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Outlook for Western Civilization

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OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN CIVILIZATION

A lecture delivered by
Dr. Bruce C. Hopper
at the Naval War College
March 30, 1950

I have cherished so much the privilege of coming to the Naval War College. I feel like Paul among the Athenians—the Athenians were always looking for some new thing. I think the Navy is that way too. Now I will try to bring out some new ideas here. What I want to bring out in the first place is time in terms of control of the time table, and not time as distinct from space in terms of civilization.

It is hard to make revelations about Russia except to repeat constantly that there is still darkness in Scythia. I find after having had six years away from academic life that what measure of retreat or withdrawal one gets in the academic circle somehow lengthens the perspective. It may be that the role of professor is just to find things that are overlooked by the experts.

In my instance what I have been looking for is the something that America once had and has lost. The perspective turns to western civilization and there are several things which stand out in my mind. The first is that the Bolsheviks are still completely convinced that they can last longer than we can in this type of struggle. The second is that they still control the time table. The third is that America's disunity is an aid and comfort to the Bolsheviks and the despair of our friends. And the fourth is that the Bolsheviks use time in their calculations as well as space.

Doctor Hopper is Professor of International Relations at Harvard University and has written several books and articles on Russia.

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Now I know that you have studied a great deal about politics and you will agree with me that timing is the master control in any program of politics. Time must not be overemphasized but one must think of time. Senator Dixon, one time governor of Montana, used to say that the strange thing is that you go on preparing and preparing and preparing for something called life, and then one day you awaken to realize that that for which you had been preparing has already passed you by. It may be that the democracies, in facing Bolshevism, go on preparing for a type of struggle that may never come off: A-bombs, H-bombs, bacteria—all that. The struggle might be rather, in the Russian phrase, a “kto-kogo”(?). Who beats who? Who can outlast the other? It may be an attrition not unlike that between the popes and the emperors for centuries in the Middle Ages.

Obviously all you have to do is read the newspapers or talk to a Russian to realize that the Bolsheviks are much more confident than we are that they can outlast us. The reason is that it is much easier to chop down trees than to replant the forest. They are more time conscious. We are not time conscious. The Lord didn't give us much patience here in America. We are a speed people—get it done yesterday—and we want what we want when we want it—but quick. Well, in playing chess with the Bolsheviks, that type of impatience may cost us the queen.

I want to talk about time, always remembering that there is a tide in the affairs of men, etc. The totalitarians plan more. They are compelled to be more time conscious and yet it is surprising how much help they got from the outside in their effort to gain control of the time table. In the case of Hitler, for instance, you can see how the Communists in Germany helped put him in power. They allied with Hitler against the Weimar Republic. You can see how President Roosevelt helped insure Hitler in power by devaluing

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the dollar and thus wiped out 40% of the German debt in 1933, overnight; how the British gave favorable trade terms; how the Russians, instead of returning wheat as in the contract for the two billion gold marks of machinery supplied by Weimar Germany, made the payment to Hitler in gold and in armament materials. The outside powers set it up for Hitler and then he went with machine gun staccato from one point to another after he had got control of the time table about 1936, or even 1935.

It was that chronic indecision of the democracies; that inability to concentrate on the real enemy. Think of all the gunning we did for Mussolini at that time. He could have been had. There were only a few rocks in the desert—a little something on his chest. He kept telling his people it is better to live one hour like a lion than a hundred years like a sheep. They didn't believe it. If we had given him a little something we could have kept him on our side of the fence and the war might have been different.

But in World War II, by the deal with Hitler in August 1939, the Bolsheviks collected loot until June 1941, and were in abeyance until October of 1944 when General Bor put on the uprising of Warsaw. Our intelligence people say that if they had kept on coming west the war might have been over the winter of 1944 or 45. But no. The Red Army was diverted into the Danube to beat the British to Vienna and so on. From then onward, as I study the records, the Bolsheviks have controlled the time tables.

At Yalta they determined when they would enter the Pacific war, for a price. They forced the second ceremony of surrender at Berlin (after the one at Reims). Thereafter they turned on the heat and turned it off again, forcing us to put the airlift on Berlin and deciding when it would cease, the heat on Iran, the heat on China, etc., etc. Who controls the time table determines not only

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the order of events in general, but determines the rules, the principles, and the fashions of the period. To control the time table is to get into the driver's seat.

Now I think that there are a number of requirements. I would like to cite *ten* selected areas in which America's indecision allows the Bolsheviks to keep control of the time table. If we are going to get control, we have to make up our minds about these particular areas.

As St. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "If the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to battle?" Well, the answer is of course, no one. During the war, our trumpet had a very certain sound. Of course there was a unity of purpose which has since been squandered, and our danger as a nation is perhaps even greater now—greater in the long terms of history than it was when the submarines were at the gates, because this danger has to do with the rise and fall, not only of nations, but of civilization. And in the long attrition which I see ahead our shining new weapons may not even be taken out of their wraps. So long as the Bolsheviks control the time table, they determine the weapons. And they don't want a shooting war.

So here are ten suggestions in areas where America is conspicuous for indecision. The first one: We must have a clear definition of our relations with the Bolsheviks, a definition upon which we will agree. Now what is it? It is not war and it certainly is not peace. But that is exactly what Trotsky said when he stomped home from the first part of the Brest-Litovsk peace conference in January, 1918. He wouldn't sign anything with the Germans. He said, "No war, no peace," and ran back to Moscow. The old soldier, General Hoffman, was not impressed with that Bolshevik logic, so he ordered the German Army to unlimber the guns. And

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it was then that Lenin decided there would be peace—at least on paper. Trotsky's formula of January 1918—no war, no peace—was not implemented actually until 1945. That is what we are living under—no war, no peace.

So how are we going to define this? I think we have to define it before we can get out of this trap of indecision. Suppose we call it tentatively—"War-in-Peace". Now that would raise a hue and cry, I know, but "cold war" is too passive a term. "Cold war" doesn't denote the pressures. Acceptance of the phrase "War-in-Peace" might change the psychology of the country and put us on the rails back to the unity of purpose which has been lost.

Recently Dean Acheson came forth with a new phrase—Total Diplomacy. Well, that's good. That denotes action at any rate, but how about something a little bit snappier than that? The phrase came to me in the middle of the night as they often do. I don't know whether you get up and write them down, but I have learned to do it, because they are gone in the morning. This phrase came to me—Jujitsu Diplomacy. That's a little spectacular I admit. The idea of jujitsu is to force the opponent to use his own strength to break his own bones. That's exactly what the Bolsheviks do to us. They use our own citizens against us—freedom of speech, freedom of this and that. In other words, they use American privileges to destroy America. Dean Acheson's speech in California I think was a bit jujitsu. You know, Seven Pillars of Wisdom on how to make Bolshevik muscles go backward. That's what that speech meant. He knew it wouldn't accomplish anything, except a roar from Moscow, but it was a jujitsu tactic. So, if we are forced to agree that peace is not around the corner, that a shooting war is not around the corner, I think it would be useful to accept a formula that would define the exact conditions, some-

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thing like a state of War-in-Peace. We have no precedence and no rules for such a relationship.

Last December I was out in Pittsburgh. One of the things I wanted to see was that battlefield in Monongahela where General Braddock fought in 1755. It is all grown up with steel mills now. I reread Francis Parkman to get the story straight. General Braddock was a very gallant soldier but knew nothing about Indians. There was shooting from behind the trees. So he spoke to the Virginians, to George Washington. He said, "Stand out there and fight like soldiers," and so on. Afterwards he said, "This isn't war. This is murder." He lost his force, and he himself was wounded and died.

Now it seems to me that the democracies are doing what Braddock was doing, using the rules and principles of honorable war against the Indians in America. If we are going to survive the long attrition, we have to get rid of the General Braddock notions. One of the first things to do is to decide on a definition of this struggle—e. g., War-in-Peace.

Then a second decision. I think this is tearing us apart—this loyalty, security-risk business. The Bolsheviks feel more and more confident that all they have to do is wait while we blow ourselves apart. Students of history have seen all this happening before in Greece and in Rome. And we are seeing it happening to us—this indecision among the citizens on the question of loyalty and security. It is not a question of loyalty, actually. It is a question of security risk at the policy level or for classified material.

But in judging and in charging our citizens, I believe the issue is the degree of tolerance they show for the enemies of our society, internal and external. In their minds, they are completely loyal and they may even think they are good security risks. Many of them

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are frustrated intellectuals. They call themselves liberals—actually they are to liberalism what Hellenistic was to Hellenic—something pseudo, subsequent, and Easternized. Many find refuge in the academic profession and there they rest on their morals in a sort of detached intellectual neutrality. The label is given to those people I think, by the writer of Revelations: “Because thou art neither hot nor cold, but lukewarm, I will spew thee from my mouth.” I think these people who are neutral in times of peril will be spewed from the mouth of history. Even the little peasants of Eastern Europe have a firmer grasp on history. They say that in times of crisis, either you sing with the angels or you will be forced to howl with the wolves. There is no happy middle ground. Now perhaps the Supreme Court will get us out of this trap. It is bad business and is getting worse.

The third point of the area requiring decision: What is the political direction of our country? This is something that will have to go to a national decision. You and I are living with it. Economically it involves government spending—the danger of bankruptcy. It includes academic folks and service people, and all those on fixed incomes and frozen salaries. We see what has been happening in Europe. There has been a transfer of power since 1914 from the middle class which ruled for over a hundred years. Power is transferred from the middle class to the industrial working class. The middle class is being dispossessed by a war of taxes.

This means in Europe, and will mean for us, more and more people shifted over to government employment, a swelling bureaucracy—the bureaucracy then absorbing the intelligensia and taking on the mentality of trade unionism. The creative instinct then dies. Who then will bear the torch? There is a line in Virgil that says, “Easy is the descent to Hell.” You can misquote Virgil a little bit by saying that easy is the descent to mediocrity. As Joseph Alsop

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wrote, "Mediocrity begets mediocrity," whether by the crony system or however else.

When we stop putting quality into the individual, then we start making a mass man. In mass men the Bolsheviks are a long way ahead of us. I can say, as a historian, and I have spent most of my time studying history, when everyone is safe, then no one is free. As we move in that direction the time will come when our Statue of Liberty will drop the torch and merely hold a monkey wrench. Security—a monkey wrench!

At any rate, if that process is abrupt then we will have too few moral leaders in the next generation. If it is gradual and spread over a number of decades, then perhaps we might train moral leaders and be able to pass on to them the mantle so that the standards will not perish. That is really the great issue of the welfare state. And yet at night when you are alone you sometimes can hear Madame Lafarge with her knitting needles at the foot of the guilotine. It can all happen again because the brutalization of western man is something that we can't measure in our times.

Now the fourth question: What kind of Germany do we want? America has not made up her mind. There our trumpet has a very uncertain sound. Some Americans say, "Let German bodies defend the Ruhr." Germany's historic role was in the North Sea, the cradle of our democracy. Western Germany is now the keystone of the arch of a third power in defense of the Atlantic seaboard. Much of our democracy came from German tribal sources. We can't have it both ways as I see it. Either we take western Germany into the western family and promote unification of all Germany, or we must be prepared to see the Germans accept the Bolshevik unification on the assumption that they, the Germans, in time can outwit the Russians. That is why I feel pained in reading

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the "Times" this morning that they are not going to allow the Bonn government to have proper representation in the London meeting. I think it is wrong. I think we should override England—the Labor government at any rate—on such things. Our bigger hope for Germany is a Franco-German rapprochement.

A friend of mine, just back from Paris, was telling me about the new O. E. E. C. headquarters building which these governments themselves paid for and built on the grounds of the chateau that formerly belonged to the Rothschilds. They were confronted with a problem in bringing in the machinery. There was a beautiful line of trees there. Now the Bolshevik method would be to say, "To hell with the trees, get them out." I must say that the American method would also tend in that direction. But these people did not think that way. They erected scaffolding and managed with a great deal of effort to bring in the machinery over the tops of the trees. They are very proud because that method signifies the spirit in this new Europe: preserve what is left of beauty and at the same time achieve something functional and streamlined. In that new Europe there is that essential keystone place for Germany. So what do we do? Do we throw Germany to the wolves or do we take her in? The Germans would like to know and we have to make up our minds soon.

The fifth area is somewhat similar: What do we do about Japan? Asia is, of course, in this process of rebirth and has been my main subject for study for twenty years. There will be five-year plans attempted around Asia. As these new states in the southern zone move forward in nationalism and independence, I rather expect to see a shift in diplomatic emphasis from Eastern Europe. We are going to be squeezed out there, and then we will shift our emphasis over to Southern Asia.

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Now here is Japan—our special problem! Japan had worked out her old solution with the material at hand—an economic solution. We stopped it and crushed Japan. So we have to provide something else or let Japan go the road of China. What are we going to do? Are we going to let Japan's industry recover based on a two-way exchange—raw materials, industrial products, etc. with Southeast Asia? That would seem to be our policy.

Let us terminate the state of war with Japan. We have more control out there than we have in Europe. Especially in General MacArthur we have a Pro-Consul on a heroic scale. I think we ought to bring him home and give him a Roman triumph to show him that his work will be perpetuated and get on with the job so that we can hold on to Japan. That should be done soon. Here we do have master control.

Now the sixth question, which is on a larger scale. Let us consider whether our crises today involves Bolshevik expansion *per se* or old style Russian imperialism. The Russians in history have always absorbed their rulers. A number of times a ruler such as Peter the Great, or Alexander the First has made great effort to modernize the Russians. The process goes on for a while and then it lapses. Russianism re-emerges after several decades. Is that going to happen this time? We have had three attempts at hegemony in Europe—in modern times I mean—French--Louis XIV, Napoleon; Teuton--Kaiser Wilhelm, and then Hitler. Now comes Veliki Ross led by the Bolsheviks. We will have to determine whether this is a racial thing or purely revolutionary Bolshevism. What will we be fighting in 20 years? Will it be a type of imperialism that is more Russian than Bolshevik? Or will the Bolsheviks by that time have taken over all the satellites and all of Asia, and confront us with a revolutionary imperialism. You must understand that this is a Bolshevik-hate-America campaign. It may

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peter out. We don't know. All I know is that the Russians never had their day. One fascinating study is to try to discover in advance when they will bring in their brands. Will they revert to religious, reevangelization, given the freedom to do so?

We can expect a Bolshevik claim for Alaska somewhere along the line. They may make it for nuisance value. They'll simply say that the corrupt Tzarist government officials sold Alaska, that it was never legal, etc., etc., etc. They wouldn't expect to get it back of course, but just say it for nuisance value. That will come. So in order to defeat the enemy in a cold or hot war, we must differ from them, not in degree but in kind, and understand whether they are predominantly Russian, Communist, or Bolshevik.

Now the seventh question, and I appeal to you as warriors: Who are our fighting Allies? Let us pick our Allies and give them of our substance and our vitality, and let the others fade. Let us not permit the false ideas of our peace mongers to interfere with this lasting decision in strategy. The first thing that strikes us in thinking of Allies, is that our friends of yesteryear may be our foes of tomorrow. Two good examples are Czechoslovakia and China. Conversely, people that we fought may be our friends in strategic bases tomorrow—Germany in the west, and Japan.

Much depends on the ruling group at the time. Italy, for instance, was with us in the first World War and against us in the second. Turkey was against us in the first, but preserved a neutrality in our favor in the second. We must seek allies in terms of these shifting affinities, and then have one criterion. Yes, send supplies here and there, but consider would we go hunting tigers with the people in question? Would they climb trees when a tiger came? Let us have it simple and direct. If we would hunt tigers

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with them, then let's build them up. Our friends include the nations in the North Sea area in general, Western Germany, and also Greece and Turkey. They are tiger hunters and so is Japan. The Japanese will defend their rice patties. I believe Franco-Spain will fight too. When our strategic thoughts will turn to Spain we will suddenly find that we haven't been so terribly hostile to Franco after all. His country will fit into the strategic picture. Therefore, who are our fighting Allies? Let's decide and hand out our favors accordingly.

My eighth point concerns our principles. What are they to be in this type of struggle, this War-in-Peace. They can't be haphazard. You in the Navy know that well. The first essential in regard to our principles is to know the enemy's principles. The outstanding principle of the Bolsheviks is continuous expansion without shooting wars. Their justification of that is their definition of popular sovereignty. For instance, they have sixteen union republics, and they say that each one is sovereign and each is equal, at an international conference, to any foreign state. Therefore it doesn't lose its popular sovereignty on becoming part of the glorious Soviet Union. Each Union Republic is considered sovereign because it has the constitutional right to withdraw. Of course, we could prove the illusion of all that. However, this point I want to make: By popular sovereignty the Bolsheviks have justified a system of expansion which is without precedent in history.

We will not review the whole list of territories they have taken since 1939. You will see how easy and wonderful it is for them, and how we have allowed it all to happen because we didn't contest them on this method of popular sovereignty. Start at this point: the frontiers. That is where popular sovereignty can be utilized. Note that in the various frontiers there is a tribal kinship with the peoples outside the frontiers. This is utilized by the

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Bolsheviks when it comes to expansion. The first one that is of special interest to you in the Navy is the Norwegian frontier. Examine the Arctic coast, the Kola Peninsula to the Atlantic. In that area live the people of Anderson's fairy tales, the Lapps. I forget the exact number overall, but they exist in the Russian part, in Sweden, and in Norway. In that area is the largest and most valuable northernmost port of the world, Narvik. If they controlled the Arctic coast, there wouldn't be that convoy trouble around North Cape again as in the last war. A Lapps' Peoples Republic would unite the natives of that northern zone. They would probably even speak of a Lapp proletariat. They don't have to be consistent, you see, in putting this thing over.

Another hot frontier with a similar tribal kinship present is down in Macedonia. I am not quite sure in my mind just what is a Macedonian. We know that some of them live in Greece, some in Yugoslavia and some in Bulgaria. I don't know whether there are any in Albania or not, but the Macedonian movement is always there. They do have a literary language of their own. So when the movement comes, when it is propitious for the Russians to put the heat on Macedonia, then they will operate out of Bulgaria.

Another interesting area is in Turkey, U. S. S. R. because the Armenian questions people outside the frontier. Armenia, of course, in the 13th and 14th centuries was a very powerful state in the Near East, thus the memory of a glorious tradition. When the Russians get ready to put the heat on Turkey for control of the Straits, then a Greater Armenian Peoples Republic is to be expected. It is a set-up. The same thing applies to Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan people on the Soviet side and the Azerbaijan people on the Persian side are of the same Turkish stock, neither Persian or Russian. The strength of this racial desire or racial coherence is again an instrument that the Bolsheviks could and would use when

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they get ready to push for the Suez and India. Now note the relations of China with the old tributary states. Siam as well as Burma fall into a special category. Anything can happen there. Then in the course of twenty years with this Russian glacier coming into the Bay of Bengal on the East and down to the Persian Gulf on the West, India would be in the pincers. That may be what we'll see before we ever get to a shooting war.

So I say, that confronted with enemy principles in operation, we must have our principles of our aim. Let us see how far the immutable principles of war, so-called, could be applied to a prolonged attrition without shooting.

First—Objective. The objective in this type of war I have described is to overcome the enemy's will to expand through the use of popular sovereignty without shooting. That is what he wants—to expand without shooting. Now we must overcome his will. That is the objective. The second principle—Offensive. That means to control the time table. A direct idea of offensive is to control the time table and take the initiative. Let us dwell on those two and leaving aside all the others—economy of force, movement, surprise, etc.—except for logistics.

My ninth requirement in this War-in-Peace is Logistics—what to do about material production, imports, exports, etc. Logistics is a requirement and a principle. Effective preparations and decisions must be made to determine the necessary amounts of supplies and man power to be utilized.

The tenth point, and this is my clinching thought in this development, is what interim strategy should we have at this time in this War-in-Peace? I arrive at that by giving our interim strategy if we applied just the two first and most important

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principles of war. I would say that the principle of objectives is the restoration of the balance of power in Europe. That is our only way to get back to free wheeling. I don't want to go through the history of security, from unity to balance of power, to this collective idea, the universal type under the League of Nations and the U. N., and to the regional type that we are now working out in the North Atlantic Treaty.

I will say, as a student of history, that I believe that the only feasible method of the state system, as presently constituted, is balance of power. That is exactly what we are doing. I think we have no complaint to find with the State Department. By the political means (the North Atlantic Alliance, plus the Franco-German rapprochement,) the economic means (the ECA) and the military means, this process is now going on. Military assistance to governments of Europe would strengthen their hands against internal sabotage and destroy the illusion that an aggressor could have a quick campaign without much bloodshed, as the Germans believed in 1914 and again in 1939. Above all, while we are arming Europe, the most important objective is to deny the Atlantic seaboard to the Russian snorkels. German submarines in two wars came pretty close to pulling it off. Maybe next time the Russian snorkels, with German help, might be able to do it. At any rate, when that vacuum created by World War II is filled, and Western Europe integrated—at least in a military sense—then, with a Third Power in existence, the Balance of Power is restored.

Now the second principle—the principle of offensive. I will try to give you something new which you can toss back at me. And I won't be able to defend it. I think that the offensive is just as necessary to victory in this type of War-in-Peace as it is in a shooting war. Some of you will recall that the French, at the time of the Battle of the Marne, retreated, dragging their guns

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through the dust. For days they retreated, retreated, retreated. Finally came the order, "Stand on the hills, south of the Marne. Point your guns north and get ready to advance." Well, you might say a thrill went through that army. A psychological change came over the French after their retreat; retreat and then advance! That is what I want to see happen to our country. First we must take the *offensive* in this interim strategy (and it is only interim).

The Russians stalk out of the U. N. Let them stay out. They need the U. N. Let us not forget it. We must not repeat the blunder we made during the war, assuming that they wanted a separate peace. That was a crowning blunder stemming, I believe, from the White House. Let them get the idea that the U. N. is pointed towards an alliance outside the Iron Curtain. But let us not make the mistake of saying that it is useless to operate without the Bolsheviks. As for the Chinese delegates who are the targets of their fire, if we throw Dr. Tsiang to the wolves we will deserve very small credit in history. Keep him on ice and give him some function until the Assembly meets in September, and then, who knows, we might be able to run him as a candidate and get a new Secretary General. It might be a good idea. That would be putting cockleburrs under the saddle of the Bolsheviks. That's what I call *offensive*.

Now the offensive we can take in regards to the atomic affair. International inspection would mean the end of Bolshevism. What about those fifteen million or more slave laborers? They simply cannot allow foreigners to run around in Russia. So if we had their consent to inspection, it would be postponed. But we can do a lot amongst ourselves. We can at least unify the western allies on atomic policies.

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Next come the offensive in regard to Germany. Let us terminate the state of war with all German people—not only Western Germany, but Eastern Germany. It is not yet the time for making a peace treaty. The Bolsheviks may go in and perhaps annex Eastern Germany. We have them in a box now. We can do a little jujitsu if we are clever enough. The Kremlin cannot unify Germany without making a fifth partition of Poland. That's our jujitsu. Let's get on with it. And immediately what shall we do? They talk about launching the youths of Eastern Germany into Berlin in May. Let's send General Clay back to Berlin. He's the idol of the German people. What are we doing with him now? Why, he is lecturing at Harvard this week. There's a bigger job than that for him. Send him back there with any kind of cooked-up mission just so he is there in Berlin, because he is a figure that the Germans trust. It would be a signal to them that we do not intend to get out of Berlin. Take the offensive.

Go in and make an offensive in regard to this national communism from outside the Iron Curtain—Yugoslavia, China, and the others. The State Department has a policy of erosion, I don't know exactly what it means but it sounds good. I would say that the offensive in the Far East should include the termination of the state of war in Japan and building up the economic answer to Japan through southeast Asia and eventually point to trade with China so as to get Japan off the taxpayers' neck here in America. These offensives must be multiplied, using all types—Point Four economic strategy, etc. My idea is that somewhere along the line, after we get into the habit, we can take the offensive. I don't mean at the drop of a hat, but to work it out in time. As long as we do not take the offensive we will never get control of the time table. If we do take it somewhere along the line while we are keeping our atoms dry, we will awaken one day to find we have the stop watch and that we are calling the time.

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A long buildup is necessary because our people assume that an offensive is something wicked and practiced only by aggressors bent on a shooting war. That isn't true at all. An offensive is the only way that we can save ourselves from perishing through attrition and from crumbling within. As an example of our blundering zeal, I could quote the Nuremberg trials. We have got to get as far away from Nuremberg psychology as we possibly can. We have to adopt a technique we have never met before in history. In other words, we must call on God to help us. Everything was a living contradiction in these trials, with the Russians being judges in their own cause and preventing the Katyn massacre from coming before the court. I won't cite it, but I do hope that members of the college will take advantage of the opportunity to read about the Katyn massacre in the report I am leaving here.

Now there is just one more thought. As part of our offensive technique—our preservation of strength—let us keep our President at home. By that I mean that every time an American President has gone abroad, it has brought disaster on Western civilization. It looks as though the President goes into the camp of the Philistines and, like Samson, he gets his hair cut when he is asleep. You can see it in the case of President Wilson for instance. There he was with his Fourteen Points, the loftiest peace program ever devised by man. He was sitting pretty. Then came the armistice! All he had to do was to sit still and say, "Here we are. Make your terms and bring them over to me. I have the Army. I have the Navy. I have the money. So decide between yourselves and then let me O. K. it." Something happened to him in November. I do not know whether Mrs. Wilson had a yen for Paris or not. I do know that the French Ambassador handed a memo to President Wilson proposing that the victorious Allies not negotiate with the vanquished powers, but decide among themselves the terms and then call in the Germans merely to sign. That was contrary to Wilson's prin-

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ciples of life. But he simply tossed the thing in his trunk. After all he was going to Paris, in spite of the fact that Colonel House said, "Don't Mr. President, don't come to Europe. Stay there in America." He went to Paris.

President Wilson landed in Brest and one description which I read in the French papers said that there hadn't been such a scene since Julius Caesar set out to conquer Britain in 54 B. C. From there he came to Paris. But did he follow Colonel House's injunction to get on the American train, go to the American part of the front, speak to the troops, then fall back to the balcony at the Embassy in Paris to receive the plaudits of the multitudes and then get back on the *SS George Washington* and go home? No! On the fourteenth of December, the crowd just choked the square from wall to wall. Here came the Messiah from the west! And with Mrs. Wilson in that shining new automobile—well, it was more than the old Presbyterian could stand. He was just carried away and he stayed. He lingered there amongst the Philistines and began to get his hair cut. One by one his points went down the drain. And in the final analysis, he got his covenant hitched onto the treaty and he had to agree to all those things—the giving away of Shantung, etc., which caused the Senate to toss the whole thing out of the window.

Looking back, we see that if President Wilson had only stayed at home and allowed the mountain to come to Mohammed, history would have been different. Who learned a lesson from that? Not President Roosevelt, because he used to go over and have a chat with Stalin without taking his long spoon. Remember? And so there has been one conference after another. We won't go into them. We will just say that there was disaster stemming from Yalta which will perhaps be with the human race for a century. And then President Truman came to Potsdam. At least he

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put his chop on things. The power of the President is so vast that we should not allow him to go on the front side of the Statue of Liberty.

You read in the press, as we are reading now, about other Presidential trips. All these people, including even Senator Tydings who knows better, and Churchill, who knows better with his tongue in cheek, know it is all nonsense. We have had enough presidential haircuts to last us for a century. So I say keep the President at home as part of this new type of thinking.