Neptune’s Oracle: Admiral Harry E. Yarnell’s Wartime Planning, 1918–20 and 1943–44

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In the development of military professionals, the historical record is an invaluable resource for those who choose to study and reflect on the infinite variables that affect strategic planning. On January 28, 1944, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell addressed a meeting of the American Military Institute. In a speech entitled “The Utility of Military History” the admiral expressed how “[t]he value of military history to the student lies in the fact that when he is in possession of all the information regarding a certain operation, he can evaluate the good and bad points of a campaign or operation, and, through the lessons learned, be more qualified as a leader to carry out actual operations in time of war.”

Yarnell spoke from experience as a planner in two world wars and from the perspective of a career that uniquely equipped him to examine naval planning following those wars. Although forgotten and unheralded as a strategist and planner, Yarnell left writings that contain numerous lessons learned, or truisms, to which he adhered during his naval career. Several of these lessons revealed themselves during his planning experiences from 1918 to 1920, molded in part by the academic training and intellectual refinement he received from studying at the Naval War College (NWC). Yarnell’s lessons, reinforced during the interwar period, guided his thoughts on planning and in his postretirement work for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) during World War II.
Yarnell’s naval career prior to World War I provided him with extensive Far East experience. After graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1897, he served on board the battleship USS Oregon (BB 3) and participated in its cruise from San Francisco around South America to Cuba during the Spanish-American War. After completing his final examinations and receiving his commission as an ensign, he returned to the Pacific and served on board a gunboat during the Philippine-American War in 1899 and with the China Relief Expedition during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. In his next assignment, as an aide to Asiatic Fleet commander Rear Admiral George Remey, Yarnell worked alongside Fleet Intelligence Officer and Inspector of Target Practice Lieutenant William S. Sims—forming a relationship with the young maverick that would blossom in the years to come.

Returning stateside in 1902, Yarnell served in and commanded torpedo boats and destroyers, with time aboard USS Biddle (TB 26), USS Dale (DD 4), USS Stockton (TB 32), and USS Barry (DD 2). During his time aboard Barry, Yarnell returned to the Asiatic Fleet via the Suez Canal, at which point he took command of Dale in April 1904. Yarnell returned to the United States in April 1905 for over a year of shore duty at the Naval Proving Ground, Indian Head, Maryland, before joining the battleship USS Connecticut (BB 18) in September 1906 for its commissioning and around-the-world voyage with the Great White Fleet.

Prior to the grand cruise, however, the Navy tried Yarnell before a general court-martial for “culpable inefficiency in the performance of duty” and “neglect of duty” as officer of the deck when Connecticut ran aground near entering the harbor at Culebra, off Puerto Rico, on January 13, 1907. The court acquitted Yarnell of all charges.

Upon the battleship’s return to the United States, Yarnell served a tour at the Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, Rhode Island, from 1909 to 1911, with follow-on assignments first as fleet engineer for the Atlantic Fleet and then as navigator in the battleship USS New Jersey (BB 16), during which the ship participated in the 1914 Veracruz occupation.

In July 1914, then–lieutenant commander Yarnell received orders to attend the NWC long course. He presumably was pleased with this appointment, as he recently had published an article in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings emphasizing how practical experience at sea, together with applying fundamental principles of strategy and tactics, enabled greater efficiency within the fleet.

Although he was already familiar with the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and Carl von Clausewitz, the sixteen-month course introduced Yarnell to the “applicatory system” of instruction, which taught strategy and
command via war games. Adopted from the Army War College in 1911–12, this three-part system revolved around preparing an “estimate of the situation,” writing orders, and evaluating these orders via war games or staff rides. The “estimate of the situation” provided a logical approach that could be applied consistently to evaluate a military or naval problem and ascertain a course of action through a series of steps and decisions. A student needed to derive a clear mission statement; consider probable enemy strength and intentions; assess one’s own forces’ strength, capabilities, and disposition; evaluate the effectiveness of possible courses of action; and reach decisions regarding a final course of action. A student then would use his individual estimates as the foundation for drafting standardized-format orders that could be wargamed for evaluation.6

Yarnell benefited from his NWC experience. The College provided an officer with an environment “where ideas, facts, and logic were of greater importance than rank and name,” argues historian Gerald E. Wheeler.7 Studies of tactics, strategy, policy, and logistics prepared Yarnell to produce strong, analytically sound estimates and to game his solutions, all while being guided to further derive and strengthen general principles from his studies and discussions among peers.8 Use of Clausewitz in the curriculum and the discussions most likely reinforced for Yarnell particular principles when developing strategic plans—namely, the coordination between military leadership and civilian policy makers, drawing from the Prussian general’s maxim: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”9 After graduation, Yarnell stayed on the NWC staff under the presidency of Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, a reformer akin to Sims in many respects, and one whose views, notably on a unified military department, Yarnell shared.10

For his follow-on assignment, Yarnell returned to sea as commanding officer of the gunboat USS Nashville (PG 7). Following American entry into World War I in April 1917, Nashville in August received orders to steam to Gibraltar to join other Allied warships patrolling the waters for enemy submarines. That October, Yarnell went ashore after receiving orders assigning him as temporary American base commander at Gibraltar, and on November 25, 1917, he assumed additional duties as chief of staff to Rear Admiral Albert P. Niblack, Commander, Squadron 2, Patrol Force, Atlantic Fleet.11

Concurrently in London, now–vice admiral Sims, in his role as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, was steadily building up his forces to support the Allied war effort. For several months, Sims maintained a robust correspondence with Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral William S. Benson requesting additional personnel for his headquarters to develop a planning section to coordinate with the British Admiralty. Collectively, the Allied planners would develop plans for aggressive operations against the Imperial German Navy, such as the April 1918 British raid on the Belgian port of...
Bruges-Zeebrugge. Sims suggested a staff composed of War College–educated, up-and-coming younger officers—and the list included Yarnell.\textsuperscript{12} In November 1917, Sims at last received Benson’s approval to establish a planning section composed of three War College graduates: Commander Dudley W. Knox, Captain Frank H. Schofield, and a third man to be named later—Yarnell.\textsuperscript{13} A fourth section member, Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, USMC, arrived in March 1918.\textsuperscript{14}

In December 1917, Knox, Schofield, and Yarnell established the American Naval Planning Section London. Free of administrative duties, the officers devoted all their time to surveying operations, discovering mistakes, suggesting improvements, and preparing plans for future operations. Essentially they were delivering to the force commander a “continuous Estimate of the Situation”—a method that Admiral Chester W. Nimitz employed decades later, albeit labeled a “Running Summary of [the] Situation.”\textsuperscript{15} The memorandums they produced mirrored the War College methodology. Yarnell participated in the drafting of forty-seven of the seventy-one London Planning Section memorandums, all developed in close consultation with Knox and Schofield.\textsuperscript{16}

Working under Sims and with his fellow planners, Yarnell refined some of his own ideas and advanced an understanding of the need for harmonization among
instruments of power. Principally, this meant coordination between political and military leaderships in developing both national and Allied strategy, as well as plans touching on information. Combined with his work at the Naval War College, Yarnell’s Planning Section experience “solidified his unification thinking,” writes historian Jeffery M. Dorwart. Yarnell believed that a merger of the Navy and War Departments would result in greater cooperation and better coordination among forces, in the interest of efficiency and economy of effort. Yarnell drew on the intellectual and informational resources of the Admiralty and from Italian and French naval planners to help guide his thinking.

Although the Planning Section work produced intellectually rigorous results, these did not always translate into success at sea, notably in the Adriatic. The planners’ work, however, did provide Sims and OPNAV with various courses of action when considering how to prosecute the war effort better.

The London Planning Section caught Washington’s attention, and by summer 1918 OPNAV increasingly depended on the London team for its own planning. In mid-July 1918, Benson cabled Sims of his desire to continue this work in Washington and ordered Sims to transfer Yarnell to OPNAV, sending Captain Luke McNamee to London in exchange. The CNO also requested that the London Planning Section prepare an outline of a plans organization based on recommendations from the war experience, the resulting memorandum for which accompanied Yarnell to Washington. Reporting to OPNAV in September, Yarnell served in the Planning Section under Rear Admiral James H. Oliver. Yarnell also received verbal instructions from Benson to sit on the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee, which had been organized to “investigate, study, and report upon questions relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and Navy.”

Almost a full year later, in August 1919, two more officers, Captain William S. Pye and Lieutenant Commander Holloway H. Frost, joined the Planning Section. Together with the existing section, these men formed the OPNAV Planning (or Plans) Division; Yarnell described them as “capable youngsters with War College training and full of vim and vigor.” By 1922, the group became the War Plans Division, exclusively focused on planning for a range of war scenarios.

Yarnell’s work within the division from September 1918 to September 1920 drew heavily
from his experience in London. Rather than drafting memorandums concerning estimates of situations, Yarnell now focused on plans. For his first year, the planning was “usually administrative planning” on “comparatively minor subjects,” such as liaison work with the State Department, the study of international law, South and Central American policies and operations, and insular policy. But the time in London for Yarnell and his fellow Planning Section alumni, in the words of historian David F. Trask, “enlarged the horizons of naval expansionist thought,” notably through recognition of the increasing naval and diplomatic power and influence of the United States. Planning for future conflicts would center on the two most able naval powers, Great Britain and Japan.

Regarding those two powers, Yarnell gravitated toward a focus on the Pacific. His initial work with the division raised fundamental questions that were used to guide the overall planning process. With Germany defeated and with the United States lacking a stated enemy or a plan to confront one, Yarnell deemed the situation “like trying to design a machine tool without knowing whether the operator is going to manufacture hair pins or locomotives.” Two potent navies—those of Great Britain and Japan—challenged that of the United States, and in the immediate postwar period both countries were considered likely enemies owing to their alliance. But in a March 29, 1919, memorandum to acting CNO Rear Admiral Josiah S. McKean, Yarnell concluded, “It is apparent that our most probable enemy at the present time is Japan.” On August 12, 1919—the CNO’s last working day in office and the day after the Planning Division stood up—Admiral Benson approved Yarnell’s “Basic Plan of Procedure for the Pacific.” Yarnell refined his thinking later in September with his paper entitled “Strategy in the Pacific,” which the General Staff College and the Naval War College reprinted.

When the Joint Board met in October to discuss War Plan ORANGE, the U.S. strategic plan to defeat Japan, Yarnell raised additional questions about the basics of planning—notably, what the interests and policy of the nation were for the Far East. These and other queries, Yarnell concluded, required State Department input. This marked Yarnell’s growing conviction of the necessity for increased liaison among the different elements of national power, in this instance State Department diplomats and officers of the Navy and War Departments. Considering the emphasis today on coordinating instruments of power—diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement—Yarnell in 1920 demonstrated a perceptive grasp of the ways and means involved in deriving and carrying out a strategy.

Upon his detachment from the division, Yarnell drafted a memorandum of his own ideas, based on his planning experiences. He emphasized that Navy activities must rest on basic war plans, and that from these should flow a series
of plans for building programs, base projects, fleet organization, and personnel. For the War Plans Division itself, Yarnell stressed that it should be staffed with high-quality, War College–educated members, low in number but with good internal communication. Addressing the division's current efforts, he emphasized consideration of economic efficiency in planning: “It is probably a safe statement to make that our naval efficiency would be doubled if every dollar was spent with that end in view, and only after the purpose for which spent had been referred to the war plans.” He concluded that the Plans Division’s future, “by hard steady work, all based on sound principles, and sound general plans,” was assured.

Yarnell’s World War I planning experience produced an array of ideas and potential policy actions because it occurred within an intellectual environment of gifted NWC graduates. He benefited from ample opportunities to garner feedback from his work, from both uniformed American counterparts and Allied military personnel. Through his thinking on the virtues of unification, whether of forces or toward strategic alignment, Yarnell always sought to understand national policy and interests as the basis for planning a military strategy. A core tenet of efficiency underlined Yarnell’s planning, aiming to save resources, regardless of whom or what they represented.

INTERWAR EXPERIENCES AND RENEWED CONFLICT

The period stretching from Yarnell’s work in OPNAV to his retirement in the fall of 1939 found him prominently engaged in the growing naval aviation community. He commanded Naval Air Station Hampton Roads and the Aircraft Squadrons, Scouting Fleet from 1924 to 1926, followed by another staff assignment to the Naval War College in 1926–27. In July 1927, he reported to Naval Air Station Pensacola for flight instruction and received a naval aviation observer designation. In September 1927, Yarnell arrived in Camden, New Jersey, to oversee the fitting out and commissioning of the carrier USS Saratoga (CV 3) and served briefly as its first commanding officer.

In September 1928, Yarnell achieved flag rank when he became chief of the Bureau of Engineering as a rear admiral. During his tenure he obtained German diesel engine technology to accelerate research and development in submarine engine propulsion. In the first quarter of 1930, he served additional duty as a naval adviser at the London Naval Conference, where his planning experience and technical knowledge supported Secretary of the Navy Charles F. Adams during the negotiations.

Throughout the 1930s, Yarnell’s most prominent roles involved naval aviation exercises and senior command in the Far East. As Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Force from 1931 to 1933, Yarnell’s carrier force of USS Lexington...
(CV 2) and Saratoga participated in Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No. 4 and achieved notable distinction by conducting a surprise carrier raid on Army installations on Oahu—providing a foretaste of Japanese actions nine years later. In the follow-on, Navy-only Fleet Problem XIII, which examined challenges posed in conducting offensive operations against central Pacific Japanese League of Nations mandates, Yarnell concluded that the Navy needed additional carriers to ensure success in a future Pacific war.\(^{38}\)

As Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet from 1936 to 1939, Yarnell garnered international praise for his deft handling of challenges to American interests amid the outbreak of war between Japan and China. Having observed the fighting in and around Shanghai, Yarnell merged his ideas on naval aviation and Japanese interests with his old planning emphasis on unification and economy of force. In a letter of October 15, 1937, to CNO Admiral William D. Leahy, Yarnell sought to avoid the waste of World War I by advocating an economic and economical war, in particular a war “of strangulation, in short, \textit{an almost purely naval war in the Pacific as far as we are concerned}.” A naval war of strangulation would entail using submarines, aircraft, and light forces with cruising endurance, economically employed, executing plans prepared in cooperation with the State, War,
and Navy Departments. Leahy shared Yarnell’s letter with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who liked Yarnell’s approach, since it aligned with Roosevelt’s own thinking on confronting Japanese aggression.

These ideas were not new. Back on February 13, 1919, Yarnell had submitted a memorandum to CNO Benson about a campaign against Japan. It detailed American actions that would be essential in the event of a war against Japan, including moving the fleet to Honolulu, building ships capable of fighting across the Pacific, and attacking Japanese commerce. “The war on commerce will be a preponderating feature,” Yarnell wrote, “the one method by which we can defeat Japan[,] as she depends on food imports.”

In a November 25, 1938, letter, Yarnell suggested to Leahy that the United States halt financial loans and shipments of war materials to Japan, while increasing American submarine, aviation, and cruiser forces to threaten Japanese supply lines. This letter included a study entitled “Situation in the Pacific.” Historian Michael Vlahos notes the near-verbatim similarity of Yarnell’s perspective regarding the Japanese in both the 1938 study and the May 1918 Memorandum No. 21, “U.S. Naval Building Policy,” which Yarnell had helped to write for Sims’s London Planning Section. Yarnell’s recommendations—together with the Report of the Board to Investigate and
Report upon the Need, for Purposes of National Defense, and for the Establish-
ment of Additional Submarine, Destroyer, Mine, and Naval Air Bases on the
Coasts of the United States, Its Territories and Possessions, led by Rear Admiral
Arthur J. Hepburn—historian Jeffery Underwood contends, merged with Roo-
sevelt’s to shape the president’s Far Eastern foreign policy of deterrence toward
Japan.\textsuperscript{44}

In July 1939, Admiral Thomas C. Hart relieved Yarnell as commander of the
Asiatic Fleet and Yarnell returned to the United States to be retired from active
naval service.\textsuperscript{45} Upon arrival in Washington in late August, he met with a variety
of senior State, Navy, and War Department officials to discuss matters in the Far
East.\textsuperscript{46} In a memorandum to CNO Admiral Harold R. Stark, written on Septem-
ber 2, Yarnell reiterated his 1938 positions on planning for a Pacific war. Specific
points included engaging in a naval war of “cruisers, submarines, and aircraft
operating against lines of communication” and avoiding fighting the Japanese
alone (i.e., without Allied support).\textsuperscript{47} In early October 1940, following the Japa-
nese occupation of French Indochina, Yarnell met with Secretary of the Navy
Frank Knox and recommended strengthening the Asiatic Fleet with aircraft,
submarines, and cruisers.\textsuperscript{48} Writing to Stark after meeting with Knox, Yarnell
offered his services to the Navy as a commander of escort or auxiliary vessels,
recalling similar services that retired British admirals had performed during the
First World War—an offer Stark politely declined.\textsuperscript{49}

Yet while the Navy may not have been interested in Yarnell serving at sea, it
was interested in his intellectual insights. On January 3, 1941, Yarnell reported for
duty to Secretary Knox, who had decided to make use of his services as a general
adviser, among other duties, until April, with follow-on assignments pertaining
to industrial incentives, shipyard inspections, and awards boards. None of these
leveraged Yarnell’s planning expertise or Far East experience but rather his Bu-
reau of Engineering experience and analytic abilities.\textsuperscript{50} In his advising capabili-
ties, Yarnell quickly drafted several brief memos to Knox, including one harping
on the subject of wasted defense spending owing to the lack of a basic plan for
national defense.\textsuperscript{51}

On January 15, 1941, Yarnell submitted to Knox a memorandum entitled “Far
Eastern Situation.” The memorandum arrived at an interesting moment: on the
eve of the first “ABC” conference among U.S., British, and Canadian military
staffs. Yarnell articulated to Knox Japan’s desire to avoid war with the United
States if it could achieve its goals without conflict, for “[t]he cooler heads of Japan
realize that war with the United States is almost tantamount to national suicide.”
Since this dynamic shifted the strategic initiative to the United States, Yarnell
endorsed coordinating and strengthening American and Allied air and naval
forces in the Far East to blunt any Japanese movement farther south. Regarding
the Philippines, he advocated for strengthening air, antiair, and submarine forces in the Philippines as soon as possible—by taking these forces “at the expense of Panama and Hawaii, which are in no danger of attack until the situation in Europe is radically changed for the worse.” Yarnell presumably knew of discussions among the Americans, British, Dutch, Australians, and New Zealanders to form an alliance to blunt Japanese aggression, and may have drafted this memo to bolster the argument and efforts of Hart and the Asiatic Fleet to funnel increased aid to the Pacific rather than Europe. In either case, a week after Yarnell submitted his memo to Knox, Hart received word that no reinforcements would be going to the Asiatic Fleet.

In mid-January 1942, following American entry into World War II, Yarnell received orders assigning him as adviser to the Chinese military mission. In his own words, the mission was “interesting, but doesn’t do much to win the war”; he added, “I dislike a desk job, and I dislike Washington.” In August 1942, orders were cut to assign Yarnell to the General Board, but he spoke about the move to Knox, who promptly had these orders canceled. Instead, Yarnell requested sea duty at month’s end—“preferably in the Pacific”—but received from Knox a noncommittal response, stating that he would be ordered to sea duty “when and if a suitable billet is available.” So when the Chinese delegation was recalled in January 1943, Yarnell requested to be returned to the retired list. But he would make one last request for a sea assignment; on May 15, 1943, to Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, chief of the Bureau of Personnel, Yarnell reiterated his October 1940 appeal to Stark, seeking active duty as a convoy commodore. Jacobs politely declined on the basis of Yarnell’s age of almost sixty-eight.

No sooner had the aged admiral returned to Newport in early 1943 than he received a request to go back to Washington to assist the Navy once again. In mid-February, Captain William D. Puleston—who himself had been retired but was serving in the Office of Economic Warfare Analysis—wrote to Yarnell and mentioned how Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aviation Artemus L. Gates had expressed a desire for Yarnell to advise him on the future of naval aviation. Appealing to Yarnell, Puleston wrote, “If we get the correct plan for naval aviation settled, it will point the way to the naval-military policy for the post-war.” Yarnell evidently liked what he heard, writing to Gates within days to offer his services as an adviser.

Days later, Yarnell submitted a proposed plan of naval and military organization that cribbed from a similar plan he had submitted to the Chinese military mission. Among other points, the plan advocated a unified military command structure under a single civilian authority, again demonstrating his belief in the benefit of unification. Meeting with Gates in May and June, Yarnell discussed matters of naval aviation, which most likely included how to address public
efforts urging creation of an independent air force. \(^6^2\) Perhaps spurred by Gates, Yarnell wrote to Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne about the independent air force movement. With CNO Admiral Ernest J. King’s concurrence, the VCNO asked whether Yarnell would be interested in heading a board to study the matter; Yarnell agreed. \(^6^3\) King wrote Yarnell a follow-up letter about his acceptance, in which he thanked him for his willingness to serve, and added, “[Y]ou can expect to be asked for advice on a large variety of air—and other—matters.”

Mere days prior to receiving the invitation from Horne, Yarnell had drafted an article that articulated his views on unification and aviation independence that he had developed over his interwar career. \(^6^5\) Historian Clark Reynolds describes Yarnell’s unification article and forthcoming June 1943 investigation into naval aviation as having “stirred up several hornet’s nests in about three months” before the retired admiral “passed into obscurity.”

Titled “A Department of War” and published in the August 1943 Proceedings, Yarnell’s article declares demobilization to be one of the major domestic problems confronting the nation. He asks “whether or not a thorough reorganization of our military departments is essential in the interest of efficiency and economy.” \(^6^6\) Having witnessed America’s costs in blood, time, and treasure in building forces for World War I, and then inefficiencies both nationally and with Allies in waging the war, Yarnell concludes that organizational independence had resulted in waste.

Yarnell proposes a new U.S. Department of War for the post–World War II era. He avers that the current organizational construct had disadvantaged American military aviation and he disparages the British model of three independent armed services—a thinly veiled swipe at American advocates of air force independence. Yarnell outlines a new organization that a civilian secretary would lead, overseeing a uniformed chief of staff who would oversee an Operations Division and a Material Division. The former would handle personnel procurement, training, and operations in war for the three service branches—army, navy, and air. The Operations Division chief also would act as commander in chief of all forces in time of war. The Material Division’s responsibilities would include design and procurement of all matériel for the armed forces. Under this proposal, all officers would attend a single military academy and all would receive aviation training. Upon graduation, officers would be assigned to one of the three uniformed branches. Officers for the Material Division would be drawn from leading technical colleges.

Yarnell believed his proposal would provide greater flexibility for the exchange of officers among branches; increase unity of command and mutual understanding among branches; and commit officers in the respective divisions to a career
of both designing and building the weapons of war, or training for the most efficient use of said weapons in time of war. The proposal, Yarnell argued, “would meet the requirements of modern war through a more logical force structure,” thereby assuring “the most efficient use of the sums appropriated by Congress for our national security.” The article bore the hallmarks of Yarnell’s planning philosophy refined over the decades, perhaps most of all regarding efficiency, both in economic matters and in the sharing of knowledge among personnel.

In late June 1943, Yarnell reported for duty in Washington to investigate aviation matters. Using a survey of active naval aviators, Yarnell’s effort examined both aviation issues and overall national defense organization. By coincidence, his survey arrived in aviators’ mailboxes at the same time that his Proceedings article reached wardroom tables. When summarized, the data from Yarnell’s survey reflected a belief that there had been a misuse of naval airpower in the war. The survey also revealed support for unification of the services under a single military secretary rather than an independent air force in direct competition with the Navy and War Departments.

Admiral King did not implement all of Yarnell’s recommendations. However, some elements—notably the appointment of aviators to Admiral Nimitz’s staff—proved useful in the fast-carrier task force campaigns of 1944.

DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING

Soon after receiving the aviation assignment, Yarnell received a second tasking: to prepare a plan for demobilizing the Navy and reducing the size of the postwar force. The matter had emerged in late July when Acting Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson Sr. informed Knox of the War Department’s recently established Special Planning Division to study postwar planning. A week later, on August 4, 1943, Yarnell wrote to Joseph W. Powell, special assistant to Secretary Knox. The letter stated that the Navy had ongoing war projects that were unnecessary, and by acting immediately to reduce those projects the service could save billions of dollars and avoid numerous postwar labor issues. In a testament to his analytic ability, Yarnell recognized that the equilibrium in the war had shifted sufficiently in favor of the Allies to warrant a reduction in war projects. With direct reference to defensive bases in the Atlantic and Alaska, Yarnell recommended an intelligent reduction in demands for military manpower and war matériel both to save money and to ease postwar transfer of labor from the military to the civilian economy. Yarnell’s letter to Powell, writes historian Jeffrey G. Barlow, probably persuaded Horne to draft an order for a demobilization board. The letter arguably reinforced a memo from Horne to King of August 2 in which the VNCO stated as follows:
While it is not considered necessary to set up a planning board or planning division as such at the present time, it is considered advisable to consider seriously the detail of an officer of rank and experience who should give his entire thought as to what planning will be necessary and how it should be carried out, and for this purpose it is suggested that Vice Admiral [Roland M.] Brainard might be ordered to duty under the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as soon as he is placed on the retired list. Horne tapped Yarnell to draft a proposed order for a demobilization board, which he submitted on August 13 for finalization within OPNAV over the coming week. On August 26, 1943, Knox ordered Yarnell to serve under the VCNO and head a Navy Special Planning Section tasked with planning for postwar demobilization. Yarnell would “prepare maximum and minimum estimates of the Post-war requirements for the Navy and naval establishment,” and after VNCO approval these would serve “as a basis for post-war demobilization planning.” Horne issued a follow-on memo to Yarnell the next day to define the scope of the work. The VCNO requested the preliminary study by November 1, to include retention target figures for naval units (types and sizes, surface and air), the shore establishment, and personnel. Horne included some of his own ideas for Yarnell’s consideration, which historian Vincent Davis summarizes as wanting the biggest possible active and reserve fleets, with Horne requesting that Yarnell give consideration to organizing task forces that “spread around[, which] appears more desirable than a concentrated fleet organization. Naval officers and men should know the world and its seas.”

Yarnell adroitly composed his preliminary draft and submitted it to Horne within two weeks. In it he acknowledged some enduring policy assumptions—maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, avoidance of European disputes, ongoing interests in the Far East—then recognized that the defeat of Germany and Japan would leave the United States with an overabundance of military power that would necessitate a swift demobilization of personnel and disposal of matériel. Yarnell stressed maintaining a building program of certain ship types to sustain research and development in case of emergency; this inclusion, one presumes, resulted from his experiences as chief engineer of the Navy. After incorporating some initial feedback, Yarnell reviewed Army demobilization plans and consulted with senior Navy civilian and uniformed officials to refine his thinking further. Unlike in his previous planning experiences, Yarnell produced the report independently.

Horne received Yarnell’s refined Navy demobilization plan draft on September 22, 1943. Yarnell framed the postwar force within national policy and the mission of the armed forces. He concluded that both American military services (writ large—the Army and the Navy) had failed to fulfill their prewar missions, which

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were as follows: to understand foreign policies and commitments; to recognize the increasing power of the nations disputing those policies; to recognize that policy and its supporting force are interdependent; and to inform the government of their inability to support national policies, owing “to the inadequacy of the armed forces.” The last-listed charge stemmed from Yarnell’s own evaluation of the nation’s (lack of) prewar military preparedness—and arguably it was only his seniority and his reputation that permitted him to lay such a serious charge against the prewar military leadership. Yarnell listed eleven policy assumptions that should guide postwar Navy planning for demobilizing the wartime force. While identifying factors relevant to the strength of the postwar Navy, he noted that the United States and Great Britain, as the only two great naval powers in the world, might both be confronted with a long postwar period of unrest and instability requiring global policing by military forces.80

The plan reflected Horne’s desire to maintain a large postwar Navy. Yarnell included as one of his relevant factors that “the first estimate of the naval forces to be kept in commission should be too large rather than too small.” In his analysis of the plan, historian Vincent Davis observes how Yarnell “tacitly assumed that the American people would be willing to support a large peacetime military establishment” and alluded to compulsory military training and a unified military establishment.81 Drawing additional cues from Horne’s August 27 memo, Yarnell recommended assigning naval forces to eight geographic stations, with a postwar surface navy organized into three task forces, each composed of three large aircraft carriers and two battleships, with supporting cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries. Three reserve task forces mirroring the “fully manned” task forces would train reservists, while each of the six geographic stations (not including the East or West Coast of the United States) would sustain a squadron of four cruisers, twelve destroyers or destroyer escorts, two carriers, and supporting auxiliaries. Plans for actual demobilization would be drafted by OPNAV to address the postwar surface forces, the disposition of Navy shore facilities, and the status of naval aviation. The Marine Corps, Navy bureaus, and assorted offices would draft their own demobilization plans.82 The geographic scope of Yarnell’s plan vastly expanded the historical stationing of USN forces abroad. This plan would pair perfectly with future plans for the United Nations and President Roosevelt’s vision of the United States as one of the world’s “Four Policemen.”83

Yarnell’s preliminary plan provided the framework for Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No. 1. Yarnell submitted a revised plan to Horne on October 28. The revision incorporated feedback from colleagues and affirmation from King that the plan was “based on acceptable assumptions and that sound conclusions are reached.”84 Yarnell added a new postwar policy assumption of “support of an adequate Merchant Marine and commercial aviation as factors in our future
security.” Regarding postwar armed strength, Yarnell included a new statement for expeditionary warfare in future American conflicts, whereby “the armed forces should be designed and trained to carry on a war of aggression in enemy territory.” He added a lengthy paragraph recommending an immediate study on the elimination of certain types of vessels not needed for the Pacific War and to eliminate all construction unessential for the successful prosecution of the war. Reassessing the target strength of the postwar Navy, Yarnell included a statement that Great Britain “will be a strong commercial rival with the remote possibility of becoming a future enemy”—perhaps an optimistic appraisal derived from his World War I experience. He also altered his assumption on the future of Russia, to include a growth in its naval forces. Yarnell delineated the number of aircraft squadrons for the previously listed geographic stations and changed the designation from “task forces” to “numbered fleets.” Lastly, he added an additional amphibious force composed of a reinforced regiment of Marines and required transports. Although still only a draft, Yarnell’s plan outlined a substantial postwar role for the Navy, matching a large force to domestic and international commitments that were unprecedented in the service’s history.

Formally released on November 17, 1943, Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No. 1 retained most of Yarnell’s refined draft. Horne and his staff made some changes to Yarnell’s work, with slight numerical edits to the size and scope of the problem and rewording of assumptions about Great Britain and Russia as potential adversaries. Horne’s staff dropped Yarnell’s national policy commitment for compulsory military training. Instead, Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No. 1 stated that “[d]efense of our national interests must envisage the desirability of being able to commence offensive operations without waiting for an initial assault and setback by any future enemy. A well trained Navy composed of vessels, aircraft, and amphibious units, ready for immediate use will be essential to that end.” The three numbered fleets each received an additional battleship and two repair ships, but otherwise the proposed postwar Navy size tracked with Yarnell’s draft. Issued under Horne’s signature, Plan No. 1 was, according to Vincent Davis, ultimately less a plan for demobilization than “a statement of assumptions and principles intended to guide the various offices of the Navy Department in their participation in the planning of the postwar Navy.”

A week after Horne released Plan No. 1, Yarnell shared his reflections on the existing planning process in a letter to the VCNO. To ease the task at hand, Yarnell recommended that Horne acquire a “small able ‘Plans Division’ to give you considered opinions on many of the problems that come across your desk.” Making a brief reference to his experience with OPNAV in September 1918, Yarnell suggested that the associated personnel include “a Rear Admiral (Active
List) in charge and not more than three or four younger officers, Captains or Commanders. They should be high grade officers who have served their time at sea and are due for 2 or 3 years shore duty. They should have no administrative duty.” Creating such a plans division would provide the VNCO with “reasoned opinions quickly on many questions which you now have to work out yourself.”

While the letter bore Yarnell’s signature, it easily could have been the specter of Sims guiding his protégé’s hand across the page, writing the same request to Benson. The tone of Yarnell’s letter shows awareness that he alone could not keep pace with the immensity of events, and that a younger, core team of officers would equip the VCNO better for postwar planning matters. Yet despite this awareness, Yarnell essentially remained Horne’s Special Planning Section all by himself.

Yarnell worked on Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No. 2 from November 1943 to February 1944. While Plan No. 1 assumed the Allied nations would reach no agreement to maintain peace in the postwar era, Plan No. 2 assumed the United States and Great Britain would divide control of the sea and air in accordance with present strategic areas—a reflection of the growing assumption within the Navy Department that Anglo-American naval cooperation would continue after the war was over. Plan No. 2 also assumed continuation of President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, with air or naval actions undertaken in conjunction with the nations of Central and South America. The Soviet Union would police the waters adjacent to its territory in the northwest Pacific, China would have a navy adequate to police its rivers and coastal waters, and Japan would be permitted a coast guard capable of policing local waters and maintaining lighthouse service. In the Pacific, new assumptions included retaining the Marshall, Caroline, Marianas, Pelew, and Bonin Islands, with air and naval bases on the former three and air bases on the latter two. The plan rested on a fundamental assumption that after the war the Allied powers would cooperate in maintaining the peace and in making and abiding by agreements for commercial and military air bases, together with reciprocal agreements for the use of foreign naval and military air bases.

The drawdown of the Navy, in both uniformed personnel and civilian workers, would be conducted gradually. Economic considerations were essential in the disposal of obsolete weaponry and the retention of naval stores on the basis of sound economy in government. Yarnell included a recommendation for the Army and Navy to organize a research effort, codified in legislation, to continue developing new weapons and armaments. In other areas Plan No. 2 essentially mirrored its predecessor.

Overall, Yarnell’s plan aimed at maintaining a naval establishment capable of policing the far reaches of the globe and of expanding further efficiently, if
necessary. It would keep an eye toward developing future tactics, techniques, and technologies for naval warfare on, above, and below the oceans.

Yarnell concluded his planning work in June 1944. Horne had forwarded the revised Plan No. 1 with its subsidiary office and bureau plans to the new Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, on May 22. Following this, on June 9, Horne sent Yarnell’s Plan No. 2 to the bureaus and offices for review, and concurrently requested that Yarnell prepare Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No. 3. This third iteration incorporated the premise that peace and security would be guaranteed by an international organization under an international agreement, dominated by the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China. Further premises included that other nations would contribute to or join the organization, with the Americans, British, Russians, and Chinese responsible for the sea and air in their respective strategic areas, and that the world organization’s total power would be capable of ensuring peace against any probable aggressor—including one of the four dominant powers.

In three days, Yarnell replied with a prescient memorandum forecasting the postwar world. He first listed three factors requiring study before a demobilization plan could be crafted: the general world conditions in the immediate postwar era; postwar armed strength among the leading Allied nations, their future policies, and the probability that one of them would become an aggressor; and the likely character of the international organization that would be agreed on. Yarnell envisioned an immediate postwar world filled with nation-state tension, unrest, and civil and minor wars. Domestically, dominant issues would be demobilizing war workers and servicemembers, disposing of war matériel, practicing economy in government expenditure, and finding a solution to racial problems. In Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, Yarnell foresaw difficulties, with conflicts among nations, probable violence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and differences between Russia and Turkey over the Bosporus and Dardanelles. The burden for addressing these conflicts would fall on Great Britain and Russia, with America’s participation limited to withdrawal of its combat forces, provision of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, and protection of American nationals and other interests. The Far East also faced uncertainty over the stability of the Chinese government, France and Great Britain resuming control of their colonial possessions, and the Philippines gaining independence. “Due to the growth of nationalist feeling,” Yarnell accurately predicted, “there will be unrest and disturbances in the colonial areas,” perhaps recognizing that neither the French nor British would resume control with ease. Yarnell projected the United States, emerging as the preeminent military power on the sea and with strong air and ground forces, would maintain its prewar policies of the Open Door in Asia, the Monroe Doctrine, and promotion of international trade, with the addition of a
willingness to enter into an international organization for peace, and obtaining a share of sea and air transportation.  

Yarnell then proceeded to examine the three other dominant powers. First, with Great Britain’s power having been on the decline since the Boer War of 1899–1902, Yarnell deemed the country unlikely to become an aggressor and advocated maintaining friendly relations.

Second, Russia possessed great potential for power. Yarnell wrote that Russian leaders’ shared “realistic and nationalistic” policy, developed with their own security in mind, was a policy that the United States “must be prepared for . . . in the post-war settlements.” He foretold the country’s insistence on taking Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bessarabia, and parts of Poland and Finland, as well as on projecting its claims in the Pacific to southern Sakhalin Island and the Kurils. Yarnell argued that the United States should not object to these actions, nor to possible demands for neutralizing the Kiel Canal and the Dardanelles, as he considered these Russian policy initiatives to be born of understandable security imperatives. Claiming that “[t]here are no major clashes of policy between the United States and Russia,” Yarnell opined that “with realistic statesmanship on both sides, there is no danger at present or in the visible future of a major clash between nations.” As Russia had no sea power, Yarnell deemed that it could not be considered a serious threat for twenty or thirty years—a conclusion at odds with that of Forrestal and the Office of Naval Intelligence by the fall of 1944.

The challenge that the third power, China, continued to face was maintaining a stable government in power during and after the war. Despite his knowledge of the senior levels of the Nationalist Chinese government, Yarnell curiously wrote that, beyond the nation reverting to chaos and civil war, there was nothing to replace the current government should it collapse; astonishingly, the Communist Chinese did not elicit a mention. Even with a stable government, reconstruction of the nation would occupy its energy, and without sea power China could not be considered a threat.

Yarnell affirmed that an international organization would not change, to any appreciable degree, the amount of American naval strength that Plan No. 2 deemed necessary to be kept in commission, and therefore he recommended that the figures for forces and outlying bases in Plan No. 2 be accepted in relation to Horne’s June 9 memorandum. By essentially cutting the knees out from under his own Plan No. 3, Yarnell left Horne with a useful conceptual document, but ensured that it was Plan No. 2 that would receive further development in the future.

Yarnell’s memorandum to Horne is a fascinating document. His global socioeconomic-political forecast proved mostly accurate, although it was perhaps overly optimistic regarding the other dominant powers. The retired admiral
broke new ground for Navy planners in attempting to examine the post–World War II world, thanks to the intellectual template provided by his work in London and OPNAV from 1918 to 1920. Yarnell’s predictions about developing an international order centered on the four dominant powers—reflecting Roosevelt’s “Four Policemen”—and the policy issues they would confront proved rather prescient, at least when considering the United Nations Security Council.

On the other hand, Yarnell’s faith that Great Britain would maintain sufficient military strength to police Germany and address other European problems, along with Russia, proved unfounded. Yarnell completely misread the potential of the Soviet and Chinese Communists to develop into formidable adversaries by decade’s end. The omission of the Communist movement in China and the belief that the United States would limit its involvement in European affairs were extremely odd oversights for someone of Yarnell’s experience in both regions. Furthermore, while he was aware of the growing capability of aviation, as particularly evidenced by bomber operations in Europe, his overriding assumption that only sea power could threaten the United States was obsolete.

Notably, neither Yarnell nor Horne was privy to a highly classified project that only King and a few other Navy personnel knew existed, code-named Manhattan.

With his submission of Plan No. 3, Yarnell essentially concluded his work. He continued to provide additional memorandums and insight to senior officials over the course of the summer and into the fall; for all intents and purposes, however, responsibility for postwar planning thereafter resided with the staffs of Horne and King—Yarnell acknowledged that the demobilization problem “is not in my hands any longer.” On November 24, 1944, Yarnell received orders returning him to inactive duty as of January 15, 1945. The day after Christmas, the Navy Department announced his third retirement. King thanked Yarnell for having “worked with devotion and distinction in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. His departure carried with it my personal regret at the loss of his services and my thanks for a job well done.” Ironically, comments historian Jeffrey Barlow, the press release was sent out the same day that King’s planners issued their study on the postwar world.

Yarnell returned to Newport. He told a friend that he had “a lot of painting and carpenter work to do around the house.”

Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, fully retired and at his desk in his home in Newport, Rhode Island, February 2, 1945.

Author’s collection
REFLECTION AND PERSPECTIVE

With his planning experiences of 1918–20 and 1943–44, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell provided the Navy with continuity, personnel-wise, between the world wars. His training at the Naval War College and his work with “the ablest men” of Admiral Sims’s Planning Section instilled and reinforced in Yarnell ideas and methodologies that he applied throughout his career, especially at critical junctures of the Navy’s evolution and force development. Most notable among these were the necessity for policy relations between and among the State, Navy, and War Departments; unification and unity of command; economy of force; and the applicatory system. While during World War II he perforce conducted his planning efforts without the contributions of a small section of talented minds working in unison, in contrast to the previous war, his half century of service and study of military history equipped him admirably for the task. He embraced emerging technologies and grasped political developments to formulate plans that provided the Navy leadership with sound foundations for further discussion and refinement. While Yarnell was—and continues to be—unheralded for his strategic vision, his fingerprints can be found all over both the interwar Navy and the force that entered the Cold War era.

If Yarnell represented one of the last beneficiaries of Sims’s leadership and legacy, he in turn provided that legacy to the Cold War U.S. Navy. In one of his final memorandums to Horne, in mid-December 1944, Yarnell wrote about the German V-1 and V-2 weapons. He explained that “the introduction of these missiles as an operational weapon marks a turning point in the methods of waging war. In the near future, even before the end of the present war, controlled missiles and high speed robot aircraft undoubtedly will become a prime factor in the success of naval warfare, and in the safety of our country.”

Like Sims, Yarnell kept an eye out for promising young minds, and found one in a young reserve lieutenant and budding strategist. In January 1945, the lieutenant wrote to the thrice-retired admiral, thanking him “for the fact that my Navy service has been as interesting and as useful as it has in fact proved.” He then added, “I am especially grateful to you for the arrangement whereby you made it possible for me to work in a section where I felt I was more useful to the war effort than that in which I had previously been.” Writing in 1946 about the implications of the atomic bomb, Yarnell’s former lieutenant grappled with military history’s role in formulating strategy. He concluded that “[h]istory is at best an imperfect guide to the future, but when imperfectly understood and interpreted it is a menace to sound judgement.” Presumably Yarnell would have agreed with this conclusion by the author, his former lieutenant: Bernard Brodie.
NOTES

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2. By legislation of July 16, 1862, midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy, after completion of purely academic studies, had to perform two years of shipboard duty. After four years at the academy, midshipmen would be detached temporarily and sent under orders of the Navy Department to sea, singly or in squads, to perform duties as assigned. After two years of shipboard duty, the midshipmen would return to the academy to undertake a final graduating examination before the Academic Board. Passage of this examination resulted in commissioning the midshipmen as ensigns. The two-year service-at-sea component was eliminated through new legislation passed in March 1912. U.S. Navy Dept., Laws Relating to the Navy, Annotated, comp. George Melling (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 762–63.


8. Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, Sailors and Scholars, p. 79.

9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,


22. William S. Benson to William S. Sims, July 17, 1918, WSS, box 24, LOC.

23. William S. Benson to William S. Sims, July 20, 1918, WSS, box 24, LOC.

25. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 82; Yarnell, quoted in Robert G. Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 1798–1947 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 90; U.S. Navy Dept., Diary of Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, beginning August 11, 1919, pp. 100–15, Subject 100—Reports (Planning Committee), Confidential Correspondence of the Navy, 1919–1927, microfilm M1140, NARA. There is some confusion about how best to label the organizations as constituted from September 1918 to August 1919 and in August 1919. The former is often referred to as a “section,” while the latter is a “division.”

26. Miller, War Plan Orange, p. 82; Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, p. 91.

27. W. Evans, J. T. Tompkins, and Harry E. Yarnell to Acting Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum, “Plans Division for the Office of Naval Operations,” April 1, 1919, Harry E. Yarnell Papers, Naval Historical Foundation [hereafter Yarnell Papers–NHF], box 2, folder 3, LOC.


30. Harry E. Yarnell to Josiah McKean, memorandum, “Types and Numbers of Naval Units,” March 29, 1919, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 3, LOC.

31. Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, p. 91; U.S. Navy Dept., Diary of Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations.


33. In a document dated March 28, 1944, Yarnell articulated the major factors that entered into consideration when developing adequate war plans. These factors, somewhat akin to instruments of power, included morale, army, navy, diplomacy, economics, and politics. Harry E. Yarnell, “Notes on Staff Organization and Information Necessary for Adequate War Plans,” March 28, 1944, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 3, folder 1, LOC.

34. Harry E. Yarnell to Members of Plans Division, memorandum, September 11, 1920, pp. 100–15, Subject 100—Reports (Planning Committee), Confidential Correspondence of the Navy, 1919–1927, microfilm M1140, NARA.


41. Harry E. Yarnell to Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum, February 13, 1919, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 3, LOC.

42. Henry E. Yarnell to William D. Leahy, November 25, 1938, Harry E. Yarnell Papers, Manuscript Division, Personal Correspondence, box 3, folder labeled “Leahy, Admiral Wm. D—66–76,” LOC.

44. Underwood, *The Wings of Democracy*, pp. 140–41; Statutory Bd. on Submarine, Destroyer, Mine, & Naval Air Bases, 1938, Report on Need of Additional Naval Bases to Defend the Coasts of the United States, Its Territories, and Possessions, H.R. Doc. N. 76-65 (1939). Established by a memorandum from Acting Navy Secretary Charles Edison to Rear Admiral Hepburn, the board convened to investigate and report on potential national defense needs for the establishment of additional submarine, destroyer, mine, and naval air bases along the nation's coasts and in its territories and possessions. The board's report of December 1938 included recommendations for establishing new bases and expanding existing bases to ensure three major air bases on each coast, plus one in the Canal Zone and another in Hawaii. Additional recommendations were to establish outlying operating bases in Alaska, the West Indies, and American possessions in the Pacific, and new submarine bases in Alaska and the mid-Pacific region. Additional strategic projects included upgrades to the Kaneohe Bay air facilities in Hawaii; submarine and air bases at Wake, Midway, and Guam; and air facilities at Johnston and Palmyra Islands.

45. Charles Edison to Harry E. Yarnell, memorandum, “Transfer to the Retired List,” September 16, 1939, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 4, LOC.

46. Yarnell, diary entries, August 28–September 1, 1939, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 3, folder 2, NHHC. These officials included Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Acting Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Harold R. Stark, Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. George C. Marshall, and Adm. William D. Leahy.

47. Harry E. Yarnell to the Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum, “Comments on War Plans,” September 2, 1939, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 11, folder 7, NHHC.

48. Harry E. Yarnell to Frank Knox, October 13, 1940, and Frank Knox to Harry E. Yarnell, October 16, 1940, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 11, folder 8, NHHC.

49. Harry E. Yarnell to Harold R. Stark, October 13, 1940, and Harold R. Stark to Harry E. Yarnell, October 16, 1940, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 11, folder 8, NHHC.

50. Harry E. Yarnell to Russel S. Coutant, June 22, 1942, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 12, folder 1, NHHC; “Minutes of Press Conference Held by Mr. Knox,” January 15, 1941, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 11, folder 8, NHHC. Yarnell's diary entry for December 11, 1940, records as follows: "Went to Nav. Dept. and had interview with Under Secretary of Navy, Mr. Forrestal, & Admiral Stark. Orders written out for me to report for duty on Jan. 3, 1941." Yarnell, diary entry, December 11, 1940, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 3, folder 4, NHHC.


52. Harry E. Yarnell to Frank Knox, memorandum, “Far Eastern Situation,” January 15, 1941, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 16, folder 21, NHHC.


54. Frank Knox to Harry E. Yarnell, memorandum, January 9, 1942, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 4, LOC.

55. Harry E. Yarnell to Charles Little, September 28, 1942, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 1, folder 5, LOC.

56. Yarnell, diary entry, August 6, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 3, folder 3, NHHC.


58. Yarnell, diary entries, January 3, 13–14, 1942, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 3, folder 4, NHHC; Yarnell to Coutant, June 22, 1942; Yarnell, diary entry, January 4, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 3, folder 3, NHHC.

59. Harry E. Yarnell to Randall Jacobs, May 15, 1943, and Randall Jacobs to Harry E. Yarnell,
May 20, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 12, folder 2, NHHC. Curiously, Yarnell’s letter mentions having applied for sea duty in September 1942, but no diary entry mentions this; however, there is no mention of the letter to Jacobs, either.

60. Yarnell, diary entry, February 16, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 3, folder 3, NHHC. See also William D. Puleston to Harry E. Yarnell, March 27, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 12, folder 2, NHHC.


62. Yarnell, diary entries, May 6 and June 3, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 3, folder 3, NHHC.

63. Harry E. Yarnell to Frederick J. Horne, June 7, 1943, box 12, folder 2; note from Frederick J. Horne to Ernest J. King, June 10, 1943, box 12, folder 2; Frederick J. Horne to Harry E. Yarnell, June 11, 1943, box 12, folder 2; Harry E. Yarnell to Frederick J. Horne, June 14, 1943, box 12, folder 2; Yarnell, diary entries, June 11, 14, 1943, box 3, folder 3; all OA, Yarnell Papers, NHHC.

64. Ernest J. King to Harry E. Yarnell, June 16, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 12, folder 2, NHHC.

65. Yarnell, diary entry, June 9, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 3, folder 3, NHHC; William D. Puleston to Harry E. Yarnell, July 23, 1942, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 1, folder 4, LOC; Harry E. Yarnell to Edward Warner, September 18, 1943, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 1, folder 6, LOC.


68. Ibid., p. 1101.


72. Harry E. Yarnell to Joseph W. Powell, August 4, 1943, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 1, folder 6, LOC.


75. Harry E. Yarnell to Frederick J. Horne, memorandum, with enclosure of rough draft memorandum “Plans for Demobilization,” August 13, 1943, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 5, LOC.

76. Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, pp. 12–13; Secretary of the Navy to the Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum, “Post-war Demobilization Planning,” August 26, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 12, folder 2, NHHC.

77. Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, pp. 13–14; Vice Chief of Naval Operations to Adm. Harry E. Yarnell, memorandum, “Post-war Demobilization Planning,” August 27, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 12, folder 2, NHHC.


79. Yarnell, diary entries, September 11, 13–14, 16–18, 20–22, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 3, folder 3, NHHC.
80. Special Planning Section to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum, “Post-war Demobilization Planning,” September 22, 1943, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 5, LOC.
81. Ibid.; Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, p. 17.
82. Special Planning Section to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations et al., memorandum, “Preliminary Draft of Plan for Demobilization,” September 22, 1943, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 5; Special Planning Section to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum, “Post-war Demobilization Planning,” September 22, 1943; Barlow, From Hot War to Cold, pp. 43–44; Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, pp. 156–57; Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, pp. 14–19.
84. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, pp. 157–58; Yarnell, diary entry, October 22, 1943, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 3, folder 3, NHHC.
85. Special Planning Section to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum, “Post-war Demobilization Planning,” October 28, 1943, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 5, LOC.
88. Harry E. Yarnell to Frederick J. Horne, November 23, 1943, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 1, folder 7, LOC. Emphasis in original.
89. Barlow, From Hot War to Cold, pp. 49–50; Special Planning Section to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum, “Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No. 2,” February 11, 1944, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 9, folder 3, NHHC.
90. Special Planning Section to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum, “Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No. 2.” On the cover memorandum for the plan, Yarnell listed the main differences between Plan No. 1 and Plan No. 2 as a reduction of numbered fleets in commission from three to two; reduction of task force squadrons in commission from six to three; reduction of submarine squadrons in commission from five to three; reduction of mine divisions in commission from six to three; and statement of bases necessary in the Pacific area.
91. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox died of a heart attack on April 28, 1944.
92. Frederick J. Horne to Harry E. Yarnell, memorandum, June 9, 1944, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 6, LOC.
93. Yarnell drafted the memorandum in only three days. See Yarnell, diary entry, June 12, 1944, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 4, folder 1, NHHC.
94. Harry E. Yarnell to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum, “Basic Demobilization Plan No. 3,” June 14, 1944, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 6, LOC.
96. Yarnell, memorandum, “Basic Demobilization Plan No. 3.”
97. Ibid.
98. Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, p. 92.
101. Harry E. Yarnell to Weldon Jones, November 10, 1944, Yarnell Papers–NHF, box 2, folder 1, LOC.
102. Yarnell, diary entry, November 24, 1944, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 4, folder 1, NHHC.
103. Possibly his fourth retirement; see note 50.
105. Barlow, From Hot War to Cold, p. 53.
106. Harry E. Yarnell to Morris Sanford, December 1, 1944, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 12, folder 3, NHHC.


109. Bernard Brodie to Harry E. Yarnell, January 22, 1945, OA, Yarnell Papers, box 9, folder 5, NHHC.