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## Organization for National Security

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## **ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY**

A lecture delivered by  
*Col. Richard C. Mangrum, USMC*  
at the Naval War College  
August 15, 1949

Important changes were made in the whole structure for national security when Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. During the past two years most of us in the armed forces have become more or less familiar with these changes and with their impact on all phases of military operations.

As you know, the President has recently signed another bill entitled "The National Security Act Amendments of 1949." It is particularly timely, therefore, to discuss the Organization for National Security in the light of these newest changes with which we must also become familiar.

All of us urgently need to understand what is going on. If I can indicate how some of the pieces of the puzzle fit together, we may be better able to see the present Organization for National Security as a whole picture. During the year you will have the opportunity to examine the picture in more detail.

At the Naval War College graduation ceremonies last May, Under Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball made some significant and challenging remarks.

"The very nature of the National Military Establishment is being altered at the top and all of you will be remiss in your duty if you do not endeavor to comprehend what these changes mean."

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Colonel Mangrum is a member of the Naval War College Staff.

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“The trend is now toward closer and more intimate control at the center, a control that goes far beyond policy. This means, naturally, less flexibility of action for the man on the spot. If you are to function properly under these new conditions you must give them cool and studious reflection, and more than that, you must apply yourselves with care to working within the limitations they impose.”

It very patently behooves us, therefore, to see what these new conditions are and what new kind of organization this is, if we are to operate usefully within it.

### **The National Security Council.**

Under the general title, Organization for National Security, I wish to discuss first the agencies which are outside of the Department of Defense and responsible directly to the President.

The first of these is the National Security Council.

The Council brings together officially the civilian heads of those Federal agencies which are largely responsible for our national security. The permanent membership of the Council now consists of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board. The changes recently made in the law added the Vice-President, and removed the three service secretaries. The President has authority, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, to add other members on a temporary basis, and he has added Secretary of the Treasury Snyder. Mr. Sidney Souers is the executive secretary of the Council.

The function of the Council is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. In brief, it outlines and attempts to correlate our foreign policy with our military policy. It

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sees that our foreign policy does not involve commitments that are beyond our capabilities, or, if it does involve such action, that we accept it as a calculated risk.

We won a great victory in World War II, only to find that after liberating a good part of Europe from one totalitarian regime, it is quickly falling under the influence of another. Political critics believe that *if* we had had a national objective—*if* we had known what we were after—such a situation would not have arisen. There is a certain amount of substance to that criticism. The formation of a National Security Council should prevent the recurrence of errors in foresight, provided that it functions the way it should and it appears to be functioning that way now.

This does not mean that the State Department has abdicated any of its responsibilities. Secretary of State Acheson and his department still have the central responsibility for formulating important decisions at top policy levels. The National Security Council provides assurance that decisions are made only after a thorough-going estimate of the situation has been made.

The State Department assumes the leadership role in the charting of foreign policy. Yet the process allows the men in the Pentagon—and also spokesmen for the domestic economy—to know what is going on, and to contribute their views before an issue is finally decided.

The composition of the Council gave rise to considerable concern over possible military domination of our foreign policy. These fears may be somewhat allayed by the removal of three of the four civilian heads of the military departments. As a matter of practice, matters that come before the Council are referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a military point of view. The Joint Chiefs are said to confine themselves very definitely to a military

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point of view, so there seems to be not too much cause for concern about military domination of our foreign policy. In any event, it is sheer folly to imagine that policy can be made in these times without reference to the immediate realities of the strategic situation.

The President has personally attended about a fourth of the Security Council sessions, which usually take place every two weeks. Whether he attends or not, the deliberations of the Council are brought to his desk within twenty-four hours by Mr. Souers and the President takes prompt action on the recommendations which have been made. Most authorities now seem to feel that the National Security Council is making a material contribution to our security and to our foreign policy.

### **Central Intelligence Agency.**

Under the National Security Council we have the Central Intelligence Agency. It is established for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government agencies and departments in the interests of national security. There is no intention that Central Intelligence should supersede departmental intelligence. As Admiral Hillenkoetter, the Director, says:

“We couldn’t get along without the departmental agencies. They are our biggest suppliers as well as our best customers. CIA would be a head without a body if it did not have them.”

The CIA has no police, subpoena, law enforcement, or internal security functions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which does have these functions, operates only in the domestic field. The FBI is required by law to make available to the CIA anything which may be essential to national security. Again to paraphrase Admiral Hillenkoetter—“they work very closely together.”

The function of the CIA, in brief, is to obtain information

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which concerns the national security, correlate it, evaluate it, and disseminate the results to those who need to use it. Thus, it serves not only its principal, the National Security Council, but all other appropriate agencies of the government as well.

### **National Security Resources Board.**

On the same level as the National Security Council we have the National Security Resources Board. It is also directly responsible to the President. Its membership consists of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, and a Chairman appointed by the President.

The job of the NSRB is the allocation of the human and material resources of the nation in furtherance of a war effort.

It advises the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization. It has no direct command function. The board provides the nuclei, which in time of war would be expanded into such offices of economic command as an Office of War Manpower, Office of Economic Stabilization, Office of Economic Warfare, Office of War Transportation, Office of Price Administration, and so on.

Part of the NSRB's "Preliminary Plan for Economic Mobilization" is the drafting of emergency legislation to provide the President with emergency powers, and for the creation of these economic commands.

The delays in the mobilization of this country in World War II would have been disastrous had our Allies not acted as a buffer between us and the enemy while we organized our resources. The Congress has presently foreseen that if the nation is to be better prepared in the future to defend itself against aggression, it is necessary to plan our economic command beforehand.

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It is important to maintain the clear distinction between the NSRB and the Munitions Board, which comes directly under the Secretary of Defense. The two Boards work closely together. The Munitions Board consolidates the requirements of the Armed Services and sends them to the NSRB. When the NSRB has allocated certain resources to the military establishment, the Munitions Board handles the detailed arrangements for the use of this allocation. I shall have more to say about the Munitions Board later on.

Mobilization planning must be continuous. The Security Act recognizes the interdependence of strategic and economic planning. The NSRB and the Munitions Board together are assembling the data for testing the economic feasibility of strategic plans developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Quick approximations will be made of military requirements on 240 items which the Munitions Board believes will represent a significant percentage of total requirements. The NSRB, with the aid of other government departments, will develop estimates of the requirements of the industrial and civilian economy. Total requirements will be compared with estimates of resources so that, within a short time, the Board can tell the military establishment the degree to which its strategic plan is feasible.

The two chief criteria for unification efforts were to be efficiency and economy. The key function of the NSRB is the effective wartime use of resources, balancing military and civilian requirements. Wartime effectiveness is the ultimate goal. It may be necessary in times of international tension, as well as in wartime, to forego economies and administrative efficiencies which could be achieved under purely peacetime conditions. Conversely, it may be necessary to sacrifice some mobilization potential to meet budgetary realities during peacetime—in which case, economies and administrative efficiencies are invoked, not by military choice, but through practical necessity.

There is some difference of opinion about how things are going in the NSRB (as indeed in the whole organization for National Security). Mr. Bernard Baruch recently quarreled with the White House about the extent of, or lack of, mobilization planning. At present the NSRB does not have a permanent chairman. The President has not yet submitted a new nomination as chairman since Mr. Wallgren was turned down by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Mr. John Steelman, of the President's Staff, is acting chairman.

The National Security Resources Board, the National Security Council, the CIA, and the Department of Defense constitute the present structure for National Security. If we are to understand fully the structure of the Defense Department itself, it is important to have thorough-going recognition of the functions of these other agencies. They are the political and economic balance-wheels for the military.

### **The Department of Defense**

The Department of Defense is a 15 billion dollar insurance business in this fiscal year 1950. No one in this room is unaware of the fact that the policy holders haven't been too happy about the way the business is being run. They seem to have the idea that the directors could reduce the cost of this insurance by large percentages if only they would leave their brass knuckles outside the board of directors' room and agree on everything. One school of thought would simply hand all the brass knuckles over to one individual who would use them only when necessary, of course, but for the common good.

The record shows, however, that much progress has been made in two years under new management. It is a different kind of management and not easy for people either in or out of the service to understand quickly. Habit patterns change slowly.



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A quote from the conclusion of one of the speeches by the late Mr. Forrestal is to the point:

“I do not wish to leave with you the impression that the job is done. It is far from done and it will be a substantial time before it is. I say to you quite frankly that I have preferred to make haste slowly, because I have had constantly in mind that we are charged with a heavy and great responsibility—the security of the nation. In the process of achieving a new form of organization, we must be sure we retain the capacity to fight successfully. Charts cannot win battles.”

Let us turn then to an examination of what composes this job of reorganization as specified by the National Security Act.

First, what did the Congress intend to do? The Declaration of Policy in the Act is short and it will be useful to keep it in mind. It reads as follows:

“Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the National Security;

to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, Navy, (including naval aviation and the Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components;

to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control of *the Secretary of Defense* but not to merge them; \*

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\*Italicized portions indicate additions to this section by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (Public Law 216).

to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces, *but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff, (but this is not to be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Staff).* \*

This is, of course, an attempt to improve the *administration* of National Security.

Regarding administration, Mr. Reginald Gillmor, former Vice-Chairman of the NSRB and for many years president of the Sperry Corporation, has some timely things to say. He speaks of an "Ultimate Science", as old as history, which has no name but whose objective is order; order among men; order which will permit their free cooperation and the release and use of all their varied talents and skills.

The instruments for this potential science of order are known by such terms as government, management, organization, and administration. Administration is the broadest of these terms and can, therefore, be used to include all the others.

In brief, he says, the two political ideologies into which the world is divided are primarily two ancient and mutually antagonistic concepts of administration.

One, the centralization concept, based on the assumption that the governing organization is omniscient and that the best results will be attained if all others obey its will.


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**NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD**

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD  
ACTING: JOHN R. STEELMAN  
HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND  
AGENCIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES, AS DESIGNATED  
BY THE PRESIDENT

**MUNITIONS BOARD**

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD (CIVILIAN)  
VACANT  
UNDER OR ASST. SEC. OF THE ARMY  
UNDER OR ASST. SEC. OF THE NAVY  
UNDER OR ASST. SEC. OF THE AIR FORCE

**RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT BOARD**

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD (CIVILIAN)  
KARL T. COMPTON

ARMY	}	TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH, TO BE NAMED BY THE SECRETARIES
NAVY		
AIR FORCE		

**OF THE NAVY**

S. P. MATTHEWS  
KIMBALL  
KOEHLER

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

SECRETARY: W. STUART SYMINGTON  
UNDER SEC.: ARTHUR S. BARROWS  
ASST. SEC.:  
ASST. SEC.: EUGENE M. ZUCKERT

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The other, or decentralization concept, based on the assumption that the governing organization is a *ministry* for providing order and that the best results come from the maximum of delegation and individual freedom.

So, the new organization for national security can be said to be a foray into the field of this "ultimate science" with a greater degree of order as its objective. Mr. Gillmor's definitions may help to explain why the road we are traveling has not been without its bumps.

### **The Secretary of Defense**

The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 makes the Defense Department an Executive Department of the Government. The Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments are no longer executive departments. They are now military departments of the Department of Defense. The three service secretaries retain their titles but they no longer have Cabinet status and are now clearly subordinate to the Secretary of Defense.

The Office of Under Secretary of Defense was established in April of this year and Mr. Stephen T. Early is the first incumbent. The title of this office has now been changed to Deputy Secretary and he takes precedence over the three service secretaries.

The principal changes effected in the Secretary's Office by the Amendments Act clarify Mr. Johnson's authority to direct and control. He is now provided with direct authority over the military budget.

The 1947 Act provided for three Special Assistants to the Secretary. These special assistants are now given the rank of Assistant Secretaries of Defense and they take precedence next after

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the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

There probably will be some internal changes in the organization of these offices, but it is too soon to tell what they may be. Until the present time, the three special assistants have presided over such offices as:

Office of Counsel

Office of Legislative Liaison

Office of the Budget

Office of Accounting Policy

Office of Progress Reports and Statistics

Administrative Office and Secretariat

Mr. McNeil's Office of the Budget is, of course, a vitally important function in the new Secretary's Office. The 1950 budget is the first to be submitted in accordance with the National Security Act. It was bound to run into many new administrative difficulties. These are particularly sharpened because of the colossal size of the military budget compared to the remainder of the Federal Budget.

In a lecture at the National War College last year, Mr. McNeil said, relative to the problems of his Office of the Budget:

“The concepts of what should comprise the budget function may be as numerous as the number of agencies or the number of people asked to comment on the subject. They would range from the concept that the budget's primary job is procurement of funds, to the other extreme wherein the budget function dictates to all phases of operations. My own concept of the budget function is that it should be much more than a procurement device. It must be an effective tool for management.”

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The influence of the budget on the whole organization of the Department of Defense, and indeed, on national objectives and national strategy, cannot be minimized. It is well to try to understand all that we can of the principles which underlie the new administration of the military budget.

This is a good place to mention, briefly, another of the changes recently effected. Title IV of the 1949 Amendments Act contains various provisions all of which are intended to implement the Secretary's authority over the military budget, and to revise the whole fiscal structure. While it is a vitally important provision of the new law, it can be excluded from this discussion of organization.

The Act also provides that one of the new Assistant Secretaries shall be the Comptroller of the Department of Defense. The Office of Comptroller is also established in each military department.

### **Armed Forces Policy Council.**

Dropping down now from the Office of the Secretary, let's see who advises or works for the Secretary. First, there is an advisory body, the Armed Forces Policy Council. This was formerly called the War Council. It's name and composition have been changed by the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act

It now consists of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary, the three service secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the three Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Council advises the Secretary on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces. Examples are the military aid program, and policy under certain budget cuts.

We don't need to spend much time on the Policy Council. It should be noted, however, that the Secretary of Defense is Chairman of the Council and the law provides him with power of decision.

This gives force to his position, and in a sense, gives him direct command powers, emphasizing the trend toward the "centralization concept."

### **Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

We should take up next the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. All the remaining activities of the Department of Defense are conditioned by the work of the Joint Chiefs.

It should be noted and remembered that the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually were an outgrowth of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Here, the military leaders of sovereign nations met to formulate broad strategy and programs for World War II. To insure prior agreement among U. S. members, it was necessary that they first meet together for preliminary discussions. Thereafter, they became known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

No legislative or executive action was taken to formalize the existence of the JCS until passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The absence of any specific charter gave great flexibility to the organization and allowed it to develop according to need as the war progressed.

The National Security Act incorporated the JCS organization into law approximately as it existed at the end of the war. The Act preserves the Joint Chiefs' status as the principal military advisors to the President, and gives them a similar status with respect to the Secretary of Defense.

Now, the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been created. He takes precedence over all other officers of the armed services, but does not have military command over the Joint Chiefs or of any of the military services. He is the presiding



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officer and provides agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs, and assists them to prosecute their business promptly. He has no vote in Joint Chiefs decisions, however. It is also his job to inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate, the President, when the Joint Chiefs cannot agree on an issue.

The functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are summarized as follows:

- (1) Preparation of strategic plans and provision for the strategic direction of the military forces.
- (2) Preparation of joint logistic plans and assignment of logistic responsibilities.
- (3) Establishment of unified commands.
- (4) Review of material and personnel requirements.
- (5) Formulation of policies for joint training.
- (6) Formulation of policies for coordinating military education.
- (7) Provision for representation on Military Staff Committee of the U. N.

One of these functions, you will note, is the establishment of unified commands in strategic areas when such commands are in the interest of national security. Initially, unified commands were set up where possible hostile action might require a single commander who could act without waiting to hear from Washington. Time and experience have proven that it is necessary to go even further in the delegation of authority to these unified commanders. This is required mainly in the logistic field in order to secure greater unification of both manpower and material. It is evident that the unified command plan is here to stay as the means of directing offensive operations in time of war.

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At present, there are six unified commands. These are: Far East, Pacific, Alaska, Carribean, Atlantic, and Europe. The Commanders-in-Chief of these commands report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Three other commanders also report directly to the Joint Chiefs—the Commanding General of the Strategic Air Command, the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, Austria, and the Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization has two major elements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committees and the Joint Staff. The Committees are charged with the preparation of plans for the JCS. The committee members are officers whose primary assignment is with the Department of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The chairman of each committee is a Deputy Director of the Joint Staff. The three principal committees are—Strategic Plans, Intelligence, and Logistic Plans.

The Joint Staff is headed by a Director and consists of 210 officers, the limit under present law. They are drawn equally from the three services, and their sole duty assignment is to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff is divided into three main Groups, Strategic Plans, Intelligence, and Logistic Plans, and each Group is headed by the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff who is also chairman of the related committee. The relationship between the groups and their parent committees is substantially the same as the relationship between a commander and his staff.

The size of the Joint Staff precludes it from becoming a fact-finding body in its own right, and it depends, therefore, upon information received from fact-finding agencies, boards, and committees of the services. Joint Committees under the Joint Staff Director have been organized for this purpose. For example, the

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Joint Communication-Electronics Committee is composed of the senior officers of the communications components of the three services; namely, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, the Chief of Naval Communications, and the Air Force Director of Communications. This committee is concerned with establishing common communications procedures and doctrines.

The most difficult of the several types of strategic plans which the Joint Chiefs must face is the outline war plan for Mobilization Planning and Industrial Mobilization Planning. If we consider this type of plan for a moment, you will see the extent to which the whole Defense Department is dependent on the proper production of such plans by the Joint Chiefs.

It must be understood, first, that the outline war plans of the JCS are not detailed operational plans. The outline strategic plan, as such, consists of four essentials:

- (1) A statement of national war objectives.
- (2) Statement of enemy capabilities
- (3) A broad general concept of operations, and
- (4) A statement of a number of time-phased military tasks to be undertaken by our forces, including statement of the major tactical units to perform the tasks.

This outline war plan for Mobilization Planning and Industrial Mobilization Planning forms the basis for the Mobilization Plans of the three services, and for the Joint Mobilization Plan. It is, in fact, the basis for the work of the Munitions Board. Thus, you can see that things must move along smoothly in the Joint Chiefs' office if anybody else is going to do *his* work properly.

**RESTRICTED****Munitions Board**

This is a good point at which to move our discussion along to the Munitions Board. The Munitions Board must have the phased requirements of the three Mobilization Plans for end products, raw materials, industrial installations and facilities.

Thereafter, in order to avoid the possibility of doing a lot of unnecessary work on Industrial Mobilization Planning for a strategic plan which is too fat for the industrial capacity of the country, the Munitions Board conducts an industrial feasibility test early in the planning cycle.

To do this, they choose about 240 of the more important end products and get "flash" estimates of these requirements from the services. These are compared with estimates of industrial plant capacity.

It might be said, by way of summarizing the foregoing, that in the logistic field the Joint Chiefs are responsible for determining the "what", "where", and "when", and the Munitions Board the "how".

It would require too much detail to explore further the functioning of the Munitions Board. Members of the Board are the Under or Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with a civilian chairman appointed by the President.

The Board clearly possesses certain executive authority, stemming from the Secretary of Defense. It differs in this respect from the National Security Resources Board. Those who criticize the weakness of the NSRB seem to fear that the Munitions Board, as part of the Department of Defense, would usurp the functions of

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the NSRB if war should come suddenly, and that the national economy would thereby come under military domination.

### **Research and Development Board**

So much, then, for the major planning and directing agencies of the Department of Defense. The last statutory agency created by the National Security Act of 1947 is the Research and Development Board. This board is an outgrowth of the Joint Board created in 1946 by the Secretaries of War and Navy.

The Board consists of a Chairman, appointed from civilian life by the President, and two representatives from each military department. The present chairman is Dr. Karl T. Compton. The Board is our means of keeping abreast of scientific discoveries and of finding military applications for them. The chief responsibility of the Board is to prepare integrated programs of research and development, in the light of which the individual projects of the Army, Navy and Air Force can be evaluated. The Board decides who develops what weapons. It makes sure that there is no unnecessary duplication in the activities of the three services.

The Board operates principally through its twenty odd committees, covering the whole broad field of science. The committees are composed of top-ranking civilian scientists, officers of the three services, and representatives of other government agencies.

The Research and Development Board is, then, a staff agency of the Secretary of Defense, to insure maximum exploitation of the scientific potential of the nation. Both the Research and Development Board and the Munitions Board are affected in the same way by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. The authority of the Secretary to direct and control is clarified, and the responsibility of both Boards to the Secretary is made specific.

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In view of the high cost of research and development, the Board gave serious consideration to evaluating weapons and weapons systems at an earlier stage. As a result of its recommendations, the Secretary of Defense established the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group last December. This Group takes its direction from the Secretary but is now responsive to both the Research and Development Board and the Joint Chiefs. The directive which established the Group provided that after one year of organization and trial, it would become a component of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This is a good example of the many evolutionary processes that have been going on in the Organization for National Security in the past two years.

### **Conclusion**

Each of the several agencies of the Organization for National Security provides ample material for study which is important to us here. As a matter of fact, you will hear visiting speakers from a number of these agencies during the year.

I have summarized what we might call the staff and command aspects of the Organization for National Security. The three military departments complete the structure and you will hear about them in presentations to follow.

This presentation was designed simply to highlight the relationships between the various parts of the organization and provide an introduction—a point of departure for your own further study.

This is the way things are today. I mentioned earlier that not everyone was satisfied and happy with this new organization. No

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doubt further changes will be proposed in time. If the past is any criterion, we can probably expect strong differences of opinion on new proposals to alter the structure.

I will conclude this presentation, then, by referring again to Mr. Kimball's admonishment of last May—

“You will be remiss in your duty if you do not endeavor to comprehend what these changes mean.”