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## Voice of America

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**VOICE OF AMERICA**

A lecture delivered by  
*Mr. Foy D. Kohler*  
at the Naval War College  
January 18, 1951

In talking with you this morning, I'm going to tell you about a very practical operation, and I'm going to devote a lot of time just to the purely physical description of the operation, because I find that few people are cognizant of it at all. Despite this, we have 100,000 people who think they know the job better than we do, and show no restraint whatsoever in saying so.

A day or so ago, I picked up a *Harper's* magazine which mentioned "The Mumble in the Voice of America". It wasn't really talking about the Voice of America at all. The Voice was mentioned a few items in the first paragraph and the only time the article did mention VOA, it made glaring errors in pure statements of fact. It went on to say that we have been missing the boat because the story to tell is that Communism stems from a very rambunctious minority, that it is minority controlled. Well, we have a lot of those people who learn in this late day the things that we have been operating on for a good many years now. They think they have made a great discovery.

I'm going to talk to you about the radio side of the Information Program. But I want to say, as a preface, that it is not the only side. At least in the free world, in those parts of the world that are accessible to us, we have an all-around program which includes the distribution of pamphlets and motion pictures, the setting

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Mr. Kohler is Chief of the Division of International Broadcasting, Department of State, in charge of all Voice of America programs.

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up of libraries and cultural institutions, the publication of books in the local languages, and the like. Radio is the one medium which operates not only in this area but it is the one which we are depending on to get through the Curtain. During the course of my talk and during the question period, I shall try to give you as good an idea as I can whether we are accomplishing this and whether we are going to be able to do it.

Now, in just plain physical terms, what is the Voice of America? I have had a lot of ladies ask me where our station is and things like that; apparently conceiving the Voice of America as a radio station comparable to their local radio station, but with a few strange characters around who are multilingual and can say the same thing in many different languages. Well it isn't that; it is a colossal radio operation. NBC and CBS combined are pretty small, as radio operations go, compared with what is, and particularly with what will be, the Voice of America.

First of all, we will start with installations in the U. S. I asked for this map to be put up here to help me describe to you the system. The basis of the operation is short-wave signals from transmitters located in the States. We have 38 of these short-wave transmitters at the present time. Some are located up in the Boston area, some around New York metropolitan area, another center near Cincinnati, and two centers on the West Coast in California. Now those transmitters are not very powerful. They run about one hundred kilowatts, most of them, and they are capable of delivering a short-wave signal direct to the target areas; but principally they are relied on to deliver the signal to our relay bases overseas. They are really the heart and core of our system and they are necessary, principally, because of our geographical location which gives us certain handicaps in the international broadcasting field. So these signals go out from the continental U. S. to

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relay bases abroad, with the exception of Latin-America. Latin-America is serviced by the Cincinnati and West Coast stations and all we have down there is our direct short-wave, plus local relays. This short-wave is picked up and relayed by about fifty local radio stations throughout Latin America. Other than that, the rest of the world, as far as we reach it today, is serviced principally by our relay bases.

The first of these bases is in England where we lease from BBC. That base has both medium and short-wave transmitters and covers the entire European area with short-wave deep into the Soviet Union. A considerable portion of Western Europe is also covered with medium-wave signal.

Our prize relay base—one we own ourselves, and I trust will continue to own after the turn-over to the Germans—is at Munich. There we have a very powerful medium-wave transmitter, generally known as Dumbo, plus a whole battery of short-wave transmitters.

Our newest base is down in Tangier, where at the present time, we have a battery of six short-wave transmitters which is going to be augmented in the near future.

Another base which has come on the air within the last six months is at Salonika in Greece, established and operated by agreement with the Greek government. We started out there with just a medium-wave relay transmitter intended only to cover the Southern Balkans; but actually our tests with that transmitter have been surprisingly good and we find that we deliver a very good signal to Warsaw and to the Black Sea area.

Now, the other side of the world is serviced principally by the California stations which, incidentally, are connected by land

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lines to our New York studios; and then their signals are picked up by relay bases that we have in Hawaii and the Philippines. The Hawaiian base has only short-wave transmitters, for obvious reasons, and covers a considerable area of the Far East. The Philippine base, just north of Manila, has a good medium-wave transmitter, and again, a battery of short-wave transmitters. We use those for relay, not only for Far-Eastern programs but also for programs to the Soviet Union.

In the expansion program, which is now in progress, we are going to establish more bases. First of all, we are going to augment greatly the Philippine base with a very high-powered medium-wave installation, that is, with the standard broadcast-band transmitter. That will be of an order of 1,000 kilowatts. None of this type has ever been in operation there before. As a prelude, we have had intensive studies made by M. I. T. and a group of associated scientists. We are going to try a medium-wave with a highly directional curtain-wave of antennas, which will probably deliver a radio signal of a strength never before heard in that area.

I have a team over in Japan completing negotiations for another such station, accompanied by a battery of short-wave transmitters on Okinawa.

When those plants are installed, we will be able to cover the whole of the Far East with, we hope, a practically unjammable signal.

We have also had in our plans a relay base for the Middle East. We had hoped to have that base on the air this year but ran into difficulties in connection with site negotiations. Arrangements for the location are about settled; the base will be at Kuwait. Here we will have a medium-wave outlet with a couple of short-

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wave transmitters, and also another one of these very high-powered medium-wave plants. Now the target area for Kuwait will be to cover not only all of the Near East but also all of Central Asia and Southern Russia. In this way, we can really try to get to those minority, suppressed nationalities of Central Asia and the Caucasus regions.

I should like now to return to the domestic operation. The 38 transmitters which we have in the U. S. are partly owned by the government and partly by private companies. The latter were in the field of short-wave broadcasting, more or less experimentally, during the last war. So it is a miscellaneous collection and it is not as powerful as it should be. Above all, it doesn't give us the rear-base security that we should have in case, let us say, we lose some of our outlying relay bases. So we are starting this year with two double megawatt short-wave plants. One will probably be located on the East Coast and the other out toward the West Coast. That, for all practical purposes, should give us a signal to our relay bases that is unjammable. Up to the present time, Soviet jamming has been able to interfere seriously with our original broadcast signal out of the States, so that relay bases do not get a good signal. We have been forced a number of times to have recourse to a commercial point of delivery for our broadcast signal.

Next year, if the Congress approves of it, we are going into a tremendous expansion program. The Bureau of the Budget and the President have already done so. We will complete what will, in fact, be a ring of very high-powered medium-wave and short-wave transmitters around the Soviet Union. That will call for an appropriation of something over \$100,000,000 and I shall tell you in a moment how we expect to go ahead with it. But if that should go through and we are able to negotiate satisfactorily, we would hope to put another very high-powered medium-wave trans-

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mitter in Munich. We would like to put another one in Tangier, one in Salonika, and one in Kuwait. Also, we would like another one on Ceylon, but of course, we have not negotiated for that.

We also have a working arrangement with the British at Singapore where they have built a new base and we can either trade them time or conceivably we would eventually go into Singapore with our own transmitters. We would also strengthen the home base with four more of these double-megawatt plants, which at that point would make our present 38 World War II transmitters pretty obsolete. But we are the kind of people who can put old equipment to good use. We would take these transmitters and use them to trade-off with other governments to get concessions for local relays and things like that. Then, in connection with the expansion program, we are also planning to put somewhere another one of these relay bases to cover the Latin-American region, so that we can really hit all over the world.

Now there are a lot of problems connected with this, some of which I have suggested to you. One of those is the question of sites. At Okinawa, we have territory under our own control and I'm glad to say that we had much less trouble with the Army than we had with foreign governments. In other places we have a lot of negotiating to do. Just for example, there is a Middle East base that has been on and off a considerable number of times between the Persians and the British. The trouble there is that Persia has certain claims to Bahrein which is, by all odds, the most ideal site for the station. We were pushing ahead on Bahrein, but we finally ran into a brick wall. Eventually, we should have an agreement in principle for using Kuwait. Fortunately, Kuwait has been dressed up some in terms of logistics, because an oil company has now started developing there. In addition to that, we hope to solve some of the site problems, or

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at least get a headstart on them, by a method which I think will probably be of interest to you.

After talking with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy in Washington, we had a firm of naval architects working on a plan for mounting these new transmitters on vessels, leaving them on the vessels but tying them into a shore antenna installation. That will save about a year in terms of how soon we can get them on the air, because even while we are building the shore antenna we can start broadcasting with a balloon rig. The other thing of course is that it will give us a very great security factor. We will be able to pull the thing up and move it out if we have to. Also, it will give us elasticity and mobility, depending on what direction events may take. So that if we wanted to strengthen our propaganda in the Far East, for example, we could arrange to do that by moving this floating relay base.

There is another great problem that is facing us; and I must say that two years ago I did not really know such a thing as a frequency existed. You have got to have a frequency for every transmitter, and that picture is about as black as it can be. There are not too many frequencies, I have discovered, especially in the band allocated to international broadcasting. Moreover, the Russians, who are well ahead of us in this type of thing, had gone ahead and registered about half of those years ago, just on speculation I take it. Anyway they have them registered.

There have been a number of conferences to try to sort out and assign frequencies for international broadcasting. None of them have been successful. The claims of all the various countries have been unreasonable. They have been beyond anything that they could possibly hope to do. Moreover, in the midst of these conferences the Russians started jamming, which in itself amounts

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to breaking all the international agreements there are on the subject. So we have just gone ahead and tried not to step on the toes of our friends on a more or less preempted unoccupied frequency.

It is even more difficult in the case of medium-wave frequencies. That is the type that comes out of the radios in your homes, standard broadcast frequencies; and they are very important in some parts of the world because that is the normal range in which the local citizen listens to his radio. So we are very anxious to penetrate with medium-wave signals, especially into Western Europe.

Under this fancy plan which they cooked up for the allocation of frequencies, we were frozen out of the medium-wave range. They had a conference in Copenhagen a year and a half ago called the European Regional Conference. It was supposed to include only European countries since medium-wave is not supposed to carry as far as short wave; especially with limitations on power of not more than 150 kilowatts per transmitter. They froze us out completely at the Copenhagen Convention so we said, "We won't play then." Thus by refusing to recognize Copenhagen we have been able to provide our own relay base in Munich, and the local German stations including the RIAS transmitter in Berlin, with frequencies which really don't belong to us but which are not being used by anyone else. So we are on the air at least, and we are going to stay there too.

I might add, to complete the picture of this international radio network, that we do have a lot of overseas relays. They are very important, particularly for Western Europe and other parts of the world where people are used to listening to the standard broadcast band and to their local stations. Fortunately, we are on

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the French national network every day. Our French program, "ICI New York." is picked up by the French national network every day and for a half-hour any Frenchman who has his radio tuned to his local station is listening to the "Voice of America." The same is true in Germany. The same is true in Austria. The same is true in Greece. It was true in Persia, until recently, when a minor political turn caused us to be kicked off the air; but we now have information that leads us to believe that we will get back on the air when the political turn runs its full course. And that has been true off and on, with great variations, in Korea. It is true in various parts of Latin-America.

Now what does this international network carry? At the moment it is operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. It is carrying programs in 26 languages for some 30 program hours, some of them being simultaneous—we haven't found any way to stretch the day yet. The content of those programs is something over 200,000 words every day. Those 200,000 words are culled from, I suppose, at least ten times that many words of source material which comes to us from news services, from telegrams, from embassies all over the world, from intelligence reports, from the F. B. I. monitoring service, from publications and books, not only in English but in every language that exists both here at home and throughout the world. I might say in passing that one of the benefits of having this operation tied in officially is that we have full access to material, not only for our use but for our guidance, and it goes through all the categories of classification. Without it you couldn't do a truly effective job.

Now who does this? At the present level of operations, we are running with about 700 people in New York to man these 26 language sections, to carry on programming in those languages, and to supply all the central and operating services and policy con-

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trols. We are about to go into an enormous expansion program, as you know. A year from now, we should be broadcasting in over fifty languages, if we can find the personnel. At that time we will have a staff in New York of about 1600 or 1700 plus about 400 more operating the relay bases overseas.

Each one of the 70 odd programs that goes out every day from studios in New York, supplemented by our Washington studio, is separately tailored for the target area. Everyone of them is written by the desks which have area experts and language experts, and are manned to a very considerable extent by American citizens, many of whom are citizens who originated from the area to which they are broadcasting. I might mention in passing that in addition to the central radio program service, we are in the transcription business. In fact, we are providing programs on a local basis around the world through the United States information officers in the Embassies and Consulates everywhere. We produce and send out to them about 15,000 transcribed platters of programs every month which they place on local radio networks. We send them some 3,000 scripts for use in the production of local radio programs which, you might say, are calculated to attain tactical objectives. That side of the service we want to expand a great deal this year.

In terms of the actual content, these programs vary a great deal. A summary figure indicates that there is about 30 odd percent news, about 60% analysis and features of one kind or another, and the balance music. But that doesn't tell very much because each program is tailored for its target area, making it a little hard to break down a picture of those 200,000 words. In categories, we might say that behind the curtain it is almost entirely news and commentary roughly on a fifty-fifty basis. There are a number of reasons for that. One is the difficulty of getting through

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jamming. Another one is that there are risks to the listener in those areas; and when he tunes in he isn't likely to want to hear music, but what is happening and how we see it, and that is what we try to give him. Behind the curtain, therefore, our programs are pretty direct, full of news and straight truth and policy. We draw a strict line between the regimes and the people in all those countries, including Russia itself. At the moment, we are broadcasting in all the satellite languages of Eastern Europe as well as in two Chinese dialects, Mandarin and Cantonese. Our expansion program is going to put us into all the splinter languages. We have already added Ukrainian to that schedule, and within the next six months or so we hope to add Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Georgian, Armenian, and later, about three or four of the dialects of Central Asia. (Azerbaijani, Uzbeki, Turki). Then, on the other side, we hope to add Amoy and Swatow of the Chinese, during the next year, as well as a lot of the languages outside.

The programs of the free-world contain a lot less news because, generally speaking, the people in those areas have their own sources of news which are reasonably objective. First of all, we concentrate in terms of news in giving the full news from *our* side; and then, more generally, our features, calculated to overcome what we know to be attitudes and prejudices against the U. S. A., and to give them a better picture of our policy.

While most of these programs, as they go out, are specially written in the language of the people to whom they are addressed, we do have a great deal of central source material which has been adapted. We don't translate anything, we adapt it. Almost every program will have a regular weekly economic commentary in which we carry on what is a reasonable propaganda line. An example to which, incidentally, the Kremlin has shown itself to be very sensitive is giving the comparison of the

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cost of living around the world in terms of hours of work for items that people really use; for shoes, food, clothing and for shelter. We have an agricultural commentary section which deals with the Mendelian and the Meturian Lysenko disputes and things like that. We have a very close working relationship with labor and with the labor unions in this country. And to this audience I can say that a great many statements which you read in the press in which Greene or Curran or Murray, or Reuther, or some of those fellows are sounding off on foreign affairs, or on the necessity for European labor to unload M. D. A. P., is written at 57th and Broadway in New York and properly placed.

We have handled the basic ideological question in the past on not too expert a basis. We have had some amateurs around like Charlie Thayer my predecessor, and myself who pretend to know something about Russia, but are not really profound students. Now, however we are setting up to go into that on a much firmer basis so that we can present the argument in the proper dialectical terms to those audiences which have been raised on it. We have Bertram Wolfe for example, who is the author of "Three Who Made A Revolution,"—a man who is probably more profoundly steeped in both the Marxist side and the American side than anyone else in the country.

We do quite a number of dramatic shows that we think will be effective. We have several, such as Orwell's books, his dramatic shows, which have had considerable acclaim—where we have been able to get acclaim. I don't know how they were behind the Curtain. We used the dramatic technique a lot to put on such things as: "Who Said It?" "Do You Remember?". The titles speak for themselves. And all the things they don't remember, when they read Soviet or Communist publications, we try to remind them of, as well as the things they have said which they have

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later stressed. Another program that is something like that, was started in the Russian language. It is a calendar of notable events in Russian history that we consider useful.

We do a lot of what is known as Special Events. For example, we have had a team down in Mexico to cover the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Meeting. We also covered the Congress of Intellectuals that took place in Berlin. The International and Social Council Meeting that will be held in Santiago next month will likewise be covered by our teams. Those are wonderful places in which we can get live material in practically all languages.

Of course we cover the U. N. very extensively. I might just add as a tribute to the domestic industry that there is a great deal of difference between domestic and foreign broadcasting, but we do get whole-hearted cooperation from the radio industry here at home and also from various organizations such as AFRA, the American Federation of Radio Artists and from Petrillo. We are the only people in the world, I think, who have carte blanche from him. We can use any music that comes off the air. As regards copyrights, we use at least 3,000 items a year. If we had to pay for all the things that we are given access to, it would cost us millions of dollars.

Terms of policy control that I have suggested to you, and the very fact that we are a part of the State Department gives us access to all the guidance and background material that is pouring in from all over the world all the time. I will also say that in the last year, especially since Ed Barrett and Joe Phillips have come into the State Department in Washington, and have devoted their time to this question, we have a much better policy liaison extending throughout the State Department, so that any time we feel the need of guidance we can get it.

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For example, we start off the day with a meeting in my office at 9:30, which is a fairly convenient hour because the bulk of our programs go out in the afternoon and the evening. You can appreciate that by realizing the time factor. To get the best evening listening hours in Europe, we broadcast from noon on, here in the U. S. Programs to Latin-America come in the evening. I can never keep up with China. We broadcast the breakfast show at night and the night show at breakfast time. However, the bulk of the programs can get the pitch for the day the first thing in the morning. So about 9:30 every morning the heads of all the desks come into my office, including all of the principal writers, news-writers, commentators, etc. At this time, we have an overnight guidance from Washington rounding up things that they know are coming up, and deciding what kind of pitch to give them. By the time we get into the meeting, we have all been through all the morning news on our own board and we have looked at the Times and the Tribune and we are ready to decide what the pitch for the day is. All in all, I think that we now have the policy side working out very well. We have to double check on them. First of all we try to start with the selection of highly responsible people as the heads of all these desks. People who know what they are doing and who could only make one mistake. We have our own monitoring system, however, which spot-checks on all the programs that go out, to test whether they are in line with policy guidances, etc. And then of course we have a good many millions of people who are monitoring us all over the world and who don't hesitate to let us know if they think we are out of line.

There are still some shortcomings. As a matter of fact the thing that we don't have that gives the Kremlin a considerable advantage is this kind of policy guidance: When the President makes a major statement, nobody needs policy guidance, the policy is right in it. In a sense, policy guidance is a means of overcoming things

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that are difficult to deal with because the material is bad. If we had a system whereby the policy would go out to all the sources of news, so that the President and the Secretary of the Navy would say the same thing, that would facilitate our job quite a lot. Then we wouldn't need policy guidance on anything, because it would be there automatically—the policy would be in the material. So there are a lot of things that we could do to get some improvement there and I'm glad to say that I think we are achieving it because, throughout the government at least, a great deal of the source of the news that we deal with comes from the government. Consciousness of the psychological and the propaganda factors of what we are doing is growing very rapidly.

Now who listens to these programs and what good do they do? Well, we start with a potential audience that we can reach with our transmitters, a listening audience of about 75 million, and with a potential audience of about 300 million. Nobody can tell you how many of those people listen to us. When we are very optimistic we sometimes like to "guesstimate" that perhaps 100 million are regular customers, but I would hate to have to prove it. However, that doesn't mean that we are without resources in that line; we have had to pioneer in some of them.

To start with, throughout the free world, the techniques and the tools that are used here at home by the domestic radio industry to measure its listening audience and the effectiveness of its programs on them are available to us. They are not very good as yet, because people are not accustomed to operating that way abroad. We have had to set up, for example, a training program in connection with a couple of universities to try to develop people who are capable of taking the techniques of the Hooper-Neilson rating, who have linguistic or area knowledge, and who are capable of going abroad and applying these techniques. In some places

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we don't even have basic research done, such as knowing precisely the number of radios and what class of population has them, whether they are strategically located, what the secondary circulation is that can be expected from them. All of this was available to us here at home.

Out in the Middle East we are developing all that basic data. We are making some progress on it and we have under contract such outfits as the Gallup people, the Institute of Public Opinion Research (that is the Elmo Roper, Wilson outfit). A New York University school headed by the director of research of McCann-Erickson Advertising is doing content study for us, and the Russian Institute at Harvard is doing analyses of Soviet reaction for the Voice of America. We are able to apply valid research techniques and we have already made a number of studies. As an example, in France we have a valid study that our listening audience familiar with the Voice of America is 4½ million a day, and out of that, 2½ million are regular listeners. I think the regular listener, in technical jargon, is described as somebody who listens a minimum of three times a week, or something like that. Anyway, they are people who really follow the program. Well, 2½ million people in France is more than those who read the entire Metropolitan Press of Paris. That is quite a few people we are talking to every day.

In Sweden, we have 480,000 listeners of whom 194,000 are regular. Now that means, since we do not even broadcast in the Swedish language, that they listen to our English language programs, though secondarily, also, to German.

Then we have such tests as audience mail. At the present time, we get letters from all over the free-world at the rate of 30,000 a month. A tremendous job to handle, incidentally.

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And then there is a demand for our program schedules. We are now mailing out about 700,000 of them. They are sent only in response to specific requests from listeners, and the indications are that we will have to be printing well over a million within the next month or so, even at the present level of operation.

Behind the curtain, of course, we have the least possibility of telling who listens, but we are not without resources. First of all, we have a number of missions back there and we do get a certain number of intelligence reports. Even more useful than the reports from inside where people are somewhat isolated, is the information we get from the interrogation of DPs and defectors as they come out. We have gone into that in a big way and it is extremely valuable in enabling us to tell what material produces results, what has had an impact, where these results are obtained, and what possible listening patterns may exist behind the Iron Curtain.

The most revealing source, I think, is the one I mentioned before, constant studies by the Russian Institute at Harvard. The attacks that are being made on us by the Soviet radio, in the Soviet and satellite press, and over the satellite radio are very revealing to us. They never fail to surprise me. They take issue with specific items in our program which indicates that, at the very least, they estimate that a lot of their people are listening to the programs, and they feel the need to combat what we have to say. In that sense, they fall into the old propagandist trap much more frequently than we do. We make a point of not engaging in direct polemics with Moscow, because one of the first rules that you learn in this game is: "don't let your opponent capture control of your output." They are much less savvy to that rule than we are, and very frequently we goad them into direct attempts at rebuttal with their own people, and these things appear in the mass media.

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Every week there comes to my desk a little book about a half inch thick that has nothing in it but attacks made on us by Soviet satellite media.

As regards jamming, which I may say that I consider the best testimony as to the concern of the Kremlin authorities about our reaching through to their people:—Jamming started on its present stupendous scale (I think the word is merited, as nothing else like it has ever taken place) in April 1949; and their efforts have been absolutely unremitting to keep us out of the Soviet Union since that date. To do that, they have built a tremendous jamming network. We have identified more than 250 short-wave transmitters and we calculate that there are up to 1,000 local noise-makers that can't be detected from outside. They are very carefully controlled from a central monitoring point and are able to shift frequencies within a matter of seconds.

How do we get through, and do we get through? We *do* get through and I will try to clarify a little more as we go along as to how much. In a general way, I think it is clear that we are getting through to a hard and, what the Kremlin considers, a dangerous core of listening. We have had considerable improvement in that since the first days. I was personally in Moscow when they commenced the jamming and they really put us off the air. As a matter of fact we are still pretty much off the air in Moscow. Our latest reports from monitors there are that it fluctuates a great deal, but around 20% of the monitoring time people are able to get the "Voice."

We have had luck in many areas by what is known as critical frequencies. I won't go into the technical explanation, but I will say that the nature of short-wave is such that at certain times of the year and phases of the sun-spot cycle, we are able to put

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a signal into parts of Russia from our bases where we have short wave transmitters. There is no place in Russia where you can put a transmitter that will block that particular signal. That is enough regarding critical frequencies. I had to memorize every word of that.

We do a certain amount of cuddling, which is to ride in close to frequencies they are using for domestic programming. But there are limitations on that. We are still trying to be reasonably legal, and at least we try to refrain from stepping on the toes of our friends. For example, if to ride on one of their signals means that we would block a signal in Sweden or in England, we don't do it.

We are broadcasting on a 24-hour-a-day-around-the-clock-basis, a slow-speed Russian Morse news file. I can't tell you whether anybody is listening to that, but we think it is a good bet. We know that the Soviet armed services have a great many operators who are sitting there listening on the air during breaks in their communication duties. We know that great efforts have been made all over the Soviet Union to train reservists who are capable of understanding Morse, and that these people are provided with equipment. We still think it is a good bet, but I couldn't prove to you that one single person is listening to it.

We are also doing slow-speed English and slow-speed German programs, which are beamed into the Soviet Union because we know that all over the Soviet Union the study of English or German is practically mandatory for anybody who goes beyond the sixth grade.

Above all, we are building up this new network because, in a sense, there is only one answer, and that is more power and more transmitters. In this way, you put a signal in either on so

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many channels that they don't have enough transmitters to block it, or else with such power that it overrides the jamming signals. I might say in that connection that we, at the present time, cooperate very closely with the BBC. We are likewise trying to get other countries into it, though they are of lesser importance because they don't have the equipment. Twice a day we team up with the BBC and put into the Soviet Union a Russian language program simultaneously. At this time, we get through almost without fail because we over-saturate their system. When we get more transmitters we will be able to do even better.