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Tensions

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Boswell quotes the great Samuel Johnson as saying, "A man, sir, should keep his friendship in a constant repair." That is the theme of what I have to say of international relations this morning. It has become particularly important for the United States because the world is convinced that the choice between peace and war will be fundamentally an American decision. This is a startling idea; we have been accustomed to believe that wars were made abroad and that we entered them not only late, but reluctantly.

The new situation is a manifestation of the altered balance of power. Whatever we may think, our allies and our enemies alike now expect the ultimate decision to rest with Washington. Once that concept is firmly grasped it is easier to understand both the virulence with which potential enemies denounce the United States and the nervousness of friendly powers when they believe their ideas, their intersts, and their hopes are not adequately taken into consideration.

In discussing the tensions between the United States and Great Britain the first thing to remember is that Britain has been a world power for some centuries. Her methods of handling international affairs were established in the days when Britannia ruled the waves with sailing ships. It is not an inapt analogy to say that in pursuing policy she keeps her weather eye peeled

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and moves from one position to another by courses which steadily take account of wind and weather; sometimes she goes off on a long tack and does not appear to be headed for her destination at all; ultimately she comes to port. In British domestic affairs this has been called "muddling through"; it is one of the reasons that in foreign affairs some have used the phrase "perfidious Albion." From the British point of view the method is justified because it gets them there—with patience. Time, they feel, is seldom of the essence in larger questions of diplomacy. The balance of power, for example, has a long history—and the prospects of a long future.

The United States, on the other hand, was not admitted to the circle of great nations until the Spanish-American War; it was not regarded as a world power until after the Wright brothers had lifted their frail kite from the sands of Kitty Hawk. American world diplomacy, consequently, is a modern development and more adapted to the age of speed. We have a feeling that the shortest distance between two points, if not a straight line, is along the great circle; therefore, we have a tendency to drive straight toward our goal, flying if possible above the weather, if not, plowing through it. This difference in mood, pace, and method makes us seem to others impulsive and impatient, while they seem to us devious and dilatory. That difference, which has grown out of history, has a subtle but significant effect upon international relations.

In the second place, Americans and the British have difficulty in understanding each other's governmental technique. This is not so troublesome for us, though we are occasionally insensible to political pressures upon the Prime Minister. On the other hand, grasping our methods is enormously difficult for the British. They do not understand how it is possible for a member of our Cabinet,

let us say, who has no responsibilities of a direct kind in foreign relations, to make a speech which deals with foreign relations. Secretary Matthews' preventive war suggestion in Boston is an illustration.

Such a statement is taken very seriously abroad; an official is supposed to speak officially. The assumption is that he must be voicing a view which the President wants explored; otherwise he would be "sacked" for making such a statement. We know that members of the Cabinet are often persons of no personal political potency; they are presidential appointees; they hold their power from him, at his pleasure. Their expressions of view, except when speaking directly on his behalf, are just like the views of any private citizen made louder by the fact of office. Even when the President has "cleared" a speech, he may repudiate it—and its author—as Mr Truman did with Henry Wallace, when he was Secretary of Commerce. Such an event could not occur in Britain.

It seems incomprehensible to the British that the chairman of a congressional committee can take a view quite different from the President without any sense of lack of fitness. That arises, of course, from our constitutional system of checks and balances. In nations which have what is known as "responsible government," an adverse vote on a matter of any importance leads the government to resign. Here the President loses something in prestige by an adverse vote in Congress, but he never has to resign. To us it seems the most normal thing in the world for Congress and the President to differ even on major issues. So common is this that the Senate has been called "the graveyard of treaties"—all of which are negotiated under the direct authority of the President.

In the third place, the Prime Minister seldom makes a policy statement outside of the Parliament. He does not have a weekly

press conference, speak off the cuff, or exchange banter with reporters. What he says, therefore, bears the weight not only of official position but of official utterance.

There is never a casual remark such as the statement of Mr. Truman that the Fulbright report on the RFC was "asinine"; or the statement about the atom bomb; or the statement the other day in which the President said that we would "press vigorously" in the United Nations, "with everything this country could bring to bear," in support of the American resolution branding Communist China an aggressor; or his statement last Thursday that renewed crossing of the 38th parallel lay within the discretion of General MacArthur.

Those are samples of the type of thing which goes on in the presidential press conferences which could never happen in Britain or France or, indeed, in most countries of the world. They occasionally give the impression that we are truculent, or that we are unstable, or that we are careless. From our point of view, because the President in a press conference may not be quoted directly, he is in a position to modify or even reject a report of such a conference; from the British viewpoint his statements are those of the head of the government and have, therefore, an aura of authority which they do not possess in this country.

Again, the British do not understand why we make broad statements of policy without consultation with our allies when there is to be a change. For example, last April Secretary Acheson said that he wanted "to make it clear that the United States stood by its international commitments for the disarmament of Germany and against its rearmament." Then, just at the most delicate moment in the negotiations regarding the Schuman Plan, it was rather abruptly stated that we wanted Germany to rearm in a hurry.

The result was enormous tension upon the part of the French, who are at least as much afraid of the Germans as of the Russians, and maybe more. It brought great dislocation, as I have indicated, into negotiations on the Schuman Plan and it put Germany in a strong bargaining position. Indeed, Commissioner McCloy found it necessary shortly thereafter to state that Germany would have to be treated as an equal. It was not until General Eisenhower went to Germany that he was able to extricate us from a very difficult situation and at the same time relieve the French and the British from embarrassment by taking the initiative, diplomatically, from Chancellor Adenauer and restoring it to the Western Allies.

Our manners occasionally have an adverse effect upon our allies. Recently, for example, in the United Nations Warren Austin used this language: "The United States will wish to have something to say; would like to get the floor and would not like to be forced off the floor by a gentleman who seems to think he has the right to assume the floor and talk many, many times." The situation in the United Nations must sometimes be annoying, but discussion does not move at such a pace that we need to exhibit irritability when somebody else talks. The record shows that the United States occupies its fair share of the time. It does not help to be snappish when we are seeking votes in support of our position.

Moreover, we sometimes take a high moral tone which others find irritating. One of the national magazines called Warren Austin the "conscience" of the United Nations. No one enjoys having a conscience outside himself; it gives the impression that he is holier than other people. We can illustrate this by our treatment of Greece. Last spring our Ambassador read a severe lecture to the Greeks upon their government, its shortcomings and the things it ought to do. His strictures carried a direct threat of reducing the amount of money available to them unless they reformed their

ways. His intervention was not successful; the Ambassador was transferred elsewhere. The same tactic was later tried by an officer of ECA. The substance of their complaints was sound, but the method of making them was one which seldom pays dividends. It betrayed a feeling of superiority which other nations find intensely annoying. When this method fails, we lose prestige; when it succeeds, it reduces the criticized nation in its own estimation and in the estimation of others to the status of a satellite.

We cannot fairly complain of the Russian habit of making satellites of those within its orbit and at the same time behave as though we were trying to make satellites. In the Greek case and in others, we gave the Russians an opportunity to speak of a "Marshallized" Europe. Some friendlier critics feel that in such instances we exhibit an unconscious imperialism while denouncing imperialism in others.

Last fall a distinguished Swedish scientist was visiting some of the universities of this country. In the most casual tone of voice he referred to Sweden as a "satellite" of the United States. I expressed not only surprise but shock and said that such a term was entirely inappropriate, that we had no such concept of Sweden. He said that maybe we had no such conscious view, but that our treatment of Sweden often was calculated to reduce it to that status and that, when pressure was put upon them, they sometimes regarded themselves in the light of an American satellite.

There is a great deal of restlessness among and within the Soviet satellites despite the severe discipline exerted upon them. We have no such means of discipline. We can, of course, withdraw dollar subsidies, but we should remember that there is no longer a serious dollar gap; the potency of the dollar as a means of pressure is greatly reduced.

That comment leads to another frequent criticism of the United States: we put the dollar sign upon too many things and overestimate its value. We total up the amount of money we have spent in Europe, or have loaned to Europe, or have given to Europe under the Marshall Plan. It makes a very impressive figure; then we act as though we had received no adequate return for such generosity.

Europeans see a different picture. We did not loan them the money or give them the money just out of goodness of heart and generosity of spirit; they know there was a quid pro quo. It was to our interest that the Third Force should prevail in France; America needed somebody other than DeGaulle or the Communists in control; indeed, it was of the first importance to the United States. Similarly, in Italy and Greece, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia the United States had a very great stake in preserving a Europe free of Soviet domination. Democratic nations in Western Europe acted to some extent as a shield.

As we now turn from the indirect type of defense to a more direct involvement we discover how enormously more costly it is. We have been tempted to underestimate how cheaply we have lived in the face of Soviet aggression during the past five years. When, therefore, we speak of the dollar in an over-serious tone of voice, our allies feel that we do not appreciate that we were buying time, that we did buy time, and that we bought it at a reasonably low figure.

Irritation among the allies is intensified by the fact that, aside from Russia, none of the great powers has a stable majority in control of its government. In Congress the party majority in the House is small and in the Senate amounts to only two votes. In both cases the parties have enough internal differences so that

the administration cannot be sure of majority support on any given issue.

In Britain the majority of the Labor government is only seven. That is not a working margin except on critical issues which might lead to the overthrow of the government and consequently to voting the members out of office so they would all have to stand for reelection. Moreover, the Labor party has its own factionalism. Its extremists are quite out of sympathy with many of the things in which the United States has lively interest. Mr. Attlee has to be extraordinarily tactful in dealing with that wing of his party.

As far as France is concerned, it is governed by blocs; the Third Force is not a solid majority; it is a shifting, wavering group that must be held together by compromise, by persuasion, and by external pressure. We know, for example, that the Pleven government actually felt it necessary to resign on the eve of Mr. Attlee's visit to Washington. It was a manifestation of parliamentary irresponsibility difficult to comprehend in times like these. In Italy the government is unstable, and in Germany Adenauer is sharply challenged by Schumacher.

It is a commonplace political fact that political tensions are always heightened in any democratic country whenever the government rules by a very narrow majority. The action of the government appears wavering because of compromises thought necessary in order to get a majority vote on a given issue. This may often lead to sharp distortions in action. We must continually remind ourselves of this dominant political factor in each great Western nation and make allowances for it.

Another point of great significance is that each of the three great powers feels that it should be the "leader" in Europe. The

United States, as the anchor man on the team militarily, industrially, in a fiscal and economic sense, and otherwise, feels that leadership belongs to it. We point with just pride to the Marshall Plan as one of the boldest and most successful moves of modern times.

The British feel that they have been the engineers of the balance of power for 150 years or more and that they have a knowledge of Europe which we do not possess. They point to our rather clumsy management of the Greek situation as a case in point. They feel that they need not surrender intellectual, moral, and diplomatic leadership merely because they can no longer bear the fiscal burden or undertake the major military tasks. They feel that France, having been defeated and occupied, with a large Communist party on the one hand and an authoritarian threat from DeGaulle on the other, is in no position to assert stable leadership of the Continent.

France is obviously determined to be the leader of Europe. The French concede that they were defeated and occupied, but they feel that they have made a wonderful recovery. They are not willing for the United States, which, from their viewpoint, came late into both wars, to seize the reins. Since the war Britain, they feel, has shown marked signs of "channel" psychology, a return to insularity and isolationism. It exhibits an overconcern with domestic issues and too little interest in real integration with the continent. Britain also takes more interest in the Commonwealth than in Europe. It offers clear evidence that a planned domestic economy is the persistent foe of international cooperation.

On all these grounds the French feel that the leadership of Western Europe belongs to them. Four bold positions mark an effort to achieve that end. The French backed the idea of a united

Europe in the Strasbourg Assembly; Britain has been represented primarily by a member of the minority party, Mr. Churchill, who has contributed great oratory and notable spiritual leadership, but has not had behind him the force of government. The French, on the other hand, have looked forward to its development as a potent factor in the life of the Continent. They regard it as a step toward functional internationalism—a gradualist mode of approach to European union.

In the second place, the French proposed the Schuman Plan for the integration of the coal and iron resources of Western Europe. It was the boldest, the most significant gesture of modern times toward healing the breach between France and Germany. In the judgment of the French a supra-national authority to manage a vital integrated industry would lay the foundations not only for very strong economic defense of Western Europe; it would also mitigate terror of German rearmament which is, negatively, so potent in French policy. They point to the fact that the British have not joined in the Schuman Plan; in fact, they have dragged their heels so badly as to be a serious barrier to its success. They point also to the fact that at the critical point in the negotiations the United States by sheer ineptitude set the arrangements back for a long time.

In the third place, France has promoted the Pleven Plan, which proposes an international defense force within the North Atlantic Alliance. It involves a supra-national parliamentary assembly, a council of ministers under that assembly, a single European defense minister, and the European army under that minister. There is now being held in Paris a conference on the Pleven Plan; France and the Low Countries and others have full delegates; Britain has only an observer, as has the United States. The French feel that in the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan they are laying

the functional foundations for a United Europe. They assert that the record proves that they alone have the boldness, the initiative, and the foresight to undertake such a great enterprise.

In the fourth place, Prime Minister Pleven and Foreign Minister Schuman recently met with Premier DeGasperi and Count Sforza of the Italian Foreign Office. They concerted measures upon a higher level of cooperation than any that has been known among the great powers. In this respect, also, the French feel that they have shown initiative, imagination, and European leadership far beyond that which can be claimed by either Britain or the United States.

In so active a competition among three great powers there are inevitable tensions and frictions which need to be held in mind as we think about the problems of international relations.

In an effort to recover the initiative, Secretary Acheson recently flew to Brussels. His visit opened the way for the appointment of General Eisenhower as supreme commander and for sending him on the investigative mission upon which he recently reported. The significant part of the report for our discussion this morning is where General Eisenhower said: "I personally think that there has to be a political platform achieved, an understanding that will contemplate an eventual and an earned equality on the part of that nation before we should start to talk about including units of Germans in any kind of army. Certainly I, for one commander, want no unwilling contingents, no soldier serving in the pattern of the Hessians, serving in our Revolutionary War, in any army of my command. It would only be a source of weakness. Therefore, until the political leaders, the diplomats and the statesmen find proper answer to that one, it is not for a soldier to delve in too deeply."

While that statement is cast in very modest language, it nonetheless performs the essential function of taking the annoying question of German rearmament out of the field of current irritations and destroys an excellent propaganda point for the Russians. It has quieted French fears and improved our relationships with England. As a practical matter, moreover, it probably has not actually delayed for any considerable length of time the employment of useful German forces. In short, the diplomatic gains are great, the military losses probably quite unreal. The realization of the Schuman Plan has been accelerated as a consequence of that report. Also the French have modified their pressure for the Pleven Plan in order not to complicate, at this time, the problems inherent in General Eisenhower's command.

Another issue among the powers relates to a conference at the highest level between Russia, Britain, France, and the United States. Russia took the initiative and proposed it in its own terms. We have not managed to take the initiative away from Russia. Indeed, the United States has been so cautious in the matter that our allies feel we have been "negative."

The French are eager for the conference. They feel that nothing is to be lost by conversation, that something might be salvaged by such a conference. In any case the longer talk is indulged, the longer the resort to arms is postponed. Since Western strength is now growing, relative to the Russian, conversation should work to our advantage.

Britain takes substantially the same view though with less vigor. The extreme left wing section of the Labor party has put Mr. Attlee under great pressure; some of them are fairly close to the Russian line, feeling that the United States is not merely preparing for defense but is planning for war.

The attitude of the United States has been that talk can hurt. Russia is a unitary power and there is no way in which it can be divided from itself. It is well known to the Russians that there are important differences not alone in policy but even more significantly in temper and feeling among the three Western allies. A meeting would give Russia an opportunity to exploit those differences. With absolute unity upon its side, it could make concessions of some minor kind to France and of some different kind to Britain and in that way accentuate the tensions which already exist.

Such a conference will probably be held. The United States will agree to it, but will try to postpone it. Arrangements have now been initiated for a meeting of the deputies of the foreign ministers in Paris on the fifth of March to work out an agenda.

If we can put Austria as the first item on that agenda, it would give an opportunity to test Russian sincerity at the very outset. There was a time when the Russians felt they had to have a continued occupation of Austria because on the basis of being an occupying power they had the right to maintain troops in Hungary and Romania. But those nations have now been reduced so completely to the status of satellites that Russia does not need the excuse of an Austrian occupation to maintain the military situation it desires in those two countries. It is well known that the forces of those satellites have been expanded and constitute a menace to Yugoslavia. If, therefore, we press for an Austrian treaty, Russia's yielding of that point would be evidence that it has a real desire to talk; if it is wholly intransigent on the subject of Austria, it will be a good indication to the French and the British that our reluctance has been justified.

The Far East also offers clear evidences of tension among the Western allies. This centers upon the recognition of China. There are two legal points of view and two political points of view.

To the British it seems obvious that Mao Tze-tung and the Reds have *de facto* control of China. They point out that the possession of power has been the basis of classical American recognition policy. They claim it is unrealistic to deny the legal claim of the Reds to what they have in fact, particularly since the predecessor government obtained its power through revolutionary means no less than the Reds.

The attitude of the United States, on the other hand, is that, at least in modern times, we have added a second test, namely that, in addition to *de facto* control, the government must have both the capacity and the will to discharge its international obligations. We assert that, on the record, whether the Chinese Reds have the capacity or not, they have not shown any readiness to discharge international obligations. As a consequence we are not obligated under any legal principle to recognize that government.

The political views are also equal and opposite. No one outside Russia and China wants Stalin and Mao to act as one. Some have great hopes that there will be Titoist deviationism on the part of Mao. Many of his past statements—even relatively recently—give grounds for thinking that he has deviationist tendencies. The British feel that, if we recognize Mao and work with him (as we have with Tito), we may weaken his ties with Russia and accentuate any tendency toward Titoism. They say that the present marriage is of the shotgun variety; as long as we are thought to menace China, he is driven into the control of Stalin; if we withdraw any menace to China, the divisive forces which grew out of the Russian rape of Manchurian resources and the obvious contrar-

iety of interests between Russia and China in other sectors would have opportunity to develop.

The view of the United States is that this contrariety of interests can be developed under its policy. Dependence of Mao exclusively upon Russia will show him the disadvantages of such a relationship. It is a lesson learned by the satellites of Eastern Europe; severe discipline is required to control their restlessness. Specifically, when a power deals solely with Russia two things happen. First, the Russians do not keep their promises; when they say they will send goods and supplies, they do not send what they promised. Second, the Russians employ a dual pricing system, buying what they want at prices they themselves set and selling what the other nation must have at prices also set by Russia. The nation which continually does business with Russia exclusively comes to see that it is steadily being shortchanged and, therefore, will be in a mood to make friendlier gestures toward the Western powers with a view to escaping such bondage.

This is a matter of judgment. Both Britain and the United States want to detach Mao from Stalin. Each thinks its method is more likely to achieve that end. There is no conceivable way by which one thesis can be proved better than the other. We shall have to find a compromise between the two. Compromise has occasionally been approached, but American public opinion is highly sensitized and has blocked every such effort.

A subsidiary of the Chinese question, but one of great intrinsic importance, is the status of Formosa. The Cairo Conference of November 1943 stipulated that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China"; that general statement of purpose was confirmed at Potsdam on the 26th of

July, 1945. Again we have the consequences of two points of view. The British say that the Reds, as the government of China, are entitled to Formosa. The United States can turn the argument around and say, if *de facto* control is the test on the mainland, why is it not the test on Formosa; certainly the Reds do not have *de facto* control and there is no available proof that they would have gained control even if the Seventh Fleet had not been there.

Quite apart from this politico-legal argument is the strategical one. I do not need to tell this audience how important Formosa has been in connection with the Korean struggle. As a matter of fact I do not think the British seriously believe that we could turn Formosa over to the Chinese Reds until after the Korean fight is over. Even when that episode is liquidated, our relationship with the Philippines is such that we cannot afford to let Formosa fall into the hands of the Reds.

General Romulo said the other day that on a clear day you can actually see Formosa from the tip of Luzon. The map raises questions as to the power of his eyesight. Nonetheless it is close enough so that in the light of our political commitments in the Philippines we would have grave difficulty if a hostile power were to control Formosa.

The British would be willing to have Formosa in the care of the United Nations or otherwise neutralized. That is all we deeply care about; but they have no proposal as to how that purpose is to be achieved. Chiang Kai-shek is there. He has 300,000 or more troops. Conceivably he could be starved out by a blockade, or he could be flushed out by a military expedition. Neither of those courses of action is within the realm of political possibilities so far as the United States is concerned. Unless somebody has a proposal for getting rid of Chiang Kai-shek and a practicable

method of replacing him with someone better, the British desire remains unrealistic.

There is a series of tensions over Korea. We have to concede as fact that the use of land forces was announced by the President a few hours in advance of the meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations. That may seem a minor matter, because the Council acted promptly to authorize the landing of troops. What might well have passed almost unnoticed if the military occupation had been an unqualified success took on a different color when a setback occurred. Often a flaw in procedure is overlooked if the operation proceeds according to the best hope; when hopes are dashed, it is easy to magnify the procedural flaw and intimate that a diplomatic trick involved the United Nations as a tail of the American kite.

The fact that the President made such an announcement before the Security Council acted lays a foundation for the Russians to claim, and even for some of our allies to feel, that the United Nations does not have real control of the war. The United Nations, Stalin intimated in his Pravda interview last week, is virtually a satellite of the United States. The unfavorable British view of General MacArthur adds still more tension.

Moreover, an occurrence before the beginning of the Korean imbroglio offers further occasion for disagreement. The United States was the occupying power south of the 38th parallel. Our military had to take possession some months before a political directive was received. The British feel that we backed the wrong horse in Syngman Rhee, in whom they have no confidence. Though there is some evidence to support their view, there is now no available cure because the other candidate is dead. There is no way to make a change in Korean leadership at this time.

As to the 38th parallel, from a military point of view it is incredible that General MacArthur should have stopped there. He was pursing a disorganized enemy and would have been derelict in duty if he had not sought to complete the destruction of the aggressor. Sanctuary beyond the Yalu was bad enough, but making the 38th a line of sanctuary would have been infinitely worse. We clearly made an error of a political kind in estimating the likelihood of Chinese intervention; we may have made a politico-military error in not agreeing to a buffer strip below the Yalu.

So far as I know there is no proof that the Chinese entered the struggle because we approached the Yalu, but we cannot prove that the contrary view of the British is wrong. Dean Rusk of the State Department has made it clear that the Chinese made shipments of arms and ammunition into the general region as early as April, before the North Koreans struck. It is possible for the United States to make a good argument that China intended all along to enter the struggle if the North Koreans did not accomplish their mission of taking possession of the whole peninsula. The British, on the other hand, can point to the fact that the Chinese Reds did not actually come in until we had passed well beyond the 38th parallel and approached the Yalu. Guessing what might have happened under different circumstances gives no definitive answers. No reconciliation of view is possible; we can only say that what is past is past; now we must look to the future.

Unfortunately, this issue has flared again. Mr. Attlee made a statement in the House of Commons which indicated that he thought the 38th parallel might well now become sancrosance and that we should not cross it again without full consultation with others involved. General MacArthur stated that the discussion was "academic," and Mr. Truman fed fuel to the flames by saying that the decision rested with General MacArthur.

Somehow they all managed, in my judgment, to be wrong. General MacArthur called it "academic" on the morrow of a landing by South Korean marines at Wonsan far above the parallel. Moreover, areas well above the 38th parallel have been bombarded by heavy naval task forces. Airplanes continually cross the parallel on missions of observation and destruction. That makes nonsense of the issue being "academic," because crossing the 38th does not have to be a land operation. Mr. Attlee's position is untenable, for the military problem would be insoluble if everything north of parallel 38 were sanctuary.

This matter should be promptly discussed on the highest level of both diplomacy and strategy, an agreement arrived at, and ratified by the United Nations. It is essential to do it before the issue becomes any more acute. While we do not see any likelihood of a crossing in force on the ground at the present time, with fluid warfare one never knows what might transpire.

Another source of tension among the allies arises from Britain's relation with the Commonwealth. France has colonies and dependencies such as Indo-China; yet it is "European minded." Britain, on the other hand, has an ambivalence in its policy. It seems to many that in the post-war world it has been more deeply concerned with the Commonwealth than with Europe. The influence of India upon British policy has been very great indeed. We have to recognize the boldness and courage by which the decision was reached to set up India and Pakistan and put an end to an imperial system which continuous tensions made no longer tolerable. When the die was cast, it became essential, if England did not want to lose all the advantages of more than 150 years of intimate association, to take great pains to be patient and understanding. That accounts for the fact that Britain has handled the Kashmir situa-

tion with such extreme caution and has managed other problems with like care.

India achieved national status under the leadership of men who spent years in jail or prison; they perhaps feel it necessary to over-compensate past colonialism by manifestions of independence that the circumstances do not really demand. They are supersensitive to anything which tends to place them in a secondary position. Nationalism is their key to everything in Asia; they do not see Communism as a threat in anything like the degree in which we do. We tend to overemphasize the Communist issue; one of the characteristics of democratic thought is that it completely shifts its focus from time to time. Just now our spotlight is wholly upon the Communist issue. India tends to think of nationalism as the dominant issue. It would rather see China independent, even though Communist, than China in a semi-colonial state. The slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" means a very great deal. As long as the Philippines have a relationship to us which India thinks verges on satellitism, as long as we are in occupation of Japan, are fighting in Korea, and control Formosa, it sees us as a dominant power in Asia; it does not like to have any Western power exercise that much influence.

The competition for leadership is very real in Asia as in Europe. India regards itself as the natural leader. We feel that in exercising that leadership it seeks to go too fast and too far in the liquidation of our interests and influence; therefore there is tension. That tension is reflected not alone between the United States and India, but also through London, where Nehru has so many ties and where the British must do everything possible to take account of his views.

In another Commonwealth nation, we have been somewhat careless in taking Canada for granted. Canada lies within our defense perimeter; we have had joint arrangements for some years. Indeed, ever since the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 we have had a virtually undefended border which involves holding Canada as within our defense perimeter. Nonetheless Canada has had many policies arising from the Commonwealth status which were quite different from ours. For example, it entered both world wars long before we did.

Canadians are tempted to say that during 70 years of their status as a dominion their wars were made in England. They worked very hard to achieve a position where they could decide the question of peace or war for themselves. Now they have the feeling that they have merely made a transfer and that wars are made for them in Washington. They feel that their interests and desires are given perhaps less consideration in Washington than they were in London.

Two illustrations bring out the point. First, in making allocations of steel our authorities in Washington did not take Canada into account. The very fact that we have so much across-the-border trade and so many interests in common has to a large degree integrated their economy with ours. We had an obligation in making allocations to be extraordinarily sensitive to their interests. Otherwise we would be treating them as though they were one of the states within the United States rather than as an equal and sovereign nation to the north. Frankly, we did not exercise that care.

Even before this latest flurry, there was the question of the St. Lawrence Treaty. It was negotiated in 1940. Canada, under her system of responsible parliamentary government,

promptly ratified, but here it went to that "graveyard of treaties," the United States Senate. Now Canadians feel that the St. Lawrence waterway is essential to their nation's development; as the Masabi Range is exhausted they must bring in Canadian ores which are available and which may best be water borne. Yet the United States is doing nothing effective to make possible the St. Lawrence waterway. Canadians feel this shows an insensitiveness upon the part of their great southern neighbor to their real interests and needs. They do not want to have any sense of satellitism toward the United States.

Similarly Australia has come to a point of irritation with us which affects our relationships with the British Commonwealth. When Percy Spender became the Minister for External Affairs for Australia about a year ago he said, "As far as possible, it is our objective to build up with the United States somewhat the same relationship as exists within the British Commonwealth." Yet within the year our handling of the Japanese situation, which the Australians described as "playing with dynamite," has brought a sense of strain. It is significant that on his way home from Japan Mr. John Foster Dulles went by way of Australia in order to make such explanations as seemed feasible to mitigate tension.

I am indicating that the ambivalence of British policy with reference to Europe on the one hand and the Commonwealth upon the other can have the effect of doubling the possibilities of irritation in our relationships. There are problems enough in Europe, there are other problems in the Americas, and still more in the Far East, and all of those somehow get drawn in because of the Commonwealth connection.

We have surveyed some of the sources of tension among the Western allies. Among them have been the differences in gov-

ernmental processes and tempers, the current political status of each of the governments involved, competition for leadership in Europe and in Asia, and the intermingling of the problems of the Far East and of the West through the ambivalence of British policy. All these make harmonious relations between the great allies difficult.

The picture has its bright side as well. An extremely hopeful feature is that there are no basic policies in question between the United States, the British Commonwealth, and France; none will permit the engrossment of Asia by the Soviets; none would let Russia take over Europe, or the Middle East, or Africa. In other words, the fundamental items of policy are well laid down and there are no significant differences of basic attitude. The differences are as to means rather than as to ends; while they are irritating, they are not fundamental.

The second aspect is also a hopeful one: within the United States, while there are differences of view as to programs of action, there is no fundamental difference with regard to policy. Neither Mr. Hoover, nor Mr. Taft, nor any other critic of present plans for implementing policy is suggesting the abandonment of Europe or of Asia. Again the differences have to do not with ends, but with means. There is universal agreement that we must have a strong naval force, and very strong air forces; there is also a determination to have substantial ground forces. The accent is more on their deployment than upon their existence. Matters of judgment divide us.

Some feel that, if we put too many land troops in Europe, insist upon German rearmament, and press our allies too hard to rearm too fast, we will irritate the Russians. We may increase Russian fears or suspicions, or, at least, will give ground for the appearance of increasing their suspicions and fears which are already at the breaking point. Thus we might precipitate a war

which we are trying to avoid. Other people accentuate the fact that, if we do not send ground troops to Europe, we do not give the French the assurance that we will prevent them from being overrun. Surely they do not want to be occupied, overrun, and redeemed again. The different estimates, therefore, are of the psychological reactions of the French, the Russians, and the British to different programs. There is no scientific way to determine which is correct; it must remain in the realm of judgment.

Interestingly enough it seems to me that General Eisenhower again showed us the sound pattern. He called only for relatively modest American commitments upon the land mass of Europe with a highly mobile armed force within the continental United States, ready for deployment when and if the demand became urgent. That came as near splitting the difference as is practicable. When General Marshall, in accordance with that recommendation, made his statement on Thursday, February 15, as to the size of our commitment in Europe, it showed the participants in the Great Debate that the issues were not so vital as they had at one time seemed. We may be on the verge of vindicating the democratic process by discussing matters with much vigor and then coming to a general consensus of view.

In his report General Eisenhower also touched on another essential—patience. He said: "It takes some time for our purposes, no matter how plainly we may think they are written on the wall. It takes some time to understand those purposes and to gain faith in them. Remember, we have our own doubts, as individuals, and we have our own debates. Think how that is multiplied in Europe, where there are ten of these nations in this organization and they have all the nationalistic factors to increase the intensity of the debate."

Having a position of great leadership we must learn to exercise it with vigor, but at the same time with enormous restraint as to method and temper. There is no doubt in anyone's mind that China is an aggressor in Korea. Why then did it take three months to the day to get a resolution through the United Nations to make that declaration? It was because of a belief upon the part of those associated with us and those in a somewhat neutral position that the United States had got so deeply involved that we were losing our perspective and pressing for unrealistic ends. It is interesting and significant to note what led finally to the passage of that resolution. There were two things.

One was a statement by Mr. Austin which was mild in temper and which did not call for immediate sanctions against China. Our desire had been *thought* to be a "limited war." Most people have long since lost faith that in modern times war can be limited. They have lost belief that what Bismarck did again and again can ever be repeated. Therefore, when Austin took that temperate attitude, they saw sanctions reduced to the possible and not involving war which, though it might start in a limited way (like the Korean embroilment), might become total.

The second thing which led to the passage of our resolution was the acceptance upon the part of the United States of an amendment proposed by Dr. Malik, the representative of Lebanon. It is extraordinary how so slight a gesture of deference to the wisdom of a state whose power is as dust in the balance affected the thinking of the rest of the world. The readiness of a great nation, most powerful in every respect in the world, to accept a rational proposal from one of the least of the powers had a profound influence in the adoption of the resolution.

That incident, which by itself would be trivial, is something upon which we should reflect. Just as the fact that we were care-

less in making the United Nations appear to be our instrument rather than our guide in going into Korea (and that slight error in tactics has had unfortunate repercussions for months thereafter), so some constructive move of this kind, even though of minor substantive significance and scarcely noted in the American press or in public discussion, may have significant results in easing the tensions among our allies.

The problems of politics are never solved, they are simply exacerbated or ameliorated, they move from one form to another. We cannot, therefore, hope for quick, ready, and patented solutions that guarantee success or peace. As the greatest nation in the world we must learn to combine energy with patience, directness with understanding, and readiness to act with awareness of the remotest implications of our actions upon other peoples.

I shall conclude, gentlemen, as I began: A nation, sirs, should keep its friendships in a constant repair.