

Naval War College Review

Volume 26
Number 2 *March-April*

Article 1

1973

March-April 1973 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

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Naval War College, The U.S. (1973) "March-April 1973 Full Issue," *Naval War College Review*. Vol. 26 : No. 2 , Article 1.

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
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Naval War College, March-April 1973, Full Issue



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

March - April 1973





NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the lecturers and authors are presented for the professional education of its readers. Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers. Reproduction of articles or lectures in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author or lecturer. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.



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The editorial offices of the *Naval War College Review* are located at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02840. Published bimonthly, distribution is generally limited to: U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard commands and activities; Regular and Reserve officers of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard of the grade O-3 and senior; military officers of other services, foreign officers, and civilians having a present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College; and selected U.S. Government officials. Correspondence concerning *Review* matters

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Cover: Portrait by Comdr. Albert K. Murray, USNR (Ret.). Left to right: Capt. Emmet P. Forrestel, USN; Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, USN; Capt. Burton B. Briggs, USN; Capt. Charles J. Moore, USN.



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CHALLENGE!

In December the Naval War College passed two significant milestones. One was the completion of the first course in Strategy under the new curriculum. The other was the dedication of our new auditorium, named in honor of Adm. Raymond A. Spruance.

In the November-December issue of the *Review*, I outlined our plans for the new Strategy curriculum. This new course is centered on case studies of military history. The style of teaching was intended to put the onus on the student for digging out for himself the principles of strategy and the lessons inherent in these cases. Now that we have completed the first course, I thought you would be interested in seeing some of the results and in judging the program for yourselves. Accordingly, I have devoted the bulk of this issue of the *Review* to some of the products of this first Strategy course.

On 7 December, Spruance Hall was dedicated, less than 24 hours after the first Raymond A. Spruance Lecture was delivered in the new building. Spruance Hall, a magnificent granite-faced building, represents the initial fruit of the college's \$23 million expansion and modernization program. It symbolizes the college's growth and vitality, and its beautiful auditorium provided the setting for the first of a lecture series of intellectual excellence. The Spruance lectures, to be presented annually, are intended to promote common ties with the neighboring academic community.

As the series' premier lecturer, Mr. Herman Wouk is a speaker with superb credentials. He is a distinguished writer whose work has been recognized by the award of the Pulitzer Prize. His pro-



been expressed in his novels *The Winds of War* and *the Caine Mutiny*. Mr. Wouk's abiding interest in the naval profession was the basis of his eloquent lecture, "The Naval Officer in the Age of Revolution."

The audience contained many members of the academic community, and the most illustrious representative was Rear Adm. Samuel Eliot Morison, USNR (Ret.). Intellectual, scholar, writer, and teacher—Admiral Morison graced the occasion with his remarks about his old friend Adm. Raymond A. Spruance during the dedication ceremony the following day.

Many other communities and professions were represented, as well. Two renowned artists who immortalized Spruance on canvas and in bronze viewed their works on display in the Spruance Hall lobby: portrait painter Albert K. Murray and sculptor Felix W. de Weldon. Government and naval civilian representatives included Secretary of the Navy John Warner, Senator Claiborne Pell, Governor Frank Licht, former Secretary of the Navy and Governor John Chafee, and philanthropist and former Assistant Secretary of the Navy John Nicholas Brown.

The lecture and the dedication also assembled former members of Spruance's World War II staff for a nostalgic reunion, probably the last time they will



Rear Adm. and Mrs. Samuel E. Morrison and Rear Adm. Richard Bates at President's reception



Mr. and Mrs. Herman Wouk and Vice Admiral Turner at President's reception.



Audience for Spruance lecture viewed from the stage of Spruance Hall



Ribbon cutting by Mrs. Spruance and Secretary Warner with Vice Admiral Turner



Left to right: Capt. R.J. Olver, USN (Ret.), Mr. C.F. Barber, Comdr. T.B. Buell, USN, Rear Adm. C.J. Moore, USN (Ret.), Mr. C.R. Huie, Vice Adm. S. Turner, USN.



Mrs. Spruance and Secretary Warner standing before the bust of Admiral Spruance after dedication ceremony.

ever again gather together. Those members of the staff who mustered to honor their great leader included Rear Adm. Charles J. Moore, USN (Ret.), Chief of Staff; Mr. Charles F. Barber, Flag Secretary; Capt. Gilvin M. Slonim, USN (Ret.), Japanese Intelligence Officer; Rear Adm. William H. Buracker, USN (Ret.), Operations Officer at Battle of Midway; Mr. Cyrus R. Huie, Flag Lieutenant, Commander 5th Fleet; Capt. Robert J. Oliver, USN (Ret.), Flag Lieutenant, Battle of Midway; Rear Adm. William M. McCormick, USN (Ret.), Flag Lieutenant, Commander Cruiser Division 5; and Capt. Rufus King, USN (Ret.), Staff, Commandant 10th Naval District. Other retired officers who were subordinate commanders under Spruance included Vice Adm. Morton L. Deyo, USN (Ret.), a 5th Fleet task group commander; and Rear Adm. Richard L. Bates, USN (Ret.), who commanded the cruiser *Minneapolis* during the Gilberts and Marshalls operations.

The following morning, 7 December, the guests again assembled in Spruance Hall to witness its dedication. Rear Admiral Morison told several anecdotes that revealed Spruance's character and personality. "The key to Admiral Spruance's character is this," said Admiral Morison. "He was always at peace with himself. In the poet's words, 'he was secure within' . . . A modest and a great man, he should have been given a fifth star."

Admiral Morison then recited Dryden's translation of Horace's 29th Ode as a reflection of his feelings about Admiral Spruance.

Happy the man and happy he
 alone,
 He who can call today his own.
 He who secure within can say,
 Tomorrow do your worse, for I
 have lived today.
 Be fair or foul or rain or shine,
 The joys I have possessed, in
 spite of fate, are mine.

Not Heaven itself upon the past
 has power,
 But what has been has been, and
 I have had my hour.

Admiral Morison thus set the spiritual tone for the remainder of the dedication, a moving and emotional ceremony.

The principal address was delivered by Comdr. Thomas B. Buell, USN, who is attached to the Naval War College while participating in the Professional Development Program. Commander Buell concurrently is writing the biography of Admiral Spruance, and his address revealed the human, personal side of the late admiral. Commander Buell's address also appears in this issue of the *Review*.

Secretary Warner and Mrs. Raymond A. Spruance, the admiral's widow, then formally dedicated Spruance Hall. A broad ribbon containing the Naval War College colors—a montage of service colors—draped the stage front. Secretary Warner spoke briefly, ending his remarks by emphasizing the vital role played by the Naval War College in training naval leaders for future high command. Then he and Mrs. Spruance took golden shears in hand and cut the ribbon—Spruance Hall had joined the naval service.

Afterwards the guests mingled in the lobby, viewed the exhibits that portrayed the career of Raymond Spruance, and renewed old friendships. Everyone was reluctant to leave, because they had sensed the greatness of Admiral Spruance and the glory that was his and the Navy's. After years of obscurity, a modest naval hero had been recognized.



STANSFIELD TURNER
 Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
 President, Naval War College

In the first of the Spruance Lecture Series, and the initial lecture delivered in the college's newly dedicated Spruance Hall, Mr. Herman Wouk presents a timely and fascinating perspective on the revolutionary changes affecting our world. To be effective in his profession, the naval officer must possess an understanding of the social forces that have molded contemporary society.

THE NAVAL OFFICER IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION*

Spruance Lecture

by

Herman Wouk

In greeting the many distinguished guests who are here tonight, I want to say a word of special greetings to a man without whose work neither I, nor anybody who writes on World War II, would be able to function. I am proud that among those present is the great historian Samuel Eliot Morison.

When the creator of Captain Queeg addresses the Naval War College, a smoky trace of revolution already is in the air. Evidently you have even decided to overlook that well-known aphorism, "The Navy is a master plan designed by geniuses for execution by idiots." Of course I never said this; Lieutenant Keefer of the U.S.S. *Caine* said it. Much like a flesh and blood parent, an author has limited control over the utterances of his phantom offspring. I suppose forgiveness comes the more easily here at the Naval War College, where obviously I address only the geniuses.

The predicament of the naval officer in our revolutionary times is a somber one. In making this the topic of the first Spruance Lecture, I have tried, in Raymond Spruance's spirit, to go to the heart of the current naval problem.

"Revolution" is a word toward which we Americans have ambivalent feelings. We are getting ready for the bicentennial, 3 years hence, of the revolution that gave birth to our country. We consider it a glorious overthrow. Our most conservative female blue-bloods proudly call themselves the Daughters of the American Revolution. They do not think of the Boston Tea Party as an unlawful destruction of property, like the burning of Watts. They do not sympathize with the embattled soldiers, taunted and threatened

*The address was extemporaneous, and the text is adapted from a taped recording.

by a mob, who fired on and killed a few people—as the National Guardsmen did at Kent State—and thus committed the Boston Massacre. They do not even remember the angry swarm of their ancestors who broke into a British Governor's mansion, destroyed his papers, and looted and set fire to it, precisely like activists in a college president's office. Theirs—and ours—has become a storybook revolution tamed and stiffened into pretty costumed wax-works. It has no smell of blood and burning.

Revolution today really means for us, as for them, the world Communist revolution, which sends horrid hot winds, full of the smell of blood and burning, eddying across our borders into our cities and our campuses. Few naval officers doubt that it is an evil. This evening, for a start, I want to doubt it. I want at least to look clear-eyed at this international stirring of the peoples, which so many Americans take as the chief threat to our survival.

To begin with, are we talking about socialism or communism? It is an old quibble. I propose to bypass it. The revolutionaries themselves always claim they are "building socialism." We are on their ground; let us use their word. Socialism is, in historical perspective, a novel and radical critique of human society not two centuries old. It poses one stark question to all established economic structures: "*Who gets how much, and why?*" Year by year, generation by generation, every society divides up its natural wealth and the product of its labor. Socialism takes a hard look at the existing rules for sharing and passes some bellicose judgments.

The 17th century philosopher John Locke, whose ideas sparked the American Revolution, said that government exists for the protection of "property"; a word he meant to include the life and liberty of each individual. Early in the 19th century Joseph-Pierre Proudhon,

rocked Europe with the slogan, "*Property is theft!*" What happened in less than a century and a half to open such a gap between two such first-class minds?

The answer is a familiar one; the industrial revolution happened. Substances lying in the ground since the dawn of time, useless and unwanted, became rich sources of energy and therefore of wealth. Newly contrived machines which used that energy fantastically multiplied the product of one man's daily labor, further increasing human wealth. But this flood of fresh riches continued to be divided under old rules. If a feeble-minded fop happened to own a thousand square miles of land because a remote ancestor had once received a piece of paper from a king or a czar, he could live out his days in wild luxury while thousands of people worked for him at starvation's edge. The land was his "property"; government existed to protect it; and government did so, when necessary, by putting down peasants' or miners' revolts with sword and grapeshot. Or if a keen-minded man bought some of the new machines and hired workers to produce a hundred times what they could with their bare hands, he could pay them for working with their bare hands and keep all the extra wealth. The machines were his "property."

In these conditions of the early industrial age, the socialist movement was born. It sprang up, not in one place, but all over industrialized Europe. It murmured up out of the ground. The brutal question began to echo on the farms, in the streets, in the factories, and in the intellectual salons: "*Who gets how much, and why?*" When the old answer came that the old divisions would continue, because property was sacred, the cry was torn from Proudhon, "*Property is theft!*" In this simple-minded cry there was so much human truth that socialism grew and grew, through the 19th century and into the 20th, as a sort of secular Islam that

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threatened to sweep the earth.

For the radical solution proposed by socialism—inside much thick difficult philosophical verbiage—emerged seductively plain and clear. It was this: scrap the iniquitous old rules for sharing, set up new rules by which all the people own all the land and all the machines, and enforce through law the equitable sharing of the national wealth. Such political cure-alls never work out exactly as expected, and socialism in practice has showed wretched defects; but the panacea, with its romantic rhetoric of a golden age, lying just beyond a soul-satisfying orgy of violent destruction, remains for some people—the enslaved, the deprived, the young—an almost irresistible marching song.

Paradoxically, however, socialism has never become a serious movement in the United States. To this day, for all the early experimental communes, the waves of populism, the 50 years of Communist agitation, the persisting chic leftist salons and journals, it wilts and languishes here. The United States of America, the present-day cutting edge of the industrial revolution, throws off socialism like a world-infecting flu to which it is somehow immune. Were this not so, the American naval officer would have very different problems.

How has this happened? "Once," says John Locke, "all the world was America—"that is, a limitless virgin wilderness, with enough land for everybody for the taking. Elsewhere ancient privilege might grip its advantages, squeezing out those who did the real work. But North America offered a fresh and agreeable answer to the question, "Who gets how much, and why?" Here was the American answer: "Every man gets what he earns with his energy, wit, and labor; for there is enough for everybody, and we all start even."

(The Naval War College audience applauded.)

Hold your applause. In our first 200

not worked. Panic and riot have then troubled the land. It is not working now for many of us, and therein lies the chief disquiet of our times. Nevertheless, it has worked long enough, for enough of us, to remain until this hour our political faith. That is why you just applauded; you believe in it.

I would add, not without cause. We are not yet far in time from Locke's virgin wilderness, the land of unlimited opportunities. My mother-in-law was born in Indian territory. My father, a Russian-Jewish immigrant, went to work here with bare hands and worked up to a prosperity that sent three children through college. Yet even when I went to college, our system seemed to be tottering. The great depression was closing banks, throwing millions of men out of work, and on the campuses generating student riots and Communist cells. That passed, but it happened. Today the impacts of the Vietnam tragedy and the race crisis again shake the ground under us.

The black man was dragged here. He did not come, like my father, to take his chances with everyone else in limitless America. He came in chains. Much white American blood was shed to strike off those chains; our Nation paid for a horrible crime with a horrible war. The price, however, was proved even higher than that. Naively it was thought that striking off the chains would be enough, but in an industrial society it was not. There simply was no way in for freed slaves. Bondage had brutalized and disabled them and their children.

Eighty years after the Civil War, a million black soldiers and sailors fought in the Second World War. When it was won they would not go docilely back to the nigger towns. By laying their lives on the line, they had authenticated their rights in America. The acute race problems today stem from these plain truths. One does not have to condone present-day crimes to acknowledge past crimes; but it is important to grasp that the

half-mad anarchists, the self-seeking activists, and the idealistic revolutionaries of the black community alike owe their followings to what has happened to the black man in America. If black protest seizes on the timeworn rhetoric of socialism, nothing could be more natural. For socialism is not the voice of the devil but a recurring human response, in the industrial age, to things that are going wrong.

Is it an adequate response? Is it, in fact, the final answer, the glorious goal of history described by Marx? I have my inborn American doubts. First and last, to my very bones, I am a free man, and I know it. Marxism—the militant and triumphant form of modern socialism—calls for the immediate violent imposition of a police state in the name of social justice, the famous “dictatorship of the proletariat,” which will fade away like the morning dew once the great revolution is secure. This is the socialist version of pie in the sky: “Police state now, freedom later.” The stated purpose of the police state is of course purely benevolent—to change once and for all the old bad rules; to make very sure that everybody shares alike; and, above all, to protect the people against a counterrevolution, an attempt by the old crowd to restore the unfair old system.

I have put here in very simple language concepts that have generated thousands of books, some of them a thousand pages long. But the essence of any major idea can usually be simply put, for only simple concepts can generate a great human tide like a religion or a revolution.

It seems to me that Marxist socialism is an unmistakable retreat from the ideas and the achievements of the American Revolution; a second-best solution, for less advanced lands, of the industrialization problem. For the sake of achieving a fair shareout of the wealth, Marxism demands a so-called

but the notion of a temporary tyranny is a tragic joke, alike of history and of philosophy.

Let me run up my flag. I think that freedom is man's most precious right and possession, the ultimate end of good government; that economic justice can be developed in freedom; and that American history moves steadily toward that goal. The American labor movement, for instance, has long since crushed the injustice of paying a machine worker the pittance of bare-hand work. The American working man shares in the yield of the machines, and drives tough bargains for his share each year or two, a process forbidden to the unfree workers in Marxist lands. A virtue of the free, open American society is its capacity for this sort of steady and progressive self-correction.

But the rate of progress is slow; ever too slow for the revolutionary temper. “Freedom for what?” is the classic sneer. “Freedom to starve?” Yet with all our weaknesses and inequalities, for all the chronic abuses of monopoly capitalism, it is we who are today, out of our abundance, feeding the Soviet Union. This is no accident of geography or technology. The United States and the U.S.S.R. are both advanced peoples with rich, vast lands. It is the difference in productivity between free men and unfree men. That is the long and the short of it, choke on the fact though a Marxist must.

Nevertheless, in underdeveloped lands, in exploited lands, in lands that have known only tyrannies of old privilege, in lands where there are a few idle rich and a whole population in misery, the forcible socialist solution continues to murmur up as once it did in Europe, on the farms and in the city streets, inside the factories and on the campuses. Not only is it useless for America to try to stamp it out everywhere, no matter how cruel, backward, or blind existing governments are; it is not in our interest, and it is not right. Whether the

long-suffering Russian people are better off under the Communist oligarchy than they were under the Czar is their business, so long as that oligarchy does not try to lead them against us in war, or to foment disorder in our own national life. Whether the unhappy Cubans, for that matter, have bettered or worsened themselves in exchanging Batista's torturers for Castro's torturers is a Cuban question; only Russian missiles on Cuban soil, zeroed on Washington or Chicago, are—and will remain—our affair.

It is very important to get these distinctions clear, for they imply foreign policy positions, and therefore military lines of action. A natural hostility exists between socialist oligarchies and individualist America, but it does not absolutely divide the world into white hats and black hats. That was a lesson that we learned fighting the Nazis and Tojo and overlooked when we sent half a million men into Vietnam. Side by side with a recalcitrant, difficult, suspicious Marxist ally we won the greatest war in history, and it will do us good never to forget that the chief winning weapon against Hitler was Soviet Russian blood. If some American businessmen are now taking a beating in crumbling, distraught socialist Chile, other American businessmen are rushing into the new trade opportunities in socialist China and Russia. The time is past, in any case, when our guns could make the way for our dollars. Our dollars will make their way because of our unequalled productivity, which can still be much increased by peace and social justice at home; or if we become foolish and decadent enough to neglect our main strength, the productive power of free and happy men, the dollar will become weaker paper than even the ruble, and guns will not help.

For most of you, probably, I have so far spoken only commonplaces. I have taken this look at the Marxist revolution

clear the way to a more central problem. Tonight as I speak, three Americans lie in the tip of a great rocket down in Florida, about to fly to the moon, perhaps the last such voyage in our century. This American voyage to the nearest world in outer space, the small dead world that has lit man's steps at night since he first walked the earth, has shocked all of us, and all mankind, more than we yet know. Its implications are just dawning on us. The sense grows that we live together on a tiny beautiful ball lost in eternal dark space. We start to see ourselves through the eyes of Armstrong and Cernan, and the view is disturbingly like God's. In that perspective our quarrels, our crises, our wars seem the pathetic yammerings and hair-pullings of inept children and our military establishments gigantic exercises in poisonous suicidal futility.

One astronaut has said, "When I flew around the world 151 times, I saw no national boundaries. I saw one world where one kind of man lives." Such words go to our hearts. He tells us what we always knew and have kept forgetting; that the real world is not a mapped globe, that the United States is not red nor Mexico brown nor the Soviet Union yellow, but that it is all one blue, cloud-girt ball and that we are all dwellers or, if you will, voyagers or, if you will, prisoners, but in any terms all here together: the black man and the yellow man, the Christian and the Communist, the revolutionary and the rich man in the mansion behind the electrified fence. We are all in the same cosmic boat, and we all have but our few pitiful years in the starlight. For us to spend our brief time piling up armaments, the sterile iron fruit of the industrial revolution; to go on amassing these weapons, I say, at huge cost in unstable explosive heaps while so many men lack food, clothing, and shelter begins to seem the most disgusting of absurdities. Yet, you must go on serving such a military system; and not only

that, you must recruit clear-eyed, free, critical young men in great numbers or the U.S. Navy will wither. There is the radical problem of the naval officer in this age of revolution.

One of the most candidly subversive men I ever met was the ex-commander of a nuclear submarine. He questioned—in unguarded late-hour talk over whiskey—the whole concept of nationalism and of “national survival.” It had been his responsibility to cruise in the black ocean depths, months on end, waiting for the order to fire and thus to poison the air and perhaps put the torch to civilization. Why? Because men were of different nationalities; it came down to that. Perhaps, he said, we had better rethink the whole question of nationality while time remained.

From the surface of the moon or the bottom of the sea, the view is strangely the same. Our military activities begin to look like dangerous and loathsome nonsense. How then can sensible men give their hearts and their days to such dirty work? This puts the case no more harshly, I think, than it is being put in a hundred nightly bull sessions at Annapolis or West Point. For whatever you may think of the new generation, they are not damned fools, and only a damned fool can remain oblivious to these things.

Another astronaut said—and all but one were military men and many were officers of the U.S. Navy—“When I was out there in deep space and looked back on the earth, I suddenly stopped feeling like an American. My national identity dissolved, and I was a human being.” That is the essence of the real revolutionary challenge of which I speak; and now I want to suggest a reply. It is the core of what I have to say to you.

Nationalism does generate all the dangers that threaten us, yet in itself it is not evil; it turns evil when it arms to inflict its ways and its will on others. Nationalism gone cancerous is Nazi Germany. Nationalism can be a peaceful

Switzerland, a civilized Sweden, and a cultured France. The burgeoning of nationalism in the past two centuries I see, at least in part, as a reaction to the industrial revolution, a deeply human protest against its drift. The machines and the mass culture press to homogenize us, to make us dress one way, think one set of thoughts, live one sort of life. This is the repulsive prospect of Huxley's *Brave New World*, a humanity of interchangeable cogs.

Nationalism would cling to the ways of our fathers, to our colorful differences, to the deep heritages that have come down through hundreds of diverse languages and cultures. If we do not want a Sovietized earth, the other peoples do not want an Americanized earth; and if some animal species are endangered by modern times, so are some dear human values. To be Americans is for us a wonderful and irreplaceable thing. It has led us to build nuclear submarines, but I honestly believe we would sink them all tomorrow if we thought we could do it and remain Americans. The growing Russian Navy is the mirror image of our nationalist concerns and precautions; but it also flies a flag of world revolution, of the imposition of socialism everywhere, and that is how things seem to stand.

Now let me read to you from Alexander Solzhenitsyn's new novel *August 1914*. In this passage, which comes late in the story, the Battle of Tannenberg is in its final stages. The Czarist army is fleeing. A staff colonel named Vorotyntsev finds himself near the disorderly front. He rallies a handful of officers to gather up their men and try to hold a gap in the torn battleline. It is something of a suicide mission. Now here is Solzhenitsyn:

In a few sentences Vorotyntsev explained to these two lieutenant colonels and to half the surviving company commanders the situation of the town, the situation of the army, the fact that their regi-

mental commander had retreated back to Russia along with the remaining companies of their regiment, and the job that he wanted the rest of them to do. As he spoke, he looked into their faces and saw, as though in his own features, that fundamentally they all bore the indelible impress of a similar background: army tradition; long spells of garrison service in a world isolated from the rest of society; a sense of alienation, of being despised by that society and ridiculed by liberal writers; the official ban on discussing politics and political literature, resulting in a blunting or stultifying of the intellect; a permanent shortage of money; and yet, despite it all, the knowledge that they represented, in purified and concentrated form, the vitality and courage of the whole nation. Now was the moment they had lived for, and Vorotyntsev had no doubt what their answer would be.

I tell you, as the author of *The Winds of War*, that when I came on this passage in a book written by a Soviet author, I felt as an astronomer might when, on peering through his telescope at another galaxy, he saw a sudden blinking and winking that spelled in Morse code, "Hello, out there!" In this awareness of what the military man is or can be at his best, bridging socialism and the American system, one strikes the bedrock of our discussion. Take these words of a Soviet artist, gentlemen, and write them on your hearts, for those moments in this revolutionary time when you doubt the worth of your calling. *They represented, in purified and concentrated form, the vitality and courage of the whole Nation.*

These are not the words of a war-loving jingoist, any more than my words tonight are. I remain the creator of

a picture of the incredible failures and the callous stupidity of the Czarist high command at Tannenberg. What Solzhenitsyn is saying, what I saw at sea in the Second World War, is a plain truth that liberal writers tend to ignore or to scorn. The final guarantee of every human society, to this hour, has been the willingness of able men to learn war and to die if they must for their native lands. All men of sense have prayed, and still pray, for the day when a guarantee less primitive, less cruel, and more worthy of children of God will come to exist; and I believe that we of the 20th century live in the slowly waning darkness before the dawn of that day.

(The speaker turned to the widow of Admiral Spruance, sitting in the front row.)

Mrs. Spruance, I regard Raymond Spruance not only as a great seafighter, but as one of the great men of our history. He deliberately and successfully avoided the limelight of journalism, and his measure has yet to be taken by historians. The dedication of Spruance Hall is a worthy step toward the full recognition he will one day have.

Let me remind you, my friends, and fellow officers, what it was that Raymond Spruance did at the Battle of Midway. This officer of the surface fleet, this black-shoe admiral, took command of a carrier task group on 24 hours' notice, went out to sea with another man's staff, and fought an over-the-horizon, carrier-to-carrier duel such as had never been fought before. He fought this revolutionary fight against huge odds and won. In that victory came a great turning point of the war, and in that victory he gave freedom one more chance for one more generation.

That, I submit to you, remains the task of the naval officer in an age of revolution. Not to solve the great ongoing problems of social stress nor to despair at the immensity and complexity of these problems outside our

country and inside, but to stand and to serve. To improvise, to make do with what we have; to serve in still another kind of revolutionary warfare, a contest which one wins only if no weapon is ever fired; to do battle against great odds of political trouble within and without our land, odds of events running almost out of human control; and with this fight, and with this service, to give freedom one more chance for one more generation.

I do not see this as service in a lost cause; I refuse to believe that the human case is without hope. We have a way of coming out of these things by the skin of our teeth. The industrial revolution is a ticking timebomb, and man's problem is to defuse it before it blows him up. I think he will do so, barely in time; but that he will do it, and that America will make an enormous, perhaps decisive contribution to that process. The way to world peace, my commonsense tells me, lies through this long, delicate, perilous defusing, not through the general carnage and overthrow so dear to the pessimistic clamorers of the Left.

A main cause for hope lies in this same menacing industrial revolution, for it has put in man's hands the means to create universal abundance. Lord Keynes said 40 years ago that the economic problem is now, for the first time in history, within the power of man to solve; what holds us back is only our own incompetence and muddle. War has had many causes, but the chief motive down the ages has been loot; and when all have enough, predation loses its point, if not its brutal fun. Certainly if all the world can again become America, in the Lockean sense, the socialist rationale for dictatorship falls to the ground.

Essentially I see socialism as a state of prefreedom, a perhaps necessary transition for some underdeveloped or decayed societies to enter into the industrial age. It is hard to argue against

for instance, despite all their fearsome sufferings, under their new regime. I suspect that eventually the socialist societies, as they industrialize, may generate a large middle class of technicians and managers to whom the Marxist tyranny will become increasingly irrelevant and irksome, perhaps to the point of getting rid of it. I may be quite wrong in this. It may be that authoritarian rule, which has dominated so much of human history, is truly congenial to some cultures and not to others. I dimly see the future as a diverse political world with a trend to social justice prevailing everywhere made more practical each decade by more productive technology, but I cannot see a future for an unfree America.

The astronaut who said he stopped feeling like an American in outer space spoke a profound but still partial truth. He got out there—for that poignant and Godly glimpse of our mortal home in the universe—precisely because he was an American; because his free country, and no other, produced the industrial base, the thousand complicated control skills, and the armies of disciplined technicians that made possible the crowning technical achievement of the

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Mr. Herman Wouk earned his baccalaureate degree from Columbia and holds an L.H.D. from Yeshiva University and an L.L.D. from Clark University. Early in his career he was active in radio with vari-

ous comedians, including Fred Allen, and in 1941 served as a presidential consulting expert to the U.S. Treasury. As a Naval Reserve officer in World War II, he served as a deck officer aboard destroyer-minesweepers in the Pacific for 3 years, including duty as executive officer of the U.S.S. *Southard*. Mr. Wouk is a celebrated novelist, author of *The Caine Mutiny* (Pulitzer Prize for fiction, 1952) and *The Winds of War*, a current bestseller.

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human race. History will never forget that the first giant step for mankind toward the stars was an American foot-fall on lunar dust.

Freedom works in human life better than any other condition. The 19th century doubted it, and Marx proclaimed the doubt. The 20th century is beginning to prove it in the heavens and on earth. For the sake of all mankind, not only for ourselves, our citadel of freedom is worth preserving.

Your role in this age of revolution—so I believe—is to preserve it, while

statesmen struggle through our generation and the next, and perhaps the next, to defuse at long last the industrial time bomb and bring in the age of cooperative world abundance and disarmament. Is that so very different, after all, from our Navy's mission down the years? The American fighting man at sea has ever been guarding the peace or winning it back from anarchy and chaos. I tell you, let the heathen rave; that remains as noble a calling as any that a man can follow on this beautiful but still unquiet earth.



The leader in a democratic country's fighting services needs to understand not only what the society of which he is a member stands for but how it has developed: since only so can he become mentally and psychologically equipped to withstand the virulent propaganda constantly directed against the system which he may at any time be called on to defend. Such understanding can of course only be gained from a study of history.

S.W. Roskill, The Art of Leadership, p. 22.

Address delivered by
 Commander Thomas B. Buell, U.S. Navy
 at the occasion of the dedication of
 Spruance Hall
 Naval War College
 7 December 1972

Samuel Eliot Morison wrote the words that best describe Raymond Spruance: "Power of decision and coolness in action were perhaps Spruance's leading characteristics. He envied no one, regarded no one as rival, won the respect of everyone with whom he came in contact, and went ahead in his quiet way, winning victories for his country." Victories that were won by American forces commanded by Spruance were—

- The Battle of Midway
- The Gilbert Islands: Tarawa and Makin
- The Marshall Islands: Kwajalein, Roi-Namur, and Eniwetok
- The Marianas: Saipan, Tinian, Guam, and the Battle of the Philippine Sea

Iwo Jima
 Okinawa

Before the war Spruance seemed an unlikely candidate for a future fleet commander. As a teenager he wrote and published poetry that displayed his sensitivity and imagination, such as his description of an approaching summer thunderstorm.

A fringe of black comes o'er the
 northern sky;
 It grows and deepens till at last
 the sun
 Grows dim and disappears. The
 frightened cry
 Of birds is heard, that would the
 tempest shun

The gloomy vault above grows
 blacker yet,
 And all except the faintly rustling
 trees
 Is quiet now. The dark clouds'
 fiery pet
 The lightning silent plays about
 their knees.

But hark! The storm approaches
 and the rain
 In the far distance may be seen.
 A sound
 Of rushing wind, a thunderclap
 contain
 A warning to be off the tempest's
 ground.

He was reared by women—at times by a domineering mother and at times by three young and adoring maiden aunts. His father was a recluse whom he hardly knew. Spruance attended the Naval Academy because his family could not afford a university education, and there he was unhappy because of the military regimen, hazing, and stagnant curriculum. Yet he was an excellent student but so inconspicuous that few of his classmates knew him well. He was described in his yearbook as a shy young thing, open and innocent, who would hurt nothing or no one except in the line of duty.

Spruance supported not only his family but his mother and aunts as well.

Following World War I he became discouraged with his low pay, very nearly resigned his commission, but remained in the service because his father-in-law told him he was too honest to be a successful businessman.

His view of a naval career was that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages, and he would do his best in any assignment he was given, whether he liked it or not. Spruance believed that the only meaningful duty for promotion was at sea, and there he remained as long as he could—even though he often became seasick in rough weather. Shore duty was for relaxation, and when he came ashore he sought comfortable quarters and pleasant surroundings. He neither worked overtime nor brought work home because he loved his family and wanted to be with them as much as possible. He sought neither favors nor friends in high places nor duty in Washington to advance his career as did some officers ambitious for flag rank. His integrity and moral courage were uncompromising, and he was frank and honest with his superiors, regardless of the consequences of disagreeing with them or telling them truths they did not want to hear. His professional performance and fitness reports were uniformly outstanding, yet he seemed fatalistic and unconcerned about his chances of promotion to admiral.

What, then, was Spruance seeking in his naval career? One evening in the years just before World War II, he and Bill Halsey and their wives were dining in a San Francisco restaurant. Both were very senior officers and close personal friends. In a reminiscent mood, Halsey asked, "Sпруance, if you had your life to live over again, what would you want to be?"

Sпруance replied, "A good naval officer."

"So would I," said Halsey.

Sпруance's greatness as a World War II naval leader derived from his wisdom, self-discipline, and courage.

Consider first his wisdom. Spruance was an intellectual in a world that does not identify intellectualism with the military profession. Rather, intellectuals are commonly associated with liberal arts and the physical sciences, advanced academic degrees, and learned writing and speaking. Using these standards alone, Spruance would not be regarded as an intellectual. He was a professional naval officer, not a philosopher or a scientist. He held no advanced academic degrees. He disliked writing, and what little he wrote was not for publication. He also disliked public speaking, and what few speeches he did make were soon forgotten.

Nevertheless, he was an intellectual in the purest sense of the word because he possessed superior mental power and relied solely upon his intellect—and never his emotions—when he fought the Japanese. Most Americans hated the Japanese in World War II, yet hatred is an emotion which distorts judgment and reasoning. Therefore Spruance did not hate the Japanese; rather he respected them as an able, hard-fighting enemy.

Sпруance was more than a clear-thinking planner and strategist—he also was an able leader of men in combat. He was a perceptive judge of men and their capabilities and expected no more of them than the fulfillment of their potential to perform. Furthermore, Spruance and the other great naval leaders of World War II shared a common belief about command: tell your subordinates what you want done, give them the necessary resources, and then leave them alone so they can accomplish their mission. Spruance's final operation orders were so thorough and clearly written that his subordinates knew *what* they were expected to do, but they were allowed initiative and freedom of action to determine *how* they would accomplish the mission that Spruance had assigned.

When Spruance's forces went to sea to make war, Spruance never interfered

in the business of his subordinate commanders. He felt that the commander at the scene of action had the best understanding of what needed to be done, and Spruance would neither interfere nor offer advice. He would make major decisions or issue general directives when necessary, but the tactical details of an operation were left entirely to his commanders at the scene. Thus he never inhibited his commanders from doing whatever they felt was necessary to carry out their mission.

Spruance often regarded war as an intellectual exercise that posed a complex yet interesting series of problems that challenged and stimulated his mind. Those problems had to be solved using logic that was unaffected by the violent passions of war: pain, suffering, cruelty, brutality, and death. Spruance did seem to be a man without emotion. He displayed neither anger nor anxiety, fear nor fatigue, uncertainty nor indecision. He became regarded as an austere, remote, almost mysterious figure who made war with a cold, calculating, even ruthless mind.

Violent emotions nevertheless remain very much a part of war, therefore, to be an intellectual in war is difficult. This was particularly true for Spruance because he was a man with deep feelings and strong emotions. He felt joy and sadness, he was easily angered, he was impatient, he was sensitive, he was loving and affectionate, he had a sense of humor; in other words, he was entirely human. It was only by virtue of his supreme self-discipline that he was able to control his emotions when confronted by the tragedies of war. This self-discipline was the second factor vital to his success.

It is not certain why Spruance suppressed his emotions, but it is certain that he started early. Although an agnostic as an adult, as a child he was reared in the Methodist faith whose doctrine demanded self-denial and dis-

indulgence. His parents' home was very likely without much love or warmth. Perhaps any display of affection was discouraged or ridiculed. He loved his maiden aunts and was happy with them, but by his midteens he began to assert his masculinity and independence. At 16 he would plunge into bitter winter weather without warm clothing, and to his grandmother's worried scoldings he would respond, "I won't be molly coddled!" Throughout his life he continued to take on cold winds and cold waters and took pride in forcing his body to endure hardship and physical discomfort.

Spruance very likely believed it was unworthy of a man to display an emotion that would suggest softness or weakness. He became ashamed of his poems and wanted them destroyed. He was also shy, and he disguised his shyness with a quiet aloofness among strangers.

Spruance knew that his mind was his greatest asset in war, and his way of living assured it would always function efficiently. He did not fatigue it with long hours or with details and minor problems that could be handled by others. Rather he focused his attention on the larger problems and decisions that were the proper concern of the high commander. Spruance kept regular hours and got a good night's sleep, especially before a big operation, thereby zealously conserving his physical and mental resources, using them only when absolutely necessary. His staff never wakened the admiral from his sleep or brought him problems after working hours—unless they were so important that they could not wait until morning.

His legendary walking was as vital to him as eating, sleeping, and breathing. His body was lean and hard; he did not abuse it with alcohol, tobacco, overwork, or tension, and he was able to survive, even thrive, in the rigors of war. Battle fatigue incapacitated or killed many flag and general officers during the war, but Spruance was always fresh,

alert, and well-rested.

From time to time, however, his emotions overcame his self-control. The sight of the devastated ships at Pearl Harbor, which he first saw the day after the attack, was the most severe emotional shock of his life. Very fortunately, his wife and daughter were in Honolulu, and alone with them in the privacy of his home he purged himself of his grief, his despair, and his sense of horror. Spruance forced himself to tell them his feelings, but he was so distraught he could scarcely talk. Never again did he speak of that terrible day.

Several months later he again became emotionally upset, this time over the poor performance of his cruisers in their first battle. His wife and daughter had returned to the mainland; he had no one to talk with until a young lieutenant, whom Spruance knew well, called on him late one evening, allowing Spruance to unburden his pent-up tension and disappointment.

Having someone to confide in during the first months of the war was therapeutic for Spruance. Later, he never again talked in confidence to anyone about his feelings and reactions to the war.

In that he was a sensitive man, he could not be indifferent to the thousands of deaths, both Japanese and American, for which he was responsible. Early in the war his cruiser-destroyer force discovered a lightly armed Japanese patrol craft. He ordered a destroyer to sink it. The destroyer took a very long time to deliberately aim its guns, and the scene was not unlike a condemned prisoner before a firing squad. Everyone, including Spruance, watched from the flagship. The tension mounted, and a staff officer murmured, "Those poor devils." Spruance suddenly turned and walked away as if he could no longer bear to watch. "Yes," he said, "I feel very sorry for those poor men." Then he paused and exclaimed, "But

he rushed back to the bridge wing to calmly watch the destroyer blast apart the Japanese ship, bit by bit.

On the last day of the Battle of Midway, American planes had attacked a Japanese cruiser that became so battered it could not defend itself, yet it refused to sink. Wave after wave of American dive bombers lashed the helpless giant, and the returning pilots reported that dead bodies were strewn about the ship and in the water. That evening, the battle over, Spruance and his staff relaxed in the Flag Mess. The radio news contained a story about a grisly murder in the United States, prompting two officers into a philosophical discussion about a murderer's mind. One officer remarked that murder was such an unnatural act that a man would have to have a deranged mind to do such a thing. With that, Spruance lowered his paper and said dryly, "What do you think I have been doing all afternoon?"

Yet he pragmatically accepted that war meant killing and that many people would have to die. He did everything in his power to reduce American casualties, primarily through meticulous planning and by using violent, overwhelming force, swiftly applied. Spruance tried to avoid civilian casualties and would have much preferred that Air Force B-29 bombers destroy Japanese defense industries, such as those producing kamikazes, rather than rain fire-bombs on Japanese civilians and cities. He could accept military men killing each other as they did in the Gilberts and Marshalls, but he deplored the killing of innocent civilians in the Marianas and on Okinawa. He was repelled by the bloodshed on Okinawa, which to him was a hellish prelude to the invasion of Japan. Spruance knew that millions of Japanese and Americans would have to die in an invasion of the home islands before Japan would surrender. Rather he preferred to blockade Japan to force her submission and save lives. But lo

warrior that he was, he was planning that invasion when the atomic bombs ended the war. When Spruance was told that the war was over, he was walking with his son Edward on Guam. After receiving the news he said nothing, and the two men continued their walk.

One of the few emotions that his staff ever saw were occasional flashes of anger, mostly outbursts of righteous indignation. Shortly after the Battle of Midway, Spruance was pacing the *Enterprise* flight deck with some naval aviators who had sunk the Japanese carriers and who had been lucky enough to have survived. Someone handed Spruance a press release originated by the Army Air Force at Honolulu. It claimed that all the Japanese carriers had been sunk by B-17 bombers and asked where the Navy's carriers had been all the while.

Spruance's belief that war correspondents and Army bombers were next to useless began that day.

As the war progressed, he clashed with several senior officers from time to time and had a low opinion of the performance of several others. Yet Spruance never publicly criticized any person or any service as long as he lived in order to avoid controversy, and he was usually magnanimous in his praise of others. When he had been a midshipman, the infamous Sampson-Schley controversy had blighted the reputation of the naval service. He wanted no repeats, so whatever the provocations, he would not be party to a controversy.

Another emotion that sometimes surfaced was his sense of humor. Spruance was a master at subtle teasing, and his dry wit was sometimes sharp enough to cause his victim a twinge of pain. Many a fellow officer was led unsuspectingly into a clever trap and did not realize he was caught until he saw Spruance's dancing steel-grey eyes. Spruance rarely smiled. Rather his eyes smiled and always betrayed him when he was laugh-

His suppression of his emotions finally hastened his death. Spruance was in failing health when his son Edward was killed in a tragic automobile accident in 1969. His personal grief and anguish at having lost his only son whom he deeply loved was a shock from which he never recovered. He refused to talk about the accident and died 6 months later.

The third characteristic that made Spruance a great naval officer was his moral and physical courage.

His moral courage was manifested by his incorruptible integrity. He spoke the truth and did what was morally right regardless of the possible consequences to his own career.

At the height of the war, when there was great hostility towards Japanese-American citizens, Spruance gave a talk in California in which he publicly criticized their unjustified imprisonment in concentration camps. After the war he held his one and only press conference. He argued against the punitive confiscation of Japanese territory and recommended a drastic reduction in the size of the postwar American Navy because there were no more enemy naval powers in the near future. He was severely reprimanded by his superiors in Washington and vigorously applauded by perceptive Americans.

It was not surprising that knowledgeable Americans universally approved his appointment as Ambassador to the Philippines because of his distinguished reputation for honesty and wisdom, rare qualities that were much needed in the U.S. Government. The Philippines were embroiled in bloody political turmoil and threatened with Communist insurrection. His superb performance as Ambassador justified the faith in him first by President Truman and Secretary Acheson and later by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles.

Spruance's physical courage was unbelievable. Throughout the war his flagship was often attacked, yet he seemed

oblivious to personal danger. He would gaze serenely at bombers diving upon him from above and was indifferent to projectiles from shore batteries bracketing his ship.

His flagship was always in the thick of action, whether during close-in shore fire bombardment or while accompanying Mitscher's carriers on raids on Japanese bases. Two successive flagships were hit by kamikazes at Okinawa. On U.S.S. *New Mexico* frantic staff officers, fearing the worst, searched for Spruance. They found him calmly manning a fire hose, concerned only whether any codebooks had been found in the crashed kamikaze.

There is no record of Spruance ever explaining his behavior in battle. A commander traditionally has been expected to set an example of bravery under fire, and Spruance had disciplined himself after years of sea duty to remain calm in periods of danger and great stress. Bombs and bullets headed his way were simply a magnification of the hazards he had overcome before the war. He never flinched, never ducked, never faltered.

Yet his worried subordinates argued that, whatever the benefits provided by his example of personal courage, they were not worth the risk of losing him. They argued he owed it to the Navy to stay alive. Spruance ignored their pleas.

Perhaps Spruance had little faith in the scanty protection of the thin-skinned flag bridges against armor-piercing bombs and projectiles and felt it would be useless to seek protection. Better to fatalistically stay in the open. John Paul Jones and Admiral Lord Nelson were always exposed in battle; Spruance had plenty of precedent. A naval commander simply did not go into battle hiding from personal danger.

Transcending his other virtues, however, was his most important military virtue of all: his fighting spirit. That fighting spirit included his eagerness and desire to come to grips with the enemy, to press on with vigor and determination against all obstacles, and to keep fighting until the battle was won.

Raymond Spruance was a fascinating and complex man. Although he was an enigma to everyone, we must try to understand him and learn from him, because he was a master at the art of naval warfare and later was a skillful diplomat and statesman. He dedicated his life to serving his country and his President with wisdom, self-discipline, courage, and fighting spirit. He sought not personal glory but rather the satisfaction of having served faithfully and well.

He envied no man, regarded no one as rival, won the respect of all with whom he came in contact, and went ahead in his quiet way, winning victories for his country.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Comdr. Thomas B. Buell, U.S. Navy, is a 1958 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1964 with the degree of bachelor of science in electrical engineering.

He has served four operational tours in destroyers, most recently as Executive Officer, U.S.S. *John King* (DDG 3). Commander Buell is a 1971 graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff. He is now assigned to the Naval War College to participate in the Professional Development Program and is conducting independent study and research in 20th-century naval warfare.

A PERSPECTIVE OF THE COLLEGE'S STRATEGY CURRICULUM

The 9 weeks devoted to the Strategy curriculum are designed to enhance the student's ability to think analytically and express himself cogently by allowing him to examine key issues of military history in the give and take of the seminar room. In essence, the Strategy study has been changed in both content and in methodology, and figure 1 illustrates the change in emphasis from a committee to an individual effort.

the basic factual material upon which all subsequent discussion and reading will be based. Three days of individual reading, research, and consultation with faculty members then follow. Having thus become acquainted in some depth with the week's topic, the students then attend a formal lecture presented by a guest speaker.** Chosen to speak in areas of their special expertise, each week's guest lecturer spends 3 days at

| | New Curriculum (16 weeks) | 1971 Equivalent (17 weeks) |
|------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Lecture hours | 75 | 167 |
| Seminar hours | 44 | 69 |
| Required reading pages | 10,316 | 3,980 |
| Written assignments | 4/60 pages | 1/10 pages (committee effort) |
| Examinations | 2 | 0 |
| Post-lecture periods | 14 | 18 |
| | 50% avg. attendance | 15% avg. attendance |

Fig. 1—Comparison of Academic Effort: New vs. 1971 Strategy Curriculum

Focusing each week on a different question or case study, the students are expected to read approximately 1,000 pages of background material as well as attend a formal lecture presented by a prominent historian. While a great deal of time is required outside the seminar room in individual research and preparation of seminar essays, the success of the program clearly hinges on the exchange of ideas—the give and take that characterizes small group discussions.*

Each academic week opens with an introductory lecture given by a member of the War College's resident faculty. These lectures are designed to provide

the War College, participating in post-lecture conferences and student seminars as well as meeting with selected student groups over the dinner table in the college's Flag Cabin.

Although historical in its perspective, the Naval War College's Strategy course focuses on questions that are as current today as they were for the ancient

*For an insight into the Strategy curriculum topics, supporting readings, and representative essay questions, see appendix I.

**See appendix II for a listing of guest lecturers for the Strategy curriculum.

Greeks. History is studied, not so much as a means to derive certain "principles," but rather as a means to view controversial issues more objectively and dispassionately. The analysis of recurrent themes in history—themes which have defined the strategic parameters within which nations have struggled throughout the ages—has provided the fuel for lively and provoking student exchanges. New insights have been gained in areas such as landpower versus seapower, total war as opposed to limited war, imperialism, civil-military relations, and war as an instrument of policy.

There are no pat answers to the questions raised in these seminars; indeed, one of the first things the student learns is never to accept at face value any assertion which claims to tie persistent problems into neat packages. Special efforts are made to introduce the student to a broad variety of readings, some of which are purposely controversial in nature, in order to further encourage the examination of all points of view. The faculty member's role at the Naval War College is not to lecture or "spoon feed" the student, but rather he must strike a fine balance between stimulating new ideas and fresh approaches on the one hand while keeping student discussions from straying too far afield on the other.

Student essay papers are an important part of the educational process. They sharpen the student's ability for both analysis and sound logical writing, as well as providing a useful instrument for sparking seminar discussions. A number of such essays follow this discussion.

Still another feature of the new curriculum was the institution of examinations. The students were provided with nine examination questions about 1 month before the examination date and were advised that five of these questions would appear on their exam,

any two of those five. In addition, they were advised that the final examination would include an additional three questions from which they would select one. Providing the nine questions was intended to help the students focus their study effort. Allowing them a freedom of choice was intended to encourage them to explore areas in which they were particularly interested without fear of being hamstrung on the examinations.

The following represents a sample of some of the questions included in this year's strategy final examination:

- Define the term "imperialism." Has U.S. foreign policy since 1898 been "imperialistic"? If so, in what sense and for what reasons? If not, how else would you describe it?

- Is today's "multipolar" world a 20th century equivalent of the 19th century's "balance of power"? Do you think that multipolarity and balance of power are better or worse guarantors of international peace than bipolarity or single-power hegemony?

- What are the historic roots of antimilitarism in Western (including American) society? Is there an inherent and inescapable antagonism between military professionalism and Western liberal/democratic ideology? On the basis of your studies in this course and of your personal observations, what do you predict will be the status of the military profession in America in the coming decade? Does history offer any guidelines to the military profession in its present and future relations with civilian society in this country?

As a conclusion to the strategy study, the final 4 weeks of the curriculum were allotted for strategy research. The student is unencumbered by a schedule and is free to pursue his choice of research on a strategy topic. The fruit of this effort is a research paper, several of which have been included in this issue.

Superior performance by students at

the Naval War College is recognized at graduation through the identification of Distinguished Graduates and the Strategy course is the first hurdle in achieving this goal. In the past, evaluation was accomplished by rating performance in

seminars and written papers, but in the case of this class, the written examinations will provide an additional tool to make the evaluation process more equitable. Superior students for the recently completed Strategy course are:

| | | |
|----------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Alves, Arcenio, Jr. | Comdr. | USN |
| Atwood, Henry C., Jr. | Comdr. | USN |
| Batchelder, Sydney H., Jr. | Lt. Col. | USMC |
| Braddon, John R. | Lt. Col. | USMC |
| Caterini, Dino J. | FSO-4 | USIS |
| De Vicq, David C. | Comdr. | USN |
| Duke, Lee E. | Col. | USA |
| Gilmore, Roger W. | Comdr. | USN |
| Goodson, George O., Jr. | Lt. Col. | USMC |
| Grace, John J. | Col. | USMC |
| Hagerty, Roger C. | Lt. Col. | USMC |
| Hartman, Richard S. | Col. | USMC |
| Higgins, Maria S. | Comdr. | USN |
| Hilt, George H. | Lt. Col. | USA |
| Hoffman, Robert B. | Comdr. | USN |
| Howard, Donald L. | Comdr. | USN |
| Howay, Jack W. | Comdr. | USN |
| Korpal, Eugene S. | Lt. Col. | USA |
| Kreckel, Lyman E. | Comdr. | USN |
| Love, Edgar J. | Lt. Col. | USMC |
| Lutz, Joseph C. | Lt. Col. | USA |
| Marthinson, Detlow M., Jr. | Comdr. | USN |
| Masson, Richard W. | Lt. Col. | USAF |
| Mathews, Frederick A. | Lt. Col. | USMC |
| McClintock, Bain | Col. | USMC |
| McNall, Phillip E. | Comdr. | USN |
| Miller, John T. | Lt. Col. | USA |
| Miller, Ralf M. | Lt. Col. | USAF |
| Moon, Richard B. | FSO-3 | State Dept. |
| Nordhill, Claude H. | Comdr. | USN |
| Pease, Charles C. | Lt. Comdr. | USN |
| Peters, Richard A. | Comdr. | USN |
| Rutherford, Bruce B. | Lt. Col. | USMC |
| Schreiner, Charles W., Jr. | Lt. Col. | USMC |
| Scott, Douglas L. | Comdr. | USN |
| Sellers, John W. | Comdr. | USN |
| Shaffer, Raymond A. | Lt. Col. | USMC |
| Stanton, James M. | Comdr. | USN |
| Stevens, Robert M. | GS-15 | DOD |
| Thibault, Edward A. | GS-14 | CIA |
| Thompson, George I. | Capt. | USN |
| Wagner, Julian F. | Lt. Col. | USA |
| Winchester, Warren H. | Comdr. | USN |
| Zirps, Christos | Comdr. | USN |

APPENDIX I

Listing of Weekly Topics, Readings, and Selected Seminar Essays for Strategy Study

I. The Sovereign State and the Balance of Power

A. Readings:

Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War*. (Books I-VII). Baltimore, 1954.

Dehio, Ludwig. *The Precarious Balance*. New York, 1962.

Holborn, Hajo. *The Political Collapse of Europe*. New York, 1951. (Borzoi Books edition)

B. Seminar Essays:

1. Discuss Thucydides on the influence of seapower.

2. Define the concept of "the balance of power" (using historical examples from Thucydides, Dehio, and Holborn).

3. Explain the disappearance of the "balance of power" as a guiding principle in international affairs after 1914.

II. Theories of Military Strategy

A. Readings:

Leonard, R.A., ed. *A Short Guide to Clausewitz, on War*. New York, 1967.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Seapower upon History*. (American Century Series Edition), New York, 1957.

Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London, 1918.

B. Seminar Essays:

1. How do Clausewitz, Mahan, and Corbett distinguish strategy from tactics on the one hand and from foreign policy on the other?

2. It is sometimes observed that Mahan's major contribution to naval strategic theory was his conception, "command of the sea." Examine that concept critically, indicating (a) what Mahan meant by it; (b) whether Clausewitz had a parallel concept; and (c) how Corbett refined this concept.

3. Discuss critically to what extent—and to what purpose—the concepts represented by the contemporary terms "limited war," "general war," "deterrence," "escalation," and "guerrilla warfare" (or "insurgency") appear in the works of Clausewitz, Mahan, and Corbett.

III. Ideological War: the French Revolution and Napoleon

A. Readings:

Brinton, Crane. *A Decade of Revolution, 1789-1799*. New York, 1934.

Markham, Felix. *Napoleon*. New York, 1963.

Marcus, Geoffrey J. *The Age of Nelson*. New York, 1971.

B. Seminar Essays:

1. What were the elements of Napoleon's military genius? What debt, if any, did he owe to earlier theorists and practitioners of the military art? What did he do that was new and different?

2. What was the institutional machinery for the formulation and execution of British military policy on land and sea during the period 1793-1815?

3. How did Britain and France wage economic warfare against each other in the years 1793-1815?

IV. War as an Instrument of National Policy: Otto von Bismarck

A. Readings:

Pflanze, Otto. *Bismarck and the Development of Germany. v. I, The Period of Unification, 1815-1871*. Princeton, 1963.

Howard, Michael. *The Franco-Prussian War*. New York, 1961.

Craig, Gordon A. *The Battle of Koniggratz*. Philadelphia, 1964.

B. Seminar Essays:

1. Discuss the concept of limited war as applied by Bismarck in 1864, 1866, and 1870.

2. Discuss the methods by which Bismarck secured popular support for the government.

3. To what extent did Prussia's naval weakness affect Bismarck's foreign policy?

V. War as the Collapse of Policy: World War I

A. Readings:

Remak, Joachim. *The Origins of World War I, 1871-1914*. New York, 1967.

Schmitt, Bernadotte. *Origins of World War I*. London, 1958.

Tuchman, Barbara. *The Guns of August*. New York, 1962.

B. Seminar Essays:

1. Why did Russia, France, and Great Britain, in spite of their traditional animosities, draw together against Germany? Was Germany--as she claimed--a victim of "encirclement" before 1914?

2. Assess the role of imperialism--i.e., the colonial rivalries of the great powers--in the origins of World War I.

3. In the summer of 1914 could Great Britain have prevented general war by making her policy clearer sooner?

VI. Policymaking in Wartime: World War II

A. Readings:

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Strategy and Compromise*. Boston, 1958.

Feis, Herbert. *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: the War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*. Princeton, 1966.

Blumenson, Martin. *Eisenhower*. New York, 1972.

B. Seminar Essays:

1. Discuss the wartime development of strategic plans for the defeat of Japan in terms of U.S. interservice rivalries.

2. Discuss the effects of logistical considerations on Allied strategy in World War II.

3. When did the Allied wartime coalition fall apart, and why?

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VII. Imperialism and War: the American Experience

A. Readings:

Williams, William A. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York, 1972.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret. *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*. Princeton, 1943. rev. ed.

Pratt, Julius. *Expansionists of 1898: the Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands*. Chicago, 1968.

B. Seminar Essays:

1. To what extent was U.S. naval policy in the 19th century responsive to the requirements of U.S. foreign policy?

2. Compare and contrast American and European 19th century imperialism.

3. Did economic forces or strategic consideration play a more important role in shaping America's acquisition of what Williams calls her "informal empire?"

VIII. Soldiers and Civilians: the U.S. Civil War

A. Readings:

Williams, T. Harry. *Lincoln and His Generals*. (Vintage Edition), New York, 1952.

Catton, Bruce. *U.S. Grant and the American Military Tradition*. Boston, 1954.

Ambrose, Stephen. *Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff*. Baton Rouge, 1962.

B. Seminar Essays:

1. The development of a "modern command system" in the Union Army.

2. Military theory and military practice: the influence of Jomini on Civil War strategy and tactics.

3. The influence of domestic politics on the conduct of the war by the Union.

IX. The Military Profession

A. Readings:

Vagts, Alfred. *A History of Militarism, Civilian and Military*. New York, 1959.

Morison, Elting E. *Men, Machines and Modern Times*. Cambridge, 1966.

Forester, C.S. *The General*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968.

Crane, Stephen. *The Red Badge of Courage*. New York, 1949.

B. Seminar Essays:

1. How do you account for fluctuations in the popularity of the military profession in the United States?

2. How adaptive has the military been to technological changes?

3. Motivation in combat: the role of military symbolism as illustrated in Forester's *The General* and Crane's *Red Badge of Courage*.

APPENDIX II

Guest Lecturers and Lecture Titles

- Bernard Knox, Director, Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington, D.C.—“Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War: Politics and Power”
- Kenneth N. Waltz, University of California at Berkeley—“The Sovereign State and the Balance of Power”
- Norman H. Gibbs, All Souls College, Oxford University—“Clausewitz on the Moral Forces in War”
- Robert Forster, Johns Hopkins University—“Ideological War: the French Revolution and Napoleon”
- David Schoenbaum, University of Iowa—“War as an Instrument of National Policy”
- Laurence LaFore, University of Iowa—“War as the Collapse of Policy: World War I”
- Forrest Pogue, Director, George C. Marshall Research Fund—“Policymaking in Wartime: World War II”
- James Field, Swarthmore College—“Imperialism and War: the American Experience”
- R.F. Weigley, Temple University—“The Civil War in the Evolution of American Strategy”
- Brig. Gen. Robert G. Gard, Jr., USA, Director, Discipline and Drug Policies, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army—“The Military Profession”

SELECTED ESSAYS FOR STRATEGY CURRICULUM

HOW ADAPTIVE HAS THE MILITARY BEEN
TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE?

by

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Student, College of Naval Warfare

One of the more common human failings is the tendency to react to new phenomena with old reflexes. Generals are often the slaves of strategies designed for other wars and diplomats are prone to retain postures and policies based on conditions of a world that no longer exists.¹

There can be no doubt that in many instances the military has been slow to adapt to changing technology. Perhaps it is grossly unfair, however, to single out the profession of arms for censure in this regard. Resistance to innovation is certainly prevalent in civilian life. But it is equally unjustifiable for the military to pretend that the problem does not exist. The professional approach would seem to be to recognize the malady for what it is and to identify the symptoms. Analysis with a view toward isolating the causes of the disease and an attempt to find possible remedies are also in order.

There is ample historical evidence to support the view that the military has been reluctant to accept change. Consider the classic case of resistance by the naval bureaucracy to the improved gunnery techniques of Lt. W.S. Sims. This might have been expected from the group of professionals whose antecedents had retrogressed from steam to sail following the Civil War. Isherwood must have felt the same sense of frustration that haunted Sims a generation later. More recently there were the problems experienced by proponents of

naval aviation prior to World War II. Within our own period of service we have been witness to the struggle of Hyman Rickover to introduce the nuclear propulsion plant. Who knows how many good ideas may have been suppressed within the last 10 years?

Nor is the U.S. Navy the only military organization to have suffered from "mossbackism." The British and French armies, prior to and during World War I, refused to adapt to the introduction of rapid fire weapons.

The impact of modern techniques was misunderstood or disregarded. In the 80 years between Clausewitz and 1911 the rate of rifle fire had increased from three rounds a minute to 16, the range of guns from one thousand yards to five or six. Of artillery one responsible French officer said, "We have rather too much of it."²

British Field Marshal Haig claimed the machinegun was much overrated. Two per battalion were more than sufficient, he felt, but fortunately the number was increased to eight and then 16 under civilian pressure. Couple this attitude toward modern weapons with devotion to Clausewitz' dictum of the offensive and senseless carnage was inevitable. In one infantry charge against entrenched German machinegun positions, 10,000 Allied troops were fed into the grinder. After 3½ hours, casualties amounted to 385 officers and 7,861 men. German losses were "nil."³

But the French staff learned its

lessons well from World War I. The offensive had failed in the face of vastly increased firepower, so obviously the defensive offered the best form of warfare. How absurd it was to spend money on the tank and armored divisions such as a young officer named Charles de Gaulle was proposing. What a magnificent trench was the Maginot Line!

One might argue that these examples were all in the distant past. Today the Pentagon spends billions of dollars for research and development of new weapons systems. The U.S. Military Establishment is quick to adopt new techniques.

Let us examine an illustration of the type of innovation prevalent in today's modern army, the Sheridan lightweight armored vehicle (LAV). The LAV was designed to replace the World War II reconnaissance vehicle, a jeep with machinegun mounted in the rear seat. Trouble was the jeep was vulnerable to enemy small arms fire and could not stand up to the tank. It was determined that a new vehicle was needed for reconnaissance. In addition to this requirement, the paratroopers wanted an air-droppable armored vehicle. Thus was born the Sheridan at \$335,000 per copy, with a Shillelagh guided missile, a 152mm. artillery piece whose casings self-destruct in the breech when fired, an M-60 machinegun, and a .50 caliber machinegun. The system is simple to operate, when it works. It takes 14 months to train a warrant officer to repair the missile system. Tested in Vietnam, it had some problems, among them 41 misfires of the artillery shell.⁴

Problems with the Sheridan are not unique and, for the most part, can be solved, given sufficient time and money. Isn't the Sheridan evidence to support a claim that the military now readily adapts to new technology? My contention is that it definitely is not. Instead, it is a new manifestation of mossbackism, the "gold-plating" syndrome. In reality, the Sheridan LAV is nothing

more or less than a fancy tank. It is, moreover, a failure as a tank. The Soviet T-54, T-55, and T-62 are more powerful. Only if the Sheridan crew detects a Soviet tank first and fires its missile does it have a chance of survival. The Army maintains that the LAV is not a tank, but it replaced M-60 tanks in the inventory.⁵ Of course, the important issue is whether or not the tank is still a valid firstline instrument of war, given the advent of the helicopter.

The technological revolution affects the Army as it affects the rest of society. While it may be logical to say that the tank occupies the same position as the horse in World War II, no tank man will believe it. Give up armor? While the Soviets still have the T-34? The guns become larger, the armor plate thicker, the mechanics more complicated and costs rise. Put a missile system on it and a sensing system to complement the missile. Stay in the game!⁶

Isn't there a striking resemblance between the tank now and the battleship of 1941? Which current Navy ships or systems suffer from the same gold-plating syndrome?

While the tactics of bureaucratic resistance have changed somewhat, the basic strategy remains: (1) Indifference, as though the threat may go away; (2) Denial of the value of the new technology by high-ranking officers; (3) Emergence of a group of middle-grade officers who believe adaptation is necessary; (4) Nominal acceptance by the hierarchy in the face of mounting external pressure with relegation to a minor role in the mission of the service; (5) Ascendance of the new system to a position of prominence only after prolonged struggle within the organization, a struggle often culminated by catastrophic destruction of the old technology in a war.

The past two decades have been a

time of exceptionally lavish defense budgets. There has been less savage competition between old systems and new for the military dollar. The services could afford both. This has been an important factor in the emergence of the gold-plating syndrome. Unfortunately the military will not be able to afford this luxury in the future. We will be forced to choose between gold-plated obsolescence and expensive new technology. The fighting promises to be bitter.

The mossback phenomenon manifests itself in civilian life too. There it takes the form of cartels, restrictive trade agreements, absorbing of patents for potential competing systems by large corporations, and featherbedding by labor unions. There is no essential difference between a fireman riding a diesel locomotive and an aviator lobbying for the B-1 bomber. Job security is at stake. The fireman is an honest man who is dedicated to safety on the railroads. The aviator is a patriotic American whose paramount interest is national security. In each case the obsolescent function is his whole reason for existence; his self-respect is threatened. It is extremely difficult for a man with many years of intense dedication to a task to admit that his particular occupation has become superfluous, especially if he is not equipped to embark on another line of work.

The diesel locomotive fireman has a union to fight for him. In the military, the individual whose task is obsolete is often well represented at the top. Senior officers are in most cases advocates of the branch of service which spawned them, be it cavalry, bomber force, or battleship. Often they were the Young Turks of their own generation. In addition to the parochial tendencies of the men within the services, there is considerable influence from businesses with vested interest in the old technology. These firms can be very effective in

weapons, but the problem exists mainly within the uniformed services. If the professional were to go before Congress and state that a weapon was outmoded and present even a fraction of the evidence which is usually mustered to support obsolescence, there can be little doubt the lawmakers would concur in eliminating that weapon.

The question which should concern us as members of the profession is whether or not there are factors peculiar to our calling which tend to promote mossbackism, and is there anything we can do that would alleviate the influence of these factors.

Are military men necessarily more susceptible to mossbackism than other groups in society? In order to answer that question one must first define the conditions which nurture creativity and compare those conditions with the environment presented by the military society to its members. Victor Thompson has enumerated the following conditions as conducive to creativity: (1) Psychological security and freedom; (2) Great diversity of inputs; (3) Personal commitment to search for solutions; (4) Structure or limits to the search situation; (5) Moderate amounts of benign competition. If we accept this list as a reasonable description of the creative environment, the next step in our analysis should be to define the nature of the military environment.

I choose to define the military as a hierarchy consisting of superior-subordinate relations. The top echelon initiates all activity. Subordinates in the chain of command make each order more specific to the next lower level until specific individuals are carrying out specific instructions. There is complete discipline from the top down. Duties are narrowly defined. There is only one point of legitimacy, the senior man. The organization is not a coalition, therefore coalition and conflict-resolving activities take place in a penumbra of illegitimacy. Individual will and cre

ativity are suppressed in favor of the corporate will. Submission to this discipline is unnatural, and it is therefore necessary for the hierarchy to reward docility and compliance with rewards such as money, medals, power, and status.⁷

The military organization is the closest approximation of the monocratic stereotype of organization defined by Max Weber. Monocratic societies require outside help from other social and religious groups in order to achieve their production goals. In the case of the military this is especially true. One has a duty to his country to sacrifice for the good of the service. A job is not necessarily enjoyable according to the work ethic. The good man is the successful man, and success consists of moving up the hierarchy. The higher one progresses, the more vague and subjective are the standards by which one is judged. Opportunity for growth is controlled by arbitrary authority, which fosters conformity in subordinates. Whereas creativity is promoted by intrinsic rewards such as peer esteem and benign competition, hierarchical rewards must, by nature, be extrinsic and competition is inherently cutthroat.⁸

Failure is an inherent part of the experimental process which leads to new technology. Innovation consists of one success after a multitude of dead ends. In a monocacy, one's function is very carefully delineated and exclusive. Exclusive distribution of activity implies exclusive distribution of praise and blame. Failure is attached to an individual (at least most people think this is so), and one feels he cannot fail even once, given the nature of the promotion process. Since failure is defined by the senior, conformity is the rule rather than creativity.

The military social structure gives an inherent advantage to those who choose to veto new ideas. The first reaction to innovation is most likely: "How does it

affect us?" If it is a threat to the status quo, it will be resisted. Such resistance can be prolonged and intense. Commenting on Billy Mitchell's bombing tests against old battleships in 1921, Capt. William D. Leahy, then Director of Naval Gunnery (a post brought to a position of eminence by Lieutenant Sims), said to the Secretary of the Navy: "The entire experiment pointed to the improbability of a modern battleship being either destroyed or put out of action by aerial bombs."⁹ CNO Adm. E.W. Eberle, stated: "Aviation has introduced a new and highly important factor in warfare . . . [and] its influence on naval warfare undoubtedly will increase in the future, but the prediction that it will assume paramount importance in sea warfare will not be realized."¹⁰ It is extremely difficult for an individual, faced with a system where advancement is a reward for compliance with the "party line" and where competition is so intense that a single "failure" may be the end of one's career, to actively push an unpopular idea.

Morison indicates that reform from within the organization is difficult, if not impossible. In every case he contends there was an outside force working for acceptance of new technology (i.e., President Roosevelt imposed Sims upon the Navy as Gunnery Inspector).¹¹ Billy Mitchell's unification proposals were the greater evil which led to Navy acceptance of the aircraft.¹² Enthoven has contended that external pressure in the form of the whiz kids is a necessary counter to mossbackism in the uniformed services.¹³

Reform from within is not an easy task. The most obvious reform would be a change in the basic structure of the military society. The Russians tried this approach after the Bolshevik Revolution and it failed. Complete abolition of the hierarchical structure of command is not possible because of the nature of warfare. So long as men must fight and

die, authoritarian systems of organization will be a necessity for combat units. But is a strict hierarchical relationship required in all aspects of the military society? Here at the Naval War College rank structure has been submergled by means of civilian clothing and the use of first names. Blind obedience to senior is a necessity in combat, and men are trained to function under that set of rules. Prolonged rational debate, however, is necessary when billions of dollars and the national security are at stake. It requires the best efforts of well educated men who also have practical experience. The problem has been that it is very difficult for men who have learned to live with regimentation to readily switch to a new set of rules when they serve a tour in the Pentagon. We need a dual system of organization in order to promote innovation. Wild ideas should have an official channel through which to bypass the bureaucracy and reach the top. Dissent concerning issues other than immediate military operations must be specifically encouraged. Such a system should permit military officers legitimate access to civilian DOD personnel and the press, with no prejudice to the innovator. Because we are a monocratic society, only the very top can give legitimacy to such a dual system. Experience with the Z-grams and CNO advisory groups illustrate that such a dual system is necessary and can have beneficial effects.

The *Naval Institute Proceedings* might be a more useful tool for expressing new and controversial ideas if it were removed from the censorship system currently used to screen articles submitted for publication. Vincent Davis relates that: "Not so much as a single sentence can be found in the thirty-six issues of [USNIP] during the immediate pre-World War II years suggesting that the carrier based aircraft could or ever would replace the big guns of the battleship as the main offensive

punch of the fleet."¹⁴ Is it mere happenstance that there have been no recent articles in the *Proceedings* which are critical of the aircraft carrier in its present form?

There are new trends within the military which will contribute to reduction of parochialism and mossbackism. Programs of education for the officer corps which make the individual less dependent on his initial service or corps specialty will tend to reduce close identification with a particular type of weapon and lead to promotion of true "general officers." Downgrading of stereotyped career patterns as criteria for flag selection boards is a welcome sign of change. Service on joint staffs and attendance at schools of a different branch also serve to moderate parochialism.

Reform we must. Every time a service gains bad press because it refuses to accept innovation or constructive criticism, it loses status with the Nation and ultimately loses control of its own destiny. The alternative to internal reform is to accept greater civilian control and ultimately loss of our right to be called a true profession.

In summary, it is safe to say that the profession of arms has been reluctant to accept innovation in the past. At present there is still resistance to give up any old weapons, thus giving rise to the "gold-plating syndrome." This phenomenon is not limited to the military society alone, but it is more of a problem for the military because of the profound effects which military decisions may have on the lives of millions of people. Basic military education, training, and the inherent constraints of a hierarchical system tend to promote parochialism and mossbackism. The pace of technological change is such that we cannot afford the luxury of mossbackism. Positive internal reforms are required, including institutional modifications to encourage innovation and a continuing program of education for the officer corps.

FOOTNOTES

1. James A. Donovan, *Militarism, U.S.A.* (New York: Scribner, 1970), p. 217.
2. J. Monteilhet, *Les Institutions Militaires de la France*, 1932, p. 262, quoted in Sir John W. Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: Times, 1962), p. 49.
3. Hackett, p. 51.
4. Ward S. Just, *Military Men* (New York: Knopf, 1970), p. 151-175.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 173-174.
7. Victor A. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and Innovation* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1969), p. 15-18.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Vincent Davis, *The Admirals Lobby* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 78.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Elting E. Morison, *Men, Machines and Modern Times* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p. 38-39.
12. Davis, p. 76-77.
13. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 95.
14. Davis, p. 81-82.

THUCYDIDES ON THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER

by

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One need not look far in Thucydides' historical saga *The Peloponnesian War* for a clear exposition of his views on the influence of seapower. In the very first chapter of the First Book, after presenting his minihistory of the birth and growth of naval power, he concludes:

All the same these Hellenic navies, whether in the remote past or in the later periods, although they were as I have described them, were still a great source of strength to the various naval powers. They brought in revenue and they were the foundation of empire. It was by naval action that the islands were conquered . . . There was no warfare on land that resulted in the acquisition of an empire.¹

Even Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great apologist for seapower 2,300 years later,

never stated the case more strongly. It is unfortunate that Captain Mahan never read, or at least never discussed, Thucydides. Both understood so clearly the influence of seapower on history. Both were military men who became, more or less by force of circumstance, historians. And Thucydides would certainly have agreed wholeheartedly with Mahan's statement that "the history of sea power, while embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history."² For *The Peloponnesian War*, while it is obviously a military history, is preeminently a history of seapower.

Many a reader of Thucydides has come away with the impression that *The Peloponnesian War* is an account of a classic struggle between a landpower and a seapower. But on closer scrutiny,

this view seems somewhat simplistic. In the final analysis, the war was won not on land, but at sea. The crushing defeat which Nicias' "Grande Armée" (if you will permit an anachronism) suffered at Syracuse, and from which Athens never fully recovered, would never have occurred if the Athenian Fleet had not been so ignominiously routed in the great harbor. And when the coup de grâce was delivered to Athens 9 years later, it was again at sea, in the scintillating victory of Lysander at Aegospotami, which Thucydides' unfinished work unfortunately does not describe, but which Xenophon and Plutarch have related in some detail.

Lest I, too, be accused of a simplistic rationale in ascribing all historical development to seapower, I readily admit that there were many other factors at work in the world-shaking events related by Thucydides. To historians who view events in terms of political science, the development of Athenian democracy, its later excesses, the conversion of the Delian League into an Athenian tyrannical empire (when the confederacy could conceivably have provided the international political order required by the times)³ are equally important factors. To historians who view events in terms of economics, the economic revolution that transformed self-sufficient city-states into interdependent colonial powers requiring markets for the export of their specialized wares was also a dominant factor in the evolution of Greece. To humanists, the great moral principles involved, the freedom for self-development in democratic Athens, even the argument for "the de-humanizing effects of war" were the determining features of the Peloponnesian struggle.

All of these different outlooks have some, indeed a great deal of, validity. However, throughout the fabric of all such varying points of view is a single notable thread—seapower. Without sea-

League, no Athenian empire. Without seapower there would have been no economic revolution, no search for markets. And without seapower it is difficult to imagine the flourishing of culture, the arts, and self-expression that Athens engendered. Surely no landlocked, introspective society could have accomplished what Athens did in the short time she did it. Land travel in Greece, given its terrain features, was severely limited. There were no airplanes to waft visitors about. Only the sea permitted the contacts, the exchange of ideas, the sampling of new things that are so indispensable to the progress and development of a society.

To Thucydides, the influence of seapower on all of these factors was incontrovertible. Seapower brought wealth, which allowed one the luxury of time to devote to the arts. It brought political power with the establishment of an empire. Without seapower, no empire would have ever been established. And without an Athenian Empire, the "glory that was Greece" could never have been.

If Thucydides was correct in his evaluation of the influence of seapower and if, as he tells us, Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War was the greatest seapower ever known up to that time, one may ask, "How could Athens possibly lose the war?" Thucydides provides the answer, not in a single sentence or paragraph, but in that thread running throughout his account of the war: how the Athenians used their seapower. Like all historians, Thucydides views the age of Pericles as the Golden Age of Greece. But more than most historians, Thucydides unabashedly pays hero worship to Pericles, for it was Pericles who best understood the principles of naval warfare and the wise use of seapower.

Themistocles had been the first to enunciate the concept of Athenian seapower. As Thucydides tells us, "... [Themistocles] considered that if the Athenians became a seafaring people

they would have every advantage in adding to their power. Indeed it was he who first ventured to tell the Athenians that their future was on the sea."⁴ Pericles, a worthy successor to Themistocles, elaborated this basic idea and developed it to its logical conclusion: Athens should become an island. As Pericles put it, "Sea power is of enormous importance. Look at it this way. Suppose we were an island, would we not be absolutely secure from attack? As it is, we must think of ourselves as islanders . . ." ⁵ And so Athens did become an island, for all practical purposes, by the construction of its great walls. As the French naval historian Vice Adm. Jurien de la Graviere, writing in 1886, saw it:

Forty-eight kilometers of walls, thick enough for two wagons to pass abreast, and rising to a height of 56 feet, enclosed Athens, Phalerum, and Piraeus. It took 16,000 men to guard the walls. Thanks to these embattlements, Athens had become an island. She could be assaulted only from the sea, and the sea was Athenian.⁶

From this impregnable fortress, Pericles was convinced, he could outmaneuver and outlast anything the Peloponnesians could launch. He proposed to conserve his forces for a war of attrition during which the Athenian Fleet would guard the Empire and Athens' supplies and wear down the enemy by seaborne raids. Hence we see his initial naval campaign aimed at establishing a net of naval blockade around the enemies of Athens while keeping her own sealanes open and secure. That Pericles had complete confidence in Athens' ability to eventually defeat Sparta, if only the Athenians followed his advice on the use of seapower, is evident from his speech urging the rejection of the Spartan ultimatum:

I could give you many reasons why you should feel confident in ultimate victory, if only you will

make up your minds not to add to the empire while the war is in progress, and not to go out of your way to involve yourselves in new perils. What I fear is not the enemy's strategy, but our own mistakes.⁷

(How heartwarming to present-day advocates of management systems analysis to see Pericles' long-range planning for the optimal use of scarce resources!)

That Thucydides considered Pericles' strategy wise is equally clear. It safeguarded the city, the fleet, and the Empire—the sources of Athens' financial and naval strength. As Thucydides noted,

[Pericles] appears to have accurately estimated what the power of Athens was . . . and after his death his foresight with regard to the war became even more evident. For Pericles had said that Athens would be victorious if she bided her time and took care of her navy, if she avoided trying to add to the empire during the course of the war, and if she did nothing to risk the safety of the city itself. But his successors did the exact opposite.⁸

No consideration of Pericles' views on the value of seapower would be complete without one final quotation which, more than any other, gives us an insight into the almost religious fervor in which he held seapower. At the end of the second year of the war, things were going badly for the Athenians. Large segments of Attica had been laid waste by the Spartans, but far worse than this was the terrible plague that struck Athens itself. It was at this moment, the darkest day Athens under Pericles had known, that he addressed them. It was as though he had saved this, his most convincing argument, for just such a day—for a moment of despair when the people were grumbling about his leadership and questioning his wisdom. After listing various reasons

why the Athenians should not be overly disheartened, he adds:

But there is this point also which I shall mention. In thinking of the greatness of your empire there is one advantage you have which, I think, you have never yet taken into consideration, nor have I mentioned it in my previous speeches. Indeed, since it sounds almost like boasting, I should not be making use of this argument now if it were not for the fact that I see that you are suffering from an unreasonable feeling of discouragement. . . . The whole world before our eyes can be divided into two parts, the land and the sea, each of which is valuable and useful to man. Of the whole of one of these parts you are in control—not only of the area at present in your power, but elsewhere too, if you want to go further. With your navy as it is today, there is no power on earth—not the King of Persia nor any people under the sun—which can stop you from sailing where you wish.⁹

Such, then, was Pericles' view of the influence of seapower, and so, indeed, was Thucydides' own. But with the death of Pericles, Athenian seapower as he had conceived it began its decline. His successors were soon to forget his wise counsel. True, Athenian fortunes prospered for a while. Athens recovered from the devastating effects of the plague, and her power seemed to grow. The short-lived truce known as the peace of Nicias permitted further consolidation. But at the very height of this resurgence, contrary to the fundamentals of Periclean strategy, Athens embarked upon the folly of the Syracusan campaign. Clearly this was precisely the sort of action Pericles had warned the Athenians about when he cautioned them against seeking to add to the

Empire during the course of the war. The disaster of the campaign can hardly be overestimated. Thucydides himself called it "the greatest action we know of in Hellenic history," and the defeat "the most calamitous."¹⁰ It marked the death knell of Athenian democracy, the passing of the Golden Age.

As mentioned earlier, while the final debacle of the Sicilian campaign came on land, the defeat of the army was made possible only by the poor strategy and unimaginative tactics of the Athenian naval forces. How could the proud, experienced Athenian Navy have been so completely defeated by the fledgling naval forces of Syracuse? It will always remain one of the great ironies of history that the Athenians, eulogized for their inquiring, creative, and innovative thinking, were, in the end, defeated by the creative and innovative tactics of the Peloponnesians, whom historians have portrayed as dully conservative. One of the more startling examples of such innovative tactics was that devised by the Corinthian Admiral Polyarches, who, as William Rogers observes, deserves a much higher place in the history of naval tactics than has been granted him.¹¹ The Corinthians wished to disable the enemy's ships without making much demand on nautical skill, in which they were lacking. Polyarches' answer was to strengthen the "epotis," a sort of "cathead or other form of cheekpiece on the round of the bow, so placed as to crush in the bow of the enemy and sweep away his oars."¹² The tactic was first used in the otherwise unimportant battle in the Gulf of Corinth at Erineus. But it was later to become the core of Syracusan naval tactics. To de la Graviere, the importance of this development can hardly be overstated: "Take careful note of this event, for it marks the beginning of what is really a revolution in naval tactics; bow ramming, replacing the broadside ramming that had been common up to now. . . ." ¹³ It was to remain the main tactic of galley

warfare until the advent of the sailing ship.

With their new-found confidence in their own naval prowess and with the realization that the Athenians were not, after all, undefeatable at sea, the Peloponnesian allies were to apply the lessons learned in Sicily in future engagements, even to the final stratagem by Lysander that ended Athenian seapower at Aegospotami.

Unfortunately, Thucydides' history stops short of the bitter end. One could wish to have a final word from the son of Olorus on the influence of seapower

upon the final outcome of the Peloponnesian War. But he knew the eventual outcome when he began his history, so it would not be illogical to look back to his earlier words and, developing his thought to its ultimate conclusion, say that just as seapower was the foundation of the Athenian Empire, so it was seapower—the Athenian misuse of it and the Peloponnesian development thereof—that led to its eventual downfall. Or, as Mario Levi concludes, "So the Athenian revolution perished at sea, surviving the Egyptian disaster only to succumb at Syracuse."¹⁴

FOOTNOTES

1. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. by R. Warner (Baltimore: Penguin, 1954), p. 21.
2. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957), p. 1.
3. See T. Walter Wallbank and Alastair M. Taylor, *Civilization Past and Present* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1954), p. 135-6.
4. Thucydides, p. 65.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
6. Jurien de la Graviere, *La Marine des Anciens* ("The Navy in Ancient Times") (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1886), p. 104. (The translation is my own.—ET)
7. Thucydides, p. 95.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 488.
11. William Ledyard Rogers, *Greek and Roman Naval Warfare* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1937), p. 162.
12. *Ibid.*
13. De la Graviere, p. 253.
14. Mario Attilio Levi, *Political Power in the Ancient World*, trans. by J. Costello (New York: The New American Library, 1965), p. 104.

UNION VICTORY: MANPOWER, MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES,
OR GENERALSHIP?

by

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When it was finally recognized that the Civil War would not be of short duration, the complexion of the war effort took on a different hue. From the earliest months of the war, the North demonstrated its ability to rapidly mobilize its manpower. To put these forces to work on the military problems confronting the North, however, also required marshaling of large economic and fiscal resources, resources which were not in a position to guarantee victory early in the war. When these assets were finally brought to bear on the frontlines, Lincoln subsequently found the proper combination of military leadership in the field and in Washington to push the whole war effort toward a decision.

It is proper, therefore, to attribute the Union's victory ultimately to the combined, effective use of manpower, resources, and generalship. The relative importance of each factor, however, changed during the course of the conflict. The following discussion is intended to illustrate the contribution which each of these factors made to the ultimate victory of the Union.

Manpower. The population of the South at the outbreak of the war was about 9 million, including over 3 million slaves, less than half the population in the North. The regular standing U.S. Army before the war totaled 16,000 officers and men, a level considered adequate at the time for the Nation's defense. In the first 9 months of the war, Washington clumsily, and at a high cost, raised and placed in the field a half a million men and concurrently built an

establishment to sustain them. The reins of control over this army were slowly developed by the War Department in a fledgling attempt to prosecute the war in an efficient manner.

In spite of the corruption and weakness of Simon Cameron's stewardship as Secretary of War, the Federal Government was able to make some significant strides in organizing the manpower and logistics needed for a long war:

- strong control in Washington over the militia and volunteer components of the manpower reserves
- more experienced military personnel for the Washington headquarters
- revised recruiting policy
- increased materiel availability
- centralized War Department purchasing¹

After Cameron's fortunate reassignment to an ambassadorship in January 1862, more effective control and management of the War Department was introduced by the new Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton. His task was to bring order out of confusion and profiteering tolerated by Cameron. Additional Assistant Secretaries of War were authorized along with the necessary staffs to handle the increasingly complex business of running a large army in wartime. To a great extent the arrival of Stanton on the scene marked a turn of the tide in the Union Government's prosecution of the war. In the spring of 1861, the situation for the Union was maintained by the actions of the war governors and volunteer agencies in raising and fielding large military forces; by the end of 1861, the situation was further maintained by the central ef-

iciency of the War Department military leaders like Quartermaster General Meigs.²

During the course of the war, the strength of the Union Army reached 2,700,000 compared with an estimated Confederate strength of between 600,000 and 700,000. By the end of the war, Union manpower reserves had not been exhausted, with about 2,000,000 men still available for service.³ Union military policy had failed to make effective use of the expanding army throughout 1861, probably because of the loss to the South of the best of the professional active duty officers of the prewar army. The job of commanding the North's wartime forces therefore fell to a small number of experienced but retired officers recalled to service, like McClellan, Grant, and Sherman.

The ongoing task of recruiting manpower for the Union Army depended for 2 years on the state volunteer and militia system. The South adopted conscription in April 1862, the North not until 1863. About 50 percent of the South's manpower was raised by this method, 45 percent in the North. Total enrollments on both sides approached 4,000,000 during the course of the war—a figure unprecedented in the history of warfare.⁴

The fighting quality of both Northern and Southern soldiers was equal. While the South had the better leadership for the first 2 years, everything else was in favor of an ultimate victory by the North. Washington's failure to recognize the importance of revolutionary inventions in the conduct of war served only to prolong the conflict. Nonetheless, at war's end, the manpower raised by the North had created an on-the-line force 3 to 4 times greater than the dwindling forces put in the field by the South.⁵ To this extent, the sheer size of the manpower of the North, actual and potential, probably saved the North from a decisive defeat in the chaotic months of 1861 and

gained the vital time necessary to transform the North's sizable economic and industrial resources into war materiel.

Management of Resources. The superiority in potential material strength of the North over the South at the beginning of the war did not automatically doom the South. The final decision was sealed by the North's ability to translate potential might into strength mobilized on the battlefield.⁶ The Union's success in war depended significantly upon the organization and application of its men, materiel, and money.⁷

The development of manpower has been outlined above. The management of the materiel and money resources of the North, from 1862 to the war's conclusion, provided the essential leverage which subsequently enabled Lincoln and his senior military leaders to succeed militarily.

For the first time in modern history, armies of immense size were fielded by both sides. The logistics problems attendant to this effort in the North were staggering. The Army of the Potomac in 1862, for example, contained about 100,000 men requiring 600 tons or 150 wagonloads of supplies each day. It was estimated that armies of 10,000 to 15,000 could forage for themselves in the South almost indefinitely. Armies of 20,000 to 30,000 were restricted largely to rich areas of the countryside. An army in excess of 50,000 men, however, depended on supplies brought up by railroads except for brief periods. For the size of armies raised in 1861, living off the land in the South was difficult and in some areas almost impossible in the presence of a vigorous enemy. Such field forces required very large wagon trains to attain even a limited mobility, but these logistics did not permit pursuit of a defeated force.⁸

The task of supplying such forces was handled by Quartermaster General Meigs. As one of the few senior officers

who held tenure throughout the war in the same position, Meigs ran the operation smoothly and ensured that after the summer of 1861 no major operation would fail for lack of food, forage, or transportation. The Union soldier, on balance, was better provided for than any soldier before in history. The success of quartermaster services in the North can be rightfully contrasted to the failure of its Confederate counterparts.⁹

The Quartermaster General's office accounted for over \$600,000,000 in transactions during the war of which \$240,000,000 was for transportation.¹⁰ From less than \$1,000,000 spent in the first quarter of 1861, the Quartermaster General accounts rose to \$8,000,000 by June 1861, quintupled a year later, peaked at \$285,000,000 in 1864, and leveled off at \$226,000,000 in 1865.¹¹

Virtually every kind of small firearm in existence was used, but breech-loading rifles were commonly regarded as untested and imperfect in 1861. Recognizing the decided advantages such a weapon would give the soldier, Lincoln unsuccessfully kept pushing his Chief of Ordnance to adopt the weapon in 1861 and 1862.¹² The conversion of old arms and the manufacture of the new breech-loaders finally was decided in 1864 when it could just as easily have been done in 1861. Under Brigadier General Dyer in 1864, the Ordnance Office of the War Department brought its arsenal production to the high state of efficiency necessary for war.¹³

The industry for war production did not exist in the South to the extent that it did in the North. The Southern industrial economy was centered on only one major enterprise, the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond.¹⁴ Clearly, one of the Confederacy's greatest handicaps was its lack of mechanical industries to supply the war effort. Of all the industries which contributed to the war effort on both sides, the iron mills rank highest.¹⁵

The scandals, profiteering, and corruption associated with expenditures of large amounts of money in the War Department offices were a severe blow to national prestige. Army fiscal integrity and administration, however, was more quickly and more completely recovered than in other branches of military affairs.¹⁶ Important and far-reaching reforms and innovations in wartime fiscal and monetary policy for the Federal Government were introduced in 1862 by Secretary of the Treasury Chase. Chase managed to finance the war without an excessive debt or exorbitant interest compared with subsequent experiences in World Wars I and II. The threat of inflation was more effectively curbed than it was in World War I, without rationing, price controls, or central banking. An experiment in public finance was also tried with the imposition of the first income tax.¹⁷

The evolution of fiscal and monetary policy for the war was complex. Once Chase and the Congress agreed to use paper money in the Legal Tender Acts of 1862 and 1863, virtually every resource of the Nation was mobilized to achieve eventual victory.¹⁸

In comparison with Washington's growing experience and efficiency in administering a national war effort, the Confederacy's record stands in stark contrast. By the end of the war, Southern wealth had shrunk to almost half of its 1860 value. During 4 years of conflict the South gradually lost agricultural capital, acreage under cultivation, and agricultural production. Land values depreciated, industry was stifled, and commerce demoralized. High rates of interest accompanied totally inadequate banking and currency facilities.¹⁹

As we have seen, the North out-ranked the South early in the war in actual and potential manpower, and the North's material resources were considerably greater. By 1864 Northern Armies held positions deep in the heart

of the Confederacy. The final push to victory came on the crest of this combined war effort with the ultimate settlement of the war's longest and most vexatious problem for Lincoln—the effective command and control of the army.

Generalship. A modern command system finally emerged for the Union in 1864. In 1861 there was in effect no army, few good weapons, no officers trained in the higher art of war, and an inadequate and archaic system of command. The policy of the North was to restore the Union by force; its strategy was offensive—the destruction of the Confederate Armies.²⁰

Until 1864 there was generally great confusion in control of the army and in its relationship to civil authority. With the appointment of Grant as General in Chief in March 1864 and Halleck as Army Chief of Staff, a new arrangement was found which worked and was superior to anything in Europe until Moltke formed the General Staff in 1866.

Grant had the advantage of learning from the mistakes of his predecessors. He had a good appreciation of the existing political-military relationship and seldom overstepped proper limits. Only McClellan and Grant had the real opportunity as General in Chief to

evolve operations in grand strategy. Both generals excelled in their grasp of the importance of naval power and joint land-sea operations.²¹ Four of the seven commanders of the Army of the Potomac proved to be incompetent—McDowell, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker. On balance, McClellan, Meade, and Grant were professionals, and while none were perfect, all were earnest and patriotic. Not until December 1864, however, were the last of Lincoln's "political" generals removed.

Grant had the facility to make decisions and execute them, and in this he towered over McClellan. With Halleck as Chief of Staff, the Union found a brilliant but unloved administrator. Checks and balances emerged between Grant and Halleck. The success of the system was best indicated by Lincoln's voluntarily reducing himself to exercising only an occasional veto on purely military matters.²²

Unselfishness by Halleck, initiative by Grant, and a sense of responsibility to a common cause by all those who served under them were instrumental in knitting together a successful military team. The role of personality in such a relationship and the understanding of human nature was finally recognized to be as important for victory as technical knowledge and military accomplishments.²³

FOOTNOTES

1. Alexander H. Meneely, *The War Department, 1861* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 322.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 374-377.

3. James G. Randall and David Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1969), p. 529-530. These figures are significant when compared with casualties on both sides: for the South, 258,000 dead and an uncertain number wounded; for the North, 360,222 dead and 275,175 wounded. Total casualties exceeded a half million: 12.4 percent of those engaged, 1.3 percent of the total population.

4. John F.C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1961), p. 103.

5. Allen Nevins, *The War for the Union, Vol. IV, The Organized War to Victory, 1864-1865* (New York: Scribner, 1971), p. 254. In 1865 the strengths of the armies were:

Union—960,000 (600,000 on duty)

South—358,000 (160,000 on duty)

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6. R.F. Weigley, *Quartermaster General of the Union Army. A Biography of M.C. Meigs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956, 1959), p. 5.

7. Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1912), v. XI.

8. John G. Moore, "Mobility and Strategy in the Civil War," *Military Affairs*, v. XXIV, pt. II, p. 73-77.

9. Weigley, p. 4-5.

10. Fred A. Shannon, *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865* (Cleveland: Clark, 1928), v. 1, p. 70. Army contractors handled about \$1 billion during the war with considerable profiteering in the early years. The Commissary General of Subsistence spent \$369,000,000 and the Ordnance Bureau \$163,000,000.

11. Weigley, p. 316-317.

12. Randall, p. 327-328.

13. Shannon, p. 142 and fn. 302.

14. Charles B. Dew, *Ironmaker to the Confederacy, Joseph R. Anderson and the Tredegar Iron Works* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 320. In the fall of 1861, the Tredegar Company was rolling the armor plate for the *Merrimack*, producing naval guns, coast defense cannon, gun carriages, artillery projectiles, and light field artillery, p. 1.

15. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

16. Shannon, p. 71.

17. Randall, p. 353-354.

18. Robert P. Sharkey, *Money, Class and Party. An Economic Study of the Civil War and Reconstruction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, 1967), p. 16. The author gives two reasons for successful money raising by the Treasury:

a. the issuance of greenbacks created the purchasing power and the inflationary condition necessary to sell bonds at par.

b. private banking interests created the marketing organization which appealed to prospective purchasers, small town bankers, and businessmen, rather than metropolitan capitalists on the grounds of patriotism rather than profit. (p. 298)

19. Randall, p. 517.

20. T.H. Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals* (New York: Knopf, 1952), p. 3, 7.

21. Warren W. Hassler, Jr., *Commanders of the Army of the Potomac* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), p. 262-263.

22. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), p. 195.

23. E.W. Sheppard, "Policy and Command in the American Civil War, 1864-1865," *Army Quarterly*, January 1939, p. 294.

THE ROYAL NAVY'S DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH AT SEA IN THE YEARS 1793-1815

by

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The British Navy defeated the French at sea in the years 1793 to 1815 because the British Navy had more ships, the crews were better trained, and officers were experienced, aggressive, and willing to engage the enemy. This will be developed further by a brief examination of factors such as strategy, tactics, and personnel.

Strategy. The French merchant fleet had carried approximately one-third of French commerce, but after war was declared on England the fleet remained in port. French colonies in the West Indies were of little commercial value because of local uprisings and anarchy during the preceding 4 years. Imports and exports, though not as vital to France as they were to England, were carried in neutral ships. Thus France, without important colonies and with no merchant fleet of her own to protect, adopted a strategy similar to what Corbett described as a "fleet in being," although it is debatable whether their ships remained "in active and vigorous life."¹ By avoiding contact with the British even when her fleet had a numerical advantage, the French Navy would serve as a continuing threat to the British.

It was taken for granted that French ships would remain in good condition in port while the British ships wore out at sea. French raiders were very active and threatened British commerce to the extent that the British Navy was forced to keep a large number of cruisers in and near the approaches to the English Channel.

hand, emphasized engaging the French at every opportunity, but for this strategy to succeed it was necessary to force the French to leave port. Attempts were made to blockade French ports, at times denying all access even to neutral shipping. The blockade was also imposed to limit French expansion by sea and to destroy forces which were intended for the invasion of England.

Tactics. The British were superior to the French in both seamanship and gunnery. Their tactics were based on an effective gun range of about 500 yards, the limited degree of train and elevation of guns, and slow speed and lack of ship maneuverability. Seamanship and gunnery were highly coordinated. In Mahan's words "the ship and its guns together formed one weapon, a moving battery which needed quick and delicate handling and accurate direction in all its parts."² The object was to maneuver the ship to bring all guns to bear and cause sufficient damage to force surrender or render defense useless and take the opponent by boarding. Explosive shot was not yet in use, and wooden ships normally could not be sunk by solid shot unless a secondary explosion could be triggered.

In single ship encounters, opponents of equal size and maneuverability generally fought beam to beam at close range where the outcome was decided by the accuracy and rate of gunfire. In this way the British frigate *Nymphé* captured the French *Cleopatre* in 1793. Captain Pellew wrote "we dished her up in fifty minutes, boarded and struck her colors."³ When a ship had an advantage

in maneuverability, as did the frigate *Crescent* over the *Reunion*, an effective tactic was to maneuver under the adversary's stern, rake the length of the ship with broadsides, and damage the stern and rudder.

Even though ship for ship the British were superior to the French, the outcome of the war was not decided by single ship engagements. Sea battles between fleets offered a much larger margin of victory to the commander who could maneuver his ships to concentrate gunfire on a portion of the opposing fleet. Marcus, in *The Age of Nelson*, shows clearly that the French lost because the British outmaneuvered them.

To initiate an attack from windward was an advantage in terms of maneuverability. The commander on the windward side was in the better position to select both the point and time of engagement because range could be closed more expeditiously to leeward. This position was also preferred because the closing maneuver required little handling of sails and freed deckhands for gunnery duties. Ships in battle carried as little sail as the tactical situation permitted.

The disadvantage of the attack from windward in a stiff breeze was that the leeward gunports could not be opened because they shipped water. This precluded use of the heaviest guns which were mounted on the lowest deck.

While the French were reluctant to fight and were usually under orders to avoid battle if they could, the British were aggressive and, weather permitting, preferred to attack from windward. They attempted to cut the French line of battle, to subject their opponents to raking fire, and continue the battle from leeward. The leeward side not only insured that all guns could be fired but also put the British in a better position to board ships that drifted down on them when they themselves might be dismantled and unable to maneuver. The

position was preferred by the British because of a fundamental difference in British and French gunnery tactics. The British directed gunfire at French hulls where it dismantled guns and otherwise impaired the capability of French ships to return fire or defend themselves. The French gunners, on the other hand, were not only less accurate but also directed their fire at the superstructure in an attempt to dismast the British and limit their maneuverability. As a result the British had less damage and fewer casualties and were frequently able to board French ships after an engagement.

Ships and Armament. The capability of British and French ships, including guns, were about equal from the standpoint of design. The British may have had a small advantage in gunnery due to the introduction of the short-range caronade in 1779. Both countries had problems in maintaining the material condition of ships. The French Navy suffered from a shortage of naval stores because of the blockade. The British Navy, however, was subjected to heavy weather, wear, and a lack of upkeep because the ships were kept at sea. Nevertheless, the differences in ships, guns, and material condition, whatever they might have been, did not influence significantly the outcome of the war.

In February 1793 England had 400 ships, of which 115 were of the line. Eighty five to 90 of the latter were in good condition, but only 20 or so were in commission. By comparison, France had 246, of which 76 were of the line and 27 were in commission.⁴ Thus France started the war with a Navy apparently one-half the size of England's, but by the end of the war England's fleet had grown to include 1,168 ships, of which 240 were of the line, while France had only 103 ships of the line and 157 frigates.

Officers. Conditions in France and England in regard to officers at the

outbreak of the war strongly favored the British. In England large numbers of capable officers who had fought in the American Revolution were ashore on half pay and eager to go to sea. By contrast, the French Navy lost most of its officer corps to emigration because of various actions taken by the revolutionary government. An ordinance in 1791 removed the distinction between the merchant marine and the navy. Jeanbon Saint-Andre, who had a fanatical hatred of the formerly aristocratic profession, was given the task in September 1793 of organizing a Republican navy. To fill the void left by the abolition of the aristocratic officer corps, the Minister of Marine was permitted in 1793 to fill flag and other officer positions without regard to existing laws and from any grade whatever. Patriotism was emphasized to the exclusion of training and experience.

In addition to harm which resulted from direct legislation of the revolutionary government, the government's failure to enforce discipline all but destroyed the French Navy. Nelson wrote to his wife from Leghorn in September 1793 that the crew of a French frigate "deposed their captain, made lieutenant of marines captain of the ship, the sergeant of marines lieutenant of marines and the former captain sergeant of marines."⁵ Under conditions such as these, the few capable officers who were still in France refused to go to sea with inept patriots. Discipline declined even further due to the inability of inexperienced officers to maintain law and order. As matters became worse, town authorities were allowed to intervene on the behalf of discontented sailors. Mutinies were condoned, and officers were often beaten by unruly mobs, imprisoned or replaced by one of the mutineers.

When the Montagnards came into power, insubordination was outlawed by decree. Nevertheless, most of the

deplorable conditions in the navy fell on the admirals and captains. Many were relieved from command and some were executed.⁶

After changes in the policy and practices of the government regarding promotion and appointment of officers had taken their toll, the experience of French officers who participated in the first great sea battle of the war on 1 June 1794 is best shown by a comparison of the grades in which they had served 3 years earlier. The commander-in-chief, Admiral Joyeuse, had been a lieutenant; two other flag officers, one a lieutenant and the other a sublieutenant; of 25 captains, three had been lieutenants, 11 sublieutenants, nine captains and mates in merchant ships, one a seaman and another a boatswain.⁷

Numerous other examples could be cited to show the disparity in the experience of British and French officers early in the war, but it is even more significant that the gap widened as the war continued. The British officers sharpened their skills at sea while the French languished in port.

Seamen. The 1791 ordinance which abolished the aristocratic officer corps in the French Navy also disbanded the marine artillerists because they, like the officers, were viewed as an elite group. The revolutionary government was determined to eliminate class distinction and did not heed the warnings of French admirals that such action would put the navy at a serious disadvantage. Almost every engagement during the war proved the admirals' fears were well founded.

The French found it difficult to maintain the strength of the navy even though a large number of seamen must have been available from a merchant fleet which did not go to sea after war was declared on England. Inexperienced hands never received training because the French were reluctant to go to sea

vented from doing so because of the British blockade.

Contrasting to these debilitating measures taken by the French Government, the British sought to revitalize their declining fleet. In December 1792, only 6 weeks before the war, Parliament authorized an increase in naval strength from 16 to 24,000 men. Conditions in the navy at this time were bad. Peace since the American Revolution caused the military establishment to slacken, and because of waste and inefficiency the money available would support only a small navy.

The large merchant fleet was a source of experienced seamen and permitted the navy to expand rapidly. While merchant seamen forced into the navy objected strenuously because of the strict discipline and low pay, the navy nevertheless increased from 24,000 in 1793 to 120,000 in 1797, and to 140,000 by 1814. An approximate breakdown by category was: volunteers 15 percent, pressed men 50 percent, quota men (draftees) 12 percent, foreigners 15 percent, and boys 8 percent.⁸ Some of the foreigners were later freed, but most were unable to obtain release.

Crews gathered from such sources led to what Admiral Collingwood called a "mass of mischief" capable of any crime and hence strict discipline was needed.⁹ In many ships punishment was harsh and tyrannical. Cruises were long and shipboard life was unpleasant, hazardous, and unhealthy, and pay had not been increased since the mid-1600's. During the war over 100,000 seamen were lost: 84,000 to disease, 12,000 to

shipwreck, and 6,000 in battle. Desertions during the war amounted to 113,000. The latter problem was so serious that when even in their home-ports, men were not normally allowed to visit their families. The mutinies of 1797 involved legitimate grievances. In spite of the deplorable conditions, however, the British Navy remained strong and effective in battle, a tribute to the leadership of her officers.

There were, in fact, a large and growing number of officers among both strong and lax disciplinarians who looked upon the health and well-being of their crews as a matter requiring their primary attention. Some rather remarkable results were obtained at a time when methods of sanitation, medicine, and food preservation were very elementary. Nelson, while on a cruise which lasted 2 years, during which time he did not leave his ship even to visit another, spoke with pride about the health of his crews. After he chased Villeneuve's fleet to the West Indies, he wrote "we have lost neither officer nor man to sickness since we left the Mediterranean," a period of 10 weeks.¹⁰ The men in his ships numbered about 7,000. The French and Spanish were less fortunate during this cruise. Even though they had left port only a few weeks before, they lost at least a thousand men during their brief stay in the West Indies.

Summary. The extent of the defeat of the French in major battles is evident from the data below.¹¹

French ship losses during the war were 377. Of these 238 were frigates of

| Battle | British | | | French | | | |
|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| | Killed | Wounded | Total | Killed | Wounded | Captured | Total |
| 1 June 1794 | 287 | 811 | 1,098 | 1,500 | 2,000 | 3,500 | 7,000 |
| Cape St. Vincent | 73 | 227 | 300 | 430 | 570 | 3,157 | 4,157 |
| Camperdown 1797 | 203 | 622 | 825 | 540 | 620 | 3,775 | 4,935 |
| The Nile 1798 | 218 | 677 | 895 | 1,400 | 600 | 3,225 | 5,225 |
| Copenhagen 1801 | 253 | 688 | 941 | 790 | 910 | 2,000 | 3,700 |
| Trafalgar 1805 | 449 | 1,241 | 1,690 | 4,408 | 2,545 | 7,000 | 13,953 |
| TOTALS | 1,483 | 4,266 | 5,749 | 9,068 | 7,245 | 22,657 | 38,970 |

50 guns or less, and 139 were of the line as follows:

| No. of Ships Lost | Decks | Guns |
|-------------------|-------|-------------|
| 9 | 3 | 100 or more |
| 19 | 2 | 80 |
| 87 | 2 | 74 |
| 24 | 2 | 64 |

245 of the 377 ships lost by the French were eventually put into service by the British.

The British battle losses amounted to 10 ships: one 74 guns, one 50 guns, and eight frigates. To these must be added 84 which were wrecked, seven foundered, and 10 which burned or blew up, 101 in all.

In the absence of any technological superiority of the British ships and guns and given that material conditions were poor in both navies, ships of the same size had potentially the same capabilities. The British maintained a superiority in numbers of ships throughout

the war, but inasmuch as their navy operated over a large area, they could not gain the advantages of concentrating their forces into large fleets without leaving some quarter without protection.

The success of the British Navy can be attributed to the naval strategy employed, the leadership of her officers, aggressiveness in battle, and the training of the crews in her ships. The French were reluctant to fight and their attitude was not without reason, in view of the lack of underway time and training. Additionally, the French Government, with concentration on the land war, neglected seapower and failed to appreciate its importance until it was needed. Napoleon, whose actions contributed to the defeat of the French Navy, was sarcastically critical of its performance against the British and summed up the matter with "the moral is to the material as three to one."¹²

FOOTNOTES

1. Sir Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London: Longmans, Green, 1918), p. 191.
2. Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1892), v. I, p. 39.
3. Geoffrey J. Marcus, *The Age of Nelson* (New York: Viking), p. 26.
4. Norman Gibbs and Christopher Lloyd, "Armed Forces and the Art of War," *The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IX, War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval, 1793-1830* (Cambridge, Eng.: University Press, 1957), p. 79.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
6. Mahan, p. 63.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
8. Gibbs and Lloyd, p. 85.
9. Mahan, p. 71.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Michael A. Lewis, *A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815* (London: Allan and Unwin, 1960), p. 346-362.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 389.



While amnesty advocates can cite numerous instances in history in which amnesty has been granted, in each instance it was more than likely a highly volatile political issue. The current problem is no different, and strong feelings will continue to persist even in the aftermath of the Vietnam war and the post-draft environment. Forgiveness is inherent in the American character, and it seems reasonable to expect that some sort of Presidential or legislative action will be taken. Whether the final result will favor limited amnesty, with violators paying a price, or complete absolution may depend on how soon the issue is settled.

AMNESTY: AN OLD GIFT IN NEW WRAPPINGS

A research paper prepared

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Historical Background. Late in the fifth century B.C., the Athenian defeat in the Battle of Aegospotami led to the final siege of Athens and her ultimate surrender to Sparta. Contrary to the wishes of several of her allies, Sparta decided to grant a reasonable peace, mainly on the basis that Athens had contributed considerably to the Greek general welfare during the Persian invasions which had preceded the Peloponnesian War.¹ The Athenians were thus permitted to maintain a form of self-government, though it was changed from the previous democratic format to one oligarchic in nature. The ruling oligarchy then purged those supporting a return to democratic rule, either by extermination or exile, and confiscated their property. One of those exiled, a former Athenian general, Thrasybulus, was able to lead a movement successful

in overthrowing the oligarchy. Thrasybulus then proclaimed: "... a complete amnesty for all that had happened during the suspension of democratic government, except in the case of the Thirty, . . . who were, however, to enjoy it too provided they gave an accounting for their acts before courts empanelled from property owners . . ."²

Not all amnesties are explicit. Following the Franco-Prussian War, extended negotiations over a treaty were further prolonged by French insistence of incorporation of an amnesty clause favoring French citizens who might otherwise have been subject to conviction for commission of offenses against the Germans during the German occupation.³ Bismarck, impatient at the delay this portended, insisted that any question of amnesty must remain "... a matter for imperial clemency volun-

tarily extended."⁴ Bismarck won his point, and the French agreed to come to terms without a specific amnesty provision, relying on a collateral "... request for the favor of the emperor."⁵

The amnesty granted by Thrasybulus in favor of the Thirty Tyrants was general in that it encompassed an entire class of offenders. The amnesty was also conditional in that it could be enjoyed only after the Thirty had fulfilled the conditions laid down by Sparta. Even though it may not be set out in a written contract, some form of amnesty or pardon is inherent in any peace agreement. Bismarck's refusal to incorporate a specific amnesty provision in the Treaty of Frankfort, instead implied the existence of a case-by-case approach to the pardon question, dependent upon "imperial clemency."

The subject of amnesty, or pardon, began to develop early in our domestic history. The Constitution of the United States provides: "The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment."⁶

Our first President had occasion to exercise the power. In 1790 the economy of several western Pennsylvania counties was based mainly on the production and sale of alcoholic spirits. Our young Government, in escaping from the evils of one form of taxation, had nevertheless remembered the benefits to be derived therefrom, and legislation designed to provide Federal excise revenues, at the expense of the Pennsylvania brewers, was soon forthcoming. This legislation produced a rash of violent reaction, directed mainly at the Federal excise tax collectors.⁷ President Washington sent a group of commissioners into the area to resolve the problem and, on the basis of their recommendations, proclaimed:

... I, George Washington, . . . do grant a full, free, and entire par-

committed during the rebellion|
 . . . excluding therefrom,
 . . . every person who refused . . .
 to give . . . the said assurances
 . . . and now standeth indicted or
 convicted of any treason, mis-
 prision of treason, or other of-
 fense against the said United
 States, . . ."⁸

This proclamation, issued on 10 July 1795, was the first general pardon in U.S. history. There followed, between Washington's initial proclamation and the Civil War, five more pardons, ranging from the Pennsylvania insurrectionists to Caribbean pirates.

Our modern understanding of the ability of the executive and legislative branches of government to grant amnesty or pardon stems, to a large degree, from the considerable activity in this area which evolved from the Civil War. Twenty different instances of amnesty or pardon were recorded as a result of the Civil War, the first occurring in 1862 and the last not until 1898.

In 1862, Lincoln believed, evidently prematurely, that the insurrection was declining. In order to assuage mounting political pressure in the North, the President thought it would be prudent for the Government to somehow manifest this belief that the war was winding down. Accordingly, he directed:

... the release of all political prisoners and other persons held in military custody "on their subscribing to a parole engaging themselves to render no aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States" . . . such person [keeping] their parole should be granted "an amnesty for any past offenses of treason or disloyalty which they may have committed."⁹

The conditional pardon of 1862 was just the beginning. There was a certain political flavor to be found in Lincoln's first act of clemency, and the pattern

It was undoubtedly Lincoln's intention all along to proclaim an amnesty when conditions made it appear that it would have the desired effect. Most assuredly the second year of the war was not the time for such action; . . . a more effective blow [than the victory at Antietam] was required to give unmistakable evidence that the confederacy was doomed to destruction.¹⁰

Accordingly, prior to delivering a proclamation of general pardon to Congress, in his address of 8 December 1863, Lincoln first called attention to affirmative developments which tended to reflect Union success in the prosecution of the war. The proclamation itself extended a full pardon to all persons who had participated in the rebellion, whether by direct involvement or implication. However, several classes of individuals were excepted from its application: officers of the Confederate government; persons who left "judicial stations" to aid the Confederacy; Confederate military officers above the rank of colonel in the army or lieutenant in the Navy; those who left Congress to aid the South; those who resigned U.S. military commissions to aid the South; and those who treated blacks or their supervisors as other than prisoners of war.¹¹

The responsibility of dealing with questions of amnesty and pardon after the war fell to Lincoln's successor, Andrew Johnson. The radical Republicans in Congress had been dismayed with Lincoln's approach to clemency, which they viewed as far too liberal. Thus, they were delighted when President Johnson appeared to adopt a more rigid approach to the problem, particularly as concerned the need for retribution. In a proclamation of amnesty and pardon issued on 29 May 1865, 14 classes of persons were excepted from its application. Included in these exceptions were "all persons absent from the

United States for the purpose of aiding the rebellion."¹²

Radical Republican Congressmen became alarmed, however, as President Johnson's instincts toward retribution lessened and pardoning policies began to become more lenient. In an attempt to discredit the claim that the executive branch possessed full pardoning powers, the radicals alleged that the President was restricted to granting reprieves or pardons which had been cleared by prior legislative fiat. The motive behind this was to prevent the rehabilitation of Southern Congressmen who, the radicals feared, would join with Northern Democrats to gain control of Congress.¹³

The House of Representatives, in December of 1866, acted in an attempt to curb President Johnson's pardoning powers. The House referred to the Senate a bill designed to repeal section 13 of the Confiscation Act of 1862. This specific provision had commented on the power of the President to effect pardons by proclamation. The rationale was that the clemency clause of the Confiscation Act was the sole basis for the President's power to proclaim general pardons. Thus, if it were repealed he would be limited to considering pardons or remissions strictly on an individual, case-by-case basis. The bill to repeal section 13 of the Confiscation Act was passed, over Presidential veto, becoming law on 7 January 1867.

Still concerned over the power that "rehabilitated" Southern Congressmen might wield and not convinced of the success of their attempt to thwart the President's pardoning activities, Johnson's enemies sought to safeguard their continued domination of the Government by passing the 14th amendment to the Constitution. Section 3 of the 14th amendment provided, in part:

No Person shall . . . hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, . . . who, having previously taken an oath . . . to support the Constitution of the 52

United States . . . shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same . . . But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.¹⁴

The President and radicals remained at direct odds, and there was considerable confusion as to the validity of clemency activities on the part of either. Congress had repealed the President's "legislative" pardoning power contained in the Confiscation Act. The legislative branch then passed its own Reconstruction Act which had the effect of annulling previous pardoning gestures contained in executive reconstruction attempts. Even though Johnson finally proclaimed a general amnesty,¹⁵ the net practical result was that effective amnesty from Civil War involvements remained a matter for determination by two-thirds of both houses of Congress.¹⁶ This very unworkable situation became more and more apparent and more and more unpalatable as years passed and the worst memories of the conflict dimmed. The disability provision of section 3 of the 14th amendment was finally repealed, on 6 June 1898, under President McKinley.¹⁷

Amnesty and the Courts. Neither the executive nor the legislative branches of our Government ultimately determine the legality of their own acts. Although the pardoning prerogative has not been the weightiest issue of constitutional import to face the Supreme Court, it has received both early and continuing consideration.

The first case to be heard by the Court involving the pardoning power was decided in 1833. The Court held that a pardon must be delivered and that the person for whose benefit it is intended may refuse clemency and cannot be forced to accept it. They defined the term:

. . . A pardon is an act of grace,

trusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private . . . act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, . . .¹⁸

A similar decision was reached in 1915 when President Wilson extended a full pardon to a newspaper editor who had refused to reveal to a grand jury the sources of fraud disclosures reported in the editor's publication. The Government argued that since the editor had been granted a full pardon, he could not be prosecuted and thus could be forced to testify in spite of his privilege against self-incrimination. The Court affirmed that a pardon could, in fact, be refused, so that the defendant was able to retain his right to refuse to offer testimony against himself.¹⁹ The Court has made a contrary determination in a case involving partial commutation of a sentence.²⁰ The probable result of the diverging opinions is that in cases of pardon the Executive will probably accomplish the desired purpose, as long as "the substituted penalty is authorized by law and does not in common understanding exceed the original penalty."²¹

The long dispute over Civil War pardoning policies between the executive and legislative branches of Government received considerable judicial attention and resulted in the establishment of the great bulk of Supreme Court rulings on the pardoning prerogative.

A major decision going directly to the scope of the Executive pardoning power was rendered in 1867. A former Confederate sympathizer, Garland, was unable to take an oath which had been prescribed by Congress in 1865 as a prerequisite to the practice of law in a Federal Court. Garland had been granted a full pardon the same year by President Johnson, and the Court said

that this entitled Garland to practice law, notwithstanding his inability to take the prescribed oath. The Court declared the President's power to pardon: "is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders."²²

A further indication of Congress' inability to limit the Executive prerogative was given in 1872, at which time an attempt had been made to legislatively modify Court of Claims procedures which had been established pursuant to an Executive pardon. "Now it is clear that the legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can change the law."²³ An important distinction exists, however, between congressional action which interferes with the Executive pardoning prerogative and that which acts independently to effect amnesty. The Court has upheld the legislative right to remit penalties, stating that such an independent act did not infringe improperly on the Executive power.²⁴

There is a limit to the scope or effect of the Presidential power. The Court, faced with the question of whether the pardon and amnesty granted by President Johnson on 25 December 1868 would entitle a claimant to recoup the proceeds from the sale of his confiscated property, stated:

A pardon . . . releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the offense, and restores to him all his civil rights. . . . But it does not make amends for the past. . . . it does not give compensation for what has been done or suffered, nor does it impose upon the Government any obligation to give it.²⁵

This decision was based on the premise that monies paid into the Treasury had become vested in the United States. The Court distinguished the situation where

Government, stating that they were capable of return to a claimant following his pardon.²⁶ Finally, the Court rejected the proposition that a pardon must be absolute and could not be conditional.²⁷

Amnesty in the World Wars. Four significant instances of pardon have been recorded following World War I, and one void is apparent. In 1917 President Wilson granted full amnesty and pardon to nearly 5,000 persons then serving Federal sentences for some form of conscription violation. The Supreme Court held that the various Federal judges did not have the power to suspend sentences they had previously awarded and which were being served. The pardon was granted just prior to the date on which the Court had determined most of the persons affected would have had to return to custody. The pardoning was conditional in the sense that the subjects had either served the preponderance of their sentences or were subject to a case-by-case study.²⁸

In 1924 President Coolidge acted to correct a situation whereby persons who deserted from the Armed Forces after World War I hostilities ceased, but before the war was declared formally over, might lose their citizenship. "With the exception of those sentenced by court-martial, President Coolidge . . . restored . . . citizenship to all . . . who deserted . . . during the . . . period between the armistice and the . . . ending of the war."²⁹

Subsequent to World War I a large number of persons had been convicted and sentenced for violations of the Espionage and Selective Service Acts. President Roosevelt, "at the urging of several liberal groups," granted: ". . . a full pardon to all persons who have heretofore been convicted of a violation of any of the foregoing statutory provisions . . . and who have complied with the sentence imposed on them, . . ."³⁰

The final act of Executive clemency pertinent to this discussion occurred in 1946, when President Truman established the President's Amnesty Board. This Board was tasked with examining the cases: "... of all persons convicted of violation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940... In any case in which it deems it desirable to do so... [the Board] shall include... its recommendations as to whether Executive clemency should be granted..."³¹ Approximately 15,000 cases were considered, resulting in grants of full pardon to 1,523 persons.

As we move from World Wars I and II to a consideration of the Vietnam situation, a void becomes apparent. No grants of amnesty or pardon were granted to draft evaders or deserters following the Korean conflict.

Amnesty—1972. The U.S. involvement in yet another armed conflict, and attendant crises related to compulsory military service laws, has resulted in further consideration of the amnesty problem. On 14 December 1971, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio introduced a bill: "... which relates to the matter of providing amnesty for draft resisters within this country and outside, on condition that they undertake 3 years of service in the Armed Forces, or in the alternative, other Government service under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General and various other Federal agencies."³² Senator Taft's bill, it should be noted, applies only to draft evaders and does not include deserters from the Armed Forces. Companion legislation, differing in that it calls for 2 years' Federal Service, as opposed to Taft's 3, was introduced in the House by Representative Edward Koch of New York.³³

Senator Kennedy's Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure received personal testimony over a 3 day period, from 28 February through 1 March 1972. The transcript

of these hearings was first released on 1 December 1972 and totals, with exhibits, 671 pages.³⁴ While all this testimony cannot be adequately analyzed here, several significant areas will be reviewed.

The views of the incumbent administration were obtained from representatives of the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and the Selective Service System. Needless to say, the testimony of these witnesses was consistent with the view expressed by President Nixon, on national television, on 2 January 1972.

We always... provide amnesty. ... I... would be very liberal with regard to amnesty, but not while there are Americans in Vietnam fighting to serve their country and defend their country, and not when POW's are held by North Vietnam. After that, we will consider it, but it would have to be on the basis of their paying the price... that anyone should pay for violating the law.³⁵

Selective Service Director Curtis Tarr suggested that a widespread program of amnesty "would be incompatible with the continuation of inductions."³⁶

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Maj. Gen. Leo Benade testified for the Defense Department and spoke on the question of amnesty only as it would apply to deserters from the Armed Forces. General Benade stated, in part, that: "the granting of any amnesty to deserters at this time, whether general or particular, or whether conditional or unconditional, would have a serious, detrimental impact on our Armed Forces."³⁷ General Benade further testified that there were currently 30,000 deserters from the Armed Forces. He stated that of the 2,323 of these known to have fled to other countries, "less than 4.1 percent were motivated by anti-Vietnam or political protest,..."³⁸ The basis for this latter figure was taken from a study of

approximately 600 of the original 2,300 odd deserters who returned to military control. General Benade also made the point that desertion should be distinguished from draft evasion, in that the former has a more serious adverse impact on the Armed Forces.³⁹

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, gave the views of the Department of Justice. He confirmed that there is no historical precedent for granting amnesty to "males who have refused to serve their country during a period of time when the country was engaged in actual hostilities . . ." ⁴⁰ He went on to show, statistically, that there were roughly 22,000 persons subject either to outstanding arrest warrants or to some earlier stage of draft-delinquency processing.⁴¹

In addition to the three witnesses whose testimony was briefly reviewed above, the subcommittee heard from 27 other persons. The majority of these were in favor of general, unconditional amnesty.

Mr. Robert Ransom, a lawyer with IBM whose son was killed in Vietnam favored unconditional general amnesty upon cessation of hostilities. Mr. Ransom was asked a crucial question by Senator Kennedy:

Q: . . . as a lawyer, how are we going to live in an orderly society, . . . if we are going to expect that . . . [people] . . . are going to take upon themselves the responsibility to violate a law and then the country is prepared to grant them amnesty?

A: . . . I simply think we have to make an exception in this war. I think this has been an extraordinary and unique situation in destroying the confidence of an entire generation in what their country stands for; . . . the only way to get that entire generation back, . . . is . . . to grant amnesty to those who did have the moral

convictions to live by their consciences in spite of the law.⁴²

Mr. Henry Steele Commager, Professor of History at Amherst College, testified at length in support of universal amnesty. Mr. Commager cited a Vietnam desertion rate of almost 74 men per thousand in 1971 and termed this a commentary on the war.

. . . after all, there was neither large-scale desertion nor draft evasion in World War II, and the national character does not change in a single generation.

. . . The Vietnam war is regarded by a large part of our population—particularly the young—as unnecessary in inception, immoral in conduct, and futile in objective.⁴³

Mr. Commager identified a deep division in American society and analogized the present situation to that faced by Presidents Lincoln and Andrew Johnson, faced with the problem of reuniting the Nation during and after the Civil War.

In making a moral case for amnesty, Commager laid a foundation of three basic points. First, that those deserting either the Army or the draft were acting sincerely, on the basis of conscience and principle, as opposed to reckless irresponsibility or cowardice. He cited the size of the resisting group as support for this and argued that the legal rightness or wrongness of a moral decision, sincerely made, is irrelevant.

His second point was that of "premature decision"; that these young men merely made the same decision, earlier, that the majority of Americans now make. This argument for forgiveness was supported by the assertion that a war fought "primarily to 'contain' China looks absurd when our President has gone to China to arrange closer relations . . ." ⁴⁴ Mr. Commager's third point is that of "premature morality."

Clearly if those whose opposition to war is based not on formal religious beliefs but on moral and ethical principles are now ex-

empted from service, then those with the same beliefs who were denied CO exemption in the past have an almost irresistible claim on us for pardon or amnesty.⁴⁵

Mr. Commager concluded with the point that the war was a mistake, and that only by admitting and learning from this mistake, including putting aside all will for vindictiveness or punishment, may harmony be restored to our society. He again recalls the Civil War, stating that while the Nation's material wounds are not as grievous, our "psychological and moral wounds are deeper, and more pervasive."⁴⁶

Former Representative from Oregon Charles Porter, a supporter of universal, or unconditional, amnesty, would offer such a program to both draft evaders and deserters. In his testimony before Senator Kennedy's subcommittee, Porter commented that contrary to defense estimates of 30,000 deserters, he understood the figure might be as high as 70,000. Mr. Porter acknowledged that this number might have been reached by adding draft evaders and went on to say:

... some ask, is amnesty fair to the 3 million men who served in Southeast Asia, ... I have found that almost always these veterans favor general amnesty ... America needs these young men. Their courage of conviction places all in their debt. It will be a glorious day for us ... when their full legal rights are restored by Congress ...⁴⁷

Prior to the hearings, Mr. Porter had echoed a theme popular among amnesty supporters by pointing out that clemency legislation for draft resisters but not for deserters would be class oriented. The argument usually put forth is that draft resisters are generally more intelligent and economically better suited to take the steps necessary to avoid military service. On the other hand, less affluent, poorer educated

men are caught up in military service, either as a result of their not understanding the full implications of conscription or because they are not able to take alternative action. Porter quoted one exile on the question of conditional amnesty and alternative service: "We left the states because we did not want to become criminals of the heart and now feel that a Government which has the stain of Indo-China on its conscience has no business passing judgment on our 'crimes.'"⁴⁸

This theme was further developed for the committee by Mr. Henry Schwarzschild, American Civil Liberties Union project director for amnesty, who testified:

It would be outrageous if amnesty, too, were to become an instrument of class and race discrimination, as are in effect so many other institutions and actions of our society. . . . All acts and failure to act, we urge, that arose out of the war, that would not have occurred but for the war, and that might be subject to criminal penalties, should be included in amnesty. . . . Equally important is the need to avoid putting these young men through an investigation of their conscience, their religious training or beliefs, their bona fides, and demanding that young men who are not yet or barely out of their teens be able to articulate a system of beliefs, . . . that will satisfy administrative or judicial bodies of the Government.⁴⁹

The subcommittee also considered, in the form of appended articles, the advice of Professor Louis Lusky of Columbia University Law School and a noted commentator on constitutional law matters. Professor Lusky, who favors amnesty, points out that joint action by the President and Congress may be necessary since there may be situations where unilateral action will

not have the desired restorative effect.⁵⁰

As testimony was taken, the problem of amnesty was debated outside of the committee room. On 26 and 27 March 1972, an Interreligious Conference on Amnesty was convened in Washington, D.C., by the National Council of Churches. After commenting that any conditional pardon, i.e., serving out of enlistments or substitution of some other form of public service would merely be to provide an alternate form of punishment, a spokesman commented: "Considerable apprehension was expressed by a number of speakers that President Nixon or members of Congress might put through a form of amnesty that would not clearly express the guilt of the American people in the 'tragic and insane war.'"⁵¹

Supporters of an absolute and unqualified amnesty, for all offenders, suggest that the Government erred in its Vietnam policy and that legitimate reaction to this error is draft avoidance or desertion.

The immediate issue, however, is restitution to a generation that has both fought the war abroad and led the vanguard of protest at home. This must come in some form of major concessions to the dissident young, concessions which should in no way demean the sacrifices of those who fought in Vietnam . . . What is needed is a program of universal amnesty for all who are or have been subject to prosecution by the United States Government for crimes relating to opposition to the war in Vietnam . . . The way amnesty is declared is nearly as important as the proclamation itself. A sanctimonious tone taken toward misguided, errant young will miss the point. The country has erred; the instinct of the exiles and the prisoners has been right.

Amnesty must come as an honest

and courageous attempt at national expiation.⁵²

In a later article supporting universal amnesty, the same writer criticizes pending legislation which would effect conditional amnesty by requiring some form of public service as a substitute for military performance. Two assumptions are identified which are alleged to support a philosophy of retribution on which it is stated conditional amnesty is based. The first is that universal amnesty would be unfair to those who have served in Vietnam, and the second that it would wreck the draft. The commentator declares that it is governmental policy that has made victims of both the returnees and the refugees, on an equal basis. On the second point, he comments: "The memory of Vietnam might say to another generation that it is a duty of citizenship to decide conscientiously beforehand if the way it is asked to fight is just and consistent with basic American principles, and if it is not, to refuse to participate."⁵³

On 29 March 1972, Representative Abzug introduced for herself and Congressmen Conyers, Dellums, and Ryan the War Resisters Exoneration Act of 1972. In support of this, by far the most liberal approach to the question of universal amnesty, she stated:

I feel that amnesty should extend not just to draft evaders but to deserters and antiwar demonstrators as well. Under my bill amnesty would be granted automatically to anyone who refused or evaded induction under the draft laws, to anyone who absented himself from the armed forces, and to violators of associated statutes when such violations occurred or will occur during the war years. . . . my bill proposes amnesty to violators of any other Federal, State or local laws when . . . the violation was motivated substantially by opposition to the war . . . [and] . . . although the

violation did result in damage it was nevertheless justifiable on the basis of a deeply held ethical or moral belief.^{5 4}

Conclusion. That the President may grant amnesty to a deserter or draft evader has been established. Similarly, should Congress desire, legislation accomplishing the same result could be passed. Though Professor Lusky found some possible areas of conflict between Federal, State and local powers of forgiveness, he doubted that this would ultimately pose a problem.

The view stated by President Nixon starts one end of the amnesty spectrum. In other words, a clearing of individual records, following routine judicial determinations of criminal offenses, presumably including the serving of sentences where appropriate, might be possible. The Taft/Koch approach is in the middle, recognizing a problem in present, although changing, draft procedures, and endorsing a substitute. At the other end of the spectrum is found Representative Abzug's proposal, which may be interpreted as an endorsement of practically any type of civil disorder or military disobedience directed at existing defense and selective service policies.

Lincoln's lesson must be remembered: that any act of clemency, whether Executive or legislative, will have considerable political impact. Will the subjects of Senator Kennedy's subcommittee hearings continue to receive the attention they did before the election now that 7 November is past? This is not to insinuate that the proponents of amnesty are insincere. To the contrary, their credentials for the most part are impeccable. But the realities of the situation force the argument. The draft, which provided the test tube for the Vietnam catalyst, is scheduled to end in July. U.S. participation in the war will end before then. And the third factor,

the availability of a selective service issue, is no longer potent. The potential recipients of amnesty have a cause, but a weakened lobby.

Granted, the major obstacle to amnesty, the continuing war, will soon be removed. It is nevertheless doubtful that the President will set historical precedent, either by initiating clemency procedures before a complete Southeast Asian resolution or by approaching anything resembling unconditional amnesty. He has clearly expressed the belief that justice will best be meted out by our judicial bodies, both civil and courts-martial, which have the ability not only to convict, but to sentence as the circumstances of each individual case dictate. Finally, it must be remembered that he is not only the President, but also the Commander in Chief. Certainly we have not proceeded far enough with volunteer Army concepts to be able to say that universal, unconditional amnesty could have other than a deleterious effect on an armed force whose very existence depends on reliability, both in discipline and leadership.

In Congress, universal amnesty faces great obstacles, if only because of the problem of recruiting sufficient support for such a sensitive issue. Alexander Hamilton, writing on the Executive pardoning power in 1788, put it this way:

Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. . . . as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might

often encourage each other in an act of obduracy, . . . On these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body of men.^{5 5}

Yet, there is support in Hamilton's thought for those who would see amnesty as a unifying tool in times of insurrection. ". . . the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in the . . . [executive] is this: . . . there are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon . . . may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass . . . may never be possible afterwards to recall."^{5 6}

Recent polls indicate that 63 percent of the American public favor some form of conditional amnesty. The ultimate issues are twofold. Does an individual in our democratic society have the right to ignore the law; and if he does, can that society survive?

. . . there are some laws, even in a democratic society, that are so unjust that any man of conscience and determination cannot obey them. . . . the conflict between the two arguments is in a sense insoluble, and the answer is not at all satisfactory: the law must be disobeyed, but the law's penalty must be accepted . . . The country

can appreciate their courage and their convictions, but cannot excuse them from the consequences of breaking the law.^{5 7}

The closer in proximity the implementation of an amnesty policy is to the resolution of the Vietnam war, the better the chances are that it will mirror the policy enunciated by President Nixon. Regardless, it is not foreseeable that a startlingly more liberal policy will ever be effected. Forgiveness is inherent in the American character; hopefully, a decision, that these types of moral and legal determinations must be divergent rather than complementary, is not.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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The American Civil War saw the introduction of many new concepts to the art of warfare, some of which were widely recognized at the time. The importance of railroads to tactical flexibility and logistics, and the impact of ironclad naval vessels on future warfare have long been noted. An equally significant but somewhat unappreciated development, however, arose from the conflict on the Western rivers of the Confederacy—riverine operations. Born of necessity, circumstance, and the vision of a few men, cooperation between infantry and an odd assortment of improvised river forces gave Union commanders the decisive advantage needed to split the Confederacy and hasten the North's ultimate victory.

THE ROLE OF RIVERINE WARFARE IN THE CIVIL WAR

A research paper prepared

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With the possible exception of the American Revolution, the war between the States marked this country's history and psyche as has no other. Measured in terms of sacrifice that touched almost every home, of battles fought and lives lost, it was the greatest war in the history of the Nation prior to Pearl Harbor. The tattered flags from its fields of glory are treasured, North and South. Monuments to its heroes stand in all our older cities.¹ Yet the greater part of the immense body of literature dealing with this war is devoted to the land battles and armies of the North and South.² The names of famous Army battles and battlegrounds are familiar to every schoolchild; Bull Run, Gettysburg, Appomattox. But what of the Navy, where are its monuments and memorial battlegrounds? Yes, the battle of the ironclads *Monitor* and *Merrimack*, and

Farragut's ringing battle cry "Damn the torpedoes . . ." stand out together with a hazy recollection of a Northern naval blockade of Southern ports. But was that all? What of the new and unique form of naval warfare that had its inception in the opening years of this great struggle and then receded into history only to reemerge in recent years in the form of riverine warfare in the Mekong Delta. For some reason, the accounts of naval operations in the Civil War, and in particular river operations, have never gained popular appreciation.

To enable the reader to gain an understanding of the role played by forces afloat on the Western rivers, this paper will examine the role of seapower in the Civil War, the importance of joint Army and Navy operations, the strategic importance of the Mississippi River, the strategy of the opponents on the rivers,

the river gunboats, and the role of gunboats in some of the major battles.

Although the purpose of this paper is to examine river warfare in the West, it will be helpful to the reader to place the role of seapower in perspective prior to focusing on the Western river operations which were but one aspect of the Northern blockade. The following extract is from a speech given by Col. Hilary A. Hebert, C.S.A., a former Secretary of the Navy, at the Naval War College, 10 August 1886:

Who shall estimate the value to the United States of its Navy which thus isolated the Confederacy, cut it off from communications with the outside world, and at the same time compelled it to guard every point against a raid like that which had destroyed the Capitol of the United States in 1814. Had the Confederacy instead of the United States been able to exercise dominion over the sea; had it been able to keep open its means of communications with the countries of the Old World, to send cotton abroad and to bring back the supplies of which it stood so much in need; had it been able to blockade Portland, Boston, Newport, New York, the mouth of the Delaware, and the entrance of Chesapeake Bay; had it possessed the seapower to prevent the United States from dispatching by water into Virginia its armies and their supplies, it is not too much to say that such a reversal of condition would have reversed the outcome of the Civil War.³

Narrowing the scope to river warfare, the Sprouts in their book *The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918* indicate the importance of seapower on the rivers:

Union naval operations upon the Western rivers also contri-

buted vitally to the defeat of the Confederacy. The occupation of the Mississippi and its main tributaries had a strategic significance second only to that of the seaboard blockade. These operations isolated the Trans-Mississippi Confederate States, extended the blockade along a third side of the military frontier, and seriously disrupted the internal communications of the Confederacy.

These operations raised unique problems as difficult as those upon the seaboard. Suitable gunboats had to be improvised; operating principles had to be adapted to the peculiar conditions of river warfare. Much of this experience manifestly had little significance for future policy. But these operations nevertheless had a broad strategic significance in showing the vital importance of controlling water communications giving access to the enemy's country.⁴

The profound influence of seapower in the Civil War has been comprehended by few Americans. Had the North prosecuted the war less vigorously and successfully at sea and on the rivers or had the South done so more effectively, the history of America and the world could have been radically changed.⁵ The North's strategy was simple and straightforward—deprive the South of its intercourse with Europe and cut the Confederacy in half through control of the Mississippi.⁶ By splitting the Confederacy down the middle, the North could cut off the supply of food from Texas and the shipments of material which entered that State by way of Matamoros, Mexico. The question of the military control of Texas could be put aside as long as its communications were cut, for in any case the State would ultimately fall once the heart of the Confederacy succumbed. Thousands of troops for the Confederate armies were left stranded west of the Missis-

issippi where they could have no influence on the future of the war.

Joint Army and Navy Operations. The war in the West was largely a fight to control the rivers and river ports of the central valley of the Nation. The rivers themselves were vital to trade and transportation in the South, and of them the most important was the Mississippi. The blockade was the controlling condition of the Union success. That success was made possible by the undisputed naval and maritime superiority of the North. Cut off from the outer world and all exterior sources of supply, reduced to a state of weakness by the blockade, the Confederacy was pounded to death. Victory on the ground was achieved primarily by the Army; many of the strategic advantages which the Union Army held, however, were established by the Navy.⁷

The effect of seapower integrated with landpower is clearly demonstrated in this conflict where the fighting was done primarily on land, but the Navy's vital assistance to the Army was essential to the North's winning many of the great battles. Significantly, the Union won most of the battles fought where the two services could cooperate, i.e., everywhere on the Western rivers and Roanoke Island in the East, while those battles fought without naval assistance, i.e., the battles of Bull Run and Fredericksburg resulted in Union defeats, or stalemates such as those at Antietam and Gettysburg.⁸

The Navy's ability to guarantee the safe transportation of troops anywhere on the Southern coast or rivers weakened the Confederate armies in the field by requiring their commanders to disperse their forces over broad areas—many of which were never really attacked. While the Union armies gained incalculable benefits from the free and swift movements of troops, logistics, and heavy artillery, the Confederates

Strategic Importance of the Mississippi River Valley. The magnitude of the Mississippi River project can be appreciated in terms of the geography involved; from Cairo, Ill., to the mouth of the river, 480 miles due south, the river actually snakes along 1,097 miles. Its banks, for the most part low, are occasionally crowned with high bluffs on the east, geography well suited for batteries that might deliver a destructive plunging fire upon boats that attempted to steam past. The bluffs beginning with Columbus, 21 miles downstream from Cairo, appear again at New Madrid, Memphis, Vicksburg, and Baton Rouge.

From the outbreak of the war, both the Union and Confederate high commands realized the importance of controlling this inland highway. The North recognized that the free use of this vast river was absolutely indispensable for commerce in peacetime and deemed it equally important to military operations in time of war. One of the major objectives of the Navy Department was cooperation with the Army in the occupation of the river and its tributaries. This objective particularly appealed to the people of the North Central States, who realized that with the Union divided, the waterways might become useless. They also perceived that the side which held the Mississippi could easily carry war into the territory of the other.

The Mississippi has been called the backbone of the rebellion, for from the beginning of the war the Confederate leaders realized its importance in extending their territory westward. The more ambitious looked to an ultimate formation of one great slave empire to include Mexico and the West Indies. Possession of the Mississippi and the Ohio Rivers from Smithland at the mouth of the Cumberland River to New Orleans gave them control of the Red, Arkansas, White, Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers. The conquest of this enormous basin was hoped by the Con-

federates to be but a matter of time. It would be difficult to exaggerate the important part that the Mississippi River would play in any such struggle. In New Orleans, the center of one of the mightiest river systems in the world, the Confederacy possessed a considerable plant for building ironclads, casting great guns, and making small arms. From Texas large supplies of beef were driven across the Mississippi to the Confederate Army long after the seaboard States had been exhausted. At New Orleans enormous quantities of cotton were collected and placed on swift vessels to elude the vigilance of the blockaders, which, upon return, supplied the Confederates with arms and munitions. No one was more aware of the importance of the river than the Confederate leaders themselves. From the beginning their most skillful engineers were engaged in fortifying its banks from Columbus, Ky., to Fort Jackson and Fort Philip below New Orleans. A large portion of the money and the strength of the South was massed on the river. It was asserted that no craft afloat could pass these fortifications. Every strategic point was armed with batteries, and the most difficult bends in the river were obstructed until a formidable line of fortifications guarded the river for a thousand miles. Beginning in the north, the Confederates erected batteries at Columbus, Island Number 10, Fort Pillow, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Port Hudson, Baton Rouge, and Forts Jackson and Philip, so that should they lose either end of this line, their troops need only fall back on the next post, gradually concentrating their forces with each defeat.⁹

Strategy on the Western Rivers. The Confederate concept of holding the rivers was primarily military, from the banks, while almost from the beginning the Union strategy was naval, or at least amphibious.¹⁰ Defensive thinking is in

fatal of Confederate errors, divided command. Different Confederate leadership had different ideas about how the river should be defended, and since from the distance of Richmond it appeared that these ideas complemented each other, all were adopted. In reality, instead of complementing, they competed; for example, General Polk thought he needed soldiers more than the naval yards needed carpenters and mechanics and would not release the men from the Army; the riverboats were divided between Memphis and New Orleans, and at both places they had to fight without help from the Army.¹¹ The Confederates were locked in the strategic concept of Jefferson Davis, that of holding the river by means of forts, with the naval forces acting as auxiliaries. Union commanders, however, viewed their naval forces as capable of making valuable contributions to offensive operations on both land and water. Northern victory had as its foundation the concept of combined operations, the joining of the unique assets provided by naval forces with those on land. The effect of seapower integrated with landpower is clearly demonstrated in the river campaigns where General Grant achieved the essence of unified command and purpose with his naval commanders. The thing that gave this war on the Western rivers its peculiar character is that control of the sea could not be won in battle and then held. The Navy could win battles and capture territory along the rivers, but it did not possess the means to sustain these victories without the assistance of the Army.

The River Gunboats. Initially the War Department thought that the South's fortifications along the Mississippi would be attacked principally by land forces and that only a few transport vessels would be required to support the Army. Since an enemy attack from within had never been anticipated,

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no naval station, dockyard, or arsenal had been established on the Mississippi or its tributaries. Indeed, except for a few small craft below New Orleans in the War of 1812, there had never been a warship on the rivers.

The first step taken by the Government for repossession of the Mississippi was to summon a retired St. Louis millionaire, James B. Eads, to Washington to seek his advice on the best methods for utilizing the Western rivers for attack and defense. Eads was a self-taught engineer, inventor, and industrialist who had pioneered the field of underwater salvage. He had an intimate knowledge of the Mississippi River system gained along with his fortune while raising sunken wrecks from the rivers, using what he called his submarines, but which were commonly referred to as snagboats. Eads had retired at the age of 37 to regain his health, to read, and think. He was inspired by writings of Louis Napoleon's use of floating iron-plated batteries in the Crimean War to bombard Russian forts. This inspiration served as the basis for his plan to blockade the Mississippi River.¹²

In Washington, Eads presented his plan to Lincoln and his Cabinet. The plan, which received immediate acceptance by the Cabinet with the exception of the Secretary of War, included provisions for establishing a base of operations at Cairo, where the Ohio and the Mississippi Rivers merge and where the Central Railroad of Illinois served as a supply line; erecting forts on either side of the river at Cairo to control river traffic; and the conversion of one of his snagboats to an ironclad to prevent the enemy from building batteries along the rivers. The Secretary of the Navy had Eads present his plan to a board of officers the next day. They approved the plan and passed the sketches of the ironclad to Samuel M. Pook, a naval architect. The Secretary of War objected

point that the Navy had no jurisdiction on the rivers. He won his point with the Cabinet, and the sketches were retrieved from Pook. However, before long, political pressures forced the Secretary of War to request that a naval officer be ordered to consult with Eads and General McClellan on the best means of establishing a naval armament on the rivers to blockade commercial traffic with the Confederate States.¹³

On 16 May 1861, Comdr. John Rogers was ordered, under the direction of the War Department, to proceed to the Mississippi to develop a naval force. He immediately rejected Ead's snagboat project. After discussions with McClellan, who thought that it would be well to purchase vessels that could be used on both the Mississippi and the smaller rivers, Rogers purchased three side-wheeled steamers—the *Conestoga*, *Lexington*, and *Tyler*. Under plans drawn up by Pook, Rogers had the boilers and steampipes lowered into the holds where they would be protected by coal bunkers and added 5-inch wooden bulwarks for protection of the crew. There was no provision for iron protective plating on these first river gunboats. Rogers requested Navy men for crews and 32-pound guns for armament from the Navy Department. The Secretary of the Navy refused his request, curtly advising him to process his requisitions through the War Department, since it had cognizance over the rivers and, further, that Rogers had no authority to buy or alter ships except by Army orders. The *Conestoga* was armed with four smoothbore 32 pounders; the *Lexington* with four 8-inch smoothbore guns, one 32 pounder, and two rifled 30 pounders; the *Tyler* with six 8-inch shell guns and three 30 pounders. Rogers managed to get some young naval lieutenants to command the boats and some rivermen to serve as crews, but his shortage of personnel was a major deficiency. He was promised 1,000 Atlantic fishermen to correct this problem

On 12 August 1861 the improvised gunboats arrived at Cairo which, because of its strategic location, was to become the naval arsenal and supply depot for the Union River Flotilla.

History books are at variance on the actions of Rogers. Some indicate that he was a veteran naval officer who worked so quietly and efficiently that he undermined himself by failing to keep the Navy Department informed of his activities; that when he finally got around to sending a report to the Navy it was too late, for the report arrived the day after his relief had been appointed. It would appear that he was a busy man during this time, for he prepared statistical tables of the water levels of the Western rivers, contracted for gun carriages, anchors, chain, clothing, bedding, powder, shot, and rowboats; all this in addition to converting the three steamers to gunboats.¹⁴ Other books indicate that he was a man who got things done but who was not too particular about details. They suggest that he rubbed the Army the wrong way by claiming jurisdiction over all shipping on the Western waters and that he quarreled with everybody about the war not being run according to regulations.¹⁵ In spite of the different accounts, it is clear that Commander Rogers laid the foundation for an effective naval organization that made major contributions to the ultimate victory of the North.

James Eads thought Rogers' converted gunboats were monstrosities and did not give up his plan for ironclads on the Mississippi. Pook had returned to Washington from his trip to the West filled with enthusiasm for Ead's idea and was commissioned to design an ironclad gunboat. His design was not perfect, but it was perhaps fortuitous that it was submitted through the War Department since the Chief of Naval Construction thought the whole project impracticable. Gen. Joseph Totten of Army Ordnance, who knew nothing

about ships except to shoot at them, advertised for bids to build seven of these vessels. Eads was the low bidder at \$89,600 per copy. The contract contained a provision that the vessels would be completed within 65 days from the date the contract was signed—7 August 1861.¹⁶ However, Government-caused delays, together with a possible misjudgment on the part of Eads of the time necessary to construct the boats, resulted in the boats not being completed at the end of the 65 contract days. The Government refused to pay, but Eads went ahead and finished the project at his own expense and delivered all the boats to the Government within 100 contract days. He then waited until the boats had won their famous victories downriver before collecting his pay.¹⁷

Because of their appearance, these gunboats were nicknamed *Pook Turtles*. They resembled one another so closely that stripes had to be painted on their stacks for identification. They were flat-bottomed scows which drew 6 to 7 feet of water. They measured 175 feet in length by 52½ feet in width. They were of approximately 600 ton displacement, capable of steaming at speeds to 9 miles per hour, and were fitted with steam engines that drove a single paddle wheel located 60 feet forward of the stern. An oak casement with sides that sloped at an angle of 35 degrees inward from the waterline formed a box that resembled a roof of a house and enclosed the engines, paddle wheel, and guns. These sloping sides, designed to cause shot to skip off their surfaces, proved to be a detriment in battles with batteries occupying the river bluffs, for the plunging fire struck the sloping sides at nearly a 90-degree angle which often resulted in the casement being penetrated by shot.

Since these boats were expected to fight bow-on, only the front part of the casement and the sides around the boilers and engines were protected by

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iron plating 2½ inches thick. The forward casement had 24 inches of oak backing behind the iron plating. This arrangement left the stern and sides fore and aft of the engine space vulnerable. The pilothouse was built with heavy oak and plated on the forward side with 2½ inches of iron and the aft side with 1½ inches of iron.

The Turtles mounted 13 guns; generally there were three 8-inch shell guns, six 32 pounders, and four rifled 42 pounders. The old-fashioned 42 pounders were always considered dangerous since they had been weakened by rifling without benefit of reinforcing steel bands. These strong floating fortresses, well adapted to the service demanded of them, were a distinct innovation in naval warfare.¹⁸

Before completing these boats, Eads converted his snagboat *Benton* into an ironclad. The *Benton* was the largest, strongest, and slowest of the ironclads—capable of speeds to only 5 miles per hour. The *Benton* displaced approximately 1,000 tons, drew 9 feet of water, and was 200 feet in length by 72 feet wide. She was constructed of two hulls 20 feet apart which were joined by heavy timbers and planked over to provide a false bottom. She was powered by a single engine which drove a paddle wheel located 50 feet forward of the stern. The *Benton* was protected by a casement similar to the Turtles but one that was much stronger. She was armed with two 9-inch shell guns, four 42 pounders, two rifled 50 pounders, and eight smoothbore 32 pounders.¹⁹

Eads also converted a river ferry, the *Essex*, into an ironclad. The *Essex* was armed with one 10-inch, three 9-inch, one 32 pounder, and two rifled 50 pound guns. These nine ironclads, together with the three converted wooden gunboats and 38 mortarboats, constituted the chief strength on the river throughout the war. The mortarboats were simple floats constructed to with-

about 5 feet high formed an enclosure for the mortar. These guns weighed 17,000 pounds and threw a 13-inch shell weighing 285 pounds. The mortarboats were towed or pushed along the river to a tactical position and moored to the bank. A derrick was then set up to lift the shells to the mouth of the gun for loading.²⁰

Manning the ironclads proved to be difficult. Their crews, as finally brought together, consisted of landsmen, steamboat hands, soldiers, and seamen. Five hundred sailors arrived in November and 1,100 soldiers arrived in December 1861. This mixed character of personnel caused many problems, for Major General Halleck insisted that Army officers should accompany the troops and that they owed no obedience to naval officers except to the commander of a gunboat.²¹ On 12 September 1861, Capt. Andrew H. Foote arrived in Cairo to relieve Commander Rogers and take command of the Western Flotilla. He soon complained that every "brigadier could interfere with him." Even when he was appointed to flag rank in November 1861, which gave him an equivalent rank of major general, the naval officers under him were constantly liable to harassment by conflicting orders from any superior Army officer under whom they might be serving.²² In view of this bizarre command relationship, it is a wonder that the river operations were as successful as they were, for it was not until October 1862 that the flotilla was transferred to the Navy Department.

Capt. Andrew H. Foote, a true sailor, would have preferred a command on the sea. The fact that he was under the direction of the War Department, receiving orders from generals who little comprehended what a gunboat could and could not do, was not the least of his difficulties. He had seen a great deal of duty in the Far East where he had fought the barbarous Malays. He had also been a classmate of Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, in his school

days. Welles selected Foote to command the Western Flotilla because he thought his capacity in dealing with savages might make him useful in handling the Army.²³ In fitting out his flotilla, Foote was frequently embarrassed by lack of materials and funds, but he carried forward his work with patience and determination. He was later to gain high praise for the work of this flotilla, but he is said to have looked upon the fighting as secondary and the creation of this fleet as being his great life's achievement.²⁴


Another variant in the chain of command on the Western rivers was the Union Ram Fleet under the command of Col. Charles Ellet, Jr.²⁵ Ellet was a civil engineer with impressive flood control and bridgebuilding credentials, including the first suspension bridge in the United States. While visiting Russia during the Crimean War he had urged Russia to employ ram boats for the relief of Sevastopol. On returning home he offered his ideas to successive Secretaries of the Navy without receiving any commitment. However, immediately after the *Merrimack* sank the *Cumberland* on Chesapeake Bay, demonstrating the power of the ram, Ellet was authorized by the Secretary of War to prepare a ram fleet to gain control of the Mississippi.²⁶ Ellet set to work immediately and bought four side-wheeled and three stern-wheeled steamers. He strengthened their hulls so that they could withstand a severe bow-on collision by installing fore and aft bulwarks of solid wood 12 to 16 inches thick and iron rods which ran athwartship. An oak bulwark 2 feet thick was added to protect the boilers. Ellet's plans had the mark of an amateur, spirited but without benefit of training. He desired no commission and wished to have no officers or seamen on his boats, only volunteers. He finally accepted a commission as a colonel and acceded to having armed soldiers and

Ellet's rams were commanded by his son, brothers, and friends who cooperated with but were not under the direction of the Mississippi Flotilla Commander.²⁸ The ram fleet, hastily put together in 6 weeks, arrived just before the Battle of Memphis in which it served with distinction. Colonel Ellet received wounds in that battle which subsequently proved fatal.²⁹ Capt. A.T. Mahan, in *The Gulf and Inland Waters*, said of Ellet's ram fleet at the Battle of Memphis:

There can be no denying the dash and spirit with which this attack was made. It was, however, the only service of value performed by this irregular and undisciplined force. . . . There were admirable materials in it, but the mistake of withdrawing them from strict military control and organization was fatal.³⁰

Two additional types of vessels that served on the rivers are deserving of comment; the first was what was officially known as *light draughts* which comprised the so called *Mosquito Fleet* and which were commonly referred to as *tinclads*. These small boats, armed with six to eight guns and capable of transporting 200 troops, rendered minor but important service in the river operations. With their shallow draft—18 inches empty, 36 inches loaded—they were able to operate in tributaries where the larger boats could not. Most of these boats were ordinary river steamers purchased and altered to suit the purpose of the Navy. They were covered to a height of 11 feet above the waterline with railroad iron a half to three-quarters of an inch thick, and with their boilers further protected they were able to stand up to fire of field artillery pieces. The tinclads engaged enemy infantry ashore, captured field batteries, and often took Confederate vessels twice their size.³¹

The second type of vessel was the hospital ship. Fever and dysentery



affected the unacclimated Northerners both afloat and ashore during the drive downriver. This disease threatened to kill off more Union soldiers than could be possibly killed by the Confederates in the struggle for possession of the river. When Island No. 10 was evacuated by the Confederates, they abandoned and sank a gunboat and six transports. These transports were soon raised and placed in commission by the Union. One of them, the *Red River*, was converted into the hospital ship of the Western Flotilla. Such floating hospitals quickly came into use by both the Army and Navy along the Mississippi.³²

Early Battles. The gunboats were first stationed at Cairo, where a Union Army, under the command of a little known brigadier general by the name of Grant, was preparing to launch a campaign to wrest control of Kentucky, which had not seceded, from the Confederates and to control the Mississippi. At first the gunboats were assigned only to patrol and reconnaissance duty. On 8 September 1861, the opening shots of the river campaign were exchanged at Columbus, Ky., some 20 miles below Cairo.³³ Grant requested that Foote send gunboats to reconnoiter the bluffs at Columbus. General Polk had fortified the bluffs and established a floating battery to secure the river for the Confederacy. As soon as the gunboat *Tyler* appeared off Columbus, the Confederate batteries opened fire, revealing their strength and positions. The *Tyler* is reported to have returned the fire, scoring hits on the Confederate batteries. Two items regarding this expedition are worthy of note; the first was that new light was shed on the heretofore widely accepted doctrine which held ships were helpless against land forts; and secondly, on the return trip to Cairo anyone who exposed himself was fired upon from the banks by Confederate riflemen. Sniper activity

taking a particularly heavy toll of riverboat pilots who became prime targets.

Two days later a second engagement took place at Lucas Point, Mo., a bend in the river 8 miles below Cairo. This action reinforced the idea of the superiority of gunboats over land forces. The *Lexington* and *Conestoga* were ordered to cover a Union force moving downriver to secure the Point where 3,000 Confederates, including cavalry and artillery, were located. The gunboats ran downstream in advance of the troops and silenced the Confederate batteries. During the fight a Confederate gunboat named *Yankee* came upriver to engage the Union boats. The Confederate gunboat was soon in retreat downriver; while withdrawing the *Yankee* took an 8-inch shell from the *Lexington* in her starboard paddle wheel totally disabling her so that she had to drift downstream to a protected anchorage. Two items of significance also arose from this engagement; it became clear that the Union Army would have to make a drive downriver to separate the Confederacy and control the Mississippi, for gunboats alone could not accomplish the task; and secondly, gunboats must carry artillery fore and aft to compete with Confederate batteries ashore—therefore, it had been assumed that the boats would only be required to fight bow-on against fortifications on bends in the rivers.³⁴

Belmont. On 7 November 1861, the first real battle of the river war took place at Belmont, Mo., across the river from Columbus and a little upstream. Grant desired to contain Polk's forces at Columbus and thereby prevent their crossing the river to reinforce Confederate forces in Southwestern Missouri who were being pressed by General Fremont and his Union Army. Grant did not have sufficient forces for a direct attack on Columbus, but he thought that an attack on Belmont would thwart any ideas Polk may have had regarding

sending reinforcements to Missouri.³⁵

Grant received a tipoff at 2 a.m. on 7 November that the Confederates were moving troops across the river from Columbus. He hastily planned an expedition to land 3,500 men on the Missouri shore out of reach of the guns at Columbus and attack Belmont. He requested naval support, and the *Lexington* and *Tyler* were ordered to serve as convoy to the troop transports. By 8:30 a.m. the troops were landed below Lucas Point and proceeding toward Belmont and the Confederate force of 2,500 men. The gunboats then proceeded downriver to bombard the batteries at Columbus.

Grant's forces drove the Confederates back and began looting their camp. While they were thus occupied, a force of 7,000 Confederates crossed the river downstream and advanced on the Union force in an attempt to cut it off from the river and the transports which had come downstream. The naval commander, noticing that the firing had ceased at Belmont, returned upstream with the gunboats to arrive in time to see the Confederate forces advancing in lines perpendicular to the river and immediately commenced firing. It was reported, "The huge shells would plough through whole platoons of men mowing them down like saplings before a cyclone."³⁶ The light artillery of the Confederates had no effect on the gunboats. The gunboats held off the Confederates long enough for the Union forces to embark on the transports. Thus Grant and his forces escaped, but it was a rout for they left enough supplies behind to outfit an army. The gunboats had saved the day and demonstrated the effectiveness of naval forces working with land forces and particularly the importance of the mobility of these large gun platforms. This battle also served to create a schism between the Army and the Navy, for Grant in his haste to prepare the expedition had

would notify him of any plan to use the gunboats. The first that Foote learned of the battle was in a report from the commanding officer of the *Tyler*, who related how the gunboats had saved the Union Army. Grant apologized to Foote for his oversight; but as a result of this incident Foote requested that the Secretary of the Navy raise the commander of the flotilla to flag rank, thus elevating him above Army officers of the rank of brigadier.

Fort Henry. The South's first line of defense stretched eastward from Columbus on the Mississippi across Kentucky through Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River, and on to the Cumberland Mountains. The Union leaders were determined to breach this line and regain control of the Mississippi, but deemed it inadvisable to advance against a heavily fortified Columbus. Instead they chose to move against the center of the line attacking Forts Henry and Donelson, thus isolating Columbus to the west.

When the ironclad gunboats became available in January 1862, both Grant and Foote wanted to use them in an attack on the two forts. Grant preferred to move against Fort Donelson but yielded to Foote's preference for Fort Henry. Grant presented the plan for a simultaneous attack by a joint Army and Navy force to General Halleck, Commanding Officer of the Department of the West, who rejected it outright. Halleck finally consented to the operation after pressuring from Grant, Foote, possibly Lincoln, and the threat of Confederate reinforcements moving into the area.³⁷

Grant left Cairo on 2 February 1862 with an army of 17,000 men on transports and moved up the Tennessee River to attack Fort Henry. Foote accompanied this force with seven gunboats, four of them ironclads. Grant's plan was to land his army 4 miles below the fort and move to interdict the road between

Fort Henry and Fort Donelson prior to moving against Fort Henry, thus preventing reinforcements or retreat along the road to Fort Donelson 12 miles away. Meanwhile, Foote would move up the river and bombard the fort from the gunboats.

Fort Henry covered an area of about 3 acres, was garrisoned by an army of 3,000 troops, and mounted 17 heavy guns. The fort was an incompleated earthwork which could be made untenable if taken under fire from many points along the river. The fort's commanding officer, General Tilghman, after receiving scouting reports of the strength of the advancing Union force, decided to evacuate the fort and sent his troops to Fort Donelson, retaining less than 100 men to man the guns. He realized that defeat was but a matter of time with troops advancing on his rear and ironclads on the river.

The Union plan of attack was thwarted when Grant's forces became bogged down by floodwater, thus preventing them from reaching the Fort Donelson road. Foote, unaware of this fact, opened the attack on 6 February and after little more than an hour, in which the Confederates resisted with determination, Tilghman struck his colors and surrendered to Foote. When Grant arrived, Tilghman was having a drink with Foote on the flagship *Cincinnati*. Foote then turned the fort over to Grant and returned to Cairo for repair of the ironclads. Grant was severely criticized by the press for his failure to take part in this battle.^{3 8}

In this action the *St. Louis*, *Cincinnati*, *Carondelet*, and *Essex* were repeatedly hit; the *Essex* took a shot in the boiler which exploded and scalded 27 men and the commanding officer. However, aside from the scalded men, the flotilla suffered only two men dead and nine wounded. The Confederate losses were five killed, 11 wounded, five missing, and 78 prisoners.

wooden gunboats *Conestoga*, *Tyler*, and *Lexington*, which had remained far behind the ironclads and thus escaped unscathed, proceeded upriver as far south as Muscle Shoals, Ala., destroying and capturing Confederate supplies and steamers.

Fort Donelson. After the fall of Fort Henry, Grant moved against Fort Donelson and its 18,000 defenders on 12 February with 27,000 Union troops. Fort Donelson, a fortified enclosure of a hundred acres, was located on a plateau on the Cumberland River. Foote arrived on the evening of 13 February with six gunboats, including four ironclads. On the afternoon of 14 February, Foote, apparently overconfident from his success at Fort Henry, steamed to within 400 yards of the fort and opened fire while closing. Within a short space of time the flagship *St. Louis*, had been hit 59 times; however, only one shot penetrated the casement, killing the pilot and wounding Foote. Foote's wound, which never properly healed, was the eventual cause of his death a little over a year later. The *St. Louis* drifted out of action downstream together with the *Louisville* which had her wheel ropes shot away and the *Carondelet* which took a hit from a 128-pound shot that took off her stack. The total loss to the flotilla was 11 dead and 43 wounded. Had Foote not pressed the fort so closely, he could have stayed out of range of its guns and effectively bombarded it with his longer range guns. The defeat of the gunboats caused the Confederates to make an attack the next day on Grant's right wing, which weakened and was giving way. Grant requested naval cooperation and a show of force while he urged his army back into the field. Foote obliged with the *Louisville* and *St. Louis* by bombarding the fort until dark. Grant's force then repulsed and shattered the Confederate attack and gained a lodgment in the Confederate line. Gen. Lew Wallace,

commenting later, said that there was no question that the gunboats distracted the enemy's attention and that he believed that the awful ironclads prevented a general movement up or across the river that night.³⁹

The fall of Fort Donelson was assessed by some military leaders as the beginning of the end for the Confederacy. With the fall of this fort the Confederates evacuated their stronghold on the Mississippi, Columbus, leaving great quantities of stores behind. The Confederate line withdrew 45 miles to the south and anchored on Island Number 10 in the Mississippi and Corinth, Miss., on the Tennessee River. Grant made his name in this battle, and the army redeemed its good name after the humiliation at Fort Henry.

Shiloh and Pittsburg Landing. Another example of the Navy's service to Grant was at Pittsburg Landing in the Battle of Shiloh where the Navy provided another lesson in the value of combined operations.

By 5 April 1862, the Confederates had massed at Corinth, Miss., and the Union Army under Grant at Pittsburg Landing 15 miles to the north. Both armies were drawn up with one wing near the river and their lines extending about 5 miles from its banks. The Confederates launched a surprise attack on the center of the Union line at dawn on 6 April. Their intention was to break through the line and then wheel on the rear of the Union wings. By 10 a.m. the Confederates had breached the center, had taken possession of the Union camp, and were moving to trap the Union wing which guarded the stores at Pittsburg Landing. The Union troops were hard pressed and in a state of confusion with retreat cut off by the river.

During the battle the gunboats *Lexington* and *Tyler* ranged up and down the river seeking an opportunity to engage the Confederates. At about 1:30

p.m. the commanding officer of the *Tyler* sent a message to General Hurlburt ashore requesting permission to open fire on the enemy. The general directed him to do so, stating that he was grateful for the offer of help, and that he could not hold the position he then occupied for an hour longer without assistance.⁴⁰ Accounts of this incident vary. Nash, in *A Naval History of the Civil War*, interprets this event somewhat differently; referring to the commanding officer of the *Tyler* he says, "He was so typical a naval officer of that day that he did not dare to act on his initiative even though he could clearly see what needed to be done." Pratt in, *Civil War on Western Waters*, says "*Tyler* . . . opened an enfilading fire and in about 35 minutes had disorganized two Confederate brigades and put their artillery out of business. At this point he realized that he was entering action without authorization; he stopped and sent his gunner to Grant to ask instruction." In any event it appears that the *Tyler* did assist in silencing at least one Confederate battery before dropping down on the Landing and being joined by the *Lexington*. As the Confederates massed for a final charge about 5:30 p.m., the two gunboats took position opposite a ravine through which the Confederates would have to charge. As the waves of Confederates started across the ravine, the gunboats opened fire and together with an Army battery of 32 pounders swept the ravine from end to end with shot, grape, and canister. The Confederates, not expecting the fire of the gunboats and eager for victory, rushed on to their destruction. Finally, unable to withstand this withering fire, they withdrew. The gunboats continued to fire on the Confederate camps throughout the night at 10-minute intervals thus preventing the enemy troops from resting. During the night the Union force was reinforced, and the following day the Confederates were forced to retreat.

The gunboats had not a single man injured. The *Tyler* alone fired 188 shells at pointblank range during the battle.

In his report of the battle, Grant commented "In this repulse much is due to the presence of the gunboats." This was the second time within 5 months that these same two boats had saved Grant from defeat.⁴¹

Island Number 10. After the fall of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, the Confederates transferred their forces and 130 large guns to Island No. 10 in the Mississippi. Islands were numbered from the mouth of the Ohio River downstream. Island No. 10 was located 40 miles below Columbus at the upper bend of a great double bend in the river. The island had been strongly fortified by General Beauregard who was called away to Corinth and Shiloh. It is significant to note that the Battles of Shiloh and Island No. 10 took place simultaneously. Beauregard left the defense of the island and command of its 7,000 defenders to General Mackall. The Confederates believed that the powerful fortifications on this island would finally stop the advance of Union vessels on the river.

A few miles south was the town of New Madrid, Mo. On 13 March 1862, General Pope with a force of 20,000 Union troops marched down the west bank of the river and bombarded the town with siege guns. That night he discovered that the Confederates had abandoned the town and had not even taken the time to destroy their stores of supplies. This victory isolated Island No. 10, inasmuch as Foote and a force of six gunboats and 11 mortarboats commanded the river above the island while Pope commanded the west bank of the river down stream. Foote, however, refused to bring his fleet downriver until battle damage suffered earlier had been repaired and the flotilla was ready to travel. Foote's refusal to move

accompany his forces downriver. The Army needed the boats to ferry troops across the river, but Foote refused on the grounds that the strongly fortified island prevented the movement of any vessel downstream.

Pope and his engineers then devised a plan to circumvent the Confederate guns by cutting a channel through the peninsula formed by the bend in the river. The channel, 6 miles long, 50 feet wide, and 4½ feet deep, was completed in 19 days. The shallow-draft, flat-bottomed transports moved through the channel and arrived at New Madrid, but the ironclad fleet drew too much water to make the transit.

Downstream, Commodore Hollins, C.S.N., in his flagship *McRae*, with seven gunboats, and a powerful floating battery, held the Union forces in check and prevented Pope from crossing the river. Pope needed the ironclads downstream to engage the Confederate Fleet and to silence batteries on the eastern shore prior to crossing with his force, and, unlike Foote, he believed it possible for a gunboat to run the batteries of the island. On encountering further resistance from Foote, Pope wired Halleck and requested that Foote be directed to remove the crews from two of the ironclads and turn them over to him.⁴² Foote thought it impossible for a gunboat to run the batteries in view of the 50 odd cannon that would be brought to bear on any vessel hazarding such an undertaking, and perhaps with the carnage of the bout with Fort Donelson fresh in his mind he refused to force this mission on any of his commanders. After continued needling from Pope, Foote finally agreed to let one of his gunboats make the attempt. The commanding officer of the *Carondelet*, Henry Walke, volunteered for this dangerous assignment.⁴³ On the night of 1 April, a raiding party of 50 sailors from the gunboats and 50 soldiers rowed downstream to the island and spiked

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ration for the *Carondelet's* run downstream.

After the moon had set on the overcast night of 4 April, the *Carondelet* started her journey downstream. All through the day the crew had prepared for this venture; planks, chains, hawsers, and bales of cotton were used throughout the ship, and a barge loaded with bales of cotton was tied alongside to ward off the expected incoming barrage. Steam exhaust—which normally escaped via the stack and which served to dampen the stack soot and keep it from torching—was rerouted into the pilot-house so that its telltale puffing would not be detected. This proved near disastrous, for when the *Carondelet* was but a half mile into the journey, the stack soot torched, and sheets of flame 5 feet high leaped from the stack lighting the river. The Confederate batteries took the *Carondelet* under fire assisted by lightning flashes from a storm over the river. Fortunately, the *Carondelet* steered close to the island, and the Confederate gunners, having depressed the elevation angle of their guns to prevent rain from entering the muzzles, overcompensated and fired over the *Carondelet*. After a 20-minute run through this fire, the *Carondelet* arrived off New Madrid without a scratch but the cotton barge had taken three hits. This feat of heroism should not be underrated, for *Carondelet* ran hard aground while approaching New Madrid, and it took an hour of hard work to float her free. Had this occurred off Island No. 10, the *Carondelet* would have been blasted from the water.

On the night that the *Carondelet* made her run downstream, the Confederate floating battery was alongside the island. After the *Carondelet* had passed, she was set adrift by her crew and floated downstream to the protection of the Confederate Fleet. When Commodore Hollins learned of the *Carondelet's* feat, he concluded that the

stream against him. Not wanting to engage these ironclads, he retired downstream. At this time his fleet represented the entire Confederate Navy on the upper river as every available gunboat had been dispatched to New Orleans where Farragut was threatening.

The night's work of the *Carondelet* sounded the death knell for the island; the next night the *Pittsburgh* ran the gauntlet, and the two set to work carrying troops across the river and silencing Confederate batteries. In 2 days the island was completely cut off and recognizing their predicament, the Confederates surrendered. The gunboats had taken their second giant step in their conquest of the river, this one 60 miles in length. More importantly, another flaw in the Confederate defensive strategy was exposed—forts could not stop the transit of the ironclads on the river.⁴⁴

Fort Pillow and Memphis. After the fall of Island No. 10, Foote became impatient with Pope's delay in getting his forces ready to travel and, on 11 April proceeded downriver 80 miles to Fort Pillow, which lay just above Memphis. Fort Pillow was located on a bend in the river and consisted of a 7 mile stretch of fortifications mounting a total of 40 guns. Pope's army joined Foote on 12 April and a plan was generated where troops would be landed 5 miles above the fort, proceed inland and approach the fort from the rear, while gunboats would bombard it from the river.

Terrain and Confederate opposition prevented Pope from gaining an advantage at the rear of the fort. He then proposed to cut a canal across the peninsula to get the gunboats downriver as he had done at Island No. 10. Foote continued to bombard the fort and by 15 April had 10 mortarboats on the firing line. That day Halleck ordered Pope's army, except for two regiments left to garrison the fort when it fell, 76

Pittsburg Landing. This left Foote and the gunboats virtually alone to continue the struggle.

Foote, upset by this action and suffering from his wounded leg, wrote Halleck that he had frustrated the most mature and hopeful plans yet formed. Foote thought that by joint operations Fort Pillow would fall in 4 days and Memphis in an additional two. He had good reason to be upset for he was left with a force of seven ironclads, one wooden gunboat, 16 mortarboats, and 1,500 troops to face the fort with its 6,000 defenders, nine Confederate gunboats which three were ironclads. Foote continued the bombardment of the fort, but little progress was made because of spring rains. His health failing rapidly, Foote requested to be relieved and nominated his successor, Capt. Charles H. Davis. On 9 May 1862 Foote hauled down his flag, turned over his command of the flotilla to Davis, and departed upstream to the accompanying cheers of his men.⁴⁵

The next morning a mortarboat was towed downstream by the ironclad *Cincinnati* to its usual firing position. A short time later Davis in *Cincinnati* observed eight Confederate steamers bearing down on him, four of them rams. During the engagement which ensued during the next hour, *Cincinnati* was rammed and sank in 11 feet of water and *Mound City*, with her bow rammed off, ran ashore and sank. When the battle ended, the Union boats retired upstream and the Confederates downstream, both claiming victory. Although the *Cincinnati* and *Mound City* were refloated the next day, it had been a costly morning for the ironclads. The exact damage to the Confederate Fleet was never assessed. Davis recorded that two of the Confederate vessels had dropped out of action in a cloud of smoke and steam and one appeared to be sinking as it rounded the bend out of sight.

Secretary of the Navy make available rams being built by the War Department. His request was forwarded to Colonel Ellet who had commenced construction of his ram fleet at Pittsburgh in late March. Ellet and his fleet of (four, five, eight or nine, depending upon historical source) rams arrived off Fort Pillow on 25 May. The confused command situation immediately caused friction between Davis and Ellet. Ellet pressed for a joint attack which would involve a dash by the fort and an attack on the Confederate Fleet. Davis declined and a sharp series of notes were exchanged, finally, Davis wrote Ellet that while his opinion of Ellet's attack plan was unfavorable, he would interpose no objection to Ellet's movements. Before any further naval action took place, the Confederates evacuated the fort and destroyed the magazines on 4 June 1862.

The next day Davis moved the flotilla downstream and anchored that evening above Memphis where the Confederate River Defense Fleet commanded by Capt. J.E. Montgomery was preparing for battle. Although Memphis was a hub of railroad traffic and a major river port, it had no defenses of its own since the Confederates considered that Fort Pillow and Island No. 10 could not be breached. Montgomery did not have enough fuel to make a run for Vicksburg, but rather than destroy the fleet which was the only existing defense of Memphis, he elected to fight.

Early on the morning of 6 June, the Confederate Fleet got underway after receiving a partial load of fuel for each vessel from the private homes of Memphis. As the Union Fleet of five gunboats and four rams got underway, the Confederate Fleet of eight rams and gunboats moved upstream to open the Battle of Memphis. This battle—fierce, intense, and decisive—lasted but 20 minutes. When it was over the Confederate Fleet was destroyed, only one of its gunboats and a supply ship

escaped downriver. Three of the Confederate gunboats were placed out of action by Ellet's rams. This victory, which was in reality a victory for the ram concept, was marred by the death of Ellet a few days later from a wound received in the battle.

Before noon of that day the Stars and Stripes replaced the Stars and Bars over Memphis.⁴⁶ Port Hudson and Vicksburg were now the last restrictions to Union control of the Mississippi as Farragut's forces captured New Orleans on 28 April and continued upstream, taking Baton Rouge and Natchez without opposition.

Vicksburg. Driven from the upper river by Davis and the ironclads and from the lower river by Farragut, the Confederates slowly fell back to the strongest natural position on the river, Vicksburg. Had the necessary Federal troops been available immediately after the fall of New Orleans, Vicksburg, which was not then heavily fortified, might have been taken. This Mississippi city, located about halfway downriver between Memphis and New Orleans, is situated on bluffs 200 feet high overlooking a hairpin curve in the river. Its defense at the time of the fall of New Orleans consisted of only 26 guns located atop the bluffs.

In mid-June 1862, Farragut arrived below Vicksburg with his fleet of war vessels together with Comdr. William D. Porter and his mortarboats. On 28 June Farragut ran the guns of Vicksburg to join hands with the rams of Ellet's force, losing 15 killed and 30 wounded in the process. A few days later, on 1 July, Davis and the ironclads joined forces with Farragut. Thus Mississippi River in a small sense was open to the sea. Although the toll was high Farragut proved that the Navy could successfully pass Vicksburg.

Farragut did not believe the Navy could capture Vicksburg without the

requested assistance from Halleck who replied:

The scattered and weakened condition of my force renders it impossible for me at the present time to detach any troops to cooperate with you. Probably I shall be able to do so as soon as I can get my troops more concentrated. This may delay the clearing of the river, but its accomplishment will be certain in a few weeks.⁴⁷

It is interesting to compare Halleck's statement with an excerpt from a letter written by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Fox to Admiral Farragut dated 10 July 1863:

I congratulate you upon the final opening of the Mississippi, you smashed in the door. . . . We do not forget that you and Davis met at Vicksburg a year ago and that five thousand troops which I vainly asked of Halleck (three times that number were lying idle at Helena under Curtis) were denied and a years fighting on the flanks of that river is the consequences. . . .⁴⁸

In view of Halleck's reply, Farragut received permission to return to New Orleans with his ships. The few weeks turned into 6 months, and the task of eliminating the batteries of Vicksburg and Fort Hudson 200 miles downriver remained, a task which was to take just a few days more than a year to accomplish.⁴⁹

On 15 July 1862 Davis sent a force of two gunboats and one ramboat up the Yazoo River to scout for the Confederate ram *Arkansas*. The Confederates had moved the *Arkansas* from Memphis where she was being constructed to the Yazoo which flows into the Mississippi 4 miles above Vicksburg. A falling water level in the Yazoo forced the commanding officer of the *Arkansas*, Lt. Isaac Brown, to rush completion of the vessel. He started downstream

with the intention of breaking through the Union Fleet and proceeding to the support of Confederate forces at New Orleans. He met the scouting party of Davis coming upstream about 6 miles from the mouth of the Yazoo. In the running battle that took place, the *Arkansas* routed the scouting force and then swung onto the Mississippi, catching the Union Fleet at anchor. He passed safely through the Union Fleet, exchanging broadsides en route to the protection of the guns of Vicksburg. In this Confederate victory, Union losses numbered 42 killed and 69 wounded while the *Arkansas* suffered 14 killed and 15 wounded.

During the next week various Union attempts to sink the *Arkansas*, including bombardment and ramming, failed. She finally slipped her mooring and moved downstream to her final resting place, under the command of Lt. Henry Stevens, who had replaced Brown when the latter became too weakened from wounds to travel. The *Arkansas* sailed over the protest of Brown who warned his superiors that she was in no condition to be moved. Several times during the voyage downstream her engines failed, and the last failure drove her ashore just as the Union steamer *Essex* was coming upstream. Stevens had explosives placed throughout the ship, ordered the crew ashore, and put her to the torch while the *Essex* took her under fire from long range. When the *Arkansas* exploded, the commanding officer of the *Essex*, Comdr. William D. Porter, took credit for her destruction. William D. Porter, the brother of David Porter who was to later relieve Davis as commander of the flotilla, wrote glowing reports of how he had destroyed the *Arkansas* in a fierce fight. Farragut and Davis disputed his reports and began an inquiry into the matter. Porter died 2 years later still defending his reports; his brother, who had had nothing to do with him for 15 years, never spoke to him again as a result of this incident.

During the closing months of 1862, the Navy added a fleet of 25 "tinclads" to the river force for use in shallow water operations and several new gunboats, including six second-generation ironclads. The Western Flotilla was transferred to the Navy on 1 October 1862, renamed the Mississippi Squadron, and placed under the command of acting Rear Adm. David D. Porter who was elevated to that rank to be on a command level co-equal to Grant with whom he was to cooperate in the campaign against Vicksburg.

The river force participated in numerous engagements on the Mississippi and its tributaries while awaiting the fall of Vicksburg. The story of this battle could be the subject of a thesis in itself, but suffice it to say that after several unsuccessful attempts by the Army and Navy to take the city, the Union forces settled down to siege operations with the gunboats effectively blockading the city from the river. Their mortars kept up a steady day and night barrage which although not particularly effective served to lower the morale of the defenders of the city. The Mississippi Squadron, running downstream under the guns of Vicksburg, also gave Grant's forces the support they needed

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Comdr. John F. Dillon, U.S. Navy, attended Indiana State University, Pensacola College, Southwestern College, and The George Washington University. As a naval aviator he has specialized in electronic warfare and has served as Operations Officer for Tactical Electronic Squadron 130, both Executive Officer and Commanding Officer of Tactical Warfare Squadron 133, and Air Operations Officer for the Fleet Electronics Support Group at Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Va. Commander Dillon is currently a student in the College of Naval Warfare.

to cross the river below the city—a stratagem which ultimately led to victory. Of the Navy's role in the defeat of Vicksburg, Grant said:

The Navy under Porter was all it could be during the entire campaign. Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been made at all in the way it was, with any number of men, without such assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. . . .⁵⁰

Vicksburg surrendered on 4 July 1863, while in the East, General Lee was withdrawing his battered force from the fields at Gettysburg. Fort Hudson on the Mississippi surrendered 5 days later. The battle for control of the great river which had started at Fort Henry was now over, the Confederacy was split asunder.

Although the Navy participated in other engagements on the rivers in the subsequent years of the war, the real story of riverine warfare took place on the Mississippi from September 1861 to the fall of Vicksburg less than 2 years later.

Summary. The Union Navy was charged with two great tasks during the Civil War: one, being the blockade of the Confederate coast from Texas to Virginia, and the second, control of the Mississippi River in cooperation with the Army. Although there has been a large body of literature written on the battles of the Civil War, the story of naval operations has failed to make a lasting impression in the minds of the American people. Few realize that had the Union failed to control the Mississippi or had the Navy been unable to maintain an effective blockade, France may have intervened on behalf of the South, and the United States might not exist as we know it today.

The North's recognition of the strategic importance of the Mississippi River and its tributaries shaped the subsequent events of the war on the Western rivers. But recognizing the rivers' military significance was not enough. A means to control the rivers was needed. Enter James B. Eads, the man with the ideas, knowledge, determination, and wherewithal to create this means: the Ironclad Pook Turtles, which, together with the Blue Water Navy, swept the rivers of Confederate opposition. Some credit for the creation of this unique gunboat force should go to the Army; it appears that had the Western rivers been under the cognizance of the Navy rather than the Army the ironclad gunboats may not have come into being, at least not in their final form.

When one considers that there never had been a war vessel on the rivers and there existed no provision for riverine operations; the problems of split command with war vessels commanded by naval officers, manned by a mixed crew of sailors and soldiers, and controlled by the War Department; and the independent nature of the ram fleet commanded by Colonel Ellet, which operated outside the military chain of command, it is truly surprising that the great struggle in the Mississippi Valley went so well for the Union.

The only factor that could overcome these difficulties was the appearance of men of stature united in purpose and working toward a common goal. Such men did appear: Grant, Foote, Davis, and Porter; and significantly, despite the obvious friction and disharmony among them, they were able to combine throughout the successful Mississippi Valley campaign from Fort Henry to Vicksburg.

The teamwork of Union infantry and gunboats denied the Confederacy access to the rivers which were vital for both commerce and military operations. By dividing the Confederacy down the middle, Union riverine forces effectively

contributed to the slow strangulation of the Army pounded it to death from the Confederacy from without, while within.

FOOTNOTES


1. Adolphe R. Roberts and Lowell Brentano, *The Book of the Navy* (New York: Doubleday, 1944), p. 129.
2. Willis J. Abbot, *The Naval History of the United States* (New York: Collier, 1886), v. II, p. 563.
3. Hilary A. Hebert, quoted in Francis T. Miller, *The Photographic History of the Civil War* (New York: Review of Reviews, 1911), v. I, p. 88.
4. Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 155.
5. Virgil C. Jones, *The Civil War at Sea* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), v. I, p. v.
6. Hebert, v. I, p. 94.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
8. Howard P. Nash, *A Naval History of the Civil War* (New York: Barnes, 1972), p. 301.
9. Edgar S. Maclay, *A History of the United States Navy from 1775 to 1894* (New York: Appleton, 1894), p. 325-326.
10. Fletcher Pratt, *Civil War on Western Waters* (New York: Holt, 1956), p. 9.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 14-16.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 17-18.
14. Jones, v. I, p. 212-213.
15. Pratt, p. 18-19.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 20-21.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
18. Maclay, p. 327-328.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
20. Abbot, v. II, p. 697.
21. Maclay, p. 329.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 329-330.
23. Pratt, p. 22.
24. George R. Clark, *A Short History of the United States Navy* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1939), p. 290.
25. Nash, p. 29.
26. Carroll S. Alden and Allan Westcott, *The United States Navy* (Chicago: Lippincott, 1943), p. 199.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Miller, p. 240.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 245.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
33. Abbot, v. II, p. 687.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 684.
35. Pratt, p. 26-27.
36. Abbot, v. II, p. 689.
37. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1962), p. 25.
38. Jones, v. I, p. 369.
39. Pratt, p. 380-381.
40. Maclay, p. 345.
41. Jones, v. II, p. 58.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 51-52.
43. Nash, p. 353.
44. Pratt, p. 68.
45. Jones, v. II, p. 155-156.
46. Miller, p. 246.

47. Nash, p. 149.
48. Robert M. Thompson and Richard Wainwright, eds., *Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 1861-1865* (New York: Divine, 1920), v. I, p. 335.
49. Nash, p. 151.
50. Clark, p. 326-327.



Fighting is nothing to the evil of the river—getting on shore,
running afoul of one another, losing anchors, etc.

David G. Farragut: Letter off Vicksburg, 1862



PROFESSIONAL READING

Corbett, Sir Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1972. 310p.

Why study strategy? Students frequently ask this question at the Naval War College.

Corbett argues strongly for a study of strategy for descriptive purposes. That is to say, such study should be for the purpose of ordering data by providing a framework for reference. As an example he cites the study of meteorology and navigation. No one would suggest that a study of weather and currents would provide a prescription of how they will behave at a given time and place, but an understanding of how they generally behave is indispensable to a mariner. To Corbett this justification for a theoretical study of strategy is "not a substitute for judgement and experience, but as a means of fertilizing both." For this reason it can do no man harm.

Corbett points out that a study of strategy is not a "how to" activity directed toward learning how to conduct wars. In other words, the study of strategy should not be used for prescriptive purposes. The reason for this is that such prescriptions will inevitably lead to dogma. The unique characteristics of each war fought on the basis of dogma prescribed from the study of previous wars will result in much mischief by way of impractical or unrealistic war plans.

The payoff ultimately is to be found

in conceptual unity, first of all between a commander and his subordinates, so they can understand the objectives to be achieved, all the better to accomplish them. Secondly, conceptual unity is necessary between a commander and his civilian masters so that both will know what precisely is the desired result or strategic effect of military or naval operations.

The first part of the book is an excellent exposition of a theory of war, based to a large extent on the writings of Karl von Clausewitz, who saw "that real war was in fact an international relation which differed from other international relations only in the method we adopted to achieve the objective of our policy." This is rather an elegant way of restating Clausewitz' dictum that war is a continuation of policy by other means.

It follows that in considering any military or naval operation the first question to be determined is simply: what is the war about? When the object of the war is clear, the next question is: how much value do we and the enemy attach to it?

At this point Corbett makes a distinction between limited and unlimited wars. This distinction rests on "the intensity with which the spirit of the Nation" is absorbed in the attainment of the objective of the war. He also notes that wars may be limited by geographical factors, especially "the strategical isolation of the object." His

conclusion is that maritime powers are best suited to conduct limited wars, primarily because such wars tend to be located in remote or easily isolated areas. Corbett's conclusion logically follows, which is, simply, that military and naval operations are the means to achieve the goals of policy. He notes, "the means adopted must conflict as little as possible with the political conditions from which the war springs."

The second portion of the book is concerned with the theory of naval war. The object of naval warfare is command of the sea or, at least, the prevention of the enemy from securing it. Corbett is careful to point out that command of the sea means control of maritime communications and not the conquering or occupation of the seas, which is physically impossible. Corbett also points out that if one belligerent loses command of the sea, it does not automatically pass to the other belligerent.

Corbett expounds the concept of a "fleet in being." This is essentially a fleet which is ready to engage or, at the very least, to harass an enemy. Even a fleet inferior in size and in strength can be used defensively to prevent an enemy with superior force from exercising command of the sea. This is the reason that if one belligerent loses command of the sea, the other automatically does not gain it.

The third portion of the book discusses the conduct of naval war. In it Corbett analyzes the methods of securing command, the methods of disputing command, and the methods of exercising command. His analysis is based on an extensive and thorough knowledge of British maritime history from the English-Dutch wars of the mid-17th century through the English-French wars of the 18th century, including the extensive maritime and naval operations of the Napoleonic wars. Examples are also drawn from the Russo-Japanese and the Spanish-American wars.

Advances in naval technology from sail to steam to nuclear power have not rendered obsolete the fundamentals of war or of maritime strategy. Only the means have changed. The British triumph over Napoleon brought an era of extensive fleet operations to a close. With only a few exceptions, the next major fleet operations occurred during the Second World War. For this reason, a student of naval strategy must go back to the age of sail for a thorough understanding of the employment of naval forces.

Corbett is as relevant for the naval officer in the electronic age as he was for the officers in the Royal Naval College who attended his lectures in the early years of this century. The theoretical study of strategy is not only useful, but necessary, because it can determine the normal, to use Corbett's phrase, by collating past events to ascertain what lines of action tended to produce what effects. The idiosyncrasies of war militate against similar lines of action necessarily producing similar effects in subsequent situations. Ultimately, a commander must exercise his own judgment and rely on his own experience, however conditioned, to determine specific courses of action to follow in each situation as it arises.

Clausewitz pointed out that the study of strategy should educate the mind of the military commander, but it should not accompany him on to the battlefield. Corbett wholeheartedly agrees.

The Naval Institute Press has performed a great service to naval officers and students of strategy by publishing a 1972 edition of this 1911 classic. Unfortunately, the price of \$14 will inevitably discourage many otherwise interested readers. Regrettably, a less expensive paperback edition was not published.

McKee, Christopher. *Edward Preble: a Naval Biography, 1761-1807*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1972. 394p.

Writing to President John Adams in 1799, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert remarked:

Our Navy at this time, when its character is to form, ought to be commanded by men who, not satisfied with escaping censure, will be unhappy if they do not receive and merit praise; by men who have talents and activity, as well as spirit, to assist a judicious arrangement for the employment of the force under their command or to cure the defects of a bad one.

Professor Christopher McKee, librarian at Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, uses this quotation as the theme of his scholarly biography of Capt. Edward Preble. Focusing on the detailed events of Preble's career from his youth in Maine, through service in the Massachusetts Navy during the Revolution and experience in the merchant marine, to his career in the U.S. Navy, McKee paints him as the personification of the American naval officer corps that came to leadership between 1801 and 1807. Although Preble was a stern captain who did not always command a happy ship, McKee sees that his success was based on the intellectual ability to understand the military, diplomatic, and commercial aspects of the naval profession and to harmonize, in his actions, the administration's policies with that understanding. In this way, McKee weaves the tactics of the squadron before Tripoli with Jeffersonian naval policy. Although not involved with the intellectual issues of strategic theory or the origins of policy, McKee rather successfully deals with Preble at the point where strategy, tactics, policy, and personality interact. This study is a useful contribution to an area of American naval history that has long been

ignored. It is thoroughly documented with primary source materials dispersed in depositories ranging from Paris and London to Portland, Maine; Washington, D.C.; and California.

McKee's careful scholarship adds insight into the history of the U.S. Navy's early period. While what he says is valuable, it is not the only approach that may be taken for a study of Preble. Seen in the broader perspective of American and modern European history, the student also needs to understand the reasons why Preble captured the popular imagination with his vigorous campaign in the Mediterranean and the effect that it had in broad national and international terms. McKee's work is generally confined to specific naval, maritime, and diplomatic events. He leaves for others to discuss the broad ramifications of these problems.

For instance, one might note that the Congressional gold medal inscribed to Preble, "*Vindici Commercii Americani Ante Tripoli*," reflected the sustained purpose behind the war and was an expression of the emerging American nationality and patriotism. At the same time, the comments of prominent men of the day brought recognition to a fledgling country. Horatio Nelson could say that the burning of the frigate *Philadelphia* was "The most bold and daring Act of the Age" and the Pope could declare that Preble "with a small force and in a short space of time, has done more for the cause of Christianity than the most powerful nations of Christendom have done for ages."

The detailed drawings of battle tactics and the extensive quotation from primary sources may make this volume less appealing to the general reader. However, it is a valuable contribution to the library of a specialist.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Wenk, Edward, Jr. *The Politics of the Ocean*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972. 588p.

The Politics of the Ocean is an unusual book, unusual in that while it is written as a contemporary chronicle of recent developments, it remains one of the most valuable reference works in the field of oceanology today. In his first three chapters, the author describes the sequence of events which ultimately led to congressional passage of the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 and subsequent congressional efforts which created the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development to implement this mandate. As Executive Secretary of the Marine Resources Council, Dr. Wenk is in a unique position to report on the council's continuing efforts.

Inasmuch as oceanology is a relatively new and expanding field and one which will grow in importance in the future, the remainder of the book concentrates on the formidable challenge it presents to those interested in the future well-being of this country. Five case studies are presented which illustrate the problems associated with trying to develop rational means of managing an area which amounts to 85 percent of the surface of this planet. Foremost amongst these are: the difficulties in developing an agreed upon concept of the coastal zone as an area of public trust; gaining greater knowledge and understanding of the oceans as a basis for new concepts of ocean law and international relations; Government and industry efforts to develop the resources of the oceans and the failure of these efforts to achieve the critical mass required for synergistic action; and the high hopes for a wet NASA as an institutional focal point for ocean-related projects and problems.

Progress today in each one of these areas has been unsatisfactory, largely because of the Government's failure to

effectively coordinate a national program focusing on the full range of ocean problems. Although the Congress gave the executive branch a clear mandate to initiate and implement a National Maritime Program in the Marine Resources Act of 1966 and supported the executive branch whenever it exercised its mandate, difficulties arose in the implementation of these new programs. There are over 35 Federal agencies or departments which have varying degrees of responsibility for implementing programs of maritime concern, not to mention the many states with coastal areas and rights. Given this fragmentation of authority, it is not surprising that the Government's overall program has only achieved limited success to date. The Marine Resources Council, with the Vice President of the United States as its chairman, did have sufficient power to accomplish some of its goals before it was disbanded. Dr. Wenk clearly shows that the proximity of the council to the White House was the source of its power and that without the support of the White House it became less effective. With the advent of the National Oceans and Atmosphere Agency (NOAA) and its advisory committee (NACOA), however, the Marine Resources Council disappeared from the scene.

The book is a powerful one. Dr. Wenk identifies the persons involved in most of the proceedings by name; gives the facts surrounding situations as he sees them; states his opinions forcefully on many subjects concerning the oceans; and while the book is not unbiased, the insights it provides are nonetheless important because of the key role its author played in the events described. No one is better qualified to express his opinions, for no one has had access to more facts or has been more involved with this attempt than Dr. Wenk.

The author very properly points out that the task of bringing rational man-

agement to our ocean resources has just begun. While we have just taken the first halting steps on a national scale, we must also acknowledge the need to concurrently develop international institutions designed to manage the world's oceans as a whole within the context of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. The book ends with a ringing call to seize the initiative in this area, imploring the reader to consider

the law of the sea as one of the possible alternatives in the development of our own national strategy.

In summary, *The Politics of the Oceans* is mandatory reading for anyone who understands that a nation's maritime policy must entail more than maintaining naval forces in readiness.

WAYNE J. SMITH
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy



If your book could persuade some of our new soldiers to read and mark and learn things outside drill manuals and tactical diagrams, it would do a good work.

T.E. Lawrence: Letter to Liddell Hart, 26 June 1933

A READING GUIDE FOR OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

This *Reading Guide*, compiled by the library staff of the Naval War College, lists books recommended to Navy and Marine Corps officers who desire to become familiar with books in the mainstream of contemporary thought. Reading of selections from each category will broaden and enrich the professional background of Navy and Marine Corps officers and increase awareness and understanding of movements and ideas figuring prominently in current intellectual discussion.

The inclusion of books in this guide does not constitute an endorsement of the facts, opinions, or concepts presented. The selection criteria for books have been relevancy, lucidity, and thoughtfulness and the scholarly requirement for presenting a wide range of ideas. Within the subject categories, a number of divergent viewpoints are presented to challenge the reader's critical and analytical abilities. For books listed in Section I, *The Contemporary Scene*, the selection criteria have emphasized currency, controversy, and provocative presentation. An attempt to present opposing viewpoints has also been made in this section. In any case, the reader is encouraged and urged to evaluate the material himself.

Prices given are subject to change by the publisher without notice.

To assist Navy and Marine Corps officers in following this reading list, shipboard libraries and general libraries ashore are stocked with representative books listed in the *Guide*. Before a command requests titles from the list, library holdings should be checked. Not all titles can be provided for each ship and station library. If the local Navy or Marine Corps library does not contain the book you want to read, you may borrow it through the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Organization. Direct your letter requesting loan of a book to the nearest of the following collections without submitting it through the chain of command.

Chief of Naval Personnel (Pers C463)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
(Library-ALSC), Bldg. 9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
(Library-ALSC)
San Diego, California 92136

Commanding Officer
 U.S. Naval Station
 (Library-ALSC), Box 20
 FPO San Francisco 96610

Commanding Officer
 U.S. Naval Station
 (Library-ALSC), Box 174
 FPO San Francisco 96630

Upon receipt of your letter of request, the book will be mailed directly to you. A book may be kept for one month from date of receipt and may usually be renewed for an additional month.

Personnel at reserve activities desiring to read books on the list should try first to obtain them from sources such as the local public library. Naval Reserve personnel may ask to borrow a book from one of the Auxiliary Library Service Collections noted above if it is not available through any libraries in the community.

Individuals who wish to purchase personal copies of books on the reading list may do so by ordering them through the Naval College Bookstore, Naval Station, Newport, R.I. 02840. To cover postage and handling, the sum of 25 cents should be added to the purchase price for the first book ordered and 10 cents for each additional book ordered.

I. THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

- Ahern, James F. *Police in Trouble; Our Frightening Crisis in Law Enforcement*. New York: Hawthorn, 1972. 260p. \$6.95
Insider's look, by the former New Haven police chief, at the isolated world of the policeman, manipulated by politicians, responsible for enforcing unenforceable laws, and saddled with poor leadership. Calls for the Federal Government to talk less and do more in the area of police reform.
- Alexander, Herbert E. *Money in Politics*. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1972. 353p. \$10.00
Comprehensive study of how money is raised and how it is spent at all levels of American politics. Several controversial remedies are suggested for the present "debt-ridden, obligation-bound" system.
- Beichman, Arnold. *Nine Lies about America*. Freeport, N.Y.: Library Press, 1972. 314p. \$7.95
America is "fascist," "genocidal," "materialistic"—these are three of the nine frequently reiterated criticisms which the author, a longtime liberal, refutes. Using extensive quotes, he exposes their lack of either logic or evidence.
- Bogart, Leo. *Silent Politics: Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion*. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1972. 250p. \$9.95
Examines the changing nature of public opinion and how it is influenced, as much as measured, by public opinion polls. Concludes that despite their described misuse by politicians and the media, polls can make a major contribution to democracy.
- Drug Abuse Survey Project. *Dealing with Drug Abuse; a Report to the Ford Foundation*. New York: Praeger, 1972. 396p. \$8.95
Well-balanced, current perspective on the drug abuse problem in the United States and what is being done to control it. Covers drugs and their effects; education, treatment, and rehabilitation; Federal activities in the field; and comparative programs in Great Britain.
- Fried, Joseph P. *Housing Crisis U.S.A.* New York: Praeger, 1971. 250p. \$7.95
One American family out of six, in rural as much as in urban areas where whites of non-Latin-American origin are in the majority, does not have decent housing. Public and private efforts to solve this crisis are surveyed and pessimistic conclusions reached.
- In the Name of Profit*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972. 273p. \$6.95
Faulty school buses, a dangerous drug, and an unsafe airbrake for the Air Force featured among the six well-documented cases of corporate chicanery by leading American industrial giants, as described in part one. Part two suggests ways of achieving corporate responsibility.
- Keniston, Kenneth. *Youth and Dissent; the Rise of a New Opposition*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971. 403p. \$9.95; paper \$2.95
Essays, written between the early sixties and the present by an authoritative commentator on young activists, set the background from which student opposition emerged, provide portraits of the dissenters, and consider the historic meaning and social significance of the counterculture. The revolt of affluent, educated youth is seen as a genuinely new phenomenon which no

Kriegbaum, Hillier. *Pressures on the Press*. New York: Crowell, 1972. 248p. \$6.95
 Explores the methods by which political figures, special interest groups, and occasionally even the general public try to influence the way that the news media portray events. Newspaper monopolies, First Amendment conflicts, and the impact of television are other areas covered in this sympathetic overview of an institution under attack.

Lieberman, Jethro K. *How the Government Breaks the Law*. New York: Stein & Day, 1972. 309p. \$10.00

That government—federal and local bureaucracies, the military, legislatures, courts, and police—contributes to America's crime problem is implied by the many instances of outright lawbreaking and failure to enforce particular laws cataloged herein. An ombudsman to investigate and expose governmental lawlessness is one solution proposed.

Martin, John H. and Harrison, Charles H. *Free to Learn; Unlocking and Ungrading American Education*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 185p. \$5.95; paper \$2.45

The fact that the expenditure of millions of dollars on education has had no measurable effect on student achievement is blamed on the graded school, an institution designed for mass instruction when, in reality, children learn in different ways. The authors would replace the present system with an educational assembly, representing all elements of a community, and new institutions embracing every aspect of education and structured to fit human diversity.

Melville, Keith. *Communes in the Counter Culture: Origins, Theories, Styles of Life*. New York: Morrow, 1972. 256p. \$7.95; paper \$2.45

A cleavage exists in the counterculture between the revolutionary young, who aspire to power in order to change American society, and the apolitical young, who have chosen to drop out of this society and to create, in communes, the embryo of a new one. Historical antecedents and the new cultural alternatives being tested in today's communes are discussed.

Mollenhoff, Clark R. *Strike Force; Organized Crime and the Government*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 274p. \$6.95

Case studies of recent government efforts to prosecute organized crime, with emphasis on the successful use of legalized wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. Appendixes give the personnel and geographic location of Cosa Nostra organizations.

Newfield, Jack and Greenfield, Jeff. *A Populist Manifesto; the Making of a New Majority*. New York: Praeger, 1972. 221p. \$5.95

Urges a new political coalition of economic self-interest between blacks and low- to middle-income whites, based on the premise that the first priority of politics is to redress the balance between the few who have too much money and power and the many who have too little. Offers a program to correct abuses both in traditional areas of populist concern, such as monopolies and taxes, and in contemporary areas, such as crime, health care, and labor unions.

Packard, Vance. *A Nation of Strangers*. New York: McKay, 1972. 368p. \$7.95

Analyzes the causes and institutions responsible for the fact that some 40 million Americans change their address at least once a year. Concludes with a description of how people are combating the sense of personal isolation and fragmentation of the family which accompanies this accelerated mobility.

Wilcox, Francis O. *Congress, the Executive, and Foreign Policy*. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 179p. \$5.95

The mutual trust and consensus that previously existed between the executive and legislative branch began deteriorating under the pressure of events in the 1960's. The present role and changing nature of Congress is analyzed in order to determine what part it should play in achieving a viable U.S. foreign policy.

II. ARMED FORCES

A. Military Sociology and Civil-Military Relations

Ambrose, Stephen E., ed. *The Military and American Society*. New York: Free Press, 1972. 322p. \$10.00

A series of essays and readings in which the editors show that the United States has created the most powerful armed forces the world has ever known. The military has an influence on American society which is direct and deep, yet, remarkably, it does not dominate our lives, establish values, or dictate our foreign and domestic policies. The military advises and suggests, but does not make the decisions.

Bunting, Josiah. *The Lionheads*. New York: Braziller, 1972. 213p. \$5.95

This novel is the story of General George Lemming, the alleged ambitious, arrogant commander of the 12th Division in Vietnam. All the action takes place in the 2 months following the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968. It is an account of military maneuvers by an author who served as an Army officer in the Vietnamese Delta.

Glasser, Ronald J. *365 Days*. New York: Braziller, 1971. 292p. \$6.95; paper (Bantam) \$1.50

A moving book about the Vietnamese war written by a pediatrician who, sent to Japan to serve the children of the dependent military there, finds himself taking care of troops from Vietnam. Each chapter accounts for a true-life story as told by patients whom Dr. Glasser has treated.

Hersh, Seymour M. *Cover-Up*. New York: Random House, 1972. 305p. \$6.95

Essentially a summary of what was said at the investigation conducted by a panel headed by Lt. Gen. William R. Peers to find out why and how the story of My Lai remained a secret for so long.

Kerry, John, et al. *The New Soldier*. New York: Macmillan, 1971. 174p. paper \$3.95

A chronology of the growth and action of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War and their philosophy as expressed in their own accounts of their experiences in Vietnam. Good cross section of the views of the dissenters.

King, Edward L. *The Death of the Army: a Pre-Mortem*. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972. 246p. \$6.95

The author was an Army officer for 23 years and resigned because he opposed the war in Vietnam. He offers his thoughts on what is wrong with the Army today and the implications those wrongs hold for America. He foresees Army planners seizing upon the concept of low-intensity wars as a justification for a large standing army.

Polner, Murray, ed. *When Can I Come Home? A Debate on Amnesty for Exiles, Antiwar Prisoners, and Others*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972. 267p. paper \$1.95

An assortment of short essays which address the question of whether, when the conflict is over, the men who refused to fight in the Indochina war should be set free. Both sides of the matter are represented, and various ramifications of the issue are considered, e.g., Would amnesty imply an admission of wrong by the Government? Can we expect obedience to the law in the future if we excuse the offenders?

Rapoport, Roger. *The Great American Bomb Machine*. New York: Dutton, 1971. 160p. \$5.95

Assails the production and testing of nuclear weapons, showing the defects that occur in their manufacture and the heavy toll exacted on the earth and the population from the effects of their fabrication and testing. The author thinks that there should be disarmament, termination of nuclear tests, and dismantling of the weapons program.

Rice, Berkeley. *The C-5A Scandal: an Inside Story of the Military-Industrial Complex*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971. 238p. \$5.95

Carefully traces the procurement of one of the Department of Defense's most expensive systems. Rice specializes in military-industrial affairs and carefully references the facts he presents. It gives a very good insight into the military-industrial complex.

B. Naval and Military History

Fitzgerald, Frances. *Fire in the Lake*. Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1972. 491p. \$12.50

A Southeast Asian affairs student and experienced reporter, the author has written a penetrating sociological and psychological study of the Vietnamese character and people during war time. The effects of the Americans' approaches and programs in Vietnam are deeply probed and contrasted with those of the NLF, a greater understanding being exhibited toward the Asian attitude. An eventual North Vietnamese victory is implicit in this analysis.

Karsten, Peter. *The Naval Aristocracy: Mahan's Messmates and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*. New York: Free Press, 1972. 462p. \$10.95

The author scrutinizes naval officers, primarily of the period from 1845 to 1925, the age of total Annapolis domination of the Navy, and feels he has discovered what these men were composed of and what motivated their actions. He also examines the influences of their actions on the Navy and on the Nation and its policies. He concludes that these officers formed a naval aristocracy who were influential in the control and development of U.S. naval power during the period under review.

Tolley, Kemp. *Yangtze Patrol: the U.S. Navy in China*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1971. 329p. \$10.00

A lively account of American contacts with China beginning in 1784 and ending with the last two Yangtze gunboats slipping to sea before Pearl Harbor. Admiral Tolley was in China during most of the 1930's, and the book describes events taking place during that time and the previous decade.

- Wouk, Herman. *The Winds of War*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. 885p. \$10.00
A well-plotted novel about the complex military and political events that got the United States into World War II. Comdr. Victor Henry, USN, is assigned to Berlin as naval attaché in early 1939. He serves as an unofficial analyst of German political-military affairs to President Franklin Roosevelt. His role as attaché also puts him in touch with Hitler, Goering, Stalin, and Churchill.

III. STRATEGY

- Art, Robert J. and Waltz, Kenneth N., eds. *The Use of Force; International Politics and Foreign Policy*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. 547p. paper \$5.95
The first two groups of these essays deal with general theories on the use of force and specific case studies illustrating these theories in practice. The last three parts of this collection are concerned with innovation and obsolescence in the use of force; constraints on the use of force, through arms control; and successes and failures in the control of force.
- Cable, James. *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications for Limited Naval Force*. New York: Praeger, 1971. 251p. \$11.00
The past is analyzed to suggest a future role for the application of limited naval force as a diplomatic tool. Special attention is given to the growing strength of the Russian Navy and its increasing use as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.
- Coffey, Joseph I. *Strategic Power and National Security*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971. 214p. \$9.50
The requirements for strategic nuclear forces is the focus of concern in this book which examines the military-technical factors influencing the size and composition of American strategic nuclear forces, the political and psychological effects of different levels of strategic power, and their implications for national security and welfare in view of current changes in military policy.
- Cornell University Program on Peace Studies. Air War Study Group. *Air War in Indochina*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. 289p. \$8.95; paper \$3.95
An analysis of U.S. air operations in Indochina. The thesis is that air warfare "can disrupt economic, social, and political activity, . . . it cannot enforce desired behavior in the way ground forces can." A good resource, because of its detail and wealth of statistical data.
- Eller, Ernest M. *The Soviet Sea Challenge*. Chicago: Cowles, 1971. 315p. \$8.95
An account of the history of the United States and the Soviet Navies leading up to their superpower status in the post-World War II era. The author, a retired admiral, sees the need for a continued growth in U.S. naval and maritime strengths in order to meet the challenge of the growing Soviet Navy. The U.S. naval participation in the Korean and Vietnamese wars has demonstrated the need for new weapons and for new uses of the seas.
- Fabian, Larry L. *Soldiers without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971. 315p. \$7.50; paper \$3.50
An important study of the political history of the United Nations peacekeeping role and the various factors that have shaped it.

Fairhall, David. *Russian Sea Power: an Account of Its Present Strength and Strategy*. Boston: Gambit, 1971. 286p. \$10.00

In addition to a discussion of Soviet naval strategy, this book emphasizes the various aspects of Soviet maritime policy—commercial shipping, oceanography, fishing. Written in a journalistic style, it presents an important contribution to the understanding of contemporary strategic concepts.

Newhouse, John, et al. *U.S. Troops in Europe: Issues, Costs, and Choices*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971. 177p. \$6.95; paper \$2.95

In spite of recent emphasis on negotiation rather than confrontation, it is felt that the U.S. NATO commitment is still vital. The authors examine a number of questions that are basic to change in the future status of U.S. troops in Europe.

Vansant, Carl. *Strategic Energy Supply and National Security*. New York: Praeger, 1971. 135p. \$15.00

Among the matters considered here are the increasing international demand for, and production of, petroleum; the attendant problem of energy resource management; and the strategic implications of the necessary waterborne transportation for this commodity, in view of the shift in the geocenter of oil production.

IV. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ambrose, Stephen E. *Rise to Globalism; American Foreign Policy since 1938*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971. 352p. paper \$1.65

The post-World War II changes in United States attitudes, policies, and methods are highlighted in this pithy pursuit and interpretation of the course of American foreign policy over the past three decades.

Dulles, Foster R. *American Policy toward Communist China, 1949-1969*. New York: Crowell, 1972. 273p. \$7.95

In this objective and succinct account are revealed the national and ideological influences, notably McCarthyism and the fear of communism, that created America's image of Communist China and molded the U.S. posture toward the Peking government. The American leaders of the period and the policies they instituted are closely observed, the drastic change in President Nixon's thinking being featured. This book affords an excellent background for those interested in present developments in Washington's China policy.

Emmerson, John K. *Arms, Yen and Power: the Japanese Dilemma*. New York: Dunellen, 1971. 420p. \$15.00

Distinguished for its comprehension of Japanese perceptions, this book presents a clear-eyed view of Japan's present prosperity and important world position, identifying the causes of her success and examining her relations with other world powers and with her East Asian neighbors. The volume concludes with a consideration of the decisions facing Japan in the current decade: the nuclear option with its political and technological implications, the "special" Japanese-American relationship, and Japan's role in the 1970's.

Franck, Thomas M. and Weisband, Edward. *Word Politics; Verbal Strategy among the Superpowers*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 176p. \$5.95

Finding the U.S. verbal justification of her right to intervene in Latin America
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1973

comparable to the Soviet announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the authors emphasize the role of diplomatic statements in international relations and foreign policy; they mark the close relationship between words and actions.

Halberstam, David. *The Best and the Brightest*. New York: Random House, 1972. 688p. \$10.00

Seeking the answer to why the United States got involved in the Vietnamese war, the author concludes that things might have been different if the decisions had been made by the "humanists" instead of the "rationalists" in Government. He supports this opinion by a scrutiny of the American political and military leaders as players in the game of bureaucratic politics, with first loyalty to the team rather than to the national welfare; the succession of errors on the field is detailed and documented.

Halper, Thomas. *Foreign Policy Crises: Appearance and Reality in Decision Making*. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1971. 235p. paper \$4.95

In this frank report on crisis decisionmaking, the author stresses the consequences of the decisionmakers' perceptions and misperceptions and indicates how the public may be misled in interpreting national responses. The case studies employed to exemplify his thesis include incidents of the U.S. involvement in the Caribbean and in the Vietnamese conflict.

Hinton, Harold C. *The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking under Soviet Pressure*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971. 112p. paper \$3.00

A brief yet penetrating study of the pressures which the Soviet Union applied to China over the past decade, the Russian motivation for this action, and the results for Chinese foreign and domestic policy. The final chapters are concerned with current problems and the prospects for Sino-Soviet relations and with the U.S. posture toward the schism and her future policy toward China.

Kahn, Herman and Bruce-Briggs, B. *Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties*. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 262p. \$7.95

Prognosticator Kahn and his colleague foresee that the relatively stable and peaceful period following World War II, which they correspond to the Belle Epoque preceding the First World War, will not explode but will decline into a contest between two successors to today's liberalism: a "humanist left" opposing a "rationalist center"—counterculture vs. counterreformation. Projections are offered regarding military, technological, and social developments evolving from this struggle.

Korbel, Josef. *Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. 302p. \$10.00

A guarded but not hopeless assessment of the authenticity and viability of European détente. After appraising the ideological, political, and economic aspects of the détente scene, the author concentrates on West Germany's mercurial foreign policy in the context of the German separation and of the relationships between Western and Eastern Europe.

Shafer, Boyd C. *Faces of Nationalism; New Realities and Old Myths*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972. 535p. \$12.95

This scholarly examination of the character and development of nationalism

recognizes the factors effecting the growing importance of nationalism and its pertinence for relations both at home and abroad. The comprehensive treatment of the subject is enhanced by a substantial bibliography.

Singer, Marshall R. *Weak States in a World of Powers: the Dynamics of International Relationships*. New York: Free Press, 1972. 431p. \$10.95

Views the changing relations between states and analyzes the character of the "ties that bind" nations—perceptual/identity, communication, economic, military, and political—ending with policy recommendations for both weak and powerful countries. Interesting tables accompany the text.

Spanier, John W. *Games Nations Play; Analyzing International Politics*. New York: Praeger, 1972. 457p. \$12.50

A guide to understanding why nations act as they do in the international arena. Employing the three analytical levels of state, national, and decisionmaking systems, the author demonstrates how these levels can apply to contemporary situations and policies, selecting crucial examples from the past 40 years. There is a generous bibliography.

Sprout, Harold and Sprout, Margaret. *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971. 499p. \$16.75

International politics from a definitely ecological perspective. After a scrutiny of the current international system and its components, the authors turn to their major concern: the changing social and physical environment and the implications for public order and world survival. The conclusion offers scenarios and possibilities for global politics in view of the encompassing realities and the evolving future potentialities and imperatives.

Terrill, Ross. *800,000,000: the Real China*. Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1971. 235p. \$7.95

During his 40-day, 7,000-mile travels through China, the author had the privilege of talking with and interviewing all classes of the people. The conversations afforded him an exceptional insight into Chinese life and outlook today: he was impressed by the changes that have occurred, but deplors the restrictions on freedom that still obtain; yet he does not see China as a belligerent power.

Tucker, Robert W. *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?* New York: Universe Books, 1972. 127p. \$6.00

Professor Tucker poses some trenchant questions regarding American security and vital interests and how they would be affected by a new type of isolationism (equated with a new anti-interventionist internationalism) that would entail the United States withdrawing from military commitments abroad and her pursuing a more modest world role in the future.

Ulam, Adam B. *The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II*. New York: Viking Press, 1971. 405p. \$10.95

An analytical investigation of the crises, trends, and developments that have caused or influenced Russia's and America's policies and their attitudes toward each other. The misunderstandings, false premises, and impetuous decisions are subjected to the cold light of reason in an effort to clarify international thinking, exposing the roots of antagonism and doing the spadework for a foundation of better agreement and world peace.

V. INTERNATIONAL LAW

Butler, William E. *The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. 245p. \$12.00

A discussion and documentation of the Soviet Union's law of the seas doctrine, together with its historical precedents. Most topics of maritime law, such as territorial waters, the high seas, and the seabed, are analyzed, as well as their current applications and possible future implications.

International Law of Communications. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1971. 170p. \$7.50

A collection of papers on the development of an international law of communications, raising the various problems brought forth as a result of the development of telecommunication satellites. The need for East-West cooperation is emphasized, along with the participation of the underdeveloped countries.

Lazareff, Serge. *Status of Military Forces under Current International Law*. New York: Humanities Press, 1971. 458p. \$19.00

A definitive work on the status of the Allied forces in terms of their territorial jurisdiction over a sovereign nation. Examples are given of past agreements; but the major emphasis is on NATO, including the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the foreign forces stationed in a certain country.

Luard, Evan, ed. *The International Regulation of Civil Wars*. New York: New York University Press, 1972. 240p. \$8.95

Through analysis of seven examples of civil wars, with a chapter devoted to each, the authors determine their underlying causes and the principles of international law applicable to these conflicts. Recent instances have been distinguished by the prevalence of foreign intervention and the training of revolutionaries outside of the adversaries' territory. The peacekeeping role of the United Nations also enters into the discussion.

Schwarzenberger, Georg. *International Law and Order*. New York: Praeger, 1971. 298p. \$17.50

Covers a broad spectrum from legal theories on the relation of law and order and the effects of law in specific issues such as treaties, the most-favored-nation standard, peace, armed conflict, nuclear weapons, terrorism, and the Eichmann trial.

VI. ECONOMICS

Cochran, Thomas C. *Business in American Life: a History*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972. 416p. \$12.50

The relationship between business and American society is the focus of this comprehensive survey that portrays the effects of business on family life, education, religion, law, politics, working conditions, and social forms.

Diebold, William, Jr. *The United States and the Industrial World: American Foreign Economic Policy in the 1970s*. New York: Praeger, 1972. 463p. \$13.50

Within the broad analysis of U.S. economic relations with Canada, Europe and Japan, the equivocal state of current American policies is examined and

recommendations are offered for aims and programs in various spheres of economic activity. Especially interesting is the consideration of extensive policy alternatives for the years ahead in the areas of international trade, the monetary system, and cooperation as opposed to nationalism.

Faith, Nicholas. *The Infiltrators: the European Business Invasion of America*. New York: Dutton, 1972. 242p. \$7.95

With so much emphasis being placed on American business inroads into European industry, this author addresses the lesser known inverse situation, disclosing that European business investment in the United States is surpassing American investment in Europe—this despite the obstacles attendant upon the U.S. antitrust and tax complexities. Representative case histories are cited and an appendix provides a list of British-owned or British-controlled manufacturing and petroleum companies in the United States and their American subsidiaries.

Fortune. *Challenges for Business in the 1970's*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972, c. 1970-1972. 178p. \$6.95; paper \$2.95

Compiled by the editors of *Fortune*, this slim volume comprises eight articles from that publication, the theme being the future of the American economy in the uncertain decade ahead. Treated are such aspects as the U.S. population question, the "identity crisis" in the consumer markets, the auto and arms industries, and pollution control.

Green, Mark J. *The Closed Enterprise System: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Antitrust Enforcement*. New York: Grossman, 1972. 488p. \$8.95

This Nader report assesses the degree and efficacy of the application of antitrust laws in the United States. The judgment is that there is evidence of price-fixing, collusion, failure to enforce antitrust legislation, and purposeful blindness of Government agencies and branches to trust violations. Not only are imputations made but remedies are also suggested.

Kraus, Albert L. *The New York Times Guide to Business and Finance; the American Economy and How It Works*. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 280p. \$8.95

How such activities of the financial and business system as investment and stock exchanges operate is clearly described, and the mysterious aspects of monetary policies are investigated, particularly as they affect economic stability. The contention between Keynesians and Friedmanites is discussed, and business, trade, the Federal budget, Government in business, and the international monetary structure are all treated.

Parker, Richard. *The Myth of the Middle Class: Notes on Affluence and Equality*. New York: Liveright, 1972. 288p. \$7.95

The concept that the American middle class is an affluent, homogeneous group is shown to be more fiction than fact; there are definite divisions within this class, with the lower section subject to the same inequalities that beset the poor. Regrettably, neither economic measures nor Government programs have been successful in producing a change in the conventional rich-poor pattern.

Reynolds, Lloyd G. *The Three Worlds of Economics*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. 344p. \$12.50

The three worlds referred to in the title are the capitalist, socialist, and the less developed; the author differentiates between the issues special to each of the triad and the individual policies employed by them. Final chapters are devoted

to the subject of how much authority Western economic theory has for the problems of the socialist and less developed economies and to proposals for how this theory may be expanded to embrace the broader range of issues.

Schultze, Charles L., et al. *Setting National Priorities: the 1972 Budget*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972. 468p. \$8.95; paper \$3.50

The first part of this annual survey of the Federal budget addresses itself to the area of national security and the defense budget and how this budget affects the Armed Forces and defense spending for the 1970's; the second part is devoted to domestic problems and programs; and the final section takes a long-term view of priorities. Copious tables augment the text.

Vernon, Raymond. *Sovereignty at Bay; the Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises*. New York: Basic Books, 1971. 326p. \$8.50

This volume organizes the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project's conclusions regarding the multinational corporation and the major derivative problems, notably the effects upon the host country's national interests and the policies evolving in response to these influences. In this authoritative work judicious solutions to these problems are developed.

Weisskopf, Walter A. *Alienation and Economics*. New York: Dutton, 1971. 202p. \$7.95

A scholarly and significant consideration of the philosophy underlying Western social and economic thought and action—"a critique of industrial society"—in essence, an attack on economics, which the author believes has become a "value-empty" discipline. Such issues as welfare and the "GNP-fetishism" are the objects of attention.

VII. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Barnaby, C. Frank. *Man and the Atom; the Uses of Nuclear Energy*. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1972. 216p. \$6.95

A crisp, clear, and fact-filled exposition of the important technologies associated with all aspects of nuclear energy and radiation, as well as the social and economic implication of nuclear power generation.

Dickson, Paul. *Think Tanks*. New York: Atheneum, 1971. 369p. \$10.00

A well-researched book which relies on primary sources of information, it reports on the U.S. idea factories and their influence, from Rand to Nader's Raiders.

Fuller, Watson, ed. *The Biological Revolution: Social Good or Social Evil?* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972. 345p. paper \$2.50

Contains papers and discussions presented at a 1970 international conference of scientists. The discussion touches upon the merits and dangers of research in such socially sensitive areas as the relationship of intelligence to race and analyzes the loss of public confidence in science and the failures of science to relate adequately to human needs.

Hawkes, Nigel. *The Computer Revolution*. New York: Dutton, 1972. 216p. \$7.95

An illustrated, competent work in which the author discusses the application of computers in modern society. An extra dimension is given to the book by the author's attention to military imperatives and commercial restraints in the historical development of the computer.

Horsfield, Brenda and Stone, Peter B. *The Great Ocean Business*. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1972. 360p. \$12.95

A nontechnical survey of oceanography in which the authors claim that the great quantities of information being collected by governments, universities, and private industries often obscure rather than clarify the topic.

Jackson, Barbara (Ward) Lady and Dubos, René. *Only One Earth: the Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet . . .* New York: Norton, 1972. 225p. \$6.00

This unofficial report, commissioned by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and prepared with the assistance of a 152-member committee of corresponding consultants in 58 countries, provides a well-balanced work which is sympathetic to the hopes of poor nations to raise their standard of living as well as to the need to decrease pollution.

Klass, Philip J. *Secret Sentries in Space*. New York: Random House, 1971. 236p. \$7.95

An author experienced in avionics is responsible for this skillfully presented account of the development and international political implications of reconnaissance satellites.

Ordway, Frederick I., III, et al. *Dividends from Space*. New York: Crowell, 1971. 309p. \$10.00

The basic thesis is that the results from space efforts have resulted in enough benefit to man to justify the massive expenditures, quite apart from value directly derived from space exploration.

Segerberg, Osborn, Jr. *Where Have All the Flowers, Fishes, Birds, Trees, Water, and Air Gone? What Ecology Is All About*. New York: McKay, 1971. 303p. \$6.95

Despite its long title, this is a carefully documented and lucid account of ecology in today's world. The author presents factual material, often with conflicting viewpoints, in support of a rational ecologic perspective.

VIII. MANAGEMENT

Argyris, Chris. *Management and Organizational Development; the Path from XA to YB*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. 211p. \$8.95

Presents plans for, descriptions of, and conclusions about, three case studies of the author's ineffectual efforts to overcome existing theory X management of client companies by inducing theory Y management.

DuBrin, Andrew J. *The Practice of Managerial Psychology*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1972. 326p. \$11.50

The author's premise is that the managerial psychologist can be an adviser, consultant, or change agent, but that individuals within the organization have the final responsibility for developing themselves and their organizations. DuBrin attempts to provide conceptual guidelines for the application of psychological techniques to improve managerial and organizational effectiveness.

Flory, Charles D. and Mackenzie, R. Alec, eds. *The Credibility Gap in Management*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971. 107p. \$6.95

Proclaims the need for a new breed of managers, those who are aware of the

need for consistency between word and deed. Stresses that credibility in management is more dependent upon personal relationships than upon systems.

Koontz, Harold. *Appraising Managers as Managers*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. 239p. \$9.95

Attempts to set forth an appraisal program that emphasizes both appraisal against objectives and appraisal of managers as managers.

Stroh, Thomas F. *Managing the New Generation in Business*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. 160p. \$8.95

Need for mutual understanding between the new generation and the establishments of business, industry, government, and education is highlighted, since both have something to offer to each other.

Wilson, Ira G. and Wilson, Marthann E. *Management, Innovation, and System Design*. Princeton, N.J.: Auerbach, 1971. 175p. \$7.95

The theory here is that the process of innovation (creating something that has never been) requires two different kinds of talents and abilities: those of the innovators and those of the managers who direct and control the innovative process. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the nature of innovation itself and exactly what is being managed before one can begin to understand the management role and responsibility in innovation. The major management problem is that since only the human brain can innovate, it is necessary to direct and control the thinking of the human brain.



CORRESPONDENCE COURSE INFORMATION

The President of the Naval War College extends the benefits of the College by offering appropriate correspondence courses. These courses are constantly reviewed and updated to keep them in consonance with the resident courses.

ELIGIBILITY AND APPLICATIONS. Naval War College correspondence courses are available to all officers of the U.S. military services of the grade of Navy lieutenant (or equivalent) and above in active service or in the Inactive Reserve. Selected Government employees of the grade GS-10 (or equivalent) and above may also enroll. The waiver of rank or grade may be granted for qualified individuals in lower grades. Applications from active duty officers should be by letter via Commanding Officer or by the application card provided in the *Naval War College Review* and in brochures. Applications from inactive duty naval officers should be by letter via Commandant, Naval District, or by letter or card via command maintaining record.

LEVEL OF STUDY. Courses are on a graduate level, are subjective in nature in that there are no "school solutions" to the exercises and problems posed, and require creative work. Students who enroll should plan to spend at least five hours a week in study and to press forward consistently, to sustain the benefit of each study session.

The Naval War College Correspondence Course Program Design—and Awards. The program is designed so that a student may select the single courses of particular interest to him or may work towards a SUBJECT AREA certificate or a diploma.

Letters of completion are issued upon successful completion of each course; copies are sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel or other appropriate authority for the student's selection jacket.

Certificates are issued upon successful completion of all courses in a SUBJECT AREA.

Diplomas are awarded to those students completing selected groups of SUBJECT AREAS which closely parallel the levels of studies offered in the Naval War College resident programs of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Warfare. Requirements are:

The Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff. Graduation from this program indicates successful completion (no waivers) of all required courses in five SUBJECT AREAS: National and International Security Organization, Military Planning, Naval Operations, Command Logistics, and Military Management.

The Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare. Graduation from this program indicates successful completion of the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff plus all courses (no waivers) in the four additional SUBJECT AREAS: International Relations, Counterinsurgency, International Law, and Strategic Planning.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CORRESPONDENCE COURSES ORGANIZED INTO SUBJECT AREAS

| NWC # | SUBJECT AREAS Courses | Prerequisites (Note 1) | Study Hours | Reserve Points | |
|-------|---|------------------------|-------------|----------------|----|
| 14 | NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION | | | | |
| 14-1 | National Security Organization | | 48 | 16 | |
| 14-1x | National Security Organization | | 24 | 8 | |
| 14-2 | International Security Organization | 14-1 | 48 | (Note 2) 16 | |
| 15 | COMMAND LOGISTICS | | | | |
| 15-1 | Basic Logistics | | 45 | 15 | |
| 15-2 | Logistic Planning | | 45 | 15 | |
| 15-3 | Operational Logistics Problem | 15-2 | 45 | 15 | |
| 16 | INTERNATIONAL LAW * | | | | |
| 16-1 | Foundations of International Law | | 63 | 21 | |
| 16-2 | Jurisdictional Concepts in International Law | 16-1 | 63 | 21 | |
| 16-3 | Rights and Duties of States beyond the Limits of National Territory | 16-1 | 63 | 21 | |
| 16-4 | Principles of the Laws of War and the Rules of Land Warfare | 16-1 | 63 | 21 | |
| 16-5 | Rules of Naval and Air Warfare | 16-1 | 63 | 21 | |
| 16-6 | Neutrality and the Termination of War | 16-1 | 63 | 21 | |
| 17 | INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS | | | | |
| 17-1 | Basic Principles and Concepts of International Relations | | 54 | 18 | |
| 17-2 | Relationships of National Power and Interests | 17-1 | 54 | 18 | |
| 17-3 | World Order | 17-1 | 54 | 18 | |
| 17-4 | Comparative Foreign Policy I (Major Western Powers) | 17-1 | 54 | 18 | |
| 17-5 | Comparative Foreign Policy II (Soviet and Chinese) | 17-1 | 54 | 18 | |
| 17-6 | Politics of the Third World and U.S. Foreign Policy | 17-1 | 54 | 18 | |
| 18 | MILITARY PLANNING | | | | |
| 18-1 | Basic Military Planning | | 54 | 18 | |
| 18-2 | The Staff Study and the Naval Directive | 18-1 | 54 | 18 | |
| 19 | NAVAL OPERATIONS (Only two courses needed for Subject Area credit) | | | | |
| 19-1 | Submarine Operations | 18 | Select | 72 | |
| 19-2 | Antisubmarine Operations | 2 | 72 | 24 | |
| 19-3 | Attack Carrier Striking Force Operations | but not | 72 | 24 | |
| 19-4 | Amphibious Operations | #1 & #2 | 72 | 24 | |
| | | Combined | | | |
| 20 | STRATEGIC PLANNING | | | | |
| 20-1 | National Strategy | (Note 3) | 54 | 18 | |
| 20-2 | Military Strategy | 20-1 | 54 | 18 | |
| 21 | COUNTERINSURGENCY | | | | |
| 21-1 | Elements and Aspects of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency | | 48 | 16 | |
| 21-2 | Communist Insurgency Methods | | 48 | 16 | |
| 21-3 | U.S. Roles in Modernizing Traditional Societies | | 48 | 16 | |
| 21-4 | U.S. Planning to Counter a Hypothetical Insurgency | 21-2 & 3 | 48 | 16 | |
| 22 | MILITARY MANAGEMENT | | | | |
| 22-1 | Foundations of Management | | 60 | 20 | |
| 22-2 | Applications of Military Management | | 60 | 20 | |
| 22-3 | Explorations in Management | | 60 | 20 | |
| 23 | SEAPOWER | | | | |
| 23-1 | General Concepts | | } 30 | 10 | |
| 23-2 | Employment of Forces | (Note 2) | | 30 | 10 |
| 23-3 | Major Issues of Naval Strategy | | | 30 | 10 |

NOTES: 1—Prerequisites may be waived on submission of specific experience or education.
 2—Retirement points tentative pending final evaluation.
 3—Prerequisites are 14-1, 17-1, and one other course in Subject Area 17.

*New enrollments temporarily suspended as a result of oversubscription.