military operations on land.

U. S. S. R. AND COMMUNISM

Sources Of Soviet Conduct

"X"


A splendid (and brief) analysis of the interaction of Soviet ideology and power and the role played by each in Soviet official conduct.
**Stalin On Revolution**

“Historicus”

42 pp.

An authoritative analysis of Stalin’s pronouncements and of their influence on Communist thinking and policy throughout the world.

**World Communism Today**

Ebon

482 pp.

Well balanced and objective discussion of the world Communist situation and of possible developments.

**The Strategy And Tactics Of World Communism**

House Document #619

429 pp.

A comprehensive, well documented report by sub-committee No. 5 of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It consists of the report proper and two supplements. The report proper covers the theory, practice and tactics of Communism. Supplement No. 1 “One Hundred Years of Communism” documents and discusses the development and objectives of the Communists, and is the major part of the report. Supplement No. 2 consists of official protests of the U.S. against Communist policies or actions.

**Russia, A Short History**

Pratt and Moore

282 pp.

An excellent history, interesting to read and valuable for reference purposes.

**Blueprint For World Conquest**

258 pp.

The Communist equivalent of *Mein Kampf*. It presents the
thesis and programs of the Second and Sixth World Congresses of the Communist International which were held in Moscow in 1920 and 1928.

LOGIC: ENGLISH WRITTEN AND SPOKEN

*How To Think Straight*  
Thouless  
246 pp.  
In direct, sprightly, nontechnical English, Professor Thouless discusses the most effective ways of achieving and maintaining a clear-thinking, well-balanced and flexible mind.

*The Art Of Plain Talk*  
Flesch  
194 pp.  
A book that explains the art of plain talk. People whose business or desire it is to convey ideas will obtain valuable hints on effective presentation.

*Principles And Methods Of Discussion*  
McBurney & Hance  
452 pp.  
A textbook designed to help those who lead or participate in group or panel discussions, symposiums, and forums.

*Principles And Types Of Speech*  
Monroe  
530 pp.  
Good coverage of the basic principles of public speaking.

LEADERSHIP

*Generals and Generalship*  
Wavell  
36 pp.
The qualities that a general must possess, the abilities he must have to handle his troops, and his relationship with the statesmen who command his activities are ably presented by Field Marshal Wavell in this book.

Lee's Lieutenants (Introduction to Vol. III) Freeman
Sketches of the personalities who were the commanders under Lee in the Army of Northern Virginia.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Organization, A Formulation Of Principle Brown
A treatise on the basic principles of organization.

The Principles Of Organization Mooney & Reiley
The principles and structure of organization throughout history with special reference to successful organizations which have stood the test of time.

WORLD WAR II

War Reports Of Marshall, Arnold And King (Selections) Ballantine
A factual and complete official account of the U. S. effort in World War II. A basic historical document.

The book confines itself primarily to a discussion of National and Departmental Logistics. In this restricted field the author makes an excellent analysis of an important problem.

_Crusade In Europe_  
Eisenhower  
478 pp.  
A work of great significance by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

_Roosevelt And Hopkins_  
Sherwood  
934 pp.  
A remarkable biographical work covering the pre-war and war years. Sherwood is able to make the reader feel personally present in the White House and at the conference tables.

_Scientists Against Time_  
Baxter  
450 pp.  
The Official history of the Office of Scientific Research and Development—1940 to the War's end—in which is chronicled the contribution of science to victory in World War II. Abundant proof, if any is needed, of the decisive impact of science on modern war.

_Hitler And His Admirals_  
Martienssen  
244 pp.  
In preparing this text the author has drawn upon the captured archives of the German Navy. Between extensive quotations of documents he has inserted an interpretative narrative to give continuity. Brassey's _Naval Annual_ 1948 contains the text of the “Führer Conferences” and is a better source for the basic material.
RESTRICTED

The Effects Of The Atomic Bomb On Hiroshima And Nagasaki

U. S. S. B. S.


A condensed but complete report on the effects of the two bombs.

Arsenal Of Democracy

Nelson


Mr. Nelson sketches briefly the difficulties and problems which arose in the setting up and functioning of Governmental Boards and Offices designed to organize, control and channel the industrial potential of the United States to meet the needs of the allied war machine in World War II. The book presents numerous facts and details but the coverage is not as complete as would be desirable.

The Second World War, 1939-1945

Fuller


A review of the strategy of the war by one of England's most capable authors in the military field. The work is appropriately illustrated and incorporates the comments of many top ranking German officers. A stimulating and provocative book.

Summary Reports, European And Pacific Wars

U. S. S. B. S.


A concise report of the results obtained by strategic bombing in the European and Pacific Theaters including conclusions, lessons learned and future trends.

The Gathering Storm

Churchill


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No other statesman of our time has such a command of the English language and few have played so large a part in the making of modern history as has Mr. Churchill. In as much as Churchill was Head of His Majesty's Government during the period of World War II, he speaks with more authority here than in his earlier books on the First World War.

*Their Finest Hour*  
Churchill  
630 pp.

Volume II of Churchill's history of the Second World War. This volume starts with the problems confronted by Churchill as he assumed the office of Prime Minister in 1940 and covers the Battle of France, Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the African campaign which culminated at Tobruk.