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Maritime Strategy

F. N. Kivette
U.S. Navy

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MARITIME STRATEGY

A Lecture delivered by
Captain F. N. Kivette, USN
at the Naval War College
11 September 1951

Gentlemen:

Maritime strategy is a subject of considerable importance to all human beings but it is particularly important to you and to me. In its most common usage the term strategy is given a military meaning and associated with the conduct of war. Yet I think it is equally applicable to non-military and peacetime usage. While it is true that war is the final test of strategy, wartime strategy is not the only factor in success or failure in war. It may certainly be the determining factor. If it be sound strategy, it will overcome many weaknesses in other factors upon which success or failure also depend.

As important as war strategy is to the final result, in this age of the blitzkrieg, the atomic bomb, the sneak attack, peacetime strategy is equally vital. We have all been witnesses to the failure of the blitz in recent times and I, for one, do not subscribe to its success in the near future. Nevertheless, it has won battles, heaped disaster upon disaster, prolonged wars, and left ruin in its wake. If we are to avoid or diminish the number and magnitude of these disasters, reduce the length of war, and mitigate the destruction of modern war, we will do so only by preparation in advance. Indeed, preparation during peace not only makes more certain the victory, but makes more probable the avoidance of war.

Captain Kivette is Head of the Strategy and Tactics Department of the Naval War College.

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Here then, I make my first point: Peacetime strategy is comparable in importance to the strategy of war. My future remarks will not ignore or neglect the conduct of war, however. Rather, they will give comparable emphasis to the strategy during peace that will aid and abet or directly prepare us for the prosecution of war.

It seems necessary to digress here briefly to give some definition to the state in which we find ourselves today. Are we at war or are we at peace? Measured by my standards we are at war, and we have been since long before Pearl Harbor. Every form of hostility, except military action, has been employed against us by Russia from time to time and in varying degrees for years. Except for the action in Korea, the military situation has been one of armed truce or armistice. An armistice is only a brief cessation of arms, a temporary suspension of hostilities. This is a condition which can exist only in a state of war. The action in Korea then, is an isolated battle in a larger war in which a temporary military truce exists in some other areas. While fighting this battle in Korea we can, however, take advantage of the uneasy truce which prevails elsewhere to pursue some of the activities which are possible in time of peace.

Now, getting back to strategy, I would like to make my second point: As in peacetime and wartime employment, strategy has both a military and a non-military aspect. War is no longer merely the employment of one military force against another. It is the employment of the total resources of the nation or combination of nations against those of the enemy. This, it seems to me, is the most significant of all considerations in modern war. The ability to wage victorious warfare is no longer measured entirely by the number of divisions we can throw against the enemy. There are many other important considerations.

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Of the non-military resources available to our country, none exceeds in importance our economic strength and power. Within the category of economic strength I include such developments of the modern industrial age as steel, oil, machine manufacture, hydro-electric power, and transportation. I do not intend to neglect military or naval strategy but I shall take up at the outset of this discussion the peacetime and non-military phases of strategy.

First, there is time now, a partial breather, during this period of armed truce or uneasy peace to develop and carry out our strategy in circumstances which are not charged with the overwhelming pressure and overriding demands of total war. The time allowed us, if put to good use, may terminate the truce with peace rather than war. Secondly, economic developments have progressed and will continue to do so much more rapidly than the human being. Man does the fighting but man has developed relatively little in many centuries. The tools of war with which he fights, and which to an ever increasing degree are the measure of his fighting strength, are the products of our normal, non-military, peacetime economic organization. Thirdly, I have the feeling that we as military men and our countrymen as a whole are prone to measure our strength in military terms. In so doing, we underrate the might, the power, and the mass of our total national resources. Fourthly, economics in general. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that economics, in other words the normal, non-military, peacetime pursuits of individuals and nations alike from time immemorial, have exercised a profound influence on strategy. I suggest that economic factors have been the underlying cause of most wars and the dominating consideration in the strategy of those countries whose prosperity has been dependent to an appreciable extent upon the sea. I will return later in this discussion to the national economy and its effect on the maritime strategy of the United States.

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As for the term strategy itself, which I have thus far used more or less loosely, there are a number of definitions given to it by a variety of military authorities not neglecting the Joint Chiefs of Staff who defines it in these terms:

“The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological and Armed Forces of a nation during peace and during war, to afford the maximum support to national policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.”

There are other definitions such as:

“Coordination of the End and the Means.”

“Adjustment of the End to the Means.”

They are long and short, simple, qualified and involved, according to the various shadings of meaning their authors desired to give them. But they all have something in common which is indicated by the use of such words as employing, exercise, developing, using, coordination, adjustment. These various terms clearly imply to me “a course of action.” This phrase suits itself to my needs and conveys the meaning I desire to give to strategy. My definition of strategy therefore might read:

“The course of action adopted with the means available to achieve the end desired.”

Or stated more simply:

“Strategy is a course of action.”

It remains now to apply our definition of strategy to the maritime world. Sir Julian Corbett gives us a good start although

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his definition perhaps, is both too broad and too narrow to fit the framework of our present discussion. He says:

“By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor.”

To paraphrase Corbett and at the same time incorporate our definition of strategy we might turn up with something like this:

“By maritime strategy we mean the course of action which governs when the sea is a substantial factor.”

Having arrived at this definition of maritime strategy it is the one I shall use, not because it is the best definition, but because it is suitable, since my remarks will deal with the courses of action when the sea is a substantial factor.

Strategy, as we have seen, ties the end to the means. This is a three-sided equation in which all three elements are interdependent though by no means always equal in the weight of considerations we give to each. We may accept as a general principle that the end, or more properly speaking, the objective, is the controlling element. To it we adjust the means and the strategy which are influenced by factors that govern the actions of people and nations.

These factors are many indeed, and extremely varied in character. Climate, for example, has always had a far-reaching effect on the people inhabiting certain geographical areas. It cannot be a matter of coincidence that the tropics are backward areas despite their natural resources which have brought vast wealth to others and are of such vital importance to the more advanced peoples. But from among *all* the factors which affect our maritime

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strategy, I shall select only two for discussion: geography, and economics.

Geography and economics, to my way of thinking, gentlemen, are the most important of all in their effect on the human race and the nations into which the human race has divided itself. In many respects they are one and the same but geography is unchanging and unchangeable and therefore compels us to adapt ourselves and our economy to it.

The sea, covering seventy percent of the earth's surface provides by all odds the cheapest, most economical means of transportation the world has known. It is for practical purpose, the only means of bulk transportation and trade between many countries and strategic areas. To some nations that border on the sea, maritime economy has been the difference between life and death. To others it has made the difference between bare existence and some degree of wealth. The sea is at once an impassable barrier and a broad open highway. To those who have learned about it, overcome its dangers, adapted themselves to it, and used it, proximity to the sea has meant wealth, power, prestige and security. But the sea is fickle. Those who have achieved greatness on the sea and then neglected the means by which they attained it, have fallen rapidly from their positions of world importance. And it is a noteworthy fact that those who have fallen have rarely, if ever, regained their former positions of prominence.

In what ways and by what means has the sea been used to bring nations to positions of pre-eminence? No one has owned or possessed it. Economics has been a fundamental factor in the history of all countries. We say that this or that nation lives by or has an agricultural economy, a manufacturing or industrial economy, a maritime economy. Like geography, economics is always

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with us. The ends people seek are economic or at least have their foundation in economics. Economics has to do with the material means of satisfying human desires. Thus, we have both an end—the economic end, and a means—such as agriculture, manufacturing, industry. It remains only to link these two together. This we do by trade or commerce. Commerce then, is like strategy, for together with economics and manufacturing or farming, it forms one part of a three-sided equation. The similarity does not end here. It is also a course of action. Things exist or are created. We have a need or a desire for them. We adopt some course of action to obtain them and where the sea intervenes our course of action is by maritime commerce.

Let us look once more at our definition of maritime strategy as we proceed, not forgetting that we are viewing it as it is influenced by geography and economics.

“By maritime strategy we mean the course of action which governs when the sea is a substantial factor.”

The commanding geographical factor in the early maritime strategy with which we are interested is the Mediterranean. This sea is the birthplace of western civilization and maritime power which have throughout history, traveled hand in hand. It was no coincidence that each of the great powers of ancient times occupied a position at one of the four geographically strategic areas that dominate the Mediterranean. The Phoenicians at Suez, the Greeks at the Bosphorus, Carthage on one side of the Straits of Sicily, and Rome on the other. Carthage also extended her power to the Straits of Gibraltar.

Why was this? Undoubtedly it was because of the economic demands of civilization and culture. The Phoenicians, located in a

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position where the goods of the East arrived overland and were dispatched by sea to the West, became the first great maritime people. They were not producers and exporters of their own goods, nor importers for their own use. They were traders who left no great culture in the manner of Greece and Rome. Their wealth and position came from the sea. Their objective was economic, their means was the sea, their strategy was based on trade. The factor which made this possible was geography.

Both Rome and Greece, like most other nations, were in short supply in some items essential to their economy, notably foodstuffs. Thus, in addition to their desires and needs for the goods of others to improve their economy, they were forced to turn to the sea for the necessities of life.

Greece would possibly have been willing to go her own way unmolested and unmolesting, for what she could not obtain or did not desire from the Phoenicians, she could get through her own monopoly of the Bosphorus and the Black Sea trade. She was challenged by the Persians and her victory at the Battle of Salamis preserved the western world's hold on the Bosphorus until it fell to the Turks two thousand years later. Rome disputed control of the Straits of Sicily with Carthage. It is a strange commentary that the Carthaginians, a great seafaring people, attacked Rome by way of Spain and the Alps, and were in turn destroyed from the sea by the Legions of Rome.

When Rome controlled the sea, she controlled all. Greece, the Phoenicians, and Carthage came under her sway. Was it economics that supported her power, or power that supported her economics? I don't know, but it is certainly clear that they were held together by the strategy that dictated control of the sea.

Now we may pass rather rapidly from ancient Mediterranean

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strategy to more modern times. The decline of the Roman Empire brought with it a decline in Mediterranean commerce. It is more likely that a lack of demand for the goods of trade rather than a lack of shipping was the cause of this decline. Historically, it is generally true that shipping has followed the demands for trade rather than the opposite.

The Venetians, aided by the Crusades, were the first to re-sume Mediterranean maritime commerce in goods of the Middle and Far East. Like the Phoenicians, their business was largely in trading and transporting the goods of others. Economically, they enjoyed something of a monopoly which was irksome to their western consumers and so the age of exploration, discovery, and colonization was ushered in.

The Portuguese were the first to find and use the South African route to India. They were soon displaced and superceded by the Dutch who in turn gave way to England. Spain and France directed their efforts to the West and found their wealth in the New World. The Spanish continued from the west coast of America across the Pacific to establish their route to the Far East. But like Holland, Spain and France also yielded to English sea power. Why and how did this happen?

England was in a unique geographical position with relation to the other great powers. Situated on an island commanding the sea approaches to Western Europe, she was both protected by the sea and dependent upon it for her economy. That the British realized this is amply demonstrated by their history. They needed economics for their well-being and power for their protection. As in the case of Rome it would be difficult to say which was the end and which the means, but no doubt exists that it was maritime strategy that joined them together.

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What were the geographical factors that influenced Britain's maritime strategy?

First, her island position. As I have mentioned, the sea is at once a barrier and a broad highway. To Britain's enemies it is a barrier which has held back the invader for a thousand years. Spain, France, and Germany discovered this too late and to their sorrow. Yet from this small island she has used the broad highway of the sea to drive Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler from Egypt, to repel Russia in the far distant Black Sea when the Bosphorus was threatened and to invade the continent once in the defeat of Napoleon and twice to defeat Germany.

Second, Britain's colonies. She selected them both for their location which would support her maritime strategy, and for their resources that would support her economy. In these respects her colonies formed an imposing list: South Africa, Aden, India, Ceylon, Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, the Falklands, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Jamaica, Bermuda, and North America. She also maintained her influence over the Suez and the Bosphorus. The English even established a post at Archangel. Unlike Spain, who plundered her colonies, Britain developed hers for their permanent and continuing benefit to British economy and for their great importance to her maritime strategy.

The third, and possibly the greatest geographical factor of all was the great broad highway of the sea itself, over which England never ceased to exercise the maximum possible control. Control of the sea is never absolute. It is a relative term that measures the difference between the freedom of movement on the one hand against the difficulty of movement on the other. With her navy she fought endlessly, one and all, small and large, with immense vigor, determination and singleness of purpose to maintain her con-

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trol of the sea. But always the greater the threat, the more relentless the fight.

The success of her commercial strategy will long be remembered in the names of Hawkins, Drake, and Morgan who enriched England at the expense of Spain, with Spanish gold captured at sea and on the Spanish Main. Nor will the Dutch soon forget the navigation act by which England widened her commercial control at the expense of Holland.

We should not leave Britain without reference to an old friend, the "balance of power", for England *was* the balance of power. In pursuit of her strategy she kept others weak. She fought against Russia with Turkey and France, against France with Turkey, Russia and Germany, and against Germany and Turkey on the side of Russia and France. Always with sea power and always with victory.

Let me repeat, gentlemen, it was maritime strategy, and in this case England's national strategy that united economics and sea power to place her in a position of preeminence. The geography of the sea, the colonies, and an island position, were the vital factors.

We might very properly ask, why did the others fail? It was Napoleon who said, "Nations have three kinds of frontiers: rivers, mountains, and deserts". He completely overlooked the fact that Britain had only one frontier and this was the sea. Once she had settled her internal affairs she was not subject to the costly land wars of others except at the time, the place, and with the force of her own choosing. Nor, until the advent of air war, was she the victim of destruction and subsequent reconstruction that afflicted others. It is significant that among the Ancients, Rome most nearly approached Britain's island geography.

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Greece and Phoenicia on the other hand were the victims of a political circumstance. As nations they were composed of sovereign city states while Rome was a centralized empire. In military terms they violated the principle of cooperation. It is interesting to note that the senior Greek admiral before the battle of Salamis, fearful that the several fleets under his command would scatter, lured the Persians into an immediate attack. As for Carthage, a great maritime people abandoned the sea for the land and fell to a land power that went to sea.

In more modern times Holland occupied a position similar to Phoenicia. Situated at the mouth of the Rhine, she handled the commerce of Europe as the Phoenicians did for the Mediterranean countries. She had little in the way of natural resources and beset by war on land and sea, she lost to a greater sea power than her own. Spain preferred wealth in coin of the realm—gold and silver—to the wealth of economic resources and when the time came she could not exchange one for the other. I wonder how much Spanish gold is now buried in Fort Knox! France we can leave behind with these words from an ordinance of Louis XIV: “.....authorizing all noblemen to take an interest in merchant ships, goods and merchandise without being considered as having derogated from nobility, provided they did not sell at retail”. In France, commerce was ignoble.

Until recently we have seldom seriously considered Russia in terms of maritime power. She had neither a maritime means nor a maritime strategy but she had a powerful objective. To reach the Baltic and the Mediterranean she fought with Sweden and Turkey for centuries. Yet when she reached the sea the geography was unfavorable and she knew not what to do with what little she had. The Russians had been too long and were still too far from the great civilizing and economic influence of the sea. Her

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rulers were fickle. Catherine the Great dismissed the sea in these words, ".....it is for traders to traffic where they please. I will furnish neither men, ships, nor money. I renounce forever all possessions inAmerica. England's experience with her American colonies should be a warning to other nations to abstain form such efforts." The great mass of Russia lies almost entirely north of fifty degrees. So do Britain and the Scandinavian countries, but they enjoy the moderating influences of the sea. The high latitudes, like the tropics, are backward areas. Russia, like Japan, was satisfied with the economy of the feudal system which had retarded civiliation in Europe during the Dark Ages until trade, commerce, and communications were again resumed.

We come to Japan. I shall pass rather lightly over Japan. To begin with she had no maritime strategy. She was concerned primarily with home economics. Commodore Perry appears not to have known what he was letting us in for when he opened that Pandora's Box. Japan's island position was favorable but she came too late and found all of the colonial geography gone. She had few natural resources of her own. Her objective was too great for her maritime means. The strategy was faulty. If, instead of seeking to establish an Empire, she had limited her maritime ambitions to a commercial strategy, in the manner of the Phoenicians, the Venetians, and the Dutch, she might have gone farther if less gloriously. To Japan, the sea is and must continue to be a substantial factor, and her future will be determined by the maritime strategy she adopts.

The geography and economics of the sea have exerted the most profound influence on civilization. Ancient and modern civilization developed on the shores of the sea and were spread to the backward areas by the sea. The sea was a means to an end for all who bordered upon it. Only those who lacked an objective, were

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faulty in their strategy, or who were adversely effected by geography, failed to attain a considerable degree of modern civilization. Power, prosperity, and culture attended those who united economics and sea power with a sound maritime strategy.

Gentlemen, we have covered considerable territory in exploring history, geography, and economics in order to arrive at some theory of maritime strategy. Now a theory is one of two things: first, a guess or a speculation; second, the analysis of a set of facts from which is derived a principle. I have felt it necessary to go through this analysis in order to establish my own philosophy and a firm foundation for discussing U. S. maritime strategy. Maritime strategy can be practical and in the case of the United States, it is immensely so. Yet in all of its immensity it can be extremely delicate and sensitive. It has many an Achilles heel.

The geographical position of the U. S. is similar to that of Britain. We are surrounded by Canada, Mexico, and the sea. We are not concerned with Canada and Mexico except as they prosper and add to the economic power of the island position. Since developing economic power, and when we have had a maritime strategy, we have been impregnable to invasion. The sea has been our broad highway. We have a temperate climate and more than most nations, a vast wealth of natural resources for home economics and maritime commerce. Though we have had less need than others of the economics of a colonial empire we lacked a strategy to employ the few outposts we possessed. We have been both able and unable to project our power overseas depending on the vagaries of our maritime strategy.

The U. S. is an economic colossus, an industrial giant. These are not just metaphors gentlemen, they are truly descriptive. We live in and by an industrial economy. It is the economy of oil, steel,

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
rubber, tin, the railroad, and the automobile. Can you imagine your wife's consternation if we were suddenly deprived of tin? If not, look in at the nearest chain store and imagine it without any tin cans! But the U. S. has no tin. It all comes to us by way of the sea? What about rubber? It all comes by sea too. But you say, we can synthesize rubber from oil and we have plenty of oil. Maybe so. But our economists are reaching far overseas to South America and the Persian Gulf to bolster our reserves. Without steel, we have no automobiles, and with no automobile the U. S. is literally on its uppers. Last year we produced eight million cars and there are fifty million in the U. S. today. We have iron but iron is not steel, and even if it were, we are going to sea to replenish our dwindling supply. Steel is chrome, cobalt, manganese, tungsten, vanadium, and others for which there are no synthetics or complete substitutes. Many of these we must obtain by sea in quantities up to a hundred percent. Can we get along without coffee, pepper, and sugar? I can't. The sea brings them to us too. The trade is not all one way for we are one of the world's great exporters. Since early Colonial days the economy of this country has been heavily dependent on export trade.

The fundamental of our economy is a standard of living that makes to us a necessity of those things which are luxuries to others. This cannot be without trade, the exchange of goods, commerce. This is maritime strategy. The Yankee trader and the trade winds did not get their names for nothing.

I have several charts that illustrate these points more clearly.

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RANDOM LIST OF ESSENTIAL MATERIALS

(PERCENT OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS IMPORTED BY SEA)

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BAUXITE	47.2
CHROME ORE	98.4
COBALT ORE	43.5
COFFEE	100.0
FIBERS	100.0
MANGANESE	97.0
VEGETABLE OILS	97.5
PEPPER	67.0
RUBBER	98.4
SUGAR	86.2
TIN AND TIN ORE	100.0
TUNGSTEN	72.5
VANADIUM	40.0


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U. S. LIFE LINES

PROCUREMENT OF ESSENTIAL MATERIALS—1946


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TOTAL U. S. PROCUREMENT



TOTAL PROCUREMENT EQUALS DOMESTIC PRODUCTION PLUS IMPORTS

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It must be apparent that if the U. S. cannot support its peacetime economy without going to sea it will be impossible to support a wartime economy without resort to the sea. I need hardly go further into maritime support of our industrial machine. It is more fitting now that we investigate maritime strategy in the defense of our country and as a means of defeating or aiding in the defeat of our enemies in war.

I take it to be a cardinal principle of our national strategy that we fight our wars on the enemies' grounds, not on our own. We are inevitably committed to the defense of Europe. No one can deny the certainty of our being involved in a full fledged war if Western Europe is invaded. The presence of our army in Europe is automatic assurance of that. I think it was our Secretary of State who recently said, it is our purpose to defend Europe, not to liberate it. We may be able to liberate Europe with sea power but we will never defend Europe without it. A sound maritime strategy is necessary in either case.

What must that strategy be? It must first give us that degree of control which will permit our free use of the sea without prohibitive losses. It must be sufficient to insure the full employment of our industrial machine. It must be adequate to carry the full weight of our armed might overseas as fast as we can ready it for movement. It must be equal to the burden of supplying the ever increasing needs of our overseas forces. Nor is this all. We will have the task of multiplying the military aid to our allies that we are giving them now.

The major threat to our control of the seas is the submarine. It is an interesting commentary that England, the greatest of all sea powers, should have so neglected the submarine that it brought her to the verge of defeat in the First World War. And having been


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given the lesson, she failed to profit by it in World War II. The Allies lost more than twenty million tons of shipping to German submarines in World War II. Winston Churchill has stated, "Shipping was at once the stranglehold and sole foundation of our war strategy." And what of Germany? She built a vast army and air force neglecting the lesson she had given Britain in the First World War. And Japan? She too, in spite of two lessons to England, failed to recognize her Achilles heel. The submarine brought about a steadily increasing strangulation of her entire economy. Chart number four tells her story.

The first objective of our wartime maritime strategy is the control of the submarine menace. Before we go further we must assume that we will accomplish this because if we fail we need go no further.

The second objective is the means by which we can create the greatest possible pressure to defeat our enemy. Control of the sea provides this means as nothing else does. With it we have the ability to project our power to the enemy's shore and beyond. We can strike at the time, at the place, and with the force of our choice. This is a multi-edged sword. It is the means for taking the offensive and it gives us the choice of the objective. It not only places the enemy on the defensive but forces a dispersion of his forces to meet our choice of thrusts. It was sea power that carried us across the Pacific and Atlantic to Japan and Africa, across the Straits of Sicily to Italy and across the English Channel to France. Likewise, it was sea power that compelled the dispersion of hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops in fruitless defense of by-passed Pacific Islands. D-day found the equivalent of fourteen German divisions defending Norway, a German army tied down in Italy and other German armies waiting the onslaught of sea power

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in Greece, Crete, Yugoslavia, and Southern France. This is maritime strategy—the employment of sea power.

In war men fight men; in the air, on the ground, on the sea and under the sea, with the weapons of war; tanks, ships, planes, and submarines. But these weapons are not exclusive. There are no air, sea, or land wars. These are only battles in the total of war. Weapons and the men who fight are employed indiscriminately and as the needs of the occasion demand. None is entirely independent of the others. They achieve their maximum effectiveness in combination. No nation has developed this combination to the high degree of effectiveness that has been attained in U. S. sea power. There is no force so ready, so versatile, so flexible to engage the enemy in war as the U. S. Navy - Marine - Naval Air Team. This is the strategy that reversed the course of a war at Inchon. This is the strategy that retrieved a disaster at Hungnam. Gentlemen, *this is sea power and this is maritime strategy.*

I shall devote my closing remarks to a brief look at the future.

I do not entirely agree with General Bradley who recently stated that we are fighting the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place, with the wrong enemy. If this is so, what is the right time, place, enemy, and war? Is it Europe, the defense of which is our main objective? And if it is, why aren't we fighting there? For one thing, Russia has the initiative and she fights for her objectives, not ours. We only oppose her at the time and place of her choosing. We must not neglect our own objectives, but we might devote great effort to divining and examining the objectives of our enemy. It is his failure to attain his objectives that is most damaging to him.

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Historically, Russia has had vast ambitions in the Far East. The conquest of China had its beginning almost three hundred years ago. The Russo-Japanese War preceded the present war for Korea by fifty years. Civil war in Indo-China and Malaya is Russian inspired. It was a Tsarist statesman who said, "Historically, we shall march to the South.....All China—all of its riches are predominantly in the south."

If the war in Korea is so completely wrong, should we have let Russia win by default? And if we had, should we have subsequently let Indo-China go by the board? And Formosa, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, India, Persia, Turkey, the Middle East? Would we let Russia pile victory on victory in endless succession without resistance from us until all but Europe had fallen? I think not.

How many more Koreas will there be? This, I cannot answer, but this I can say. If we are prepared, if we are ready, if it is certain that aggression will be countered by swift and powerful blows, it may very well be that we will have no more Koreas and this war will prove to have been the right war, in the right place, at the right time, with the right enemy. But if they must, these blows will be delivered with that combination of land, sea, and air that we call sea power. It is the only means by which we can strike swiftly, surely, and suddenly with the most effective combination of forces at our command.

Wherever war may be, in Korea, Persia, or Europe—on land, at sea, or in the air—sea power will play its decisive role.

Gentlemen, this summarizes my concept of maritime strategy.

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