Patton's Way: A Radical Theory of War

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes
James Kelly Morningstar

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Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/17
guide to dealing with these emerging threats. Whether soft war is actually war still remains up for debate, despite Soft War’s well-crafted arguments.

Having examined cyber war, media war, and lawfare, Soft War takes on the general category of nonviolence, and the more-specific questions of hostage taking and prisoners. One of the more-provocative chapters examines the use of unarmed bodyguards. This title applies primarily to unarmed civilians performing the role of peacekeepers without UN authorization. Some readers will be surprised to learn that some small-scale operations of this nature have been undertaken, but no reader should be surprised at the complications deriving from attempts to conduct such operations on a much broader scale. Even more surprising is the argument that under some circumstances, civilians might be conscripted, morally and legally, to conduct such an operation.

Soft War’s concluding chapter, “Proportionate Self-defense in Unarmed Conflict” by Michael Gross, is not a summation of the book’s content but a separate piece of scholarship that stands on its own merit. Gross discusses appropriate responses to sanctions, lawfare, and cyber warfare/terrorism, and he also identifies and examines some of the very significant challenges in constructing a valid response to unarmed attacks. His conclusion that “soft war poses an abiding challenge for just war theory” (p. 232) is somewhat anticlimactic; for all that, it is defensible.

In the end, Soft War is much more an invitation to a conversation than it is a set of ready-to-use solutions. It does raise questions to which, so far, there are no answers. It proposes solutions, some of which are likely to create additional and potentially worse problems. Its contributors do not hesitate to challenge status quo thinking and deliver new perspectives. Perhaps most importantly, this book recognizes that ethical considerations must be part of operations in the gray area between peace and war and that the time to identify tools and guidelines for resolving those associated ethical issues is now.

RICHARD J. NORTON


When most people think of General George S. Patton Jr., USA—even people who should know better—they tend to confuse him with George C. Scott, the actor who played him in the 1970 movie Patton. In many ways, that is a tribute to Scott’s acting and the power of film in contemporary society, but there is a reason the motion picture was made in the first place: Patton was an exceptionally good general who got results.

James Kelly Morningstar reminds us of that fact in this powerful and significant account of Patton’s approach to war fighting. Much of Patton’s unique approach to combat operations has been obscured by a number of factors. He died soon after the war, which allowed other Allied generals to offer accounts in the form of interviews, speeches, and memoirs that emphasized their contributions and, in turn, downplayed those of Patton. In addition, many people, including historians and army officers studying his battles, did not understand or appreciate fully his approach, and
attributed Patton’s results simply to “daring . . . intuition . . . determination.”

Morningstar chooses to differ. He quotes Brigadier General Oscar W. Koch, USA, Patton’s chief intelligence officer, on this matter: “If one can call anticipation of enemy reactions based on a lifetime of professional training and on thinking and application ‘intuition,’ he had it” (p. 7). Morningstar argues that “Patton was one of the Army’s few deep thinkers and an astute theoretician” (p. 16). He contends that Patton’s theories were the subject of careful study of military history and geography and an understanding about the logic of power—in particular, the combination of time, space, and mass.

Patton rejected the U.S. Army doctrine of the day that emphasized firepower and attrition. In a sense, he was the rebel against the system that the George C. Scott movie presents. “Patton developed a new calculus of war: fire to enable maneuver, maneuver to create shock, shock to frustrate enemy decision-making, frustrate decision-making to destroy enemy morale, and destroy morale to collapse the enemy’s will” (pp. 3–4). To do these things, Patton encouraged subordinate initiative, speed, and flexibility at the tactical levels. He relied on intelligence, not only to know where the enemy was but to get a sense of how a battle would unfold, which gave him an understanding of how to beat his adversary. As in the game of chess, he wanted to cut off his opponents’ options and beat them before they had a chance to take action. Many contemporaries looked at what Patton was doing and failed to understand. Subordinate initiative looked like poor command and control. Maneuver and the application of firepower against lightly held positions often made others think his units were never battle tested, which ignored the fact that he was not trying to get into an attritional engagement.

This book is one that every serious specialist of World War II should read. More importantly, it is an account that any individual involved in developing doctrine in any professional army—be it the U.S., British, or South Korean—should read, study, and consider carefully.

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES


Ronit Y. Stahl, a professor of history at the University of California, Berkeley, has written a detailed and fascinating book on the American military chaplaincy. Of the piles of books on military topics that authors, historians, analysts, and academics publish each year, books on emergent military technology, historical battles, and biography dominate the stacks; religion and the chaplain corps responsible for tending to servicemembers’ ecumenical needs tend to get short shrift. And when religious matters—and in particular chaplains—are written about, these works often focus on larger matters of ethics or morality in military service. Thus, it is welcome to see Stahl’s scholarly work on a military specialty that is one of the smallest across all military services but whose effect on servicemembers and their culture is often directly inverse to its size.

Stahl begins the story in the early twentieth century, when the modern American