World War II Infographics

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Recommended Citation
Demy, Timothy J.; Lopez, Jean; Aubin, Nicolas; Bernard, Vincent; and Guillerat, Nicolas (2020) "World War II Infographics," Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 1 , Article 16. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/16
polities that are in many ways the most important and instructive of Graeco-Roman antiquity, as revealed especially in their foundings. Sparta is the quintessential Greek polis in its self-contained and parochial nature; Rome, by contrast, is the city destined to become an empire and put an end to the classical world.

CARNES LORD


The magnitude of World War II is difficult to comprehend fully. The scope, course, and details of the war are such that gaining a useful working knowledge of it can be challenging. The authors have assisted such endeavors greatly with the present volume. They come to the project with significant knowledge of the war and expertise in writing and editing military history. Additionally, Guillerat was trained as a data designer and graphic artist. The result is an informative, enjoyable, and aesthetically pleasing volume that is easy to use. The authors go far beyond simply presenting chronology, statistics, and lists.

Containing hundreds of easy-to-read and visually appealing color charts and graphics, the volume divides its subject matter into fifty-three areas, grouped in four sections: “The Context of the War,” “Arms and Armed Forces,” “Battles and Campaigns,” and “Aftermath and Consequences.” Among the areas of particular naval interest are the infographics labeled “Combat Fleets,” “A Carrier Battle Group in 1942,” “A Tidal Wave from Japan,” “The Battle of the Atlantic,” “The Battle for Midway,” “War in the Mediterranean,” and “Japan: The Final Days.” Economic, demographic, and military information is presented visually in a manner that moves beyond names and numbers and provides the reader with useful and memorable information. For example, of the 2.2 billion people alive in 1939 when the war erupted, 130 million of them, from thirty nations, were mobilized for military service (p. 23).

The volume’s inclusion of coverage of areas not always presented in others works, such as the Manhattan Project and the Holocaust, is extremely helpful. Also of interest are infographics on troop mobilization, armaments production, civilian displacements, military collaboration and resistance, and Operation BAGRATION. The work provides information on major battles but not a graphic portrayal of every battle, so some users may desire more details on specific battles and campaigns. This should not be viewed as a defect, however, since supplying the latter is not the purpose of the work.

The authors have managed to organize and portray visually, using state-of-the-art graphic design, the scope and course of the war. The only thing lacking in the book is a CD of the work, which would allow the infographics to be used in the classroom or elsewhere. Its 9½” × 11¾” size makes it very readable and functional as a research volume. The book does not have an index.

Each of the volume’s fifty-three areas of study is introduced with a well-written narrative overview of the section that is contextualized historically. What one finds in this volume that sometimes is lacking in other, similar works is references and sources for all the data presented. For historians and students, this is necessary and extremely helpful.
The design layout and choice of information presented allow for the voluminous facts and figures pertaining to World War II to be comprehensible not only to specialists but to students and general readers. It will withstand both the requirements of scholarship and the expectations and desires of general readers. Such balance is difficult to obtain.

Although the volume is one of graphics and not pictures, the saying that “a picture is worth a thousand words” is certainly applicable and accurate in the instance of World War II Infographics. Coupled with a good historical atlas of the war, it should be a ready reference work for research and pleasure browsing by anyone with more than a nominal interest in World War II. There are several helpful infographic books on World War II on the market, but, from this reviewer’s perspective, this volume goes far beyond the others.

TIMOTHY J. DEMY


Many books have been published on “cyber” in recent years, many of which leave the reader with the sense that cyber must be important, while never clearly communicating what cyber actually is or what a “cyber warrior” might do all day. Clint Watts’s Messing with the Enemy is distinctive in providing an accessible yet detailed account of what Watts and his colleagues did to detect, analyze, and disrupt online two very different adversaries: jihadist terrorist organizations and the Russian government. The book is not technical and does not hide behind buzzwords, nor does it imply that the subject is too classified or too specialized for the reader to understand. The social media world in which Watts works may depend on technology, but ultimately the story in Messing with the Enemy is of very human communication and manipulation. The book is an engaging read and, while it is not a scholarly study, its “operator” perspective fills a niche likely to interest the Naval War College Review audience.

Author Clint Watts is a West Point graduate who became a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counterterrorism field agent, returned to West Point as cofounder of its Combating Terrorism Center, went back to the FBI in counterintelligence, and today is an independent consultant. Watts’s writing is lively, conveying plenty of personality while still delivering serious substance. Watts comes across as someone who would be fascinating to share a drink with; would be maddening to supervise; and, on balance, is an asset to America.

With respect to terrorists, Watts and his teams mapped organizational and intellectual networks faster than the U.S. Intelligence Community did, using public social media posts and open-source data ranging from weather reports to donkey prices. Watts directly “messed” with terrorist leaders, who—as if they were Bond villains—proved surprisingly willing to converse with a counterterror operative. Watts recounts goading jihadists into incautious revelations or, for one U.S.-born leader, into angering his al-Shabaab hosts by tweeting about preferring Applebee’s to Somali cuisine. Such “messaging” is a staple of conducting counterintelligence or fighting organized crime, yet official U.S.