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U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS

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
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**INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICERS**

Issued Monthly By
The Department of Correspondence Courses
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

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FOREWORD

Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of professional interest to officers of the naval service.

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SOVIET GEOPOLITICS AND STRATEGY

An address
at the Naval War College
Newport R. I. on
June 5, 1951

by
Edmund A. Walsh, S. J.,
Vice President, Georgetown University;
Regent,
School of Foreign Service

May I at the outset express to Admiral Conolly and his staff my deep appreciation of the privilege accorded me of participating in the important work of this Conference. The announced objectives of these Global Strategy Discussions and the comprehensive program organized for these days give testimony to that consciousness of urgency which we all experience. The United States of America face the most challenging menace to our national security ever encountered in the 162 years of our existence as a free nation.

I do not exclude nor seem to minimize the issues raised by our civil war of 1861. That sanguinary conflict was a domestic tragedy confined to our own territory. But the present danger does not stop there nor involve us alone. It strikes at the very roots of international order threatened by the prospect of being corrupted into international chaos.

This generation has fallen heir to the most dangerous heritage of responsibility ever devolving on Western man since the fall of the Roman Empire. The disappearance of that stabilizing power in the ancient world ushered in a period of political frag-

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mentation and conflict among nations which lasted for a thousand years, as feudal rivalries and undisciplined localism succeeded to the unifying genius of Roman law and Roman jurisprudence. The retreat of the last consul to his embattled capital on the Tiber created an administrative vacuum which profoundly influenced the emerging pattern of Western Civilization. It took ten centuries for Europe to arrive at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and inaugurate the modern state system. But the cure was a dubious prophylaxis, as narrow nationalism and an exaggerated sense of sovereignty plunged the world into a series of wars culminating in two global conflicts, each progressively more devastating than any of its predecessors.

We of the Western Hemisphere are no longer cast in the role of detached onlookers but as leading players in this recurring contest of power. Four great empires have perished within our memory and under our very eyes:— the Russian, the Austrian, the German, and the Japanese, while a fifth, the British, has, like the Roman, retreated to its island stronghold and taken a defensive position on the Thames. The wheel of history has come round full circle. And we know what has rushed in to fill the political vacuum created in the wake of the recent global convulsion. A new tide of conquest has rolled westward on the continent of Europe up to the Iron Curtain and eastward to the China Sea. The inevitable confrontation is now at hand between the growing Soviet Empire and the awakened conscience of America accepting leadership for the mobilization of defense in the non-communistic world. On our understanding of Soviet strategy and on our ability to counter it may well depend the quantity and quality of human freedom in the world for an unpredictable future. If it is not met and its advance halted, life on this planet will not be worth the living. Eight hundred million people, approximately one third of

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the human race, have already come within the expanding orbit of Soviet domination.

The issue is drawn and the cards are dealt. There is neither ambiguity nor divided counsel in the camp of our enemies. That luxury has been monopolized by the democracies. "We live", Lenin once declared,....."not only in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist i. e. non-communist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."

Again, he warned his followers: "As long as Capitalism and Socialism exist side by side, we cannot live in peace. One or the other will finally triumph. One will hold the funeral oration for either the Soviet Republic or World Capitalism. It is only postponing war."

Where and with what power or coalition of powers the final war must be waged was more than once specified by Mr. Stalin. During an interview with a delegation of American workers visiting Moscow in 1927, he frankly pictured the future zig-zag of Soviet policy, adding a prophecy directed toward the United States. ".....Thus, in the course of further development of international revolution," he predicted, "two centers will form on a world scale The struggle between these two centers for the possession of the world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and communism in the whole world."

Here we have plain talk from an expert. His general estimate of the United States is amplified by numerous passages in his other writings and addresses, in which he refers to the United

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States of America as "the chief country of capitalism, its stronghold." He expressed the same conviction in the interview with Governor Stassen in 1947. On other occasions, notably in conference with leading representatives of the American Communist Party on May 6, 1929, Mr. Stalin intimated that America will be a tough case for the Communist nutcracker because of the strength and power of American capitalism. Social revolution, he thought, will come to the United States only at the end of the revolutionary cycle. But that it must come is a cold, intellectual supposition always present in Communist thinking and never doubted by Mr. Stalin. He urged his visitors to greater efficiency in hastening the revolution in the United States.

It was on February 9, 1946, however, that Mr. Stalin in a public address dropped all pretense at honest co-operation and openly proclaimed that World War II was not due to diplomatic inefficiency among negotiators, but to that old enemy, modern capitalism. He argued that wars are inevitable in the future so long as capitalism as a system continues to exist. Agreement and peaceful settlement is impossible "under present capitalistic conditions of the development of world economy." Coexistence of the two systems in a permanent balance of power is not possible in Mr. Stalin's logistics, though a truce is always possible—particularly when the Soviet Union is faced with a dangerous emergency. Such a temporary truce became advisable when Hitler invaded Russia in 1941. To dramatize the situation, Stalin dissolved the Third International.

The Political Bureau of the Party, those fourteen men blessed with a passion for anonymity who direct world unrest from the Kremlin, are experienced strategists and flexible tacticians. They are realists and cautious planners, though fanatic in their thought. Hence, their reaction to American foreign policy will be of a far

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different type from the line employed against Finland or Turkey or Norway or Iran or Korea. Such contiguous countries possess little depth in defense and can expect but little respect for their material power or capacity for resistance when the cards are down. But in the case of the United States extreme caution is indicated, in view of the demonstrated ability of this country to wage a devastating campaign once its industrial resources are mobilized and its man power summoned to technological warfare. If outright attack on America is not among the probabilities at the present time, it could take place with ruthless speed if some internal disaster, such as a paralyzing industrial crisis, overtook us. Since this hoped-for depression, long entertained in Moscow, has not been realized, a revision of the Kremlin's timetable is probably in progress.

Although amazing the world by the audacity of its maneuvers in eastern and central Europe, the Kremlin's assault there has been largely of the indirect and covert kind. The Politburo is letting the satellites carry the ball and harass the opposing team by constant fouls, brass knuckles in the scrimmages, and brazen defiance of rules. The offensive has been limited, moreover, to pre-cribe and carefully chosen areas. In Europe and Asia they are playing on their home grounds and know the hazards. But the risk of overextension is not unknown to the planners, and the consequences of each move have been carefully calculated. Miscalculation could prove fatal. This caution seemed at one time to be operating in China, where Moscow appeared reluctant to have her Communist allies push their advantage too fast, too far, or too indiscriminately. She was not sure how far she could trust the present native leadership there. But the inhibition proved ineffective in the face of a tempting prize, and the red tide of conquest has rolled relentlessly southward and eastward to the China Sea. Moreover, the new conquest of vast territory in Asia

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has served to offset the diplomatic defeat administered by the Berlin airlift.

Turning now from the ideological blueprints of the Soviet conspiracy, let us examine the geographical application of them in recent years. It will be remembered that Nazi Germany made its own the celebrated theory of the British geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, respecting the influence of geographical environment on history. As early as 1904 and again in 1919 and finally in 1944, he warned the Western World that the pivot of history lay in that vast inner mass of Eurasia to which he gave the picturesque title of the Heartland. Describing it as roughly coinciding with what is now Soviet territory, he declared, with extraordinary foresight, that if this natural fortress, inaccessible as it is to sea power, should ever be properly garrisoned militarily and developed economically by a virile people, it could become the center of an empire capable of ruling the world. Mackinder's brilliant hypothesis ended with the warning: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the world island; who rules the world island commands the world."

This thoughtful condensation of much human history and accurate observation of the influence of geography on history was conceived and formulated, to be sure, in an age when air power had not yet become a major component of military potential. Hence, the theory has been modified, but not entirely canceled out by the coming of the age of air power. Soviet Russia, consciously or unconsciously, is supplying the deficiency in terms of military aviation. I believe the unknown geopoliticians behind the Iron Curtain have adapted Mackinder's formula to the new circumstances of the air age. They have probably changed and shifted some elements and emphasized others so that their consolidation

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of land power in central and eastern Europe now leaves them free to accelerate control of marginal lands on the rim of the world island. It may well be that they are saying: "Who controls the rimlands of Europe and Asia can protect the Heartland of the World Revolution." The growth of Soviet sea power, especially of submarines, is not without meaning in such a program.

We may assume that the planners of global strategy in the Kremlin have drawn their specifications for a world State in terms of the resources at their disposal and with due consideration of the opposing forces. There are certain geographical regions of prime importance because of the number and quality of the States there clustered together. Natural location, climate, food supply, population, economic resources, industrial potential, social and political organization, and cultural development all coalesce to render such regions recognizable as reservoirs of power superior to less favored areas. Three such power centers exist in the world today—all situated north of the equator.

The first coincides broadly with the area within which the Politburo sits: it comprises European Russia, central Europe, eastern and southeastern Europe, and terminates in western Europe, including Britain. A second concentration of natural and political power, though of variable and less developed character, lies at the eastern end of the Eurasian plateau: China, Korea, Japan, Manchuria, the maritime provinces of Russia, and the teeming lands that stretch into southern and southeastern Asia. The third center arose in the transatlantic world with the principal power potential located in that area of North America which includes the eastern regions of the United States and southeastern Canada.

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All three of these power centers lie in the beneficent latitudes within which the major events of world history have occurred; within that complex are found the three fountainheads of Western civilization, Rome, Athens, and Jerusalem, as well as the focal points of Oriental thought and religions. Geographers have pointed out that these regions accommodate nearly three-fourths of the human race, although covering but one eighth of the land surface of the earth. They are the favored sports of nature, richly endowed in many instances, potentially productive in others. Effective control of them by any one political force could guarantee world empire.

Considering the first of these strategic areas we find that the eastern half of it is already controlled by Soviet Russia. Outside the Iron Curtain, reaching to the English Channel, the North Sea, and the Mediterranean, lie the critical non-Communist regions of the West which the Marshall Plan visualizes as the last stronghold of freedom, democracy, and Christianity in Europe. The second power center, already occupied by Soviet Russia in the north and in process of being rapidly absorbed into the Communist orbit in the southeast, is the present major theater of operations in the open conflict between World Communism and the non-Communist States of the Far East.

The remaining power center in the Atlantic world is as yet free from direct and overt assault by the Revolution. Distance has conferred a temporary immunity; youthful vigor, resiliency, and awakened consciousness by Americans of their inherent power have induced considerable caution in the Kremlin. Hence the conflict here remains in the preliminary stages of ideological warfare, diplomatic skirmishing, infiltration, manufactured confusion, and world drama will be played out between this formidable power

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espionage. On Mr. Stalin's showing, however, the final act of this center in the West and the Oriental strongholds of World Communism. Meanwhile the Revolution is consolidating its position in the old world by geographic stages and by measures which become significant when viewed in their totality and in the relationship of each to the master plan.

Take a map of the world and follow with your finger the creeping progress of the Soviet empire since the disappearance of the Nazi and the Japanese empires. Through Pechenga on the north, acquired from Finland by force, she now has a new outlet to the Atlantic. Drop a line from that point, through central Europe, to Albania, her satellite on the Adriatic, noting as you pass, Yugoslavia, slated to be repossessed when Stalin finally decides to deal with Tito. Through Albania, on the fringe of her power, she has access to the Adriatic and, hence, to the Mediterranean. Her march toward Greece was countered by the Truman Doctrine and her hopes for Communist triumph there have been frustrated with American assistance. Had her plans succeeded in the Hellenic world, she would have been enabled to anchor her power firmly in the eastern end of the Mediterranean, then turn to a corresponding western anchor in Spain, which always remains a factor in her planning. But her hopes for gaining control of Spain, which go back even before 1935, have been frustrated thus far by the tough hidalgos. Should she finally succeed in fomenting civil war in the Iberian Peninsula, with the emergence of a satellite Communist State such as the Marxist pattern always assumes will follow a domestic revolution, Gibraltar would be the next target. Istanbul and the Dardanelles have always bulked large in the expansionist program of Russian imperialism, and this craving for that traditional objective, inherited from the Tzars, has not been neglected by the new autocrats. Unreasonable

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concessions have been demanded from Turkey in recent years but denied with equal determination, and the refusal has been backed up by American economic aid. But the demand will surely be renewed at a propitious moment.

Meanwhile the atmosphere of pressure will serve to maintain that psychological tension and expensive defense program along the Dardanelles which Moscow utilizes so consistently in its war of nerves. The measure of validity in Russia's historical claims for free exit through the Dardanelles is not slight. More than one European statesman has gone so far in the past as to concede publicly that Russia should have Constantinople. Both England and France so declared in 1916; but that age-old controversy between Moscow and Constantinople was limited in its application to the ancient capital of the Byzantine emperors. It now carries a wholly different significance, in view of the Communist program of World Revolution and the hope to overthrow all non-Communist governments such as Turkey. This new messianic universalism is what Soviet Russia has added to her inherited tzarist tradition. This urge to the sea and the constant process of opening up new territories and colonization of them was noted by the greatest of Russian historians, V. O. Kluchevsky, as the principal, fundamental factor in Russian history. "All other factors," he writes in Volume I of his celebrated *History of Russia*, "have been more or less inseparably connected therewith . . . Debarred from settlement by the geographical features of their country, the eastern Slavs (in their historical evolution) were forced, for centuries, to maintain a nomad life, as well as to engage in ceaseless warfare with their neighbors. It was this particular conjunction of circumstances which caused the history of Russia to become the history of a country forever undergoing colonization, a movement continued

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up to, and given fresh impetus by, the emancipation of the serfs, and remaining in progress to the present day.”

An entirely new factor, possessing the dynamic energy which Lenin imparted to it by dialectical materialism, has now been super-imposed on Kluchevsky's summation of Russian National history. The evangel of World Revolution and the specific instruments to achieve it, whether in the form of the Third International or the Cominform, are commonly ignored by those who seek to justify Soviet conduct. They keep referring to certain old grievances, such as Russia's landlocked isolation, her legitimate striving to acquire warm-water ports, the ignoring of her existence at Versailles, the refusal to accord diplomatic recognition during so many years, and her exclusion from the powers which met at Munich — although the latter should now be cause for gratitude and not a stigma. Soviet Russia was predestined to bellicosity from the very moment Lenin turned the successful domestic revolution of 1917 into an organized Marxist revolution on a world scale. And each decade as it passes will add to her manpower. Her population trend and fertility rate indicate an increase by 1970 which should bring her population to something over 250,000,000, whereas the rest of all Europe combined will probably not exceed 400,000,000. And if we consider the population of newly acquired territories, the Soviet total should be 270,000,000 by 1970. This is not to include non-Russian satellite countries of Europe, and China, in both of which fertility is high. Since population is one of the important components of power, these new acquisitions will progressively encourage the Politburo to more frequent use of its favorite weapon — aggression by proxy.

Return now to the northern perimeter of Eurasia and continue along Soviet Russia's Arctic coasts with a geopolitical eye.

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She is dominant there, and has no contestant in those icy solitudes. She already claims approximately 50 per cent of all offshore territory lying within the Arctic Circle, including such potential landing fields as Novaya Zemlya, Wrangel Island, Franz Joseph Land, and the new Siberian group. Rounding the eastern shoulder of Siberia as it projects into the Bering Strait you will note that she possesses not only Kamchatka, Sakhalin, the Kurile and Komandorskie Islands, but exercises control over North Korea and still controls the important harbors of Port Arthur and Dairen, both of them strategic ports of China. The encirclement of East Asia, by control of its rimlands, is nearly complete. These developments underscore a cardinal point in the program of World Revolution: Communist strategists have always maintained that the way China goes furnishes the key to all problems on the international front. The general headquarters for the forthcoming struggle for Asia is believed to be located in Thailand, where Soviet personnel in Bangkok is reported to be enormously in excess of any legitimate diplomatic need. From the Pacific, then, to the Iron Curtain on the West, she will be in a position to mount an outer ring of offensive and defensive installations around her Heartland, particularly in marginal regions adapted to land-based air power.

If her efforts to secure a base in Tripolitania, the western half of Libya, had not been refused in the United Nations, she would have gained a coveted foothold in the Mediterranean basin. That great inland sea, if ever dominated by Soviet influence, would prove of inestimable strategic value in sealing the outer rim of protective areas, providing at the same time a sea route to western Europe and the Atlantic world. That is why Tito's rebellion particularly enrages the Moscow geopoliticians.

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The invasion of Tibet in early November, 1950, by Communist troops from China, reveals two constant factors in Soviet strategy. The geographical position of that hitherto inaccessible region makes it a strategic, though difficult passageway for a military advance on India, provided suitable airfields can be located somewhere among its towering mountains. Reports are already current that locations for the first potential air bases have been surveyed by Russian agents on a flat plain in western Tibet between Lake Rakas and Lake Manasarowar. This would bring Soviet striking power dangerously near the heart of India. New Delhi, the capital, lies approximately 300 miles to the southwest, an easy two-way run for Soviet bombers through negotiable passes of the Himalayas.

To meet the requirements of political strategy, the planners of the aggression invoked their usual pretext. They welcomed the existence of a rival Dalai Lama, another claimant to the position of ruler and high priest, who was living in exile in China. By supporting the claims of a second living Buddha of Mercy against the actual incumbent, the Communist Politburo of China staged another "liberation." They activated the familiar pattern of a civil war to be instigated by Communists and utilized by the Soviet Union for hidden intervention. The device was an old one and was employed in Greece, China, and Korea. It was tried in Finland, where a Communist regime was first installed under Kuusinen as prelude to the invasion of 1939. The erection of a puppet State usually follows and the Iron Curtain falls. Then, to preclude assistance from outside powers, the Communist legalists invoke international law as forbidding foreign intervention in a purely civil war. This concept was introduced into the Soviet argument against the United Nations' resolution to come to the assistance of South Korea. It makes both the United Nations and the United

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States of America not only iniquitous warmongers, but actual aggressors by unilateral, legal definition. Since, according to Mr. Vychinski and all Communist jurists, the Soviet concept of law is the only valid interpretation of legality in any situation, the invasion of Tibet, like that of South Korea, became an act of moral heroism and dialectical purity.

There may well be other considerations arising from the historical development of Tibetan autonomy. China, to be sure, has never officially acknowledged the separation of that remote province from her sovereignty, although for a long time Tibet has acted independently. The significant fact for humanity is the steady advance of the Communist World Revolution into another area of Asia and the establishment of new outposts in what has been called "the roof of the world." This geographical pattern would seem to extend itself to other significant spots much nearer the Western World, where forward bases would be indispensable for logistical preparation of the eventuality prophesied so unequivocally by Mr. Stalin: ". . . a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."

Two other Soviet maneuvers acquire special geopolitical meaning when related to this persuasion of inevitability, and when integrated with the concrete position already taken by Soviet strategists and diplomats. In December of 1946, Ecuador was requested to grant "fishing rights" to the Soviet Union in the waters adjacent to the Galapagos Islands, a highly strategic area off the west coast of South America approximately 1000 miles from the Panama Canal. The distance could easily be covered in five hours by hostile war planes launched from the deck of a properly camouflaged "fishing" bark. One bomb would be enough

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to cripple the locks and sever one of the vital defense lines of the two Americas. Then, in January, 1947, Norway was presented with a Soviet demand for bases on Spitsbergen, the ice-covered group of Arctic islands, 3500 miles from New York, Chicago, and the industrial heart of the United States. Modern bombers, with a 5000 mile one-way cruising range from Spitsbergen, could reach not only industrial centers represented by Detroit and Pittsburgh, but penetrate deep into continental America. The same holds with respect to bombing ranges from the coast of Eastern Siberia.

Should the Communist empire ever advance as far as the English Channel on one side of the world and eventually dominate the full coast line of China and its pendants on the other, the position of the United States would indeed be perilous. Consult your map of the world again—a Mercator projection will do if no other is available—and note the geographical position of the United States. But be sure to take a map which does not put the two Americas off on the fringe of the land mass of the earth but midway between Europe and Asia. That is our true position in the composition of world movements and world forces—an insular power encircled east and west by the two major old-world continents. Soviet Russia, if finally dominant in both of them, would then be ready for the kill.

The cost of preventing final achievement of Moscow's projected world domination will indeed be staggering but must be weighed in the balance with the alternatives. There is need of complete thinking at this point, not spurts of enthusiasm, of volatile sentiment, nor unfounded fears nor programs for the partial containment of Soviet aggression. The cost of a needed commodity or of an essential service is not truly stated by the price tag but by the foreseeable consequences if it is not bought.

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A fire extinguisher for a modest home or a sprinkler system for an industrial establishment may seem expensive in terms of the present income of the respective buyers; it can be immeasurably more expensive, possibly fatal, not to have them on hand and in working condition when the fire breaks out.

There is a fire aflame in the world today, kindled and fanned by a band of international arsonists bent on spreading the conflagration as widely as possible. The Revolution is on the march from Berlin to Korea. Eight nations have had their freedom burned to ashes already. The final confrontation now has come and American blood has been shed in a major war. The two central figures, whose emergence Stalin predicted, are committed to combat in the Far East while their diplomats sit facing each other across conference tables which stretch from the Kremlin to the English Channel, from Brussels and Paris to New York and Washington. The unprecedented character and stark realism of the conflict became evident when the President of the United States could bluntly declare a year ago that he could no longer put faith or credence in any promise made by Soviet Russia.

The President's later analysis of the Soviet program, in his Report on the State of the Union, compared it with the imperialism of the Tzars. Previous Russian expansionism, he pointed out, "has been replaced by the even more ambitious, more crafty, and more menacing imperialism of the rulers of Soviet Russia. . . they are willing to use this power to destroy the free nations and win domination of the whole world. . . . The gun that points at them, points at us, also." This forthright language conveyed no news to informed students of the Russian Revolution and probably not to Congress. The news element derived from the official pronouncement of it by the President of the United States before such a legislative assembly, followed by an impres-

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became acknowledged facts for incorporation in a State paper as public basis for stronger public policy.

In normal times such statements from the head of a government would have meant instant rupture of diplomatic relations and a probable full mobilization for war on both sides. But we are not engaged in conventional diplomacy under accepted standards of international decency such as prevailed at Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars. We are embarked on a kind of cosmic poker game for the highest stakes in history. Some there are who believe one of the players has been prolonging a colossal bluff which began at Yalta and Tehran and which succeeded notably against the leading player on the opposite side, who was then in failing health. The government of the United States finally decided to call for a showdown on the Korean crisis and was supported by the United Nations. Had both done so earlier, the odds in favor of true peace in Europe and Asia would have been far more favorable and Soviet Russia would not have scored the gains that began with the desertion of Poland by her former allies. On the issue, when the cards eventually fall, may well depend the quality and quantity of human freedom for generations to come.

The record is clear and the designs of Soviet Russia were never unclear. Her gamble in Korea was logical perfidy as is her present intriguing to capture the oil resources of Iran. Edmund Burke in 1772 warned Europe that the partition of Poland by Prussia, Austria, and Russia would not be the end of the feasting. It was, he pointed out, only a breakfast for the great armed powers; but where would they dine? He knew that neither history nor appetite for power ever stops short.

The true question before the American people and before

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their representatives in Congress is not so much the cost in dollars, though heavy, but the alternative possibilities. If the grim record of the past five years of Soviet-American relations has achieved anything, it has clarified the cold war down to a basic consideration. The debate is not whether we can afford to do the necessary things for the defense of Christian civilization — but can we afford not to do them?

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AMERICA'S PROBLEMS, PRESENT & FUTURE

A Lecture delivered by
Mr. Bernard M. Baruch
at the Naval War College
May 24, 1951

Never was this country faced with such grave danger. Yet we seem to be devoting more of our energies to fighting among ourselves than to fighting the enemy. The truly terrible danger that could overwhelm us is being largely overlooked.

I do not want to belittle, ignore or dismiss the genuine issues involved in the "Great Debate"—such questions as what is the best strategy for America to pursue? What are the rights and responsibilities of Congress in matters of war in an era in which there is no peace? What must be the relationship between the civilian and military authorities?

Through the whole of this "Great Debate" runs one false assumption—i. e., that these controversies confront us with the choice of action we must make.

Actually our choice has been—and remains—to be militarily strong or militarily weak. Whether we attempt to make peace or prepare for war, there will be much lacking as long as we are militarily weak.

Whoever the General is in command in Korea, will he have the military power necessary to make and enforce peace in that tragic land?

Mr. Baruch, elder statesman, financier and philanthropist, was Chairman of the War Industries Board in World War I. During World War II, he served as adviser to President Roosevelt and War Mobilization Director James H. Byrnes.

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The divisions being sent to Europe represent little more than a token of the mighty defensive effort we and our allies have still to make.

We are even too weak militarily today to be either isolationists or internationalists.

Were we forced to stand alone in the world, without allies, we obviously would have to rearm with the utmost speed and to the utmost of our capacity. And if we are to hold our allies together, we must also make ourselves strong in time, or nation after nation will be overrun until we are left alone—truly isolated.

In short, everything depends on the speed with which we mobilize the strength that is ours. Speed of mobilization should be our first concern.

In foreign affairs, it is imperative to keep your eye constantly on the main threat of war. That threat rises out of one awful fact—the Soviets have (been permitted to obtain) a terrifying jump in military readiness. Until that lag between Soviet armament and Western rearmament is overcome, the threat of war will be constant. The foundation for a lasting structure of peace will be missing.

Until our mobilization is quickened, I doubt that any discussion of foreign affairs can make much sense. For example, in recent months there has been much agitation for re-examining our foreign policy. Of course that should be done. The waging of peace should be constantly in the process of re-appraisal and adjustment to meet changing conditions. But upon what is this re-examination to be based? Upon our present military weakness? Or upon the strength we know is ours but which we have failed to bring into being?

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Some contend that we should not undertake more abroad than is justified by our military power. This contention ignores the realities of both American and Soviet power.

The Soviet system is one of immediate military readiness, with millions under arms, constantly threatening to overrun other nations. Behind that formidable array how strong is the economy already strained and backward in many respects? How thin is the margin upon which she can draw, with her low living standards and the forced enslavement of so many millions of people there. The Soviet system, in short, is a mobilized military power greatly out of proportion to the supporting economic and spiritual strength.

In contrast, the American system is one of an enormous economic and spiritual potential, vastly out of proportion to our immediate military strength. At the peak of the last war we produced more munitions of all kinds than the rest of the world combined, while mounting enormous amphibious offensives across both oceans at the same time.

Right now nearly all our available military strength is strained just to hold Korea.

Which measure of American power are we to employ in determining whether we are over-extended in our commitments? The tiny forces so far mustered? Or the military power greater than any in history which was demonstrated to the world about six years ago?

And which measure of Soviet power is to be used? The seemingly formidable fist being shaken at defenseless neighbors? Or the frightened, purging hands suppressing the discontent and hungers of the Russian and satellite peoples?

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As long as there is no war the Soviets can menace all the countries bordering on their satellites in both hemispheres, for no one can say at which front the Soviet forces will be hurled. Once war breaks out, then all the many miles of frightened frontier across which the Soviets now threaten to erupt become so many miles of frontier through which Russia can be attacked.

Never under-estimate one's enemy. True. But let us not underestimate the strength of the free world.

Let us not lose sight of the fact that our danger is less a reflection of Soviet military strength than of American military weakness.

Who is to say how much of the world the free peoples can hold until their power has been mobilized? Were we to cut our commitments recklessly to fit our present feeble military measure, we might invite the Soviets to seize territories which they, themselves, do not believe they can hold.

This is hardly the time for retreat, when our power still lies *unused*. This is the time to hold, until we can rebuild the arsenal of democracy which we forged during the last war—and junked *so hastily* before the peace was won.

May I emphasize, though, that I do not believe in dribbling away our resources along innumerable futile fronts. For almost five years I have called for a global strategy, under which all our many commitments would be viewed as parts of the one whole, with a clear distinction between holding actions and those areas where we were determined to press through to decision. With each succeeding month, that global strategy becomes more necessary. With each succeeding month the lack of such strategy becomes more costly.

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Since the war's end, we have staggered from crisis to crisis without facing up to what the total peace-making would require? Almost, it would seem, we have refused to look further than the next step immediately ahead. Because we lacked an over-all, thought-through strategy, opportunities for strengthening the peace have been lost. The actions we have taken have dragged behind the need.

The course of events in Korea has demonstrated anew the danger of treating each crisis that arises as a separate problem, without calculating its repercussions upon the whole of our policy. The bickering among our allies, the dismissal of General MacArthur, the widening disunity on foreign affairs here at home—the futile, petty political approach on inflation—these and other difficulties all are in large part ugly reflections of a lack of an overall, global, strategy.

To formulate this strategy, there should be a central peace-making agency, composed of men with no other business but to think, work and plan how to win the struggle for peace. This General Staff for Peace could be brought into existence by expanding the present National Security Council. Such a revitalized Security Council, with its membership broadened to include men of outstanding stature, and working under the direction of the President, could be given the task of re-examining the whole of our foreign policy. The recommendations of such a body, I believe, would command the support of Congress and restore the public confidence.

Still, no global strategy devised by any group will be worth more than the weight of our mobilization. Our peril is not that we are over-extended in our foreign commitments in relation to our armed forces. Our peril is that we are over-extended in relation

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to the absence of denials and controls here at home, in the clamor of pressure groups for petty advantage, in swollen profits, in taxes that are too low and prices that are too high.

We are over-extended abroad because we have not yet extended ourselves at home.

Under our present mobilization program, according to official announcements, 1953 will find us with the capacity to produce 35,000 tanks and 50,000 airplanes a year.

Moreover, according to official announcements, prime emphasis is being placed upon providing the "capacity" for military production, with much actual production of munitions being held back. We are to be ready to produce these weapons "on short notice."

At the outset of the last war, whole nations were conquered for want of a few of the tanks, planes and other weapons which we and other democracies had "on order". I hope the tragedy of "too little and too late" is not repeated because we and our allies lack the weapons which were to have been produced "on short notice."

Perhaps we will have all the time we need. Let us at least be clear that we are committing ourselves to a fearful gamble.

Is that gamble necessary? Think that question through. Some risk, of course, is unavoidable. No matter what is done, some danger of war will remain. But one has only to look around the country to see how much more could be done, if the will for swifter action existed. When I weigh the terrible possible consequences of a failure to mobilize in time, against the petty comforts and petty profits being clung to, I cannot help but conclude

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that the sights of our mobilization program have been set too low and too distant.

We should not wait until the fire has broken out before producing the fire-fighting equipment. Sizable reserves of all crucial weapons, far in excess of any troop requirements presently foreseen, should be produced and accumulated now.

There need be no fear that these weapons will become obsolete. The Soviets have accumulated vast stocks of weapons, at a terrible cost to the Russian people. The free peoples should have their stocks of weapons to offset what the Soviets already have. Done properly the cost will not be ruinous.

Such a stockpile of weapons is a prime essential for America's regaining the initiative. With such weapons we would be able to render swift and possibly decisive assistance to any nation menaced by aggression. We would be able to take instant advantage of any opportunity that might arise for arming some ally. We would be prepared were events to compel an abrupt increase in our own armed forces, since men can be recruited more rapidly than munitions.

Today our foreign policy is bogged down because of military weakness. A ready supply of weapons would restore mobility to our foreign policy.

Even if these weapons were never used, their production would be worth while as insurance. How much of our productive capacity might be destroyed in an initial blitz attack upon this country, or through sabotage? How priceless would be weapons already on hand, even if not of the latest design.

I make no pretense of knowing the Kremlin's intentions. I

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do know there can be no basis for peace in our world until the gap between Soviet armament and our defenses is plugged. The longer our mobilization drags, the greater the ultimate effort which we will have to make. Time permits Russia to press her own armaments production and to perfect her own atomic weapons.

The wisest course, it seems to me, would be to mobilize all-out, losing no time and sparing no necessary effort until we balance Russia's rearmament. Having done that, we could then relax somewhat, provided we continued to pace ourselves in relation to Soviet military power and the threat of war. Only in terms of such a balance could we talk possible peace or disarmament.

What do I mean by all-out mobilization?

It does not mean drafting millions of men into the service before they are needed. Nor does it mean curtailing less essential civilian activities needlessly, where the manpower, materials or other resources which are released cannot be used. A proper mobilization program is always a balanced one.

What all-out mobilization does mean is organizing the nation so that all military demands—whatever their size and however they change—can be met with the least possible delay and with the minimum essential needs of the civilians safeguarded. This requires an all-embracing system of priorities directing all our resources of men, money and materials—so they make the maximum contribution to defense. First things must be made to come first through the entire economy.

All-out mobilization also means drawing a firm line against inflation and profiteering. To do that, the experience of the last two wars taught, action has to be taken quickly, at the very outset of the emergency. By imposing a general ceiling across the

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entire economy, over all prices, wages, rents, profits and other costs, the equilibrium between the various segments of the economy which existed before the emergency began is preserved. Machinery is set up to correct inequities and where the needs of defense production demand it.

Along with such across-the-economy controls must go higher taxes and other financial controls; the elimination of profiteering; increased production of more essential things at the expense of what is less essential; the power to ration scarce civilian essentials where necessary; the postponement of all less essential works; the reduction of unnecessary expenditures; conservation of scarce resources; vigorous development of substitutes for things in short supply; control of all exports and imports; and an organized self-restraint among the people—the enlightened self-discipline to accept the denials which winning the peace entails.

These principles of mobilization evolved out of our experience in the first world war. When the second world war broke out, they were disregarded. We were supposed to be fighting “a different kind of war”. But the mobilization authorities soon found themselves forced to return to the plan of mobilization they had discarded. Unfortunately, a terrible price was paid for that delay.

When the Korean emergency began last summer, the same cry arose, “this is a different kind of crisis.” Again, time has forced a return to the old mobilization principles. Again, the neglect and delay have cost us dearly.

Because of the inflation since the Korean war, the real value of every defense dollar has been cut by a fifth to a third and more—needlessly. Rising prices have virtually wiped out the increase in taxes that was levied, and those now contemplated. While the people have been paying higher taxes, they have had their incomes

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cut further by rising living costs. The value of their savings is being cheapened.

I have studied the arguments of those who oppose all-out mobilization controls. It seems to me, they make two fundamental errors.

First, they tend to confuse the size of the program with the kind of controls which are needed. A partial mobilization, it is contended, requires only partial piecemeal controls.

Actually, though, a partial mobilization requires the same full set of controls as does a total mobilization; increased taxes, money and credit controls; priorities to increase production of the more essential and to reduce the production of less essential; price, rent and wage ceilings, and so on across the entire economy.

The frame of any mobilization program must be a balanced control of the whole economy, with adjustments permitted as defense needs dictate. With the whole economy under balanced control, it becomes possible to adjust to any size military program, to tighten less essential civilian activity where and when needed, or to increase such activity if conditions permit. Without a balanced control of the economy as a whole, whatever is undertaken, even a relatively small effort, shoots dislocations and maladjustments throughout the economy, aggravating the inflationary dangers.

The first rule of mobilization is to bring the economy under control as quickly as possible, before things have gotten out of hand, as they have now. Once the economy has been allowed to run loose, the whole mobilization process becomes in large part a frantic struggle to recapture the equilibrium which should never have been lost.

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The second basic error made by those who oppose all-out mobilization controls is a failure to appreciate that preventing inflation under mobilization conditions differs vastly from peacetime inflationary problems.

Under a normal peacetime economy, it is proper to take the position that the basic cause of inflation is too much money. It is wise to insist that action be directed not only at so-called "symptoms"—prices—but at the cause—the pumping out of new money.

But, under mobilization conditions, we cannot eliminate the basic cause of inflation—expenditures for defense. Every effort should be made to reduce less essential expenditures and to raise taxes to pay as much of the cost of war as possible. Still, regardless of what fiscal controls are adopted, mobilization will steadily increase government spending.

If inflation and its evil twin, profiteering, are to be curbed, higher taxes and other financial measures must be a part of a total system of controls, reaching across the entire economy.

To increase taxes greatly without drawing a line of stabilization through the entire economy is to invite still further inflation. As long as prices are left uncontrolled, those called upon to pay higher taxes will attempt to pass on the burden to others in the form of higher prices. The pressures for ever higher wages will mount. With them will come a rise in all costs, in all prices.

As higher wages and higher prices cut into the value of every defense tax dollar, additional taxes must be levied. The spiral can be an endless one, endless, that is, save in disaster.

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Price and wage controls are also indispensable for the proper functioning of a priority system.

Priority means giving to one before another. When this happens the man who has been displaced will seek to replace his position. If the total supply is not sufficient to go around, he will bid a higher price for what he wants. Uncontrolled prices and uncontrolled wages encourage manufacturers of less essential civilian items to compete with more essential producers for scarce labor and scarce materials.

The inflationary dangers that rise out of mobilization are not all the result of simply too much money. The needs of mobilization upset the normal peace-time relationships of supply and demand. Because you do not have the time to wait for supply and demand to adjust themselves, the government must step in with mobilization controls, until time is given to the law of supply and demand, with increased production, to function.

I should stress one other reason why mobilization requires all-out controls, since in some ways it is the most important reason of all. That is the problem of insuring equal sacrifice for all. Imagine, if you will, what would happen in this country if our young men were drafted under a system of obvious favoritism, which permitted rich men to buy substitutes; or those with political pull to dodge their duty. Similarly we invite havoc and disunity if economic mobilization is to permit some to profiteer while millions undergo cruel hardship; if a manufacturer's prices are controlled but the wages he must pay are left free to rise; if wages are frozen while food prices mount daily.

The program I have always advocated, of imposing a general ceiling over all prices, all wages, all rents, all other costs, across the entire economy, as of a certain date, with machinery to adjust

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injustices, has the immense advantage of demonstrably treating all segments of society alike.

The processes of mobilization are not pleasant. Naturally the desire runs strong to put it off as long as possible. But if we do not mobilize all-out at once while it may still be possible to prevent a third world war, we will have to mobilize later, when the price will be higher.

The test we face is not America's alone. The whole free world is on trial. Among the nations of Western Europe there are sufficient resources, both of people and industry, to raise an adequate defense against Soviet aggression. What has been lacking has been the will to translate those resources into military readiness. I appreciate how harsh has been the suffering of these people. But the Soviet government, whose people suffered even greater devastation, has ruthlessly put military power ahead of improving living standards. Those who would remain free men dare not do less in defense of peace than the dictators have done in preparation for war.

This is not the time for haggling either among ourselves or with our Allies. Under the North Atlantic Pact all of the signing nations have obligated themselves to form a common defense. Providing for this common defense is not something America alone can do. But ours is the responsibility of leadership. Let us set an example of courage and determination. Then call upon others to match our efforts.

Let us—

1. Achieve unity at home behind a global strategy which recaptures the initiative in the peacemaking from the enemy.

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2. Support that strategy by mobilizing all-out until we have balanced Russia's rearming, losing no time in accumulating sizable reserves of all crucial munitions.
3. Stop inflation and profiteering now.
4. Think through the terms on which we would feel it safe to settle with Russia.
5. Put our defense establishment on a sustaining basis, which requires Universal Military Training, so we can see the peace-making through. Whatever the possible settlement, we still will have to stand guard with ceaseless vigilance.

RECOMMENDED READING

For those officers wishing to pursue a course in professional reading, the Naval War College *Basic Selective Reading List* compiled for officers of the classes of 1952 is published herewith.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service where a collection of books are available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948)

Basic Selective Reading**I. TITLES DEALING WITH U. S. AND WITH RUSSIA**

		<u>Pages</u>
Total Empire (1951)	Walsh	284
Journey of Our Time (c1951)	de Custine	338
War or Peace (1950)	Dulles	266
The Coming Defeat of Communism (1950)	Burnham	278
My Three Years in Moscow (1950)	Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith	335
Russia (1949)	Pares	215
The Price of Power (1947)	Baldwin	350
Policy for the West (1951)	Ward	312
Defense of the West (1950)	Liddell Hart	324
Blueprint for World Conquest (Introduction) (1946)	Communist International	27
Is War With Russia Inevitable?	Kennan (Reader's Digest, March, 1950)	9
Sources of Soviet Conduct	"X" (Kennan) Foreign Affairs, July 1947	11
America and the Russian Future	Kennan (Foreign Affairs, April, 1951)	20
Stalin on Revolution	"Historicus" Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1949	26
Problems of Leninism (1943)	Stalin	642
United States and China (1948)	Fairbank	384
Two Kinds of Time (1950)	Peck	725

II. TITLES DEALING WITH MILITARY HISTORY AND EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES

		<u>Pages</u>
Modern Arms and Free Men (1949)	Bush	273
Operation Survival (1949)	Hessler	274
If Russia Strikes (1949)	Eliot	252
Soviet Arms and Soviet Power (1949)	Guillaume	212
The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War (1950)	Isely	590
The Second World War (1949)	Fuller	415
Why War Came in Korea (1950)	Oliver	260
Bombing and Strategy (1946)	Dickens	90
Summary Report, European War (1946)	U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey	18
Summary Report, Pacific War (1946)	U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey	32
U. S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War (1947)	Ballantine	301
Operational Naval Logistics (1950)	Eccles	215
Democratic Ideals and Reality (1942)	Mackinder	266
New Compass of the World (1949)	Weigert	365
On War. Vol. I (pp. 1-71) (1942)	Clausewitz	71
Vol. III (pp. 76-177; (1942) 209-220)	Clausewitz	112
Art of War (1892)	Jomini	92
The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Selections) (1945)	Mahan	
Naval Strategy (Selections) (1911)	Mahan	
Mahan on Naval Warfare (Selections) (1944)	Westcott, Ed.	
The Art of War (1944)	Sun Tzu	99
Makers of Modern Strategy (Selections) (1944)	Earle	

III. TITLES DEALING WITH COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION

Problems of Combined Command Organization, A Formulation of Principle (1945)	General Eisenhower	24
Reality of War (1909)	Brown	302
Lee's Lieutenants—Introduction to (Vol. 3) (1942)	Murray	96
The Atlantic Pact (1949)	Freeman	18
North Atlantic Treaty (1949)	Hoskins	99
	Dept. of State	5

IV. TITLES DEALING WITH MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

		<u>Pages</u>
How to Think Straight (1939)	Thouless	248
The Art of Plain Talk (1946)	Flesch	210

SELECTIVE READING LIST

This list contains a wide range of titles which have been included because of their current value and the interest shown in them by the Classes of 1951 and prior resident students.

Brookings Institution	Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1950-51
Brookings Institution	Security of the Middle East (1950)
Lippmann	U. S. Foreign Policy (1943)
Spencer	U. S. and the Near East (1950)
Hall and Voss	American Interests in the Middle East F. P. A.—Headline Series #72 (1948)
Eisenhower	Crusade in Europe (1948)
Churchill	The Second World War (3 Vols.): The Gathering Storm; Their Finest Hour; The Grand Alliance (1948-1950)
Marshall, Arnold, King	The War Reports (1947)
Stimson	On Active Service in Peace and War (1947)
Stilwell	The Stilwell Papers (1948)
Sherwood	Roosevelt and Hopkins (1948)
Hull	The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (1948)
Payne	Mao Tse-tung (c1950)
Lockwood	Sink 'Em All (c1950)
Graham	Empire of the North Atlantic (1950)
Wendt	Atomic Energy and the Hydrogen Bomb (1950)
Daniels	Defense of Western Europe (1950)
Royal Institute of International Affairs	Defense in the Cold War (1950)
Lincoln	Economics of National Security (1950)
Stebbins	The U. S. in World Affairs (1950)
Peck	Two Kinds of Time (1950)
A. E. C.	The Effects of Atomic Weapons (1950)
Martienssen	Hitler and His Admirals (1949)
_____	Texts of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam Declarations
Morison	U. S. Naval Operations in W. W. II Vol. 1 The Battle of the Atlantic Vol. 2 Operations in North African Waters Vol. 3 The Rising Sun in the Pacific Vol. 4 Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions

	Vol. 5 The Struggle for Guadalcanal
	Vol. 6 Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier (1947-1949)
Corbett	Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1918)
Douhet	The Command of the Air (1942) (1st 3 chapters)
Gavin	Airborne Warfare (1947)
Livezey	Mahan on Sea Power (1947)
Van Zandt	The Geography of Air Transport (1944)
Ely	The Red Army Today. Rev. ed. (1951)
Tedder	Air Power in War (1948)
Newman	Mediterranean Background (1949)
Reitzel	The Mediterranean (1948)
Sprout	Foundations of National Power. Rev. ed. (1951)
Stausz-Hupe	The Balance of Tomorrow (1945)
Bradley	No Place to Hide (1948)
Carroll	Persuade or Perish (1948)
Nimitz	The Future Employment of Naval Forces (1948)
Fischer	Stalin and German Communism (1948)
Dewhurst	America's Needs and Resources (1947)
Monroe	Principles and Types of Speech (1949)
Mooney	Principles of Organization (1947)
Almond	The American People and Foreign Policy (1950)

CURRENT READING LIST

This section lists material published in current periodicals which will be of interest to officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

- Alsop, Stewart *Stalin's Plans for the U. S. A.*
Sat. Eve. Post, July 14, 1951, p. 17, 106-110. The private intentions of Stalin to confine U. S. influence to the Western Hemisphere and the story of the man who heard them uttered.
- Ashkenazi, Touvia *The Suez: Will It Be a New Iran?*
The New Leader, July 30. Another crisis in the Middle East threatened by Egypt's blockade in the Suez Canal.
- Bayne, Edward A. *Crisis of Confidence in Iran.*
Foreign Affairs, July, 1951, pp. 578-590. Briefly summarizes the background of the Anglo-Iranian controversy and points to errors in British and American policy which caused Iranians to lose confidence in the West.
- Beloff, Max *Soviet Policy in China.*
International Affairs, July, 1951, p. 285-296. The relationship between the Russian and Chinese Revolutions.
- Berle, A. A., Jr. *Our Asian Policy.*
The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science - July 1951, pp. 60-71. A review of U. S. foreign policy in the Far East in relation to the Soviet threat.
- Bochenski, I. M. *On Soviet Philosophy.*
The Review of Politics, July 1951, p. 344-353. The philosophical character of Bolshevism.
- Chang, C. M. *Mao's Strategem of Land Reform*
Foreign Affairs, July 1951, pp. 550-563. Corrects some wide-spread misconceptions about the principal features of the Chinese Communist Party Line.

- Cousins, Norman
Romulo, Carlos P.
Isaacs, Harold R.
and others
- America and the Challenge of Asia.*
Saturday Review of Literature, August 4,
The whole issue is devoted to editorials on the
subject.
- Deutscher, Isaac
- How Strong is the U. S. S. R.?*
The Reporter, August 7, 1951, p. 17-20. Post-
war industrial and agricultural production in
Russia.
- Halsey, Ashley, Jr.
- Shipyards—Biggest Weakness in
Our War Potential.*
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1951,
pp. 737-743. Urges government support of
shipyards in order to have the industry ready
to meet emergency
- Hittle, J. D., Lt. Col.
- Soviet Command and Staff Methods.*
U. S. Army Combat Forces Journal, July 1951,
p. 36-40. The organization of the Soviet gen-
eral staff. (Chart showing structure of the
high command).
- Mannering, Henry
- Yugoslavia—Right Turn?*
The Reporter, August 7, 1951, p. 21-23. Ideal-
ogical and economic changes since Tito's
revolt.
- Marx, Daniel
- Economic and Political Factors
Affecting Trade Between Eastern
and Western Europe.*
Political Science Quarterly, June 1951, p. 161-
190. Trends in East-West European Com-
merce.
- Montross, Lynn
- The Inchon Landing.*
Marine Corps Gazette, July 1951, p. 26-35. An
account based on records and reports from
units in Korea.
- Onslaw, C. G. D.
- West German Rearmament.*
World Politics, July 1951, p. 450-585. Detailed
account of the developments leading to the
rearmament of Germany.

- Padover, Saul K. *Psychological Warfare.*
Headline Series, No. 86, Mar.-Apr., 1951. Deals with the potentially dead weapon now being used by major world powers to persuade millions of people to accept certain beliefs and ideas.
- Rivers-Macpherson, E. R., Col. *Oil Strategy.*
The Army Quarterly, July 1951, p. 155-159. Sources of supply and military requirements of oil for a global war.
- Shaplen, Robert *Guerrillas—Our Hope in Red China.*
Collier's, July 21, 1951, p. 13-14; 49-50. A plea for U. S. assistance to keep Chinese guerrillas fighting against the Red regime.
- Towster, Julian
Lenczowski, George
and Others *The Middle East.*
Current History, July 1951 - Entire Issue.
- Ward, Barbara *The Silent Revolution.*
Atlantic, July 1951, p. 34-38. The war of ideas between Communism and the West.
- Williams, Maynard Owen *Turkey Paves the Path of Progress.*
National Geographic, August 1951, p. 141-186. Present day Turkey with emphasis on her military importance. (Illustrations, maps).

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R. I.

(B/WMB:mc)
30 Aug 1951

Naval War College Memorandum No. 42-52 (Supp. 1)

To: All Officers

Subj: Selection Board, ALNAV No. 92

1. On behalf of the Naval War College the President wishes to express his congratulations to the following staff and student officers of the College who have been selected to the grade of Captain in the Navy.

CDR Bennett M. DODSON
CDR Frank A. DINGFELDER
CDR David LAMBERT
CDR Ralph L. SHIFLEY
CDR Theodore R. VOGLEY
CDR Albert L. SHEPHERD
CDR Joseph W. KOENIG
CDR Charles F. GARRISON
CDR Charles E. KING
CDR Porter F. BEDELL
CDR Jesse B. BURKS
CDR Stanley M. BARNES

2. It is also noted with pleasure that all former Naval War College graduates in the zone considered were selected for promotion.

For the President



WALLACE M. BEAKLEY
Chief of Staff