"POLICY" IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Dr. Henry M. Wriston

OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN CIVILIZATION

Dr. Bruce C. Hopper

RECOMMENDED READING

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FOREWORD

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“POLICY” IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

A lecture delivered by
Dr. Henry M. Wriston
at the Naval War College
May 23, 1950

Occasionally it is desirable to take the mind off the instant problem in order to consider broader and more general questions; the current puzzle is sometimes easier to solve after it is looked at in a longer perspective. When this is done successfully it changes the scale of daily events and makes it possible to view them with more detachment and see them in their relationship to values which are permanent.

In an attempt to do something of that kind I wish to discuss what we really mean by “policy” in foreign affairs. At the outset we are faced with a problem in semantics. The language of diplomacy, at least until the Russians revised international manners, has been formal in style and notable for understatement. It is not infrequently equivocal in expression. The reason is simple: anyone executing diplomatic maneuvers must have in mind the possibility of failure and must prepare in advance a way of retreat in order to save face; if prestige is maintained, it is possible to return to the encounter when arguments have been refurbished, military and other dispositions re-arranged, and when the chances of success are more favorable.

In dealing with basic policy, however, “diplomatic” language should never be used. Meaning should be crystal clear; therefore, policy is best expressed in naked terms. An illustration from domestic life will clarify the point. When nullification threatened the

_A prominent educator, historian and author, Dr. Wriston is now serving as president of Brown University in Providence, R. I._
Union, President Jackson reduced fundamental policy to a brief phrase in his classic toast: "The Federal Union: it must be preserved." That was a definition of the problem in terms so clear, so explicit, and so simple that it was impossible to confuse the issue.

When adjustment, which had been tried earlier in the Missouri Compromise and was tried again in 1850, failed to resolve the conflict and the States were brought to the verge of war, Lincoln restated the Jacksonian policy in language equally clear and perhaps even more explicit. In a letter to Horace Greeley he wrote: "If I could save the Union without freeing any slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that."

He succeeded, in those few words, in separating the central issue—the preservation of the Union—from the confusing emotional tensions arising from the problem of slavery. In the Second Inaugural he again restated the issue with such matchless clarity that Charles Francis Adams, Jr., wrote his father, our Minister in London: "That rail-splitting lawyer is one of the wonders of the day.... This inaugural strikes me in the grand simplicity and directness as being for all time the historical keynote of this war."

It is one of the major tragedies of our time that no such lucid summary of the meaning of the recent world war has come from any statesman. It is a measure of our confusion that it is asserted from time to time that no such valid and clear pronouncement could be made because of the incoherence which the Russian alliance brought in its train. This is not true. If one has any grasp of historical fact, it must be clear that the Russian alliance brought no more complications than the slavery issue brought to the War between the States. Lincoln was able to put in words which a child
could understand the reason for war. In similar fashion the basic policy beneath American participation in both world wars of the 20th century is just as simple; any schoolboy could grasp it. It is, explicitly, that the interests of the United States are so world-wide that it could not permit any aggressor nation to control the whole continent of Europe—or for that matter Asia.

That is the complete and adequate explanation of our participation in both wars. It is also the complete and adequate explanation of our delay in entering both wars. Our basic interest is real and vital, but it is neither so immediate nor so vital as the like interests of Britain and France. As long as there was reasonable basis for the belief that Britain and France could win alone, or with moral and material help from us, or assistance short of force, there was adequate reason to abstain from fighting. When it became clear that the risk of their defeat was too great and, therefore, our own policy was genuinely imperiled, we went in. It is not necessary to assert that the timing was accurate in either case. The point is that delay in participation was not irrational. As fundamental policy explains our entrance into the world wars, it equally explains our part in the "cold war"; the fact that victory in two world wars did not avoid the cold war does not invalidate the reasoning.

When one looks at foreign policies, therefore, there are many which can be put in phrases just as clear and just as brief as the Jacksonian policy with reference to the Federal Union. The classical British doctrine, the Balance of Power, illustrates the point. Our twin policies of the Open Door in China and the integrity of China are other illustrations. If one reflects upon those fundamentals with which we are concerned this morning, it will be perfectly obvious that they can be more effectively implemented and more successfully carried out when they are reduced to plain,
naked, Anglo-Saxon terms. It is a magnificent exercise to list the major policies of American diplomacy, and to define each in a hundred words or less. Such an effort leads to a clarification of mind.

The second characteristic of fundamental foreign policies is that they are never created; they develop. When the situation has matured to a point where a statement can sum up past thinking and experience and set the course for the long future, they are put in dramatic, crystallized form. Such statements do not require frequent revision. The Balance of Power is as clear—and as valid—today as it ever was. The preservation of the Federal Union is as fundamental now as it was in 1830. Of course, policies are not “timeless,” because there is change as well as continuity.

Let us take the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine is essentially reinsurance for our own independence. One can trace its roots back to George Washington and beyond, but it could not be stated until two great events had happened: first, the consolidation of our nation, which can be associated historically with the War of 1812 (at least in its culminating phase); and second, the breakup of the Spanish colonial empire in Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine found expression when those two historical developments came into conjunction at a moment of crisis.

We have another fundamental doctrine which is seldom given expression in this country, and yet I think it must be recognized. Since our emergence as a world power, and more particularly since we attained the stature of a major world power, our basic policy is not to permit any one aggressive power to be dominant in Europe over a considerable period of time. Again, that was always our interest. We can see it reflected in the fact that during the Napoleonic struggle we fought at various times on both sides—the
naval war with France and the War of 1812 with Britain. But it could not emerge as a very significant policy until all the world recognized us as a world power, and it could not become a fundamental policy until we were recognized as the Western power—the anchor man in that power group.

We have the same sort of fundamental policy with regard to Asia. Of course, we had no basic Asiatic policy for many years because we did not face the Pacific and Asia was not a factor in world affairs. But once we touched the Pacific it is extraordinary how speedily men who have no claims to great statesmanship perceived the reality of our interest in that continent. Thus as Asia came into the focus of international affairs and as we rose to the stature of a world power, the policy of no single dominant power in Europe had to be matched by a policy of no dominant power in Asia. It found expression in two classical phrases—the Open Door in China, that is resistance to economic imperialism, and the Integrity of China, or resistance to political imperialism.

It is essential to recognize the extraordinary stability of basic policy. The ebb and flow of circumstances over those underlying realities must occasion many tactical maneuvers in the effort to make policy effective, but that does not mean a new policy. The Integrity of China, for example, is still valid. It has suffered many vicissitudes. As a policy it was never fully achieved; but, if one understands its fundamental character and appreciates how long it was in maturing, it becomes equally clear that it is not yet completely, or permanently, defeated. Its current eclipse is nothing to be happy about, but neither is it anything to despair over.

Thus when we draw policy into its time perspective it becomes clear that most so-called "new" policies are transient; that is because they violate a third quality which a fundamental policy
should have. It should be not only clear and stable, but free of passion and emotion; it ought to be a strictly intellectual construct framed from real and permanent interests and utterly devoid of heat. Of course, once it has come to definition and its status is determined it may be, in fact it must be, defended with fervor. But what Jackson showed in his toast and Lincoln demonstrated in the War between the states, Washington had defined in his Farewell Address; he emphasized the objectivity of proper policy when he spoke against "passionate attachments" and "inveterate antipathies."

Thus the so-called "Morgenthau policy" for Germany was, it seems to me, not a policy at all; it was just a reaction under emotional stress; it overlooked geography, experience, the talents of a people, strategical concepts, and the psychology of both Germans and Americans. It was, therefore, transient.

It was also disastrous, because it exemplified a characteristic modern error—the belief that the opposite of something bad must be something good, which is not true. By destroying not only German dominance but German power completely, protection is not achieved; it may lead, as the Morgenthau proposal did, to a power vacuum and thus draw in another nation (in this instance Russia) until it threatens to replace the beaten nation as the dominant force in Europe. The consequence may be a situation no less intolerable than that which was overcome by war.

The policy of destroying all German power—economic, political, and military—was emotionally oriented. The war checked Fascism and Nazism, but the exhaustion of the West offered to Russia an opportunity to attempt something which was contrary to our interest. Only slowly did realization dawn that an emotional response was likely to defeat our own policy by making us think
of Germany in negative terms only and misconceive Russia in positive terms, often sentimentally. This attitude can be summed up in the phrase, “Good old Joe,” now happily relegated to the realm of myth.

In the fourth place we should remember that the word “policy” should be reserved for the things which are fundamental and continuous and should not be applied to devices and tactics, however important they may be. It is a mistake, for example, to refer to the Marshall Plan as basic policy. It is an extraordinary important operation, but nonetheless essentially a tactical device in support of our basic policy of preventing a single aggressive power from encompassing Europe. It is, therefore, a means to a larger end. It is, as we know, a transient means, for, by its own terms, it is to end in 1952. It has all the elements of ingeniousness that any brilliant tactical maneuver should have; it involves the constructive use of economic power to buy time for the re-creation and re-organization of forces likely to hold Russia in check. Its success or failure must be judged upon those considerations.

It certainly has bought time. I do not think anyone seriously believes that the Italian Government would be constituted as it is today without the Marshall Plan or that the Greek Government would be constituted as it is today but for Marshall aid. There is now before us a novel and bold suggestion—the Schuman proposal for the integration of the coal and steel industries of France and Germany. That proposal would have been incredible if either DeGaulle or the Communists had been in control of France. If the Third Force had not been perpetuated in power by external support, that dramatic program for strengthening the economic defenses of Western Europe would never have been proposed.

Whether progress toward the re-organization of Europe is complete enough or swift enough is a matter of judgment. Current
opinion, of course, is that it has not proceeded with adequate speed. The official conclusion is reflected in the statements of Mr. John J. McCloy. He testified before the House Appropriation Committee: "The struggle is immediate and intensive. We in Germany feel that we are facing a critical point in history, and I think no persons sensitive to the forces which play over Europe today can feel differently." Speaking in London early in April he said that "no permanent solution of the German problem seems possible without an effective European union." It was as a consequence of feelings thus expressed officially that the Atlantic Pact Conference has been held recently in London with a view to new tactical dispositions in support of the basic policy of a Europe undominated by a single aggressive power.

That brings us to the fifth aspect of policy which is important in this broader consideration: responsibility for the success of a policy is never unilateral because it is a policy of the United States with regard to other people. Therefore, the "other people" involved may contribute directly to the success or failure of the policy. There have been times, for example, when the behavior of some Latin American countries has invited European interference in contravention of the Monroe Doctrine. Such occurrences greatly complicated our problem.

In recent somewhat violent discussion of the so-called "failure" of our Far Eastern policy, its multilateral aspect is almost overlooked. In seeking to effectuate its policy, the United States had to use the available instruments. Chiang Kai-shek is obviously no longer the man he once was, physically, mentally, or spiritually. General Marshall, in his mission to China before he became Secretary of State, could find no personnel unconnected with the Kuomintang or the Communists adequate for leadership; the Third Force, which has been so decisive a factor in post-war France, was con-
spicuous by its absence in China. We, therefore, had no channel through which our policy could flow. General Wedmeyer also came to that conclusion and said, in effect, that if we wanted to be sure to stop the Reds we must supply the personnel and make the full commitments; otherwise we must let nature take its course for a time because he saw no hope of making an effective instrument of Chiang Kai-shek.

Somewhat the same problem has confronted us in Greece; we have had to work with what is there. The letter, which Ambassador Grady wrote to the Premier of Greece on the first of April, makes it clear that what we have had to work with in that country is not very good; he made a bold and tactically dangerous move to improve it. This is what he said: "The effort to make Greece self-sustaining and independent of foreign aid . . . . has hardly begun . . . . An important reason for the delay has been a less than satisfactory performance by the Greek Government in its conduct of economic affairs. Only twenty-seven months remain in which the Greek Government may take advantage of the American aid made available through the Marshall Plan. This short time permits no further delay . . . . The American people, however, are entitled to expect, and do expect, that any Greek Government which hopes to continue to receive the aid which they have generously offered, will utilize this assistance to the fullest degree.

"In my opinion, only a stable and efficient Government supported by the people and by Parliament will be able to act with courage and the firmness of long-term policy which are essential to the wise use of the aid offered by the American people. Irresponsible talk of adjourning Parliament or of new elections before the new Parliament has had an opportunity to rise to its responsibility, can only create a climate of political and economic uncertainty which may do grave damage to the country's future . . . .

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Only a Government which can secure and maintain public confidence by its boldness and by its devotion to the public interest can be expected to execute the reconstruction stage of Greek recovery. We earnestly hope the Greek Government will meet this challenge . . . . It is in the hands of the Greek Government and the Greek Parliament to decide whether or not they wish to continue to receive American aid and hence to accept the responsibilities which will attain its purpose. It is the obligation and intention of the American Government with regard to all Marshall aid countries to decide whether or not the performance of the recipient Government, whether Greek or any other, justifies a continuance of the aid on the scale heretofore contemplated."

When one has read the letter and realizes that it is usually bad tactics to interfere so openly in the domestic politics of a foreign nation, both the boldness and the dangerousness of the move become clear. It suggests the situation was so serious that only a drastic remedy was worth trying. It also highlights how a sound and necessary policy may fail temporarily (and the word "temporarily" must sometimes be given a very flexible interpretation) for want of adequate, cooperating partners.

The sixth aspect of basic policy in this review is that success or failure at any given moment is affected by the quality of our own management. Americans in times past were proud of our "shirt-sleeves diplomacy," which in some circumstances was well adapted and worked satisfactorily and in other circumstances was hopelessly bad. There have been at times amazing deftness and finesse, great perception and skill, and at other times, stupidity and lack of stamina.

As a sound strategic concept can fail for want of energy and for many other reasons, so a policy which is entirely valid
can be under-played, as the Monroe Doctrine was from time to time when we were not alert enough in the defense of its principles; it can be over-played, also, as Olney did in the Venezuela case. Neither the under-playing nor the over-playing affects the validity of the basic concept. The Monroe Doctrine does not represent a geographic reality, for the Western Hemisphere, except physically, is pretty much a myth. Certainly it is not culturally valid. Nonetheless politically it is sound, and even the failure of Latin America to develop along the democratic lines that the Anglo-Saxons believe are correct, while it causes difficulties, does not make the fundamental concept less valid. It must be said that so far as the Monroe Doctrine is concerned our successive Secretaries of State, since we became a world power, have adapted themselves to the changing scene.

In the seventh place, success of a basic policy does not hang upon dramatic or critical events. We have practically worn out the word "crisis" in our time. Modern means of communication and other factors have led us to over-dramatize the daily event and to hide the fact that indirect results are often more important than the immediate result. As George F. Kennan suggested recently in his notable speech in Milwaukee, sometimes five or ten years elapse between cause and effect in major foreign policy developments. The true meaning emerges only after the sense of crisis has subsided.

Hitler offers a dramatic example: he told his men that on their arms rested "the fate of the German nation for the next thousand years." That was nonsense, because it made transient circumstances appear too decisive over too long a period. Already we can see that the German nation, though defeated, is now so essential to both competing power blocs that we may again see a repetition of what has happened so often before in history: over
a considerable period of time the defeated nation may profit more in defeat than it would have profited if it had won the victory.

Hitler's error suggests a common failing. Right now over-dramatization of current events leads us to expect too much of diplomatic conferences. It is complained, for example, that the Big Three communiqué issued week before last sounded very much like the one issued nearly a year before. That ought not to be regarded as necessarily bad. It may well reflect steadiness of purpose, not a mere rushing from one hunch to another.

In 1880 one of our basic policies was crystallized by President Hayes, when he said that, "The policy of this country is a canal under American control . . . . An inter-oceanic canal across the American Isthmus will essentially change the geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States . . . . It would be the great ocean thoroughfare between our . . . . shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the United States."

The last phrase sums it up—the canal as "part of the coast line of the United States." That was as explicit as a policy could be made. Few people could now tell with any precision why that statement came just when it did; the crisis which precipitated the pronouncement has faded. The policy, so plainly and forcefully stated, remains. It ran counter to the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and Hayes' comment was in a sense an announcement of the fact and a prediction that the treaty would not survive the pursuit of American policy.

Over the years that policy could have been implemented by any number of actions. At one extreme would have been the annexation of everything within that "coast line." There was a
strong drift in that direction for some time. The statement of Olney that our "fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition" was in harmony with such an idea. The Platt Amendment for Cuba and the putting of armed forces into Haiti, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, and other countries might have eventuated in military, political, and economic control. At the other extreme, while the basic policy of regarding the canal as part of our coast line remains unchanged, all our relations with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean have been put upon the bases of mutuality, with some accent upon United States leadership, to a degree which Olney's tactics would never have led one to expect as within the realm of possibility. In short, a shift in tactics from time to time seen in too short a perspective looks like a shift in policy, when in reality it does not involve such a development.

This consideration leads to the eighth point. One of the central issues of recent discussion is bipartisanism. Basic policies are non-political. That is more accurate than saying bi-partisan. I think Senator Vandenberg recently called them "un-partisan," which correctly expresses the point. The Monroe Doctrine, the Panama Canal as our coast line, Canada as within our defense system resistance to control of Europe or Asia by a single power—all these policies would be the same whether the administration were Republican or Democratic.

On the other hand, the tactical dispositions adopted to achieve the policies are subject to politics, and properly so. It is the essence of the democratic system that action by the party in power is carried on under the scrutiny and criticism of the minority. In England this is epitomized by the phrase, "His Majesty's loyal opposition." It is revealed in our government by the fraternalization across the aisle at one moment and the tension between the
two sides at the next. The opposition almost always has to take a somewhat negative attitude because it does not have access to all the current dispatches and information necessary for constructive judgment. But even when criticism is negative, it may well force those in power to act carefully. It can be vigorous and occasionally may be violent, but should be at all costs responsible. When we see political opposition in this light, we realize that it is not to be deprecated, but encouraged; that is the only way in a democratic society by which the public can hear both sides of every question and reach a considered consensus.

In times of crisis when there is imminent and serious danger, opposition is mitigated. That has been true of the so-called “Truman Doctrine” with regard to Greece and Turkey, true in connection with the Berlin air lift and the Marshall Plan. Nonetheless, if the mitigation of opposition is long continued and not limited to matters under dangerous tension, it leads to a tendency to regard all opposition as improper. That feeling is far more dangerous in many respects than even violent opposition because it cuts at the root of the responsibility of the majority party and destroys the foundations for an informed public opinion.

Consideration of policy in these broader terms indicates in the ninth place that it must be judged dynamically, rather than by any static method of estimation. One recent proposal is that we draw up a balance sheet to show our assets and liabilities and learn whether or not we are over-extended. It is not an apt analogy, because policy is never fully reflected in a balance sheet—even industrial policy. By its nature the momentum, which is inherent in the activity of any organization, is not shown. In some of our greatest corporations, the balance sheet has an item: patents, one dollar. If the patents were really worth one dollar, the organization would be bankrupt. If the company did not have the patents, it
would not be in business. That dollar is merely a symbolic figure; it is an indication that the value of the patents cannot be estimated.

Anyone who has been on an investment committee knows that the balance sheet does not adequately reflect the kind of management the company has. The enterprise may be solvent, but stagnant; management may be vital, but unwise. Those considerations could well be concealed, rather than revealed, on a balance sheet. Moreover, the balance sheet, by its very nature, isolates the company. It does not show it in relationship to its competitors or to those cooperating with it. But an industrial company does not live in isolation any more than a nation does. Therefore, while a balance sheet has certain obvious merits, as a basis for estimation of policy it may be quite misleading.

Let us take, for example, the Monroe Doctrine; on any balance-sheet theory it would never have been drafted by so stern a realist as John Quincy Adams nor uttered by so seasoned a political leader as James Monroe. There were timorous people who felt at the time that we were over-extending our commitments. They wanted us at least to concert our action with Britain; but John Quincy Adams, one of our really great Secretaries of State, said that he was unwilling the United States should come in as "a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war." He could read with amusement, not untinged with irritation, the bombastic words of George Canning, "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old," because he knew that statement was not true.

The policy involved in the Monroe Doctrine has been challenged many times and by many powers—Britain, France, and Germany among others—but we were seldom alone in its defense. It is not historically accurate to say that it rested upon the power
of the British navy. From time to time it did so depend to some extent, but at other times it challenged the power of the British navy.

What the balance-sheet technique would conceal is that, when at various times the issue was drawn, there was almost always some nation with an interest which was parallel to our own over a short or middle-length period, and that we could count upon assistance, direct or indirect. It was not even necessary that our interests should coincide with those of the cooperating power in Latin America; support might mean no more than a common desire to oppose the threatening power for wholly different reasons; the effect was to lend help to our policy at the moment of crisis. But even beyond such assistance there is a fact of first importance, namely that we always had a greater interest in the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine than anyone else could have in challenging it.

This leads to the final characteristic of basic policy: not all policies, not even all basic policies, have the same order of magnitude or equal priority. We would defend the policy of the Panama Canal as part of our coast line before we would make war to avoid dominance of Asia by a single power. Similarly, we mitigated our support of the Monroe Doctrine in the course of the Civil War because the indissolubility of the Union took priority over the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine. The balance-sheet technique conceals the fact that our commitments are not uniform over the whole area of policy and, more particularly, that they are not uniform at any given moment. Moreover, not all the policies of a nation are challenged at the same moment. For this reason it is never necessary to exert all the nation’s power behind every policy at one time; they tend to be successively challenged—not all at once.
Other nations, some of whose policies parallel our own, may have, indeed must have, different priorities. That no one power should dominate Europe is American policy; it is also British policy and French policy. Inevitably it has a higher priority in the British and French hierarchy of policy than in ours. The same reasoning applies to aid to Greece and Turkey. Because they were on her life-line, Britain's interest was more immediate and direct than ours. Our interest in them was a subsidiary of our determination to let no nation dominate Europe. Only when Britain notified us that she could not bear the weight, and when the Russian threat was immediate and serious, did we take over the leadership.

Today there is no direct threat to the Canal as part of our coast line, no challenge to Canada as within our defense system, no infringement of the Monroe Doctrine; today it is our policy of no one dominant nation over all Europe or Asia that is being challenged. That fact accounts for the notable shift in our tactical dispositions, in new political emphases, and in dramatic economic maneuvers; but it does not in any way mean the abandonment of other policies, nor does it mean that we are over-committed, because while there is a very heavy threat in one area, there is virtual absence of challenge in others.

The purpose of this review of the underlying considerations in foreign policy is to lift our sights from the daily and immediate, the complex and the confusing. It is designed to help us look at the broader significance which time and analysis can reveal. The seriousness of the current situation is abundantly clear. We do not want even a tactical reverse. Nevertheless no one ever achieves all his objectives; whether we like it or not we must expect some reverses because our opponent is strong, resourceful, and determined. The recent temper of Americans has been one of reaction from the stimulation of victory; it may well have moved from the over-optim-
ism that followed triumph to an unwarranted pessimism. Judgment will be sounder if it is founded upon a long-range view.
OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN CIVILIZATION

A lecture delivered by

Dr. Bruce C. Hopper

at the Naval War College

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I have cherished so much the privilege of coming to the Naval War College. I feel like Paul among the Athenians—the Athenians were always looking for some new thing. I think the Navy is that way too. Now I will try to bring out some new ideas here. What I want to bring out in the first place is time in terms of control of the time table, and not time as distinct from space in terms of civilization.

It is hard to make revelations about Russia except to repeat constantly that there is still darkness in Scythia. I find after having had six years away from academic life that what measure of retreat or withdrawal one gets in the academic circle somehow lengthens the perspective. It may be that the role of professor is just to find things that are overlooked by the experts.

In my instance what I have been looking for is the something that America once had and has lost. The perspective turns to western civilization and there are several things which stand out in my mind. The first is that the Bolsheviks are still completely convinced that they can last longer than we can in this type of struggle. The second is that they still control the time table. The third is that America’s disunity is an aid and comfort to the Bolsheviks and the despair of our friends. And the fourth is that the Bolsheviks use time in their calculations as well as space.

Doctor Hopper is Professor of International Relations at Harvard University and has written several books and articles on Russia.
Now I know that you have studied a great deal about politics and you will agree with me that timing is the master control in any program of politics. Time must not be overemphasized but one must think of time. Senator Dixon, one time governor of Montana, used to say that the strange thing is that you go on preparing and preparing and preparing for something called life, and then one day you awaken to realize that that for which you had been preparing has already passed you by. It may be that the democracies, in facing Bolshevism, go on preparing for a type of struggle that may never come off: A-bombs, H-bombs, bacteria—all that. The struggle might be rather, in the Russian phrase, a "kto-kogo"(?). Who beats who? Who can outlast the other? It may be an attrition not unlike that between the popes and the emperors for centuries in the Middle Ages.

Obviously all you have to do is read the newspapers or talk to a Russian to realize that the Bolsheviks are much more confident than we are that they can outlast us. The reason is that it is much easier to chop down trees than to replant the forest. They are more time conscious. We are not time conscious. The Lord didn’t give us much patience here in America. We are a speed people—get it done yesterday—and we want what we want when we want it—but quick. Well, in playing chess with the Bolsheviks, that type of impatience may cost us the queen.

I want to talk about time, always remembering that there is a tide in the affairs of men, etc. The totalitarians plan more. They are compelled to be more time conscious and yet it is surprising how much help they got from the outside in their effort to gain control of the time table. In the case of Hitler, for instance, you can see how the Communists in Germany helped put him in power. They allied with Hitler against the Weimar Republic. You can see how President Roosevelt helped insure Hitler in power by devaluing
the dollar and thus wiped out 40% of the German debt in 1933, overnight; how the British gave favorable trade terms; how the Russians, instead of returning wheat as in the contract for the two billion gold marks of machinery supplied by Weimar Germany, made the payment to Hitler in gold and in armament materials. The outside powers set it up for Hitler and then he went with machine gun staccato from one point to another after he had got control of the time table about 1936, or even 1935.

It was that chronic indecision of the democracies; that inability to concentrate on the real enemy. Think of all the gunning we did for Mussolini at that time. He could have been had. There were only a few rocks in the desert—a little something on his chest. He kept telling his people it is better to live one hour like a lion than a hundred years like a sheep. They didn't believe it. If we had given him a little something we could have kept him on our side of the fence and the war might have been different.

But in World War II, by the deal with Hitler in August 1939, the Bolsheviks collected loot until June 1941, and were in abeyance until October of 1944 when General Bor put on the uprising of Warsaw. Our intelligence people say that if they had kept on coming west the war might have been over the winter of 1944 or 45. But no. The Red Army was diverted into the Danube to beat the British to Vienna and so on. From then onward, as I study the records, the Bolsheviks have controlled the time tables.

At Yalta they determined when they would enter the Pacific war, for a price. They forced the second ceremony of surrender at Berlin (after the one at Reims). Thereafter they turned on the heat and turned it off again, forcing us to put the airlift on Berlin and deciding when it would cease, the heat on Iran, the heat on China, etc., etc. Who controls the time table determines not only
the order of events in general, but determines the rules, the principles, and the fashions of the period. To control the time table is to get into the driver's seat.

Now I think that there are a number of requirements. I would like to cite ten selected areas in which America's indecision allows the Bolsheviks to keep control of the time table. If we are going to get control, we have to make up our minds about these particular areas.

As St. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "If the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to battle?" Well, the answer is of course, no one. During the war, our trumpet had a very certain sound. Of course there was a unity of purpose which has since been squandered, and our danger as a nation is perhaps even greater now—greater in the long terms of history than it was when the submarines were at the gates, because this danger has to do with the rise and fall, not only of nations, but of civilization. And in the long attrition which I see ahead our shining new weapons may not even be taken out of their wraps. So long as the Bolsheviks control the time table, they determine the weapons. And they don't want a shooting war.

So here are ten suggestions in areas where America is conspicuous for indecision. The first one: We must have a clear definition of our relations with the Bolsheviks, a definition upon which we will agree. Now what is it? It is not war and it certainly is not peace. But that is exactly what Trotsky said when he stomped home from the first part of the Brest-Litovsk peace conference in January, 1918. He wouldn't sign anything with the Germans. He said, "No war, no peace," and ran back to Moscow. The old soldier, General Hoffman, was not impressed with that Bolshevik logic, so he ordered the German Army to unlimber the guns. And
it was then that Lenin decided there would be peace—at least on paper. Trotsky’s formula of January 1918—no war, no peace—was not implemented actually until 1945. That is what we are living under—no war, no peace.

So how are we going to define this? I think we have to define it before we can get out of this trap of indecision. Suppose we call it tentatively—“War-in-Peace”. Now that would raise a hue and cry, I know, but “cold war” is too passive a term. “Cold war” doesn’t denote the pressures. Acceptance of the phrase “War-in-Peace” might change the psychology of the country and put us on the rails back to the unity of purpose which has been lost.

Recently Dean Acheson came forth with a new phrase—Total Diplomacy. Well, that’s good. That denotes action at any rate, but how about something a little bit snappier than that? The phrase came to me in the middle of the night as they often do. I don’t know whether you get up and write them down, but I have learned to do it, because they are gone in the morning. This phrase came to me—Jujitsu Diplomacy. That’s a little spectacular I admit. The idea of jujitsu is to force the opponent to use his own strength to break his own bones. That’s exactly what the Bolsheviks do to us. They use our own citizens against us—freedom of speech, freedom of this and that. In other words, they use American privileges to destroy America. Dean Acheson’s speech in California I think was a bit jujitsu. You know, Seven Pillars of Wisdom on how to make Bolshevik muscles go backward. That’s what that speech meant. He knew it wouldn’t accomplish anything, except a roar from Moscow, but it was a jujitsu tactic. So, if we are forced to agree that peace is not around the corner, that a shooting war is not around the corner, I think it would be useful to accept a formula that would define the exact conditions, some-
thing like a state of War-in-Peace. We have no precedence and no rules for such a relationship.

Last December I was out in Pittsburgh. One of the things I wanted to see was that battlefield in Monogahela where General Braddock fought in 1755. It is all grown up with steel mills now. I reread Francis Parkman to get the story straight. General Braddock was a very gallant soldier but knew nothing about Indians. There was shooting from behind the trees. So he spoke to the Virginians, to George Washington. He said, “Stand out there and fight like soldiers,” and so on. Afterwards he said, “This isn’t war. This is murder.” He lost his force, and he himself was wounded and died.

Now it seems to me that the democracies are doing what Braddock was doing, using the rules and principles of honorable war against the Indians in America. If we are going to survive the long attrition, we have to get rid of the General Braddock notions. One of the first things to do is to decide on a definition of this struggle—e. g., War-in-Peace.

Then a second decision. I think this is tearing us apart—this loyalty, security-risk business. The Bolsheviks feel more and more confident that all they have to do is wait while we blow ourselves apart. Students of history have seen all this happening before in Greece and in Rome. And we are seeing it happening to us—this indecision among the citizens on the question of loyalty and security. It is not a question of loyalty, actually. It is a question of security risk at the policy level or for classified material.

But in judging and in charging our citizens, I believe the issue is the degree of tolerance they show for the enemies of our society, internal and external. In their minds, they are completely loyal and they may even think they are good security risks. Many of them
are frustrated intellectuals. They call themselves liberals—actually they are to liberalism what Hellenistic was to Hellenic—something pseudo, subsequent, and Easternized. Many find refuge in the academic profession and there they rest on their morals in a sort of detached intellectual neutrality. The label is given to those people I think, by the writer of Revelations: “Because thou art neither hot nor cold, but lukewarm, I will spew thee from my mouth.” I think these people who are neutral in times of peril will be spewed from the mouth of history. Even the little peasants of Eastern Europe have a firmer grasp on history. They say that in times of crisis, either you sing with the angels or you will be forced to howl with the wolves. There is no happy middle ground. Now perhaps the Supreme Court will get us out of this trap. It is bad business and is getting worse.

The third point of the area requiring decision: What is the political direction of our country? This is something that will have to go to a national decision. You and I are living with it. Economically it involves government spending—the danger of bankruptcy. It includes academic folks and service people, and all those on fixed incomes and frozen salaries. We see what has been happening in Europe. There has been a transfer of power since 1914 from the middle class which ruled for over a hundred years. Power is transferred from the middle class to the industrial working class. The middle class is being disposessed by a war of taxes.

This means in Europe, and will mean for us, more and more people shifted over to government employment, a swelling bureaucracy—the bureaucracy then absorbing the intelligensia and taking on the mentality of trade unionism. The creative instinct then dies. Who then will bear the torch? There is a line in Virgil that says, “Easy is the descent to Hell.” You can misquote Virgil a little bit by saying that easy is the descent to mediocrity. As Joseph Alsop
wrote, "Mediocrity begets mediocrity," whether by the crony system or however else.

When we stop putting quality into the individual, then we start making a mass man. In mass men the Bolsheviks are a long way ahead of us. I can say, as a historian, and I have spent most of my time studying history, when everyone is safe, then no one is free. As we move in that direction the time will come when our Statue of Liberty will drop the torch and merely hold a monkey wrench. Security—a monkey wrench!

At any rate, if that process is abrupt then we will have too few moral leaders in the next generation. If it is gradual and spread over a number of decades, then perhaps we might train moral leaders and be able to pass on to them the mantle so that the standards will not perish. That is really the great issue of the welfare state. And yet at night when you are alone you sometimes can hear Madame Lafarge with her knitting needles at the foot of the guillotine. It can all happen again because the brutalization of western man is something that we can’t measure in our times.

Now the fourth question: What kind of Germany do we want? America has not made up her mind. There our trumpet has a very uncertain sound. Some Americans say, "Let German bodies defend the Ruhr." Germany’s historic role was in the North Sea, the cradle of our democracy. Western Germany is now the keystone of the arch of a third power in defense of the Atlantic seaboard. Much of our democracy came from German tribal sources. We can’t have it both ways as I see it. Either we take western Germany into the western family and promote unification of all Germany, or we must be prepared to see the Germans accept the Bolshevik unification on the assumption that they, the Germans, in time can outwit the Russians. That is why I feel pained in reading
the “Times” this morning that they are not going to allow the Bonn government to have proper representation in the London meeting. I think it is wrong. I think we should override England—the Labor government at any rate—on such things. Our bigger hope for Germany is a Franco-German rapprochement.

A friend of mine, just back from Paris, was telling me about the new O. E. E. C. headquarters building which these governments themselves paid for and built on the grounds of the chateau that formerly belonged to the Rothschilds. They were confronted with a problem in bringing in the machinery. There was a beautiful line of trees there. Now the Bolshevik method would be to say, “To hell with the trees, get them out.” I must say that the American method would also tend in that direction. But these people did not think that way. They erected scaffolding and managed with a great deal of effort to bring in the machinery over the tops of the trees. They are very proud because that method signifies the spirit in this new Europe: preserve what is left of beauty and at the same time achieve something functional and streamlined. In that new Europe there is that essential keystone place for Germany. So what do we do? Do we throw Germany to the wolves or do we take her in? The Germans would like to know and we have to make up our minds soon.

The fifth area is somewhat similar: What do we do about Japan? Asia is, of course, in this process of rebirth and has been my main subject for study for twenty years. There will be five-year plans attempted around Asia. As these new states in the southern zone move forward in nationalism and independence, I rather expect to see a shift in diplomatic emphasis from Eastern Europe. We are going to be squeezed out there, and then we will shift our emphasis over to Southern Asia.
Now here is Japan—our special problem! Japan had worked out her old solution with the material at hand—an economic solution. We stopped it and crushed Japan. So we have to provide something else or let Japan go the road of China. What are we going to do? Are we going to let Japan's industry recover based on a two-way exchange—raw materials, industrial products, etc. with Southeast Asia? That would seem to be our policy.

Let us terminate the state of war with Japan. We have more control out there than we have in Europe. Especially in General MacArthur we have a Pro-Consul on a heroic scale. I think we ought to bring him home and give him a Roman triumph to show him that his work will be perpetuated and get on with the job so that we can hold on to Japan. That should be done soon. Here we do have master control.

Now the sixth question, which is on a larger scale. Let us consider whether our crises today involves Bolshevik expansion per se or old style Russian imperialism. The Russians in history have always absorbed their rulers. A number of times a ruler such as Peter the Great, or Alexander the First has made great effort to modernize the Russians. The process goes on for a while and then it lapses. Russianism re-emerges after several decades. Is that going to happen this time? We have had three attempts at hegemony in Europe—in modern times I mean—French—Louis XIV, Napoleon; Teuton—Kaiser Wilhelm, and then Hitler. Now comes Veliki Ross led by the Bolsheviks. We will have to determine whether this is a racial thing or purely revolutionary Bolshevism. What will we be fighting in 20 years? Will it be a type of imperialism that is more Russian than Bolshevik? Or will the Bolsheviks by that time have taken over all the satellites and all of Asia, and confront us with a revolutionary imperialism. You must understand that this is a Bolshevik-hate-America campaign. It may
peter out. We don't know. All I know is that the Russians never had their day. One fascinating study is to try to discover in advance when they will bring in their brands. Will they revert to religious, reevangelization, given the freedom to do so?

We can expect a Bolshevik claim for Alaska somewhere along the line. They may make it for nuisance value. They'll simply say that the corrupt Tzarist government officials sold Alaska, that it was never legal, etc., etc., etc. They wouldn't expect to get it back of course, but just say it for nuisance value. That will come. So in order to defeat the enemy in a cold or hot war, we must differ from them, not in degree but in kind, and understand whether they are predominantly Russian, Communist, or Bolshevik.

Now the seventh question, and I appeal to you as warriors: Who are our fighting Allies? Let us pick our Allies and give them of our substance and our vitality, and let the others fade. Let us not permit the false ideas of our peace mongers to interfere with this lasting decision in strategy. The first thing that strikes us in thinking of Allies, is that our friends of yesteryear may be our foes of tomorrow. Two good examples are Czechoslovakia and China. Conversely, people that we fought may be our friends in strategic bases tomorrow—Germany in the west, and Japan.

Much depends on the ruling group at the time. Italy, for instance, was with us in the first World War and against us in the second. Turkey was against us in the first, but preserved a neutrality in our favor in the second. We must seek allies in terms of these shifting affinities, and then have one criterion. Yes, send supplies here and there, but consider would we go hunting tigers with the people in question? Would they climb trees when a tiger came? Let us have it simple and direct. If we would hunt tigers
with them, then let’s build them up. Our friends include the na­tions in the North Sea area in general, Western Germany, and also Greece and Turkey. They are tiger hunters and so is Japan. The Japanese will defend their rice patties. I believe Franco-Spain will fight too. When our strategic thoughts will turn to Spain we will suddenly find that we haven’t been so terribly hostile to Franco after all. His country will fit into the strategic picture. Therefore, who are our fighting Allies? Let’s decide and hand out our favors accordingly.

My eighth point concerns our principles. What are they to be in this type of struggle, this War-in-Peace. They can’t be haphazard. You in the Navy know that well. The first essential in regard to our principles is to know the enemy’s principles. The outstanding principle of the Bolsheviks is continuous expansion without shooting wars. Their justification of that is their definition of popular sovereignty. For instance, they have sixteen union republics, and they say that each one is sovereign and each is equal, at an international conference, to any foreign state. Therefore it doesn’t lose its popular sovereignty on becoming part of the glorious Soviet Union. Each Union Republic is considered sovereign because it has the constitutional right to withdraw. Of course, we could prove the illusion of all that. However, this point I want to make: By popular sovereignty the Bolsheviks have justified a system of expansion which is without precedent in history.

We will not review the whole list of territories they have taken since 1939. You will see how easy and wonderful it is for them, and how we have allowed it all to happen because we didn’t contest them on this method of popular sovereignty. Start at this point: the frontiers. That is where popular sovereignty can be utilized. Note that in the various frontiers there is a tribal kinship with the peoples outside the frontiers. This is utilized by the
Bolsheviks when it comes to expansion. The first one that is of special interest to you in the Navy is the Norwegian frontier. Examine the Arctic coast, the Kola Peninsula to the Atlantic. In that area live the people of Anderson's fairy tales, the Lapps. I forget the exact number overall, but they exist in the Russian part, in Sweden, and in Norway. In that area is the largest and most valuable northernmost port of the world, Narvik. If they controlled the Arctic coast, there wouldn't be that convoy trouble around North Cape again as in the last war. A Lapps' Peoples Republic would unite the natives of that northern zone. They would probably even speak of a Lapp proletariat. They don't have to be consistent, you see, in putting this thing over.

Another hot frontier with a similar tribal kinship present is down in Macedonia. I am not quite sure in my mind just what is a Macedonian. We know that some of them live in Greece, some in Yugoslavia and some in Bulgaria. I don't know whether there are any in Albania or not, but the Macedonian movement is always there. They do have a literary language of their own. So when the movement comes, when it is propitious for the Russians to put the heat on Macedonia, then they will operate out of Bulgaria.

Another interesting area is in Turkey, U. S. S. R. because the Armenian questions people outside the frontier. Armenia, of course, in the 13th and 14th centuries was a very powerful state in the Near East, thus the memory of a glorious tradition. When the Russians get ready to put the heat on Turkey for control of the Straits, then a Greater Armenian Peoples Republic is to be expected. It is a set-up. The same thing applies to Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan people on the Soviet side and the Azerbaijan people on the Persian side are of the same Turkish stock, neither Persian or Russian. The strength of this racial desire or racial coherence is again an instrument that the Bolsheviks could and would use when
they get ready to push for the Suez and India. Now note the relations of China with the old tributary states. Siam as well as Burma fall into a special category. Anything can happen there. Then in the course of twenty years with this Russian glacier coming into the Bay of Bengal on the East and down to the Persian Gulf on the West, India would be in the pincers. That may be what we'll see before we ever get to a shooting war.

So I say, that confronted with enemy principles in operation, we must have our principles of our aim. Let us see how far the immutable principles of war, so-called, could be applied to a prolonged attrition without shooting.

First—Objective. The objective in this type of war I have described is to overcome the enemy's will to expand through the use of popular sovereignty without shooting. That is what he wants— to expand without shooting. Now we must overcome his will. That is the objective. The second principle—Offensive. That means to control the time table. A direct idea of offensive is to control the time table and take the initiative. Let us dwell on those two and leaving aside all the others—economy of force, movement, surprise, etc.—except for logistics.

My ninth requirement in this War-in-Peace is Logistics—what to do about material production, imports, exports, etc. Logistics is a requirement and a principle. Effective preparations and decisions must be made to determine the necessary amounts of supplies and man power to be utilized.

The tenth point, and this is my clinching thought in this development, is what interim strategy should we have at this time in this War-in-Peace? I arrive at that by giving our interim strategy if we applied just the two first and most important
principles of war. I would say that the principle of objectives is the restoration of the balance of power in Europe. That is our only way to get back to free wheeling. I don’t want to go through the history of security, from unity to balance of power, to this collective idea, the universal type under the League of Nations and the U N, and to the regional type that we are now working out in the North Atlantic Treaty.

I will say, as a student of history, that I believe that the only feasible method of the state system, as presently constituted, is balance of power. That is exactly what we are doing. I think we have no complaint to find with the State Department. By the political means (the North Atlantic Alliance, plus the Franco-German rapprochement,) the economic means (the ECA) and the military means, this process is now going on. Military assistance to governments of Europe would strengthen their hands against internal sabotage and destroy the illusion that an aggressor could have a quick campaign without much bloodshed, as the Germans believed in 1914 and again in 1939. Above all, while we are arming Europe, the most important objective is to deny the Atlantic seaboard to the Russian snorkels. German submarines in two wars came pretty close to pulling it off. Maybe next time the Russian snorkels, with German help, might be able to do it. At any rate, when that vacuum created by World War II is filled, and Western Europe integrated—at least in a military sense—then, with a Third Power in existence, the Balance of Power is restored.

Now the second principle—the principle of offensive. I will try to give you something new which you can toss back at me. And I won’t be able to defend it. I think that the offensive is just as necessary to victory in this type of War-in-Peace as it is in a shooting war. Some of you will recall that the French, at the time of the Battle of the Marne, retreated, dragging their guns
through the dust. For days they retreated, retreated, retreated. Finally came the order, “Stand on the hills, south of the Marne. Point your guns north and get ready to advance.” Well, you might say a thrill went through that army. A psychological change came over the French after their retreat; retreat and then advance! That is what I want to see happen to our country. First we must take the offensive in this interim strategy (and it is only interim).

The Russians stalk out of the U. N. Let them stay out. They need the U. N. Let us not forget it. We must not repeat the blunder we made during the war, assuming that they wanted a separate peace. That was a crowning blunder stemming, I believe, from the White House. Let them get the idea that the U. N. is pointed towards an alliance outside the Iron Curtain. But let us not make the mistake of saying that it is useless to operate without the Bolsheviks. As for the Chinese delegates who are the targets of their fire, if we throw Dr. Tsiang to the wolves we will deserve very small credit in history. Keep him on ice and give him some function until the Assembly meets in September, and then, who knows, we might be able to run him as a candidate and get a new Secretary General. It might be a good idea. That would be putting cockleburrs under the saddle of the Bolsheviks. That’s what I call offensive.

Now the offensive we can take in regards to the atomic affair. International inspection would mean the end of Bolshevism. What about those fifteen million or more slave laborers? They simply cannot allow foreigners to run around in Russia. So if we had their consent to inspection, it would be postponed. But we can do a lot amongst ourselves. We can at least unify the western allies on atomic policies.
Next come the offensive in regard to Germany. Let us terminate the state of war with all German people—not only Western Germany, but Eastern Germany. It is not yet the time for making a peace treaty. The Bolshevists may go in and perhaps annex Eastern Germany. We have them in a box now. We can do a little jujitsu if we are clever enough. The Kremlin cannot unify Germany without making a fifth partition of Poland. That’s our jujitsu. Let’s get on with it. And immediately what shall we do? They talk about launching the youths of Eastern Germany into Berlin in May. Let’s send General Clay back to Berlin. He’s the idol of the German people. What are we doing with him now? Why, he is lecturing at Harvard this week. There’s a bigger job than that for him. Send him back there with any kind of cooked-up mission just so he is there in Berlin, because he is a figure that the Germans trust. It would be a signal to them that we do not intend to get out of Berlin. Take the offensive.

Go in and make an offensive in regard to this national communism from outside the Iron Curtain—Yugoslavia, China, and the others. The State Department has a policy of erosion, I don’t know exactly what it means but it sounds good. I would say that the offensive in the Far East should include the termination of the state of war in Japan and building up the economic answer to Japan through southeast Asia and eventually point to trade with China so as to get Japan off the taxpayers’ neck here in America. These offensives must be multiplied, using all types—Point Four economic strategy, etc. My idea is that somewhere along the line, after we get into the habit, we can take the offensive. I don’t mean at the drop of a hat, but to work it out in time. As long as we do not take the offensive we will never get control of the time table. If we do take it somewhere along the line while we are keeping our atoms dry, we will awaken one day to find we have the stop watch and that we are calling the time.
A long buildup is necessary because our people assume that an offensive is something wicked and practiced only by aggressors bent on a shooting war. That isn't true at all. An offensive is the only way that we can save ourselves from perishing through attrition and from crumbling within. As an example of our blundering zeal, I could quote the Nuremberg trials. We have got to get as far away from Nuremberg psychology as we possibly can. We have to adopt a technique we have never met before in history. In other words, we must call on God to help us. Everything was a living contradiction in these trials, with the Russians being judges in their own cause and preventing the Katyn massacre from coming before the court. I won't cite it, but I do hope that members of the college will take advantage of the opportunity to read about the Katyn massacre in the report I am leaving here.

Now there is just one more thought. As part of our offensive technique—our preservation of strength—let us keep our President at home. By that I mean that every time an American President has gone abroad, it has brought disaster on Western civilization. It looks as though the President goes into the camp of the Philistines and, like Samson, he gets his hair cut when he is asleep. You can see it in the case of President Wilson for instance. There he was with his Fourteen Points, the loftiest peace program ever devised by man. He was sitting pretty. Then came the armistice! All he had to do was to sit still and say, "Here we are. Make your terms and bring them over to me. I have the Army. I have the Navy. I have the money. So decide between yourselves and then let me O.K. it." Something happened to him in November. I do not know whether Mrs. Wilson had a yen for Paris or not. I do know that the French Ambassador handed a memo to President Wilson proposing that the victorious Allies not negotiate with the vanquished powers, but decide among themselves the terms and then call in the Germans merely to sign. That was contrary to Wilson's prin-
principles of life. But he simply tossed the thing in his trunk. After all he was going to Paris, in spite of the fact that Colonel House said, "Don't Mr. President, don't come to Europe. Stay there in America." He went to Paris.

President Wilson landed in Brest and one description which I read in the French papers said that there hadn't been such a scene since Julius Caesar set out to conquer Britain in 54 B.C. From there he came to Paris. But did he follow Colonel House's injunction to get on the American train, go to the American part of the front, speak to the troops, then fall back to the balcony at the Embassy in Paris to receive the plaudits of the multitudes and then get back on the SS George Washington and go home? No! On the fourteenth of December, the crowd just choked the square from wall to wall. Here came the Messiah from the west! And with Mrs. Wilson in that shining new automobile—well, it was more than the old Presbyterian could stand. He was just carried away and he stayed. He lingered there amongst the Philistines and began to get his hair cut. One by one his points went down the drain. And in the final analysis, he got his covenant hitched onto the treaty and he had to agree to all those things—the giving away of Shantung, etc., which caused the Senate to toss the whole thing out of the window.

Looking back, we see that if President Wilson had only stayed at home and allowed the mountain to come to Mohammed, history would have been different. Who learned a lesson from that? Not President Roosevelt, because he used to go over and have a chat with Stalin without taking his long spoon. Remember? And so there has been one conference after another. We won't go into them. We will just say that there was disaster stemming from Yalta which will perhaps be with the human race for a century. And then President Truman came to Potsdam. At least he...
put his chop on things. The power of the President is so vast that we should not allow him to go on the front side of the Statue of Liberty.

You read in the press, as we are reading now, about other Presidential trips. All these people, including even Senator Tydings who knows better, and Churchill, who knows better with his tongue in cheek, know it is all nonsense. We have had enough presidential haircuts to last us for a century. So I say keep the President at home as part of this new type of thinking.
RECOMMENDED READING

For those officers wishing to pursue a course in professional reading, the Naval War College Reading List is published here­with. The list contains books and articles in many varied fields and totals approximately 7,000 pages.

I. UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

"War or Peace"  
Dulles (1950)  
266

This book, autobiographical in nature, is a study of the present world situation and what might and should be done about it. Mr. Dulles presents the military structure of the Communist Party and reveals a keen understanding of its techniques and objectives. As stated in his conclusion, “If our efforts are still inadequate, it is because we have not seen clearly the challenge and its nature”. He does much to correct this.

"The Coming Defeat of Communism"  
Burnham (1949)  
278

An appraisal of the workings of Communism and the optimistic opinion that Communism will be defeated. The author, an ex-Communist is thoroughly familiar with the methods and objectives of Communism and against this background critically examines our containment policy. The premise advanced in an earlier book, “The Struggle for the World”, that we are at war now with Communism and have been since 1943 is again proposed. The author’s plan consists of recognizing this state of war; determining the objective which he believes should be nothing short of the defeat of Russian-based communist power; and conducting an
offensive political-subversive war. This type of unorthodox warfare would consist basically of propaganda warfare in all its many ramifications. The author believes that Communism and Capitalism are irreconcilable. Convincing conclusions are drawn of the world political scene but the plan of action for the defeat of Communism is not clearly outlined.

"My Three Years in Moscow"  
Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith (1950)

General Smith's report covers his personal and official experiences and problems as United States ambassador to Russia from March 1946 to March 1949. It is illuminating and interesting, particularly because of the combined military and ambassadorial character of General Smith.

Pares (1949)

A short history of Russia written by the distinguished Russian historian. The epilogue gives an evaluation of Russia's internal situation and her position in the world today.

"The Price of Power"  
Baldwin (1947)

A thorough presentation of the political, economic and military position of the United States and an inventory of the military strength, new military developments and industrial power of the United States in relation to other world powers. New world strategy and new tactical considerations are discussed. Possibilities as to the future course of events are analyzed in the light of the foregoing.
A veteran newsman’s world-wide coverage of the gloomy Cold War situation as of early 1950. With no punches pulled he appraises the gains of Communism and the sporadic and ineffective short range diplomatic efforts of the U. S. to curb its growth throughout the world.

The Communist equivalent of “Mein Kampf”. A reprint of some original Communist documents in which they have set forth exactly what and how they plan to conquer the world.

This article, written by a high official of the State Department, brilliantly examines the conflict with Russian Communism and those considerations influencing the commencement of an all-out war. The author gives us a framework of rather vague generalities which, if carried out, few will disagree should guide us successfully through the present “cold war”. He concludes that war, although a possibility, is not probable in the light of an analysis of the future course of Russia and Russian Communism.

Concise, hard-hitting evaluation of Russian and Communist aims and their determination to overthrow the West and defeat capitalism.
"Historicus" 42

"Stalin on Revolution"  Foreign Affairs, January 1949

An authoritative analysis of Stalin's pronouncements and of their influence on Communist thinking and policy throughout the world.

II. WORLD WAR II AND THE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES

"Modern Arms and Free Men"  Vannevar Bush (1949) 264

Dr. Bush scientifically evaluates modern weapons and assigns them relative importance in a future war. Moreover he relates the weapons to man's eternal struggle for freedom from domination by those who would dominate. He clearly shows why education is a basic requirement in a democratic system. Throughout the book the author's deep belief in the ultimate triumph of men of good will is manifest.

The book is at once significant and authoritative. Published as it is at the very moment the United States is preparing to embark on a huge program for military defense of Western Europe, its value is inestimable. For Dr. Bush points out that today defensive weapons (with some notable exceptions such as the submarine) appear to be gaining over offensive power. The book has only one apparent defect. It was written before the atomic explosion in Russia. The military man who reads this book (and none can afford not to) will encounter statements which Dr. Bush might not have made had he known of the explosion.
This important and timely book strikes deep at the roots of world and national problems and appraises the factors influencing our national policies today. The geopolitical scene, carefully related to our own responsibilities in the world today, is brilliantly examined. The importance of sea power to us because of our favorable geographic position is carefully delineated to show its impact in the shaping of a sound foreign policy. Military strategy, as it is being evolved in the highest councils of government, is critically examined. Mass destruction area bombing, as a method of conducting strategic air warfare, is strongly attacked from the standpoint of being militarily unsound and morally indefensible.

The author makes a strong case to discredit the Douhet concept of strategic air warfare. However, Mr. Hessler in no way deprecates the effectiveness of land-based air. The military advantages open to us as an “island power” (strategic connotation of the phrase) of exercising the offensive capability of sea-air power in any foreseeable war is enthusiastically developed. Whether or not one agrees with the emphasis placed on the strategic significance of carrier-based tactical air does not detract from his conclusion which no student of air power can contest: i.e., the heart of air power is command of the air, and further, the fighter plane is the means of gaining or disputing this ultimate goal.

This book is worthy of conscientious study by all members of the military services. Readers will find exam-
pies of the author's navy partisanship. However, the vital problems dealt with are clearly and logically expressed and analyzed.

"U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War"
Ballantine (1947) 308
While the title is very broad, the book confines itself primarily to a discussion of National and Departmental Logistics. In this restricted field the author makes an excellent analysis of an important problem.

"If Russia Strikes"
Eliot (1949) 252
A discussion of the probability of a war between the U.S. S.R. and her satellites and the Western Powers, the character and timing of such a war, the probable theaters, roles of the various armed forces on both sides, etc. in the near future.

"Soviet Arms and Air Power"
Guillaume (1949) 212
This book recounts briefly the highlights of the military operations in Germany and USSR on the Eastern Front during World War II. It contains an analysis of the factors of Soviet strength, including: the command and administrative structure of the Red Army and its relationship to the Communist party; factors of manpower and populations; morale; and the employment of ground and air forces. The most significant aspect of this book is the treatment given the war effort of the Soviet economy.

"What Kind of War"  (Atlantic Monthly, July, 1949) Baldwin 20
Hanson Baldwin gives us a refreshing presentation
of the all too neglected principle that the determination of the objective is the first step in the preparation for war. He then discusses the capabilities and limitations of atomic and strategic air warfare, atomic policy, and the political, psychological and morale factors in war.

"The Atlantic Pact"  
Hoskins (1949)  
This book gives a brief but thorough account of the events leading up to the Atlantic Pact, and also tells why each country joined the Pact. It is complete in citing specific speeches and doctrines, as well as in furnishing a reproduction of the Pact itself. An excellent account of U. S. foreign policy as it is today.

"Western European Union"  
Hawtrey (1949)  
A primer for the English public, setting forth the English point of view on European Union, including the problems with proposed solutions. The whole problem is related to the Marshall Plan, military aid, and the North Atlantic Pact. Every officer of the services of the USA should read this in order to appreciate the viewpoint of our main ally. It is clearly and simply written and the reading is easy.

"Bombing and Strategy"  
Dickens (1946)  
In this short book the author analyzes and criticizes British aerial strategy (particularly strategic bombing) of World War II. Concerned primarily with the integration of bombing and other military and naval efforts as they affect the British Isles, it contains much food for thought for military planners as re-
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gards the employment of air power in a balanced fleet.

"The Bismarck Episode"
Grenfell (1948) 219

A detailed account of the chase and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck.

"Summary Reports, European and Pacific Wars"
U.S.S.B.S. (1945-46) 50

In two parts. A concise report of the results obtained by strategic bombing in the European and Pacific Theaters including conclusions, lessons learned and future trends.

"The Role of Sea Power in Global Warfare of the Future"
(Brassey’s Naval Annual, 1947) Rosinski 14

A brief article in which Dr. Rosinski develops the thesis that sea power will continue to be a fundamental and decisive historical force.

III. COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION

"The Art of War."
Sun Tzu 99

This is a 1944 edition of the Giles translation of one of the greatest military classics ever written. The book comprises thirteen short chapters. In the first paragraph Sun Tzu writes “The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected”. From that point he proceeds to an enunciation of the principles of war, and to an examination of them. This is a book that should be read by every
 officer and would be a valuable addition to his personal library.

"Makers of Modern Strategy" (Selections)  Earle (1944)

This book is an outgrowth of a seminar on military affairs which was conducted at the Institute for Advanced Study. Twenty well known historians trace the development of modern military thought in brief, and in some cases brilliant, studies of the contributions of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet, and Foch (among others) to current military thinking.

"Generals and Generalship"  Wavell (1943)  36

The qualities that a general must possess, the abilities he must have to handle his troops, and his relationship with the statesmen who command his activities are ably presented by Field Marshall Wavell in this book.

"Organization, A Formulation of Principle"  Brown (1945)  308

A treatise on the basic principles of organization.

IV. ATOMIC ENERGY

"Fear, War and the Bomb"  Blackett (1948)  236

Professor Blackett first analyzes air power in the last war, then the atom bomb as a weapon. With these two studies as a premise, he proceeds to discuss the bomb’s strategic consequences. The author’s background as an atomic scientist, a former member of Great Britain’s Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, and as a military man, plus the carefully chosen quotations from numerous authorities, combine to make this part
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of the book convincing. The second half of the work is devoted to the political implications of the bomb, and here the author displays so much bias that one naturally questions the conclusions drawn in the first half. The book is so controversial that it probably will be widely read.

"Must We Hide?"  
Lapp (1949) 182

A short discussion of the results of the first five A-bomb bursts. Dr. Lapp, Executive Director of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research and Development Board, develops the capabilities of the bomb and demonstrates these capabilities by relating the various types of bursts to the damage each would produce in an American city.

"The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki"  
U.S.S.B.S. (1946) 43

A condensed but complete report on the effects of the two bombs.

V. MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

"United States and China"  
Fairbank (1949) 384

John King Fairbank is well qualified to write in the field he deals with in this book. He has lived for a number of years in China and traveled extensively there. He is at present in charge of the China Program at Harvard. Professor Fairbank states that his purpose is "to indicate some of the major currents which now form the tide of social change in China" and "to summarize the major patterns of thought and conduct, the major political and economic forms" which are in-

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grained in Chinese society. This purpose he accomplishes admirably. The book should be read by any officer who wishes to straighten out his thinking on the subject of our position in China, for in it Fairbank manages to separate the wheat from the chaff, and to present a reasoned, coherent picture of the forces that make China what it is.

"How New will the Better World be?" Becker (194) 246

A stimulating discussion of the post-war reconstruction period. The author diagnoses the present state of the world, with special attention to nationalism, sovereignty, power politics, and imperialism.

"How to Think Straight" Thouless (1939) 233

In direct, sprightly, nontechnical English, Professor Thouless discusses the most effective ways of achieving and maintaining a clear thinking, well-balanced and flexible mind.

"The Art of Plain Talk" Flesch (1946) 194

A book that tells how to talk plain. People whose business or desire it is to convey ideas will obtain valuable hints on effective presentation.
This section lists material published in current periodicals which will be of interest and value to officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

"Strategy of Limited War"

"America Today: A Freehand Sketch"
By Lewis Galantiere. Foreign Affairs. July.

"Piercing the Iron Curtain"

"Atomic Weapons and the Korean War"

"The Great Results of Korea"

"Exaggerated Dangers of Germ Warfare"

"American Policy Toward Russia"
By Quincy Wright. World Politics. July.

"The Strategy of World War III"

"Guerrilla"
Parts I and II, by Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, II Marine Corps Gazette, July and August.

"We're Betting our Shirts on the Atomic Submarine"
By Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood. Saturday Evening Post of 22 July.
"Soviet War Potential is Rising"

"Russia Today: Its Strength, Its Weakness, Its Ability to Wage War against the United States"