Notes on the Term Strategy

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NOTES ON THE TERM STRATEGY
A lecture delivered by
Professor Edward Mead Earle
at the Naval War College
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Admiral Beary and Gentlemen of the Naval War College:

I ought to say first of all that I am particularly delighted
to be here. This is my first appearance at the Naval War College.
That is not due to any lack of appreciation on my part of the Navy
or sea power, but rather to the circumstances which from time to
time have prevented me from accepting previous invitations. So
that, although this is the first actual appearance, I have a feeling
of warm affection for the College and for the things with which you
are concerned.

I have chosen this topic of “Notes on the Term Strategy,”
because, as has been said in the introduction, the term is one which
is used in a very great variety of ways, with a great many different
meanings, and not always with great exactitude. The term cannot,
in the nature of things, be defined with great exactitude, and it cer­
tainly is not my purpose to give it a definitive and hide-bound
definition this morning. What I prefer to do is to throw out a few
ideas that are suggested by the word and to point particularly to
some of the non-military phases of strategy which have become
increasingly more significant in the last fifty years than they had
therefore been.

The very word strategy came into use in the English
language only toward the end of the eighteenth century—some­
where after 1763, the end of the Seven Years’ War. That in it-
self is significant, I might say, as I'll point out presently. The word is of Greek derivation coming from the Greek “strategos” or “strategus”. This “Strategus” was first a general officer. He was an officer of the military forces and in many cases in Greece he was also the chief political officer of the government. It was true in Athens, it was true in the Achean league, that the “Strategus” was not only commander of forces in the field, but he was also the Chief Magistrate or whatever other designation the principal political office of the government happened to be. That idea was carried over into the constitution of the United States, in which the President of the United States was made Commander in Chief of all the Armed Forces of the United States. In actual practice in most states, always in time of war, and more frequently than not in time of peace, the chief political officer of the government is also the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. It is usual in France—not always necessarily true, but usually true—that the Prime Minister may be the Minister of Defense; and it frequently has been true in Britain that such is the case as well.

In most of the Utopian literature of the eighteenth century, which influenced a good deal of the American political thought which entered into the constitution, the same thing was true—that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces was the same person as the principal political officer of the government. So that, even in the very literal meaning of the word “strategy,” there is an implication that it has political as well as military connotations, associations and implications.

I said that the word did not come into very general use until the late eighteenth century. And the reason was that it was not until the eighteenth century that there was much point in differentiating between tactics and strategy. “Tactics” was the word in very general use before the word “strategy”. But as war became somewhat more complicated in its character, for a variety of
reasons, and finally when war involved the very existence of a nation in arms with a revolutionary philosophy, as in the case of the French Revolution, it was clear that you had to have a concept which concerned the handling of all the military resources of the nation and which was not confined merely to what went on in the actual battlefield. So long as the very idea of strategy involved simply a certain number of "ruses de guerre" and devices for fooling the enemy as to the disposition of your troops, there wasn't enough difference between strategy and tactics to necessitate a real differentiation in definition. In the first World War, but more particularly in the last war, it was true that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the principal political agent of the government, played a conspicuous role in the actual conduct of the war. For example, I suppose Franklin Roosevelt was more keenly aware of his job of being Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces than any other man who ever occupied the White House. Certainly Winston Churchill, more than any Prime Minister before him, felt the keenness of his responsibility for making critical decisions in connection with the conduct of the war. The instance of Hitler is so obvious as to need no comment, and it is significant that Stalin eventually made himself Generalissimo of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union as well as Chief of the Soviet State. Lincoln is an instance of a President who didn't quite know whether he was Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces primarily, or was President of the United States primarily, with the result that under Lincoln we had a good deal of bungling in the conduct of military operations (a fact with which you are so familiar as to require no further comment).

As I understand it, the definition in the Navy of the word "strategy" varies at different echelons of command: that the strategy to be pursued, we'll say, by the officer commanding a fleet of destroyers would be one thing; the strategy of a man in com-
mand of a fleet would be another; the strategy of a man in command of all the naval forces in an area like the Pacific would be still something else; the strategy of a chief of naval operations would be on a still different level. And then on the top of all this apex is the President of the United States who, after all, has the final say.

Not only does the definition of strategy change with the echelon of command, it changes with time, and with changed circumstances. There have been certain changes in the character and conduct of war for the last two hundred years which, of necessity, would have changed certain of our attitudes toward the term "strategy" and certain of our associations with the term. The critical question at the moment however, it seems to me, is whether strategy is a concept which operates only in wartime or is a concept which is applicable to times of peace as well. My own feeling is very strong that the term strategy must be considered as operating even when there are no active hostilities.

I do not mean that there is general agreement on the part of writers in this field. For example, there is an article in the current number of World Politics by Bernard Brodie, an old student of mine, who says it is a mistake to use the term strategy in connection with peacetime or in connection with politics. He prefers the words "security policy" as a definition of the things that I would call "grand strategy." Discussions about semantics are singularly futile things which I would prefer to avoid. But one of the reasons why I prefer to use the term, "national strategy", or if you like, "grand strategy", even as applied to peacetime, is that if we use the term, we will be less likely than we otherwise would be to overlook the strategic factors in policy, as we have so often overlooked them in the past. Therefore I would like to keep the word "strategy" in the forefront of our peacetime thinking,
as well as in the forefront of our wartime thinking, lest we make critical errors of judgment. We must not overlook one of the fundamental truths of politics, namely that most political decisions in the field of international relations have strategical implications and, vice versa, strategical decisions have their inevitable impact on politics.

A British historian once said that the British Empire was built up in a fit of absent-mindedness, a phrase which is very generally quoted and which has an element of truth. But, if you look over the history of Britain's decisions as to what she would take as the reward for victory in any given situation, you are impressed by the very strong influence that the Admiralty had in the making of ultimate decisions. Usually wars broke out without any thought that at their termination Britain would end up with another island in the Mediterranean, or with a position as important, we'll say, as the Cape of Good Hope. But, when it was being decided at the end of the war what was to be done in the way of exacting some penalty from the loser to reward the victor for victory, the Admiralty usually stepped in and discovered that there were some positions of the loser which might be of use to British sea power, and the civilian agencies of the British government not only heard the Admiralty but usually accepted their recommendations—not universally, but usually.

If I had time I could spend a few moments of profit and amusement on the manner in which Benjamin Franklin frustrated the Lords of the British Admiralty in connection with what Britain would take at the end of the Seven Year's war, known in our histories as the French and Indian War. The Admiralty wanted to take the French West Indian Islands and leave France in North America, and Franklin was determined to get France out of North America and leave her the West Indian Islands; and Franklin won out in the ultimate debate.
On the other hand, it has been rare in American experience for the military forces to have any influence whatsoever in determining what should be done in matters of this sort. For example in 1898, the United States could have had all of the former Spanish Islands in the Pacific. We chose to take only the Philippines and Guam, leaving the rest of the islands to Spain. They were thereupon sold by Spain to Germany without any protest on the part of the United States. They were seized by Japan in 1914 without any reservation being entered by the United States concerning our interests in the matter. They were given to Japan by the treaties of Versailles in 1918 without effective interposition of the United States, except that they were placed under mandate rather than under Japanese sovereignty—a device which proved to be a difference rather than real distinction. We had to win those islands back at tremendous costs, as so many of you in this room know, in World War Two.

Not only did the armed forces have nothing to say about such questions, but it is doubtful that at that time they themselves would have had as broad a grasp of the realities of Pacific strategy as we had somewhat later. And it is certain that no civilian agency in the government gave any thought whatsoever to the question of the disposition of those islands in relation to the larger strategic interests of the United States and the Pacific area.

It is because of that kind of blunder on our part, a blunder that the British ordinarily did not make before the war of 1914, which I think would warrant our keeping this word “strategy” before us as a peacetime concept as well as a wartime concept. Decisions must be made, if the interests of the United States are to be properly served, which keep strategical considerations in the foreground.
So, if you want to call "national strategy," "security policy," I think you are using a somewhat undramatic term, to put it mildly. Instead of "national strategy," you are not only using a less descriptive, a less dramatic term, but you are running a risk that you will, in the use of that term, depart from one of the things that is of principal consideration; namely, that political decisions would be made with constant reference to their strategical implications.

Now a moment or two as to the way in which this term strategy is used in language other than purely military language. Hitler, for example, continuously used the term "broadened strategy," by which he meant a strategy somewhat wider than a purely military strategy. And Hitler was a genius at using political instrumentalities and political formulas as a means of weakening the enemy's resistance to the program which he was in the process of turning out. A young American journalist wrote a vivid and exciting book in 1940 called, The Strategy of Terror, in which he said that the principal weapon in the armory of the Nazies, even before the shooting started in the War of 1939, was the terrorization of other peoples so that they would either be afraid to resist, or that they would resist half-heartedly, feeling that resistance would, in any case, be futile.

Diplomacy has been called the strategy of peace. And I have heard General Eisenhower refer frequently in the last few months to the "strategy of bankruptcy" that the Soviet Union may be following—a policy of compelling the United States to resist Soviet pressure at so many points that the burden of responsibility will be greater than our economy can bear. So that the word strategy in common usage, quite aside from those used in military textbooks, would suggest that it is no longer purely a military thing but is a concept which has non-military phases.
Now, how did this all come about? Well, during the period up until 1789 or 1793 in Europe, war was a comparatively simple thing, fought with relatively small mercenary armies for limited objectives. With the French Revolution and the war which broke out between France and the rest of Europe in 1792-1793 you had an entirely new concept of the Army, and you had the beginnings of the nation-in-arms, backed, in the case of the French Revolution, with a tremendous ideological urge. Then the rise of industrialization in Europe transformed the conduct of war from one which was a relatively simple operation to one which involved the total resources of the state, scientific, technological, industrial and the like. The rise of nationalism required not merely that an Army should be a conscript Army but also that the Army must know what it was fighting for, since it would be likely to fight only for objectives which were national objectives as distinct from the old dynastic objectives.

The Europeanization of the world, the spread of European civilization throughout the world meant too, beginning with 1763—or even earlier than that—that every war was a world war, and that decisions concerning the conduct of the war had to be made not concerning a single front in a limited geographical area, but in a great variety of fronts in a great many geographical areas, so that a very changed character and extent of war meant that you had to have new definitions of strategy to conform to an entirely new state of affairs.

Now, in a sense, the fundamentals of war haven't changed, as war in its inception is a political act, not a military act. The decision to go to war, or not to go to war, is taken by people who are essentially civilian in their attitudes, even though they may be at the given moment officers of the armed forces; or they may have the dual status that I mentioned of being both civilians
and commanders in chief. But the decision to go to war is usually taken by a person who is civilian in attitude and who makes his decisions for political rather than military considerations. I don't like to quote the remarks of Clausewitz that "War is the continuation of politics by other means—", because it is cited so often that it seems almost a bromide now. But it is nevertheless really true. As he said, war has a different vocabulary, but it has essentially the same purposes as politics.

Further, the conduct of war in this day and generation is likewise essentially a civilian matter. For one simple thing, the civilians determine who shall be in command—which is a matter of great moment in the conduct of war. And the ability to spot able and winning commanders is an ability of great moment to the state. If you don't think so, just compare our situation in this war with the situation in the Civil War when we had a whole series of Burnsides, and Popes and "Fighting Joe" Hookers and the like; where Lincoln seemed, at least in the early days of the war, to be unable to pick winning commanders for the principal theater of war.

Even in questions which are supposedly purely military, the civilians frequently make the critical decisions. There is one little quotation from Lloyd George's memoirs which I'd like to read here. The question was before the British in the spring of 1915, as to the number of machine guns that they should provide for the new army—the new army which had been brought into being after the declaration of war in August 1914. And Kitchener, who was the Minister of War in virtual command of the British Army, suggested that the existing number of two machine guns per battalion ought to be increased to perhaps four, but that anything over four would be a luxury. Of this Lloyd George said, and this is from his memoirs:
“Take Kitchener’s maximum, four per battalion, square it, multiply the result by two; and when you are in sight of that, double it again for good luck.”

Thus Lloyd George, a civilian minister, multiplied the requisition of the Chief of the British Armed Forces for machine guns by sixteen. And by the late summer of 1915 the British Army was complaining that it still didn’t have enough machine guns.

The same thing was true with Lloyd George’s putting greater emphasis on high explosive shells, as compared with shrapnel shells, very early in the war. So that a great many decisions which seem to be military, even in their essence, are civilian, even in the making of decisions in war time. The more you see of the conduct of the First World War the more you realize what a tremendous role Lloyd George and Churchill played in Britain and what a tremendous role Rathenau played in Germany in these respects.

Of course, you could go on with this sort of thing, mentioning the complicated question of whether ships at sea should be convoyed in the face of the submarine menace—a decision which was made by Lloyd George, personally; a decision that they should be convoyed. The question of using tanks was a decision which Churchill made and which he virtually rammed down the throats of the British Army against their will. I’m not talking of such larger questions of strategy—such as a war of maneuver to be used by flank attacks through the Dardanelles or Italy versus a war of attrition—because there some of the civilian decisions seem, in retrospect, to be wrong. But one could cite almost as many cases where the military decisions were also wrong.

In World War Two the same thing was true—that a great many of these critical decisions were made by civilians. I suppose one of the decisions which took the greatest courage, the greatest
moral courage, was Churchill’s decision to ship out of the British Isles, in the critical days of 1940, large supplies of British tanks, virtually all of their tanks, to North Africa which he had determined to hold and leave Britain itself, then facing invasion, without tanks. That decision took courage and balance, and, in the end, proved to be the right decision.

The question of how much of the national resources should be devoted to air power is essentially a civilian decision in Britain and, in some instances, a civilian decision in the United States. A question of inter-allied unity of command was a civilian decision in both the first and the second world wars and, in this case, we avoided the catastrophic results of failing to have unity of command for a long time. And the decision to make the European Theater the principal area of operation was a decision which Churchill succeeded in persuading both our military and our civilian authorities to accept again. It was a correct decision. I cite these as showing that even in military matters civilians have to make decisions in wartime which seem to be of military character.

War, too, is a social revolution; it does things to the social and economic structure of a nation. It creates strains and stresses which can be resolved only by far-reaching revolutionary changes in society and those changes have to be initiated and carried out by the civilian authorities as well as suggested, in some instances, by the military authorities.

As to making peace, the decision as to when peace negotiations will be opened and what will be the terms of peace is primarily a civilian, rather than a military question. Even in time of peace no political decisions of great moment in international affairs can be made without their military implications, and very few strategic decisions can be made which do not have far reaching political implications.
There was a feeling in most professional armed forces before 1914, and there still is—and there is reason for it—that politics is something which the professional officer should not interfere with. And that's a sound judgment. But politics is not something which the professional officer should not be informed about, because failure to be informed about the political results of strategic decisions may be catastrophic.

I'd like to cite here two German officers of great professional competence—one was Tirpitz, the builder of the German Navy—the other was Schlieffen, the Chief of the German General Staff before the First World War. Schlieffen persistently took the attitude that politics was no concern of the regular officer—that the decision should be made on the merits of the military case without reference to political repercussions—that politics was the business of the civilian authorities. Tirpitz took the opposite point of view—that politics was the business of the professional officer. Both officers helped bring Germany to grief in the First World War. Whereas, if you should have a somewhat middle of the road line that it is the business of the professional officer to be informed about political matters and to make strategical decisions in the light of the political facts of the case—he doesn't need either to intervene in political decisions on the one hand, or to ignore them on the other as being outside his field of interest or competence. What I mean by that is that Schlieffen drew up the famous plan, that you all know about, for knocking France out of the war before Russia could effectively mobilize. He was indifferent to the political consequences of going through Belgium. That, in his mind, was up to the German government to arrange. One of the catastrophic errors of the war was the German decision to go through Belgium even though political accommodations for that act had not been arrived at. So that, if a brilliant officer ignores political considerations, as Schlieffen persisted in doing, the results may be disastrous.
It is doubtful if Britain could have been brought into the war so soon if it had not been for the issue of Belgium; and, if she hadn't been brought into the war so soon, the results of the war might have been quite different.

On the other hand, Tirpitz actively interfered in politics continuously. He understood their military implications, when he took an active part in effecting political decisions to see that things went his way. Furthermore, from the very beginning, he conceived of the German Navy as having a political, not a naval objective. I could recommend very highly as an entertaining, interesting book, *Tirpitz's Memoirs*. They are very well done and they give a picture of a type of naval thought that is worth serious study. Tirpitz's view was—at least it may have been preliminary to a larger view—but he never got the chance to enlarge the original concept—that the German Navy probably would never be able to effectively challenge the British high seas fleet; but that, if Germany had a big enough navy to make it risky for Britain to fight Germany at all, the Navy would have the effect of keeping Britain out of the war—the war which most German staff officers presumed would come in Western Europe. So the German navy was built on the idea that it would be a continuous threat to the British fleet in the British home waters. That was a political goal for the Navy, rather than essentially a naval goal. That is an interpretation, if you like, but I think it is essentially a sound interpretation. The German navy could have built a navy primarily for waging a war against British commerce, and it could have put still heavier emphasis on the submarine before the outbreak of the war in 1914. The German High Seas Fleet was designed as a means of keeping Britain out of the war. And Tirpitz miscalculated, because he didn't understand two things; first, that it was possible for the British to make all sorts of accommodations with other powers so as to strengthen their fleet in home waters; and,
second, that the one thing that Britain would not tolerate from any power on the continent of Europe was a real threat to the security of the British Isles such as the German fleet implied, and as Tirpitz intended it to imply.

I mention these two very gifted German professional officers as illustrations of the danger of being uninformed about politics and of the danger of either ignoring them, as Schieffen was inclined to do, or of attempting to influence political decisions, as Tirpitz continuously tried to do.

There is a rather nice little story of Tirpitz’s interfering in political decisions in a more direct way. In 1912 to ’13, when the British were trying to come to a naval understanding with the Germans on the basis of limiting the construction of capital ships, Churchill went to see the German naval attache, at least met him informally, and said, “Now we really mean business about this; we really want to cut down the building programs of both nations; we want to come to an accommodation with Germany.” And the German naval attache wrote a private letter to Tirpitz and said, “What do I do with this information?” Tirpitz wrote back and said, “You tell the German Ambassador that you have had a conversation with Churchill and that your impression is that Churchill was not very sincere about these naval negotiations.” That’s how far Tirpitz was willing to go in influencing political decisions. But, as I say, I’m not sure that this story is in his memoirs. We have all of Tirpitz’s papers, incidentally, in the National Archives in Washington, and any of you who read German could have some fun spending some time reading Tirpitz’s papers, to advantage.

Now I have taken a shot at a definition of strategy which you can find in *Makers of Modern Strategy*. I’m just going to take time to read this and make comment on it, if I may.

“Strategy deals with war, preparation of war, and the waging of war. Narrowly defined, it is the art of military
command, of projecting and directing a campaign. The Oxford dictionary defines it in a sense as the art of the Commander in Chief. It is different from tactics which is the art of handling forces in battle in much the same way as an orchestra is different from its individual instruments.

Until about the end of the 18th century, strategy consisted of a body of strategems and tricks of war, "ruses de guerre", by which a general sought to deceive the enemy. But as war and society have become more complicated—and war is an inherent part of society—strategy has of necessity required increasing consideration of the non-military factors: economic, psychological, moral, political and technological.

Strategy therefore is not merely a concept of wartime but inherent element of statecraft at all times. Only the most restricted terminology would now define strategy as the art of military command."

In preparing this book *Makers of Modern Strategy*, we brought all sorts of people into the picture who wouldn’t fit into the category of military commanders. You know we use Marx and Engels as fathers of the strategy which to some extent the Soviet Union has followed, the strategy of subversion, of subverting the political integrity and the moral conviction in other states in the justice of their cause. We took Alexander Hamilton and Rathenau as the fathers of a nation with great industrial potential for war. It was the conscious objective of Hamilton and Rathenau to make the United States and Germany, respectively, nations of great war potentials as they were certain to become by becoming great industrial nations.

One can, if you like, accept the Brodie point of view—that these matters should be properly called "security policy" rather than "strategy." As I say, that to some extent is a mat-
ter of semantics but basically, to me, the important thing is to keep continuously, by the use of the term strategy, national strategy or grand strategy in the mind of the politician the idea that strategical factors must be taken into consideration in making political decisions, and to keep continuously in the mind of the professional officer the necessity of being informed upon politics, national and international, even though he may not take and perhaps should not take an active part in influencing political decisions.

To go back to Tirpitz and Schieff en again, the Chief of the German General Staff was of course the great figure in Germany. The Navy in its early days was small potatoes in the national scheme of things. As the Chief of the German General Staff, Schlieffen, if he had been more alert than he was politically, might have seen the political consequences of the vast German naval building program; and even as a soldier, had he been more alert, he would have seen that from the point of view of Germany the building of a fleet of this kind was a diversion of the resources of the nation away from the basic plan. The Schlieffen Plan came within a hair’s breath of succeeding in 1914. If all of the resources that had gone into the German navy from 1898 to 1914 had been available to the right wing of the German army in those critical days of August 1914, the battle of the Marne might never have been fought, Paris might have been captured and the war won by Germany by a fairly safe margin. So that one can’t overlook, in making plans, the inter-relations of the Services to one another. I’m not suggesting by this that all navies belong in that category. It’s just that in the nature of things the Germans could never hope to obtain a navy of decisive character—a high seas fleet which could decide the outcome of the war. Their mere possession of a fleet capable of challenging the British decided the outcome of the war against them, which was one of the great German catastrophies.

The more I read of history the more I am convinced that
history is sometimes governed by coincidence. One of the most fateful coincidences in history is the fact that the United States and Germany both became great powers at the same time. Had the United States become a great power fifty years later than she did, Germany might well have won the First World War. In fact, I think she would have won the First World War. Had the United States not been a great power in 1940, Germany would almost certainly have won the Second World War. And what is it in history that accounted for this pure coincidence? The United States might have become a world power fifty years later. Then you get back into so many causes as to why so many people wanted to get out of Europe and come to the United States and thus build up the population and the resources of this virgin continent. Coincidence frequently plays a great role, and coincidence of the German naval challenge proved to be a challenge to the United States, as well as to Britain, in the years 1914 to 1917. It was a matter which very few Germans could have foreseen and which virtually no American foresaw. Admiral Sims had a pretty clear picture of the situation, but he was virtually alone in that respect for a considerable period of time.

Now no nation, of course, can afford to make an over-all foreign policy without reference to considerations of national security; that is, after all, fundamental. You take the history of French policy over three hundred years; and the more it changes, the more it remains the same thing, until the unhappy days between the two world wars when the French didn’t seem to be able to make any effective decisions. And pretty much the same thing was true of Britain. But the French had running through their history three clear cut objectives; one was to keep Germany disunited, because a disunited Germany was not a serious threat to the integrity of France; the second, was to have allies in Eastern Europe and Southern Europe so that, in the event France did have
to fight Germany, Germany would have to fight a war on two fronts; and a third objective was to have frontiers which were relatively easily defendable because they were natural frontiers—mountains and rivers and the like—or failing "natural frontiers" to have fortified frontiers. And it was only when the French got away from those basic factors, which ruled for three hundred years, that they were finally and irrevocably defeated by the Germans in 1940.

The British have had a similar long-term security policy. At the heart of that policy was the determination, over a period of three hundred years, not to allow any naval power to rise which would threaten the security of Britain's home waters. And corollary to that was the idea that no powers must control the low countries, which are across the narrow body of water, across the straits, from Britain itself; and, finally, that no power must dominate the whole continent of Europe, because any power controlling the whole continent of Europe would be in a position to build an effective sea power paramount to that of Britain. And I could go on with the United States and the Soviet Union as to these controlling factors, as to these security factors, in making a foreign policy.

Those are things that no statesman may ignore except at the national peril. At the same time, in individual cases, wrong decisions may be made because of failure to take account of the strategical factor, as I cited in the case of the Pacific Islands. So that the wise statesman will keep continuously in the forefront, rather than in the background of his thinking, the idea that strategy is a concept of politics as well as a concept of war.

There is just one closing thought I'd like to throw out, and that is, that it is important for the professional officer to be informed on politics—the more broadly the better. Not merely so that he can help to make the correct strategical decisions, but because, at times, he has to make decisions which are political or
quasi-political in character. There are always some questions which
the civilian agencies of the government will not answer. In other
words, you can’t draw a war plan without certain presumptions as
to who the enemy is going to be. It seems easy to do that now
because you know who is right over the horizon. We know that
now, but you remember the case of Woodrow Wilson seriously sug­
gesting that the Chief of Staff be fired in 1916 because he had draft­
ed a plan for American campaigns against Germany in the event
we became involved in the European war. Wilson had the theory
that merely drawing up a plan as to what you’d do if you got into
war with Germany would prejudice the good relations between the
United States and Germany, which at that time, even in the midst
of war, in which we clearly were going to be involved, he wished to
maintain on a cordial level.

Questions like, who is the enemy going to be? How near or
how remote is the possibility of hostilities? These are questions
which again civilian agencies of the government are always re­
luctant to answer. Now I’m well aware that dealing with questions
of that kind on a military level is playing with dynamite, but it
is also playing with dynamite not to deal with them. And so you
have the real fact that you do have to deal with them. And you
have the fact that it is dangerous to deal with them. And part of
the art of being a soldier, or an airman, or a great commander of
naval forces is to deal, not with easy questions which anybody
could answer, but with the difficult questions.

I’d like to read one other thing; I’m going to leave this be­
hind me. This is a brief statement taken from a lecture I gave in
Denver a year or so ago on “What is National Power?” and this
paragraph has been said by various people to be worth quoting.

“National power in the present day world is a complex
and diverse phenomena. It is no longer the ‘walled towns,
stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horses,
chariots of war, elephants, ordnance artillery' and the like to which Francis Bacon referred more than three centuries ago. Neither is gold the major source of national might, as was thought by the mercantilists of the 18th century. Power is now, as it conventionally has been, men and ships and guns. It is planes, rockets, bombs. It is landing craft, flame throwers, machine guns. It is radar devices and fire control mechanisms. But even more, it is factories and farms, assembly lines and tractors, skilled labor and technicians, laboratories and the scientists who work in them. It is the ribbons of steel called railroads and the ribbons of concrete called super highways. It is the pronouncements of statesmen and the teachings of seers. It is telephone wire and radio communications. It is atomic weapons and the means of their manufacture. It is all the multifarious forms in which modern industry, modern agriculture, modern communications and modern finance manifest themselves. It is also education, the press, the church, the spirit of our youth. There is no phase of American life which does not contribute to our national power. Conversely, we could not sacrifice any appreciable portion of our power without curtailing some vital activity and impairing some essential quality of the American people.

In other words, we cannot escape the role of Great Power which History and Destiny have thrust upon us. A rich man may forsake the world and give all his goods to the poor. But the wisdom of man and the art of the politician know not how a Great Power can divert itself of those things which can make it a Great Power. Power then is fundamentally a matter of fact, not volition. We may use our power, or misuse our power. But we cannot discard our power or conjure it away."