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J. M. SWEENEY
Chief of Staff

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INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS

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FOREWORD

Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of professional interest to officers of the naval service.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

A Lecture delivered by
Captain Frank L. Johnson, USN
at the Naval War College
August 30, 1951

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
(AS ACCEPTED BY THE U. S. ARMY)

1. The Objective
2. Simplicity
3. Unity of Command
4. The Offensive
5. Maneuver
6. Mass
7. Economy of Forces
8. Surprise
9. Security

Source: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL (FM 100-5)

Part of the mission of the Naval War College is to further an understanding of the fundamentals of warfare. The "Principles of War" are considered to be one of those fundamentals. Accordingly, it is my purpose this morning to review with you the more widely accepted "Principles of War" and to give a few examples of their application in order to provide a better understanding and appreciation of their usefulness as guides in sound planning and in successful operations.

Captain Johnson is a member of the Staff of the Naval War College.

Paradoxically, the United States Navy—alone I believe of all major military services, U. S. or foreign—does not accept officially the Principles of War as such. They are not listed and no specific reference to them is made in the Navy's series of U. S. Fleet publications (the U. S. F.'s). However, as you either well know or would assume, all of the principles of war on this list are actually considered or are taken cognizance of in those same U. S. F.'s.

The Navy's attitude has been that they are permissable as maxims, precepts, factors, guides, or even basic considerations but it is questioned whether they can be accepted as principles. Also, in view of the many differences in the various lists both in concept and number and by reason of the continuous doctoring of the principles themselves as to scope and interpretation, their immutability has been challenged.

The Principles of War may be defined as "guides which should be considered by military commanders in the formulation of sound plans and in the conduct of successful operations." Uusually these principles are condensed into the form of a simple list of single words or short phrases which might be tabbed "labels". In order to add greater substance and meaning to these so-called symbols or labels there has been prepared and distributed to each of you a mimeograph of the Principles of War setting forth for each principle a brief statement of "What is it?" and "What does it contribute to success in war?"

(Editor's Note: For the convenience of the reader, the lecturer's briefed concept of the Principles of War has been included at the end of the lecture.)

In labelling some of the principles in these extracts I followed the preference of many students of naval warfare; as for example MOBILITY in place of the U. S. Army's MANEUVER.

The mere mention of the term "Principles of War" brings out the semantic beast in certain individuals. The word discussion goes something like this: "A principle is a basic or fundamental truth—an essential constituent. Therefore, to be valid as a principle each principle of war must be included in each plan or in each action. But since each principle of war is not always included it follows, ipso facto, that the so-called principles are really not principles at all—otherwise each would be a part of any plan or action."

So, for those who cringe at the term principle, meaning "a basic truth", I offer for your consideration this definition of principle: "A general law used as a guide to action." I like to consider the "Principles of War" as the guides or as the factors in the art of warfare which a successful commander must consider in his planning and operating. Granted, he may not use one or more principles in any specific plan or operation, yet the commander must have considered their use and discarded them only after careful weighing.

The "Principles of War" have been distilled from the history of warfare over a period of 2500 years. Sun Tzu, the famous Chinese general, came up with 13 principles in 500 BC. Napoleon is credited with 115 maxims. Clausewitz, I believe, is satisfied with but 7 principles. Nelson employed 10 tactical principles. The British Royal Navy now officially recognizes 10 principles. The U. S. Army first mentioned the Principles of War in 1921 in the War Department Training Regulation 10-5.

It is certainly not necessary for me to emphasize that an intelligent perception of the Principles of War is best gained by intensive and objective study of the principles and methods of great military leaders of the past, examined in the light of present and

possible future developments in weapons, equipment and techniques or, in other words, in the light of modern conditions of war.

Also, there is no need to stress the point that the underlying principles of warfare do not change; it is the application of these principles which is variable. New weapons and new techniques all dictate changes in the application of the principles of war.

The airplane, tank, motorized artillery, submarine, radar, fighter direction, and the amphibious assault are some of the weapons, developments or techniques which have exerted a profound influence on warfare and particularly, in the application of the principles of war.

Before presenting the principles, a few words of caution concerning their application would appear to be in order. They should not be regarded as religious tenets, but rather as reliable guides indicating the factors which should be evaluated in order to arrive at the desired results. This proper evaluation depends upon the experience, education, and training of the commander. It is not necessary that all of the principles be specifically included in any one plan or action. The correct application of any one, or of several of them, will not assure soundness or success. In fact, the correct application of all the principles of war may not assure success if the human elements—morale, discipline, leadership—are lacking or are inferior to those of the enemy.

Success in war depends more on morale than on physical qualities. Numbers, armament and resources cannot compensate for the lack of confidence in self and leaders, nor for the lack of energy, determination, skill and bold offensive spirit which springs from a national determination to conquer.

These principles are not all inclusive and they do not offer a magic formula to resolve any and all military problems. A mili-

tary commander must resolve for himself what the principles imply and how they should be applied.

This brings us to an examination of the Principles of War themselves. The first principle which we will consider is "The Principle of The Objective".

STATEMENT:

EVERY MILITARY UNDERTAKING MUST HAVE AN OBJECTIVE; THAT IS, IT MUST BE DIRECTED TOWARD A CLEARLY DEFINED GOAL AND ALL ACTIVITY MUST CONTRIBUTE TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THAT GOAL.

This principle is invariably placed first on listings of the principles of war, and rightly so because it is the dominating one in every act of war. Without an objective every other principle of war becomes meaningless. Some military personnel hold that it is the only true principle of war and that all other principles merely aid in achieving the objective. This viewpoint has merit but does it serve any practical purpose as such?

On the national level, military objectives support the national objective in peace as well as in war. During war, in addition, the military objectives should directly support the national war aims. By national war aims I mean that set of conditions which if fulfilled, should restore peace on satisfactory terms. In World War II the only war aim which the allies had or, at least the only one which they publicized, was "Unconditional Surrender". The results of that war aim are all too painfully evident. Let us hope that our strategic planners now have a realistic set of national war aims and that our war plans support those aims.

The British have a noteworthy title for the Principle of the Objective: "SELECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE

AIM". It is the selection of the proper objective which is the difficult decision. As you are well aware much study, time and effort goes into the selection of the proper objective. Here at the Naval War College a large portion of the curriculum is devoted to just that—the Naval Manual of Operational Planning and the operations problems are the tools.

The Battle of Midway provides an excellent example of a proper selection of the physical objective. Although the Japanese troop ships were tempting targets, the carriers were the main threat and were therefore chosen as the primary objective.

"Maintenance of the Aim" highlights an important feature of this principle. History is replete with examples of failures to maintain the objective. In 1942 the Germans in their summer offensive in Russia, supposedly started with one objective—cross the Volga, sweep around behind it to the north in order to capture Moscow and to envelope a large part of the Russian Army. Early successes went to their (more likely Hitler's) head and they split their forces for a second objective—the Caucasus oilfields. Disaster resulted.

Examples of commanders who did not deviate from their mission must include Admiral Spruance and his decision at the Marianas to defend the landing operations (his assigned mission) instead of rushing out to meet the Japanese fleet several hundred miles to the westward.

On the other hand, the problem of when NOT to maintain the aim or the objective is a difficult one. The considerations would be the same, as those governing the initial selection of the objective.

The application of this master principle involves consid-

eration of all the principles of war coupled with the most skilled judgment, especially as regards changing the objective.

The second principle is the "Principle of The Offensive".

STATEMENT:

VICTORY CAN NEVER BE WON BY PASSIVE DEFENSE; ONLY SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE ACTION, OR THE THREAT OF UNFAILING OFFENSIVE ACTION BRINGS SUCCESS.

Briefly stated the "offensive" means carrying the war to the enemy. Every military man understands the importance of the offensive. It has been said that the selection by the commander of the right time and place for offensive action is the decisive factor in attaining the objective.

A characteristic American trait is reflected in this principle. Our military doctrine in general is to keep the enemy off balance by offensive action. It does not signify headlong attack nor attack for the sake of the principle itself. The aim must be that of creating favorable conditions for attack. It is the timed attack that counts.

The Principle of the Offensive does not mean that defense is never permissible. On the contrary, in war the offense and defense are mutually complementary. All war, strategically or tactically, must be both offensive and defensive. A good illustration of that is the paradox of air power in which the bombardment aircraft on offensive missions take defensive action in flight against the offensive attacks of interceptors whose mission is defensive in nature. Defensive measures, including defensive strategy, should be employed so as to permit going over to the offensive

as soon as the situation permits. During the early part of World War II it was necessary for the Allies to remain on the strategic defensive. In the Pacific area, our navy had to maintain the defensive until 1943. But even during this period, if you will recall, the U. S. Navy went over to a limited offensive on several occasions —Marshall Island raids, Wake and Marcus Island strikes, and Guadalcanal. Also, Doolittle's Tokyo raid definitely belongs in the list.

The offensive implies sustained pressure which is followed up and exploited. Here we encounter the term "pursuit" which is of such importance that some military students include it separately as a principle of war. Admiral Conolly likes the term "exploitation" which connotes more than just pursuit. He believes that there should be a "Principle of Exploitation." General Patton's Third Army sweep across France in World War II, the U. S. submarine offensive in the Pacific and the Carrier Task Force strikes in the South China Sea are examples of exploiting successes large and small.

The offensive confers the initiative and, with it, freedom of action. It tends to deny both to the enemy. In World War II when the Allies went over to the offensive, they had command of the sea and local command of the air. Invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy and finally Normandy resulted; all made possible for us by the use of that old but ever-present weapon—sea power—against a land-bound enemy. World War III, if it comes, may well find a duplication of this same situation against land-bound Russia.

Principle number 3 is the "Principle of Concentration".

STATEMENT:

TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS IN WAR IT IS ESSENTIAL TO

CONCENTRATE SUPERIOR FORCES (GROUND, SEA, AND AIR) AT THE DECISIVE PLACE AND TIME IN THE PROPER DIRECTION AND TO SUSTAIN THIS SUPERIORITY AT THE POINT OF CONTACT AS LONG AS IT MAY BE REQUIRED.

This principle goes by many names—mass, superiority, concentration of combat power, concentration of force. "Concentration" is a time-honored battle term in the U. S. Navy and it more nearly depicts to me the dynamic intent of the stated principle. It means superiority of fighting power at the point of contact—the superiority being maintained as long as required. This superiority of fighting power may be obtained by a combination of such factors as: personnel, materiel, weapons, fire power, organization, unity of command and unity of effort, leadership, combat readiness, morale.

In the naval action off Samar in the Philippines in 1944 the Japanese were superior in almost everything except leadership.

The time element is important in concentration since the application of this principle implies the simultaneous employment of force. This importance is emphasized by the successful heavy bombing technique used over Germany in the later stages of the last war. Operations of very large numbers of bombers were not only concentrated in space—on one target—but also in time, the actual attack being compressed into the shortest possible period. Pre H-hour bombardments by air and surface forces also emphasize the concentration of fire power both in time and space.

Strangely enough, the Germans applied the principle of concentration in their employment of submarine wolf pack tactics, but, in effect, neglected the principle in the Battle of Britain when it required 8 hours to send over a total of 800 planes thus failing to saturate the British defenses; they also failed to concentrate their V-1 weapon attacks in terms of time.

The interdependence of the principles of war are well illustrated by this principle. Attainment of concentration requires proper selection of the objective followed by the application of all other principles—mobility, economy of effort, surprise, security and cooperation.

The fourth principle is the "Principle of Mobility".

STATEMENT:

MODERN WAR DEMANDS: (1) THE POSSESSION AND USE OF THE CAPABILITY OF PHYSICAL MOBILITY (STRATEGICALLY AND TACTICALLY) TO TRANSFER FORCES ECONOMICALLY AND WITH RELATIVE RAPIDITY FROM PLACE TO PLACE AND TO MAINTAIN THOSE FORCES IN ACTION; AND (2) A HIGH DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY TO ENABLE PRE-ARRANGED PLANS AND OPERATIONS TO BE ALTERED TO MEET CHANGING SITUATIONS AND UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS.

Movement, maneuver, flexibility are synonyms for mobility. As indicated in the statement both physical movement of forces and flexibility of plans are included in this principle. Also inherent in the intent of "Mobility" is the concept of adaptation of plans and movements to meet the changing conditions of warfare.

Mobility is defined, in a more narrow sense, as the means or vehicle that carries fire power to the position selected for best results. It is an inherent characteristic of naval forces but is, of course, greatly enhanced by the availability of advance bases. Mobility makes possible the more effective application of concentration, offensive, surprise, security, and economy of effort.

Since relative mobility or flexibility is a desired goal in combat the reduction of enemy mobility is an obvious consideration.

One of the primary missions of tactical air power is to interdict the battle area in order to destroy enemy means of movement.

Weapon development, present and future, concentrates on speed and range or radius of action—witness the jet plane, guided missile, the atomic-powered submarine. Reason—to gain the upper hand in the race for a relative advantage in mobility or in relative rapidity of movement. Here, air power comes into its own. The ability of an air force to assemble at a common point from widely dispersed bases in such a short period of time, and strike rapidly to the extent of its range in any direction, makes it the most mobile of all the armed forces.

I want to pause here for a possible provocative digression. The above flat statement regarding the mobility of air forces cannot be accepted at its face value. This mobility hinges on the availability of supporting air bases—possession of protected real estate and adequate logistics support in turn, govern that availability. General Eisenhower stated, in effect, that there was nothing as immobile as an air force until it had been carefully nested down in its protected air bases. He failed to mention the need of continually supplying those bases.

Let us now consider a flat statement on naval air power—"It is only when air power is wedded to free moving sea power that it achieves true mobility. This is so, whether it is operating from a carrier or from sea-supported bases in the forward area". Isn't it true also in this case that this mobility hinges on the possession of protected real estate—the aircraft carrier or forward base—and on adequate logistics support?

Carrier-based air power, in its possession of a mobile air field, does have one predominant advantage—its capability of ob-

taining and maintaining air superiority in areas of the world which are, at present, inaccessible to land-based tactical aircraft. In World War II the role of carrier aircraft was decisive in the support of amphibious operations at the Marianas, Philippines, Okinawa, among others. Adequate carrier air forces in possession of the British might have prevented the surprise German occupation of Norway. However, assuming that we do have both protected bases and logistic support there can be no question but that air forces, sea and land-based, are the most mobile or flexible weapon in existence. In contrast to armies and naval surface forces, air forces of all categories lack the inherent ability to maintain themselves in action in the medium (air) in which they fight. They depend on the land or on the sea for their operating support.

Strategically, the mobility of land-based air forces is seriously compromised by the heavy installations and tremendous logistics support it requires. The Air Force has recognized the validity of the statement and is overcoming this relative immobility, in part, by pursuing the development of aircraft with radii of action for true global coverage; and, for present type aircraft, by aerial replenishment,by the development of large airdromes around the periphery of the probable enemy, and by use of fly-away kits which provide partial support for 30 days operation for heavy planes at advanced bases (POL products and ammunition required in addition to these kits).

The demonstrated mobility of the Air Force long range bombing planes needs no further comment from me. The feat of the carriers Enterprise and Hornet with their embarked air groups in proceeding thousands of miles from Coral Sea early in May 1942—repairing battle damage and replenishing at Pearl Harbor—and in participating less than a month later at the Battle of Midway in

June 1942 is a classic demonstration of the strategic mobility of carrier task forces.

Some of you may have wondered where logistics and communications fit, if they do, into the principles of war. My concept is that both are essential tools or means by which certain of the principles are applied. This is particularly true for the principle of mobility which is the key to concentration and offensive action.

The "Principle of Economy of Effort" is the fifth principle for examination.

STATEMENT:

ECONOMY OF EFFORT IS THE JUDICIOUS EXPENDITURE OF RESOURCES AND THE BALANCED EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE CONCENTRATION(S) AT DECISIVE TIME(S) AND PLACE(S).

The principle of economy of effort, in general, serves: to permit the concentration of superior forces at the decisive point and place by allocating to secondary efforts only the minimum forces necessary for fulfillment of their planned contribution to the success of the main effort. It serves also to guard against the reduction of essential strength through detachments or assignments to relatively unimportant tasks or missions.

Economy in the sense intended here means not parsimony but wise use. There must always be a compromise of distribution and employment of effort between the principles of the "Offensive" and "Concentration" on one hand and "Security" on the other. The correct balance, dictated by the Principle of "Economy of Effort", is governed to a large extent by mobility—the greater the mobility

the fewer forces required for an assigned task such as radar-equipped search planes for ASW work.

The ideal application of this principle is attained when we achieve concentration while at the same time forcing dispersion on the enemy. Both sea and air power typify this ideal of application by their inherent ability to concentrate great striking power quickly about an enemy's perimeter, thus making him disperse to meet this ever present threat. The Japanese throughout World War II were required to disperse their forces over the vast sea and land perimeter of their conquered empire. Germany in the last war dispersed her forces on a line running from Norway through France to Africa while the Allies, with mobile sea and air forces, were able to strike in force at selected points. The vast but vulnerable land perimeter of the Soviet Empire would require the same dispersal of forces in any World War III in order to counter mobile allied sea-air power. Strategic air strikes from encircling bases should profit greatly by this dispersion as should amphibious assault operations and carrier-based air strikes.

Strategically the global demands against limited resources for the next war will call for difficult decisions in the application of the principle of economy of effort. If the European Theater is assigned top priority the pressure will be tremendous for assignment of disproportionate forces to the Far East, Southeast Asia and Middle East theaters. Public opinion in this country will clamor for the allocation of more than reasonable defense forces to protect the continental United States against threat of attack.

The next principle is the "Principle of Cooperation".

STATEMENT:

A NATION'S FULL WAR POTENTIAL AND THE FULL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMBAT POWER OF ITS MILITARY

FORCES CAN BE DEVELOPED AND PROPERLY APPLIED ONLY BY THE COMPLETE, FREELY-GIVEN, AND EFFECTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN ALL COMPONENT PARTS OF THE NATION, ITS ALLIES, AND ITS MILITARY FORCES.

This principle, in effect, strives: for the decisive application of maximum power of available forces toward the objective by unity of effort achieved through unity of command, directed coordination, and through full, voluntary and intelligent co-operation. It also strives for the elimination of confusion and wasteful duplication of effort, and for the harmonious and concerted action of various efforts toward a common goal. It is a unifying principle like the principle of the objective—"Objective" designates common aim; "Co-operation" results in common endeavor.

The full effectiveness of the principle of co-operation depends mainly upon: (1) correct organization including unity of command, (2) common, combined, or joint training, (3) thorough and correct indoctrination, (4) mutual knowledge of the characteristics, employment, capabilities and limitations of own forces and of those of other services (including allied), and (5) upon the selection of a definite objective, clear to all.

As was noted at the beginning of this presentation the U. S. Army calls this principle "Unity of Command" but their concept of its meaning and application is quite similar to that indicated above.

There were innumerable examples familiar to all of you of excellent cooperation amongst the military (including allies) and between the military services and the civil government during World War II. Examples were the JCS, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, SHAFE, Close Tactical Air Support, amphibious assaults

in the Pacific and particularly the Combined Amphibious Operations on the Normandy Beaches.

The "Principle of Security".

STATEMENT:

THE PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY EMBRACES ALL MEASURES WHICH MUST BE TAKEN TO GUARD AGAINST ANY FORM OF COUNTERSTROKE WHICH THE ENEMY MAY EMPLOY TO PREVENT THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE.

The application of the principle of security, in general, provides: for the protection from unacceptable damage or restrictive interruption of that which is vital or highly important in accomplishing the objective. It further provides for the avoidance of surprise; for the retention of freedom of action; for the maintenance of the integrity of plans and of classified information; and, in its entirety, for the preservation of the capability of gaining the objective.

This principle as a mission of protection does not necessarily imply a defensive attitude; it may often be better performed by offensive action. Security is elemental, being associated with all forms of warfare. It contributes, to a marked degree, to the successful application of the principles of the objective, offensive, concentration, mobility, economy of force, and surprise.

Security of classified information, as you noted, is only a part of the "Principle of Security". The protection of bases (including the Zone of the Interior—or Continental United States) and the protection of sea, land, air lines of communications—are most important.

A partial list of security measures would include the protecting of bases, vulnerable points and areas (including LOC) which are vital or highly important; the minimizing of enemy interference with own plans and freedom of action; and would include the denying to the enemy of the means to gain intelligence. Security implies the gaining of intelligence of the enemy.

This protection must form the basis for War Plans and for supporting operational plans. Primary purpose of this security is to give freedom of action to commanders in carying out the War Plans. Need I mention the restrictions which would be placed on our freedom of action in carrying on the war, if an initial surprise attack on the U. S. destroyed 25% of our industrial capacity.

At the top level, practically our sole national objective, in peace or war, is that of SECURITY—political, economic, and military security—having for its purpose the preservation of the American way of life. The maintenance of that objective is the whole purpose of our foreign, domestic, and military policies. Even more directly our military objectives in war support the national war aims which have been set up to insure the continuance of our security as a nation.

The United States probably for the first time in its history is becoming "security" conscious but only because the very security of this country itself is being directly threatened—from within by espionage, subversion, and sabotage and from without by A-bombs, guided missiles and other weapons.

In peace, relative strategical security is obtained: by good intelligence, security forces such as the FBI, and by military readiness for war. In war, it is best obtained by the bold and resolute execution of well-conceived offensive plans—(air strikes, submarine and mining offensives, amphibious assaults for example.)

At a lower level all military facilities and units require relative security: bases—including air fields, aircraft, ships, and ground units. This security may be partially obtained by such measures as air defense, anti-submarine screens, fighter cover, and outposts.

Over-emphasis on security may vitiate the principles of the offensive, concentration and economy of force among others. At the start of a war, democratic nations in particular, usually enter into a defensive or build-up phase which is primarily concerned with the security of industrial and military facilities and with Lines of Communications in order to build up military effort for the offensive phase. After the shift to an offensive stage, security receives relatively much less emphasis for obvious reasons.

In this connection since the more critical military decisions have to be made and the supporting plans initiated during about the first year of a war it has been suggested that our top level military colleges would do well to place more stress on the solutions of problems involving the plans and operations for the first months of war.

The "Principle of Surprise".

STATEMENT:

SURPRISE RESULTS FROM CREATING UNEXPECTED SITUATION(S) OR FROM TAKING COURSES OF LEAST PROBABLE EXPECTATION—BOTH CONSIDERED FROM THE ENEMY POINT OF VIEW AND BOTH DESIGNED TO EXPLOIT THE ENEMY'S CONSEQUENT LACK OF PREPAREDNESS.

The value of surprise in warfare is well known by all of you. Best results are obtained when the other principles of war are

applied with surprise. The element of surprise may be in time, place, direction, force, technique and weapons and may be obtained by such means as: secrecy, deception and diversion, careful planning, rapidity of execution and rapidity of movement. Intelligence and counter-intelligence are major factors in the Principle of Surprise.

Surprise can be a two-bladed weapon. It boomeranged on the Japs at Pearl Harbor (by unifying the American war effort) and also backfired on the Japanese at the Battle of Midway.

Mobility greatly aids in surprise. One of the intrinsic strengths of air power and sea-air power, including amphibious lifts, is that of achieving surprise, both strategically and tactically.

The last principle to be considered will be the "Principle of Simplicity".

STATEMENT:

SIMPLE AND DIRECT METHODS OF PLANNING AND OPERATING, BY FACILITATING THE OBSERVANCE OF THE OTHER PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND BY REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND MISTAKE, AFFORD GREATER POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS IN WARFARE.

The British and Canadians do not consider "Simplicity" to be of sufficient importance to include it in their listings. Those of you who remember the increasing complexity of light force tactics during the years just prior to World War II will also recall the relative simplicity of war-time tactics which frequently were simplified, by necessity, to a brief "Follow-me". Also anyone, who has had occasion to familiarize himself with the stack of operation plans and annexes now standard issue for a single post-war amphibious exercise, understands the need and desirability of simplicity in the conduct of warfare.

Simplicity, of course, is relative. The carefully coordinated and timed sequence of events in an amphibious assault especially the ship-to-shore movement is complicated. Modern warfare is complex.

One must guard against the tendency to confuse simplicity with personal convenience—meaning "easiest to accomplish". Simplicity is the most difficult of all principles to attain in practice. We must strive for it both in peace and war.

That concludes our examination of the "Principles of War". These principles have stood the test of time. They have been officially recognized by all major military services except the U. S. Navy.

We have seen that the various principles of war overlap and complement each other, are dependent on one another, and can, on occasion conflict with each other. They are the tools, the guides, or the methods which commanders must consider, weigh and blend skillfully for success in war.

The making of sound plans and their bold execution requires mastery of the art of war. The master of any art is he who adapts most skillfully new methods to established principles. The objective of each student of war should be just that "To adapt new methods to established principles".

In conclusion—A summary of the nine (9) "Principles of War": "Select the proper *objective*. Make the plan of such *simplicity* that it will be understood easily, thus facilitating perfect *cooperation*, the proper timing of all effort through familiarity with the objective and the intentions. *Surprise* the enemy if possible, at the same time taking steps to insure *security*, the preparation and protection against surprise by the enemy. Keeping in

mind the single important aim, take the *offensive*, forcing the enemy to act on the defensive, a situation in which every advantage must be exploited by the aggressor. In accordance with the principle of *mobility*, "get there first", using an *economy of effort* (but without stinting), in order to guarantee *concentration*, superiority at the point of contact, the most vital principle of all."

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE OBJECTIVE.

STATEMENT:

Every military undertaking must have an objective; that is, it must be directed toward a clearly defined goal and all activity must contribute to the attainment of that goal. It is axiomatic that military objectives support the national objective(s)—in peace as well as in war—and, more directly, support the national war aims during conflict.

CONTRIBUTION: *

This principle focuses all military activity upon the objective; supplies connecting links that impart coherence to war; simplifies the problem; promotes coordination and continuity of effort; facilitates the correct application of the other principles of war; and, if properly selected, supports the attainment of the war aims or of the objectives of the larger force of which it is a part. The principle of the objective, properly applied, provides the prerequisite for success in any undertaking—a specific, realistic, and clearly defined goal.

2. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE OFFENSIVE.

STATEMENT:

Victory can never be won by passive defense; only sustained offensive action, or the threat of unfailing offensive action brings success.

* To sound planning and successful operations.

CONTRIBUTION:

In general, this principle serves: to exploit at every practicable opportunity the initiative inherent in offensive action; to bring vigorous, timely concentration of forces against a weaker concentration; to create favorable conditions for attack; to raise morale; to preserve the commander's freedom of action for imposing his will on the enemy; and, in exploiting the offensive, to insure maximum gain. The selection by the commander of the right time and place for offensive action is the decisive factor in attaining the objective.

3. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCENTRATION.

STATEMENT:

To achieve success in war it is essential to concentrate superior forces (ground, sea, and air) at the decisive place and time in the proper direction and to sustain this superiority at the point of contact as long as it may be required. Concentration produces superiority at the vital point through an effective combination of the factors: personnel, materiel (including weapons), fire power and fire concentration, organization (including unity of command), leadership, morale, combat readiness, and unity of action among others.

CONTRIBUTION:

The principle of concentration, in general, serves: to achieve decisive combat superiority and desired results at the points or in the areas where the enemy is inherently weak and cannot reinforce in time; to employ the proper economy of force at or in the less decisive points; and to enable maximum total effective force to be exerted in achieving the objective. The correct and skilful application of all the other principles of war should lead to one single end: concentration of the required superior combat power at a selected time and place, projected in the proper direction, striking an overwhelming blow at the decisive point(s) in order to achieve the objective.

4. THE PRINCIPLE OF MOBILITY.

STATEMENT:

Modern war demands: (1) the possession and use of the capability of physical mobility (strategically and tactically) to transfer forces economically and with relative rapidity from place to place and to maintain those forces in action; and (2) a high degree of flexibility to enable prearranged plans and operations to be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. It is axiomatic that success in battle depends on mobility.

CONTRIBUTION:

In general this principle serves: to position forces in the most favorable position to accomplish the objective; to maintain forces in action once they are in position; to increase the freedom of movement and the flexibility of plans and operations; to increase the fire power and effectiveness of forces; to increase the opportunities to gain or to prevent surprise; to make possible the conduct of sustained offensive action; and to exploit advantageously the battle phases of penetration and pursuit.

5. THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY OF EFFORT.

STATEMENT:

Economy of effort is the judicious expenditure of resources and the balanced employment of forces for the purpose of achieving effective concentration(s) at decisive time(s) and place(s). It can also be stated as "the proportional distribution of forces to accomplish assigned tasks most effectively."

CONTRIBUTION:

The principle of economy of effort, in general, serves: to permit the concentration of superior forces at the decisive point and place by allocating to secondary efforts only the minimum forces necessary for fulfillment of their planned contribution to the success of the main effort; to guard against the reduction of essential

strength through detachments or assignments to relatively unimportant tasks or missions; and to encourage the wise expenditure of resources for present needs in order to preserve offensive power for final concentrated blows.

6. THE PRINCIPLE OF CO-OPERATION.

STATEMENT:

A nation's full war potential and the full effectiveness of the combat power of its military forces can be developed and properly applied only by the complete, freely-given, and effective cooperation between all component parts of the nation, its allies, and its military forces. It is a unifying principle like the principle of the objective—"Objective" designates common aim; "Co-operation" results in common endeavor.

CONTRIBUTION:

This principle, in effect, strives: for the decisive application of maximum power of available forces toward the objective by unity of effort achieved through unity of command, directed coordination, and through full, voluntary and intelligent co-operation; for the elimination of confusion and wasteful duplication of effort; and for the harmonious and concerted action of various efforts toward a common goal.

The full effectiveness of the principle of co-operation depends mainly upon: (1) correct organization including unity of command, (2) common, combined, or joint training, (3) thorough and correct indoctrination, (4) mutual knowledge of the characteristics, employment, capabilities and limitation of own forces and of those of other services (including allied), and (5) upon the selection of a definite objective, clear to all.

7. THE PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY.

STATEMENT:

The principle of security embraces all measures which

must be taken to guard against any form of counterstroke which the enemy may employ to prevent the attainment of the objective.

A partial list of security measures would include: the protecting of bases, vulnerable points and areas (including LOC) which are vital or highly important; the minimizing of enemy interference with own plans, with freedom of action and with employment of other principles of war; and the denial to the enemy of the means for gaining intelligence. Security implies the gaining of intelligence of the enemy.

CONTRIBUTION:

The application of the principle of security, in general, provides: for the protection from unacceptable damage or restrictive interruption of that which is vital or highly important in accomplishing the objective; for the avoidance of surprise; for the retention of freedom of action; for the maintenance of the integrity of plans and of classified information; and, in its entirety, for the preservation of the capability of gaining the objective.

8. THE PRINCIPLE OF SURPRISE.

STATEMENT:

Surprise results from creating unexpected situation(s) or from taking courses of least probable expectation—both considered from the enemy point of view and both designed to exploit the enemy's consequent lack of preparedness.

CONTRIBUTION:

The principle of surprise, in general, serves: to strike the enemy when and where he is unprepared and thus achieve confusion and a slackening of enemy effort and initiative; to give our forces a moral and a material advantage over the enemy which is too late for him to entirely overcome; and to permit the attaining of maximum effect from a minimum expenditure of effort.

9. THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMPLICITY.

STATEMENT:

Simple and direct methods of planning and operating, by facilitating the observance of the other principles of war and by reducing the possibility of misunderstandings and mistakes, afford greater possibility of success in warfare.

CONTRIBUTION:

In general, the principle of simplicity serves: to facilitate the observance of the other principles of war; to keynote correct planning; and to promote more effective execution of plans and operations. Simplicity is the most difficult of all principles to attain in practice; usually the simplest plan which insures victory is the best.

MARITIME STRATEGY

A Lecture delivered by
Captain F. N. Kivette, USN
at the Naval War College
11 September 1951

Gentlemen:

Maritime strategy is a subject of considerable importance to all human beings but it is particularly important to you and to me. In its most common usage the term strategy is given a military meaning and associated with the conduct of war. Yet I think it is equally applicable to non-military and peacetime usage. While it is true that war is the final test of strategy, wartime strategy is not the only factor in success or failure in war. It may certainly be the determining factor. If it be sound strategy, it will overcome many weaknesses in other factors upon which success or failure also depend.

As important as war strategy is to the final result, in this age of the blitzkrieg, the atomic bomb, the sneak attack, peacetime strategy is equally vital. We have all been witnesses to the failure of the blitz in recent times and I, for one, do not subscribe to its success in the near future. Nevertheless, it has won battles, heaped disaster upon disaster, prolonged wars, and left ruin in its wake. If we are to avoid or diminish the number and magnitude of these disasters, reduce the length of war, and mitigate the destruction of modern war, we will do so only by preparation in advance. Indeed, preparation during peace not only makes more certain the victory, but makes more probable the avoidance of war.

Captain Kivette is Head of the Strategy and Tactics Department of the Naval War College.

Here then, I make my first point: Peacetime strategy is comparable in importance to the strategy of war. My future remarks will not ignore or neglect the conduct of war, however. Rather, they will give comparable emphasis to the strategy during peace that will aid and abet or directly prepare us for the prosecution of war.

It seems necessary to digress here briefly to give some definition to the state in which we find ourselves today. Are we at war or are we at peace? Measured by my standards we are at war, and we have been since long before Pearl Harbor. Every form of hostility, except military action, has been employed against us by Russia from time to time and in varying degrees for years. Except for the action in Korea, the military situation has been one of armed truce or armistice. An armistice is only a brief cessation of arms ,a temporary suspension of hostilities. This is a condition which can exist only in a state of war. The action in Korea then, is an isolated battle in a larger war in which a temporary military truce exists in some other areas. While fighting this battle in Korea we can, however, take advantage of the uneasy truce which prevails elsewhere to pursue some of the activities which are possible in time of peace.

Now, getting back to strategy, I would like to make my second point: As in peacetime and wartime employment, strategy has both a military and a non-military aspect. War is no longer merely the employment of one military force against another. It is the employment of the total resources of the nation or combination of nations against those of the enemy. This, it seems to me, is the most significant of all considerations in modern war. The ability to wage victorious warfare is no longer measured entirely by the number of divisions we can throw against the enemy. There are many other important considerations.

Of the non-military resources available to our country, none exceeds in importance our economic strength and power. Within the category of economic strength I include such developments of the modern industrial age as steel, oil, machine manufacture, hydro-electric power, and transportation. I do not intend to neglect military or naval strategy but I shall take up at the outset of this discussion the peacetime and non-military phases of strategy.

First, there is time now, a partial breather, during this period of armed truce or uneasy peace to develop and carry out our strategy in circumstances which are not charged with the overwhelming pressure and overriding demands of total war. The time allowed us, if put to good use, may terminate the truce with peace rather than war. Secondly, economic developments have progressed and will continue to do so much more rapidly than the human being. Man does the fighting but man has developed relatively little in many centuries. The tools of war with which he fights, and which to an ever increasing degree are the measure of his fighting strength, are the products of our normal, non-military, peacetime economic organization. Thirdly, I have the feeling that we as military men and our countrymen as a whole are prone to measure our strength in military terms. In so doing, we underrate the might, the power, and the mass of our total national resources. Fourthly, economics in general. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that economics, in other words the normal, non-military, peacetime pursuits of individuals and nations alike from time immemorial, have exercised a profound influence on strategy. I suggest that economic factors have been the underlying cause of most wars and the dominating consideration in the strategy of those countries whose prosperity has been dependent to an appreciable extent upon the sea. I will return later in this discussion to the national economy and its effect on the maritime strategy of the United States.

As for the term strategy itself, which I have thus far used more or less loosely, there are a number of definitions given to it by a variety of military authorities not neglecting the Joint Chiefs of Staff who defines it in these terms:

> "The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological and Armed Forces of a nation during peace and during war, to afford the maximum support to national policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat."

There are other definitions such as:

"Coordination of the End and the Means."
"Adjustment of the End to the Means."

They are long and short, simple, qualified and involved, according to the various shadings of meaning their authors desired to give them. But they all have something in common which is indicated by the use of such words as employing, exercise, developing, using, coordination, adjustment. These various terms clearly imply to me "a course of action." This phrase suits itself to my needs and conveys the meaning I desire to give to strategy. My definition of strategy therefore might read:

> "The course of action adopted with the means available to achieve the end desired."

Or stated more simply:

> "Strategy is a course of action."

It remains now to apply our definition of strategy to the maritime world. Sir Julian Corbett gives us a good start although

his definition perhaps, is both too broad and too narrow to fit the framework of our present discussion. He says:

> "By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor."

To paraphrase Corbett and at the same time incorporate our definition of strategy we might turn up with something like this:

> "By maritime strategy we mean the course of action which governs when the sea is a substantial factor."

Having arrived at this definition of maritime strategy it is the one I shall use, not because it is the best definition, but because it is suitable, since my remarks will deal with the courses of action when the sea is a substantial factor.

Strategy, as we have seen, ties the end to the means. This is a three-sided equation in which all three elements are interdependent though by no means always equal in the weight of considerations we give to each. We may accept as a general principle that the end, or more properly speaking, the objective, is the controlling element. To it we adjust the means and the strategy which are influenced by factors that govern the actions of people and nations.

These factors are many indeed, and extremely varied in character. Climate, for example, has always had a far-reaching effect on the people inhabiting certain geographical areas. It cannot be a matter of coincidence that the tropics are backward areas despite their natural resources which have brought vast wealth to others and are of such vital importance to the more advanced peoples. But from among *all* the factors which affect our maritime

strategy, I shall select only two for discussion: geography, and economics.

Geography and economics, to my way of thinking, gentlemen, are the most important of all in their effect on the human race and the nations into which the human race has divided itself. In many respects they are one and the same but geography is unchanging and unchangeable and therefore compels us to adapt ourselves and our economy to it.

The sea, covering seventy percent of the earth's surface provides by all odds the cheapest, most economical means of transportation the world has known. It is for practical purpose, the only means of bulk transportation and trade between many countries and strategic areas. To some nations that border on the sea, maritime economy has been the difference between life and death. To others it has made the difference btween bare existence and some degree of wealth. The sea is at once an impassable barrier and a broad open highway. To those who have learned about it, overcome its dangers, adapted themselves to it, and used it, proximity to the sea has meant wealth, power, prestige and security. But the sea is fickle. Those who have achieved greatness on the sea and then neglected the means by which they attained it, have fallen rapidly from their positions of world importance. And it is a noteworthy fact that those who have fallen have rarely, if ever, regained their former positions of prominence.

In what ways and by what means has the sea been used to bring nations to positions of pre-eminence? No one has owned or possessed it. Economics has been a fundamental factor in the history of all countries. We say that this or that nation lives by or has an agricultural economy, a manufacturing or industrial economy, a maritime economy. Like geography, economics is always

with us. The ends people seek are economic or at least have their foundation in economics. Economics has to do with the material means of satisfying human desires. Thus, we have both an end—the economic end, and a means—such as agriculture, manufacturing, industry. It remains only to link these two together. This we do by trade or commerce. Commerce then, is like strategy, for together with economics and manufacturing or farming, it forms one part of a three-sided equation. The similarity does not end here. It is also a course of action. Things exist or are created. We have a need or a desire for them. We adopt some course of action to obtain them and where the sea intervenes our course of action is by maritime commerce.

Let us look once more at our definition of maritime strategy as we proceed, not forgetting that we are viewing it as it is influenced by geography and economics.

> "By maritime strategy we mean the course of action which governs when the sea is a substantial factor."

The commanding geographical factor in the early maritime strategy with which we are interested is the Mediterranean. This sea is the birthplace of western civilization and maritime power which have throughout history, traveled hand in hand. It was no coincidence that each of the great powers of ancient times occupied a position at one of the four geographically strategic areas that dominate the Mediterranean. The Phoenicians at Suez, the Greeks at the Bosporus, Carthage on one side of the Straits of Sicily, and Rome on the other. Carthage also extended her power to the Straits of Gibraltar.

Why was this? Undoubtedly it was because of the economic demands of civilization and culture. The Phoenicians, located in a

position where the goods of the East arrived overland and were dispatched by sea to the West, became the first great maritime people. They were not producers and exporters of their own goods, nor importers for their own use. They were traders who left no great culture in the manner of Greece and Rome. Their wealth and position came from the sea. Their objective was economic, their means was the sea, their strategy was based on trade. The factor which made this possible was geography.

Both Rome and Greece, like most other nations, were in short supply in some items essential to their economy, notably foodstuffs. Thus, in addition to their desires and needs for the goods of others to improve their economy, they were forced to turn to the sea for the necessities of life.

Greece would possibly have been willing to go her own way unmolested and unmolesting, for what she could not obtain or did not desire from the Phoenicians, she could get through her own monopoly of the Bosporus and the Black Sea trade. She was challenged by the Persians and her victory at the Battle of Salamis preserved the western world's hold on the Bosporus until it fell to the Turks two thousand years later. Rome disputed control of the Straits of Sicily with Carthage. It is a strange commentary that the Carthagenians, a great seafaring people, attacked Rome by way of Spain and the Alps, and were in turn destroyed from the sea by the Legions of Rome.

When Rome controlled the sea, she controlled all. Greece, the Phoenicians, and Carthage came under her sway. Was it economics that supported her power, or power that supported her economics? I don't know, but it is certainly clear that they were held together by the strategy that dictated control of the sea.

Now we may pass rather rapidly from ancient Mediterranean

strategy to more modern times. The decline of the Roman Empire brought with it a decline in Mediterranean commerce. It is more likely that a lack of demand for the goods of trade rather than a lack of shipping was the cause of this decline. Historically, it is generally true that shipping has followed the demands for trade rather than the opposite.

The Venetians, aided by the Crusades, were the first to resume Mediterranean maritime commerce in goods of the Middle and Far East. Like the Phoenicians, their business was largely in trading and transporting the goods of others. Economically, they enjoyed something of a monopoly which was irksome to their western consumers and so the age of exploration, discovery, and colonization was ushered in.

The Portuguese were the first to find and use the South African route to India. They were soon displaced and superceded by the Dutch who in turn gave way to England. Spain and France directed their efforts to the West and found their wealth in the New World. The Spanish continued from the west coast of America across the Pacific to establish their route to the Far East. But like Holland, Spain and France also yielded to English sea power. Why and how did this happen?

England was in a unique geographical position with relation to the other great powers. Situated on an island commanding the sea approaches to Western Europe, she was both protected by the sea and dependent upon it for her economy. That the British realized this is amply demonstrated by their history. They needed economics for their well-being and power for their protection. As in the case of Rome it would be difficult to say which was the end and which the means, but no doubt exists that it was maritime strategy that joined them together.

What were the geographical factors that influenced Britain's maritime strategy?

First, her island position. As I have mentioned, the sea is at once a barrier and a broad highway. To Britain's enemies it is a barrier which has held back the invader for a thousand years. Spain, France, and Germany discovered this too late and to their sorrow. Yet from this small island she has used the broad highway of the sea to drive Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler from Egypt, to repel Russia in the far distant Black Sea when the Bosporous was threatened and to invade the continent once in the defeat of Napoleon and twice to defeat Germany.

Second, Britain's colonies. She selected them both for their location which would support her maritime strategy, and for their resources that would support her economy. In these respects her colonies formed an imposing list: South Africa, Aden, India, Ceylon, Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, the Falklands, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Jamaica, Bermuda, and North America. She also maintained her influence over the Suez and the Bosporus. The English even established a post at Archangel. Unlike Spain, who plundered her colonies, Britain developed hers for their permanent and continuing benefit to British economy and for their great importance to her maritime strategy.

The third, and possibly the greatest geographical factor of all was the great broad highway of the sea itself, over which England never ceased to exercise the maximum possible control. Control of the sea is never absolute. It is a relative term that measures the difference between the freedom of movement on the one hand against the difficulty of movement on the other. With her navy she fought endlessly, one and all, small and large, with immense vigor, determination and singleness of purpose to maintain her con-

trol of the sea. But always the greater the threat, the more relentless the fight.

The success of her commercial strategy will long be remembered in the names of Hawkins, Drake, and Morgan who enriched England at the expense of Spain, with Spanish gold captured at sea and on the Spanish Main. Nor will the Dutch soon forget the navigation act by which England widened her commercial control at the expense of Holland.

We should not leave Britain without reference to an old friend, the "balance of power", for England *was* the balance of power. In pursuit of her strategy she kept others weak. She fought against Russia with Turkey and France, against France with Turkey, Russia and Germany, and against Germany and Turkey on the side of Russia and France. Always with sea power and always with victory.

Let me repeat, gentlemen, it was maritime strategy, and in this case England's national strategy that united economics and sea power to place her in a position of preeminence. The geography of the sea, the colonies, and an island position, were the vital factors.

We might very properly ask, why did the others fail? It was Napoleon who said, "Nations have three kinds of frontiers: rivers, mountains, and deserts". He completely overlooked the fact that Britain had only one frontier and this was the sea. Once she had settled her internal affairs she was not subject to the costly land wars of others except at the time, the place, and with the force of her own choosing. Nor, until the advent of air war, was she the victim of destruction and subsequent reconstruction that afflicted others. It is significant that among the Ancients, Rome most nearly approached Britain's island geography.

Greece and Phoenicia on the other hand were the victims of a political circumstance. As nations they were composed of sovereign city states while Rome was a centralized empire. In military terms they violated the principle of cooperation. It is interesting to note that the senior Greek admiral before the battle of Salamis, fearful that the several fleets under his command would scatter, lured the Persians into an immediate attack. As for Carthage, a great maritime people abandoned the sea for the land and fell to a land power that went to sea.

In more modern times Holland occupied a position similar to Phoenicia. Situated at the mouth of the Rhine, she handled the commerce of Europe as the Phoenicians did for the Mediterranean countries. She had little in the way of natural resources and beset by war on land and sea, she lost to a greater sea power than her own. Spain preferred wealth in coin of the realm—gold and silver —to the wealth of economic resources and when the time came she could not exchange one for the other. I wonder how much Spanish gold is now buried in Fort Knox! France we can leave behind with these words from an ordinance of Louis XIV: ".....authorizing all noblemen to take an interest in merchant ships, goods and merchandise without being considered as having derogated from nobility, provided they did not sell at retail". In France, commerce was ignoble.

Until recently we have seldom seriously considered Russia in terms of maritime power. She had neither a maritime means nor a maritime strategy but she had a powerful objective. To reach the Baltic and the Mediterranean she fought with Sweden and Turkey for centuries. Yet when she reached the sea the geography was unfavorable and she knew not what to do with what little she had. The Russians had been too long and were still too far from the great civilizing and economic influence of the sea. Her

rulers were fickle. Catherine the Great dismissed the sea in these words, ".....it is for traders to traffic where they please. I will furnish neither men, ships, nor money. I renounce forever all possessions in .....America. England's experience with her American colonies should be a warning to other nations to abstain form such efforts." The great mass of Russia lies almost entirely north of fifty degrees. So do Britain and the Scandinavian countries, but they enjoy the moderating influences of the sea. The high latitudes, like the tropics, are backward areas. Russia, like Japan, was satisfied with the economy of the feudal system which had retarded civiliation in Europe during the Dark Ages until trade, commerce, and communications were again resumed.

We come to Japan. I shall pass rather lightly over Japan. To begin with she had no maritime strategy. She was concerned primarily with home economics. Commodore Perry appears not to have known what he was letting us in for when he opened that Pandora's Box. Japan's island position was favorable but she came too late and found all of the colonial geography gone. She had few natural resources of her own. Her objective was too great for her maritime means. The strategy was faulty. If, instead of seeking to establish an Empire, she had limited her maritime ambitions to a commercial strategy, in the manner of the Phoenicians, the Venetians, and the Dutch, she might have gone farther if less gloriously. To Japan, the sea is and must continue to be a substantial factor, and her future will be determined by the maritime strategy she adopts.

The geography and economics of the sea have exerted the most profound influence on civilization. Ancient and modern civilization developed on the shores of the sea and were spread to the backward areas by the sea. The sea was a means to an end for all who bordered upon it. Only those who lacked an objective, were

faulty in their strategy, or who were adversely effected by geography, failed to attain a considerable degree of modern civilization. Power, prosperity, and culture attended those who united economics and sea power with a sound maritime strategy.

Gentlemen, we have covered considerable territory in exploring history, geography, and economics in order to arrive at some theory of maritime strategy. Now a theory is one of two things: first, a guess or a speculation; second, the analysis of a set of facts from which is derived a principle. I have felt it necessary to go through this analysis in order to establish my own philosophy and a firm foundation for discussing U. S. maritime strategy. Maritime strategy can be practical and in the case of the United States, it is immensely so. Yet in all of its immensity it can be extremely delicate and sensitive. It has many an Achilles heel.

The geographical position of the U. S. is similar to that of Britain. We are surrounded by Canada, Mexico, and the sea. We are not concerned with Canada and Mexico except as they prosper and add to the economic power of the island position. Since developing economic power, and when we have had a maritime strategy, we have been impregnable to invasion. The sea has been our broad highway. We have a temperate climate and more than most nations, a vast wealth of natural resources for home economics and maritime commerce. Though we have had less need than others of the economics of a colonial empire we lacked a strategy to employ the few outposts we possessed. We have been both able and unable to project our power overseas depending on the vagaries of our maritime strategy.

The U. S. is an economic colossus, an industrial giant. These are not just metaphors gentlemen, they are truly descriptive. We live in and by an industrial economy. It is the economy of oil, steel,

rubber, tin, the railroad, and the automobile. Can you imagine your wife's consternation if we were suddenly deprived of tin? If not, look in at the nearest chain store and imagine it without any tin cans! But the U. S. has no tin. It all comes to us by way of the sea? What about rubber? It all comes by sea too. But you say, we can synthesize rubber from oil and we have plenty of oil. Maybe so. But our economists are reaching far overseas to South America and the Persian Gulf to bolster our reserves. Without steel, we have no automobiles, and with no automobile the U. S. is literally on its uppers. Last year we produced eight million cars and there are fifty million in the U. S. today. We have iron but iron is not steel, and even if it were, we are going to sea to replenish our dwindling supply. Steel is chrome, cobalt, manganese, tungsten, vanadium, and others for which there are no synthetics or complete substitutes. Many of these we must obtain by sea in quantities up to a hundred percent. Can we get along without coffee, pepper, and sugar? I can't. The sea brings them to us too. The trade is not all one way for we are one of the world's great exporters. Since early Colonial days the economy of this country has been heavily dependent on export trade.

The fundamental of our economy is a standard of living that makes to us a necessity of those things which are luxuries to others. This cannot be without trade, the exchange of goods, commerce. This is maritime strategy. The Yankee trader and the trade winds did not get their names for nothing.

I have several charts that illustrate these points more clearly.



Ral-124

RANDOM LIST OF ESSENTIAL MATERIALS
(PERCENT OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS IMPORTED BY SEA)



SOURCE OP NAV-03-P-115 1946

U. S. LIFE LINES

PROCUREMENT OF ESSENTIAL MATERIALS—1946



RESTRICTED

It must be apparent that if the U. S. cannot support its peacetime economy without going to sea it will be impossible to support a wartime economy without resort to the sea. I need hardly go further into maritime support of our industrial machine. It is more fitting now that we investigate maritime strategy in the defense of our country and as a means of defeating or aiding in the defeat of our enemies in war.

I take it to be a cardinal principle of our national strategy that we fight our wars on the enemies' grounds, not on our own. We are inevitably committed to the defense of Europe. No one can deny the certainty of our being involved in a full fledged war if Western Europe is invaded. The presence of our army in Europe is automatic assurance of that. I think it was our Secretary of State who recently said, it is our purpose to defend Europe, not to liberate it. We may be able to liberate Europe with sea power but we will never defend Europe without it. A sound maritime strategy is necessary in either case.

What must that strategy be? It must first give us that degree of control which will permit our free use of the sea without prohibitive losses. It must be sufficient to insure the full employment of our industrial machine. It must be adequate to carry the full weight of our armed might overseas as fast as we can ready it for movement. It must be equal to the burden of supplying the ever increasing needs of our overseas forces. Nor is this all. We will have the task of multiplying the military aid to our allies that we are giving them now.

The major threat to our control of the seas is the submarine. It is an interesting commentary that England, the greatest of all sea powers, should have so neglected the submarine that it brought her to the verge of defeat in the First World War. And having been

given the lesson, she failed to profit by it in World War II. The Allies lost more than twenty million tons of shipping to German submarines in World War II. Winston Churchill has stated, "Shipping was at once the stranglehold and sole foundation of our war strategy." And what of Germany? She built a vast army and air force neglecting the lesson she had given Britain in the First World War. And Japan? She too, in spite of two lessons to England, failed to recognize her Achilles heel. The submarine brought about a steadily increasing strangulation of her entire economy. Chart number four tells her story.

The first objective of our wartime maritime strategy is the control of the submarine menace. Before we go further we must assume that we will accomplish this because if we fail we need go no further.

The second objective is the means by which we can create the greatest possible pressure to defeat our enemy. Control of the sea provides this means as nothing else does. With it we have the ability to project our power to the enemy's shore and beyond. We can strike at the time, at the place, and with the force of our choice. This is a multi-edged sword. It is the means for taking the offensive and it gives us the choice of the objective. It not only places the enemy on the defensive but forces a dispersion of his forces to meet our choice of thrusts. It was sea power that carried us across the Pacific and Atlantic to Japan and Africa, across the Straits of Sicily to Italy and across the English Channel to France. Likewise, it was sea power that compelled the dispersion of hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops in fruitless defense of by-passed Pacific Islands. D-day found the equivalent of fourteen German divisions defending Norway, a German army tied down in Italy and other German armies waiting the onslaught of sea power



in Greece, Crete, Yugoslavia, and Southern France. This is maritime strategy—the employment of sea power.

In war men fight men; in the air, on the ground, on the sea and under the sea, with the weapons of war; tanks, ships, planes, and submarines. But these weapons are not exclusive. There are no air, sea, or land wars. These are only battles in the total of war. Weapons and the men who fight are employed indiscriminately and as the needs of the occasion demand. None is entirely independent of the others. They achieve their maximum effectiveness in combination. No nation has developed this combination to the high degree of effectiveness that has been attained in U. S. sea power. There is no force so ready, so versatile, so flexible to engage the enemy in war as the U. S. Navy - Marine - Naval Air Team. This is the strategy that reversed the course of a war at Inchon. This is the strategy that retrieved a disaster at Hungnam. Gentlemen, *this is sea power and this is maritime strategy.*

I shall devote my closing remarks to a brief look at the future.

I do not entirely agree with General Bradley who recently stated that we are fighting the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place, with the wrong enemy. If this is so, what is the right time, place, enemy, and war? Is it Europe, the defense of which is our main objective? And if it is, why aren't we fighting there? For one thing, Russia has the initiative and she fights for her objectives, not ours. We only oppose her at the time and place of her choosing. We must not neglect our own objectives, but we might devote great effort to devining and examining the objectives of our enemy. It is his failure to attain his objectives that is most damaging to him.

Historically, Rusia has had vast ambitions in the Far East. The conquest of China had its beginning almost three hundred years ago. The Russo-Japanese War preceded the present war for Korea by fifty years. Civil war in Indo-China and Malaya is Russian inspired. It was a Tsarist statesman who said, "Historically, we shall march to the South.....All China—all of its riches are predominantly in the south."

If the war in Korea is so completely wrong, should we have let Russia win by default? And if we had, should we have subsequently let Indo-China go by the board? And Formosa, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, India, Persia, Turkey, the Middle East? Would we let Russia pile victory on victory in endless succession without resistance from us until all but Europe had fallen? I think not.

How many more Koreas will there be? This, I cannot answer, but this I can say. If we are prepared, if we are ready, if it is certain that aggression will be countered by swift and powerful blows, it may very well be that we will have no more Koreas and this war will prove to have been the right war, in the right place, at the right time, with the right enemy. But if they must, these blows will be delivered with that combination of land, sea, and air that we call sea power. It is the only means by which we can strike swiftly, surely, and suddenly with the most effective combination of forces at our command.

Wherever war may be, in Korea, Persia, or Europe—on land, at sea, or in the air—sea power will play its decisive role.

Gentlemen, this summarizes my concept of maritime strategy.

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Brookings Institution

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July-August.

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Mediterranean: A Key to Victory.
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Conner, Karl, Lt. Col.

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