The cover reproduces The First Wave on Japan, a 1945 watercolor painting by Standish Backus Jr. It depicts Higgins boats carrying Marines of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment ashore at Fort No. 2 on the Futtsu Peninsula, Tokyo Bay, Japan. The landing represented the first test of whether the Japanese actually would abide by the terms that had been negotiated or would resist. In "Conditional Surrender: Conflict Termination in the Pacific, 1945," Richard J. Shuster and Takuya Shimodaira describe the series of developments and the behind-the-scenes efforts that—despite the Allies' public stance demanding "unconditional surrender" and the stubborn determination of most of the Japanese leadership to fight to the bitter end—led to peaceful surrender and the official termination of World War II in August–September 1945.

Source: Naval History and Heritage Command
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Much has been written about the Maritime Strategy developed by the U.S. Navy in the 1980s to counter Soviet ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) operations in a major war. Less attention has been given to its intelligence backstory. Bradford Dismukes, in “The Return of Great-Power Competition: Cold War Lessons about Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Defense of Sea Lines of Communication,” analyzes the failure of the Navy in the 1970s to understand the essentially defensive posture of the Soviet SSBN force in its northern “bastions,” and hence the USN exaggeration of the Soviet naval threat to NATO’s sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic. Dismukes argues that we must be careful not to repeat this error in designing naval forces and strategies to counter the Russian (or Chinese) navy today. Bradford Dismukes is a former U.S. naval intelligence officer and long-standing student of the Soviet navy.

The reemergence of great-power competition is also the premise of James A. Russell’s “Twenty-First Century Innovation Pathways for the U.S. Navy in the Age of Competition.” Beginning with a brief review of the two great historical eras of American naval innovation, with their effective adaptation to the strategic and fiscal realities of the day, he then focuses on the broad failure of the Navy in the 1990s to design and build a fleet adequate to the demands of the twenty-first century. Faulting in particular the innovative yet problem-plagued littoral combat ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class aircraft carrier, he argues that the Navy missed an opportunity to anticipate the era of unmanned systems that is now so rapidly upon us. James A. Russell is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

James Kraska and Yusuke Saito, in “The Law of Military Operations and Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” provide a valuable analysis of a potential fault line in America’s alliance with Japan that perhaps is not recognized sufficiently. In the United States, of course, the executive branch as personified in the president has considerable leeway to respond to military crises on its own; in Japan, reflecting the constitutional legacy of its defeat in World War II, a variety of contingencies involving the commitment of Japanese military forces require formal approval by the Japanese Diet. It is critical that these differences and their effects be understood fully on both sides and reflected in operational planning. James Kraska is chairman of the Stockton Center for International Law at the Naval
War College; Commander Yusuke Saito is a legal officer in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

War termination is an underappreciated and understudied aspect of war. One has only to look at the performance of the U.S. government in the aftermath of its recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to be convinced of this. The story of the management of the end of World War II in the Pacific is a great object lesson in this regard. In “Conditional Surrender: Conflict Termination in the Pacific, 1945,” Richard J. Shuster and Takuya Shimodaira present an unusual analysis of these events from the perspectives of both the victor and the vanquished. As the title of the piece suggests, the American victory may have been unconditional as far as the Japanese military was concerned, but the translation of military victory into strategic success had everything to do with America’s acceptance of one “condition”: retention of the Japanese emperor, as titular head of state. The authors call attention to the fact that both American and Japanese decision-making in the final stage of the war featured sharp internal disagreements. The emperor’s decisive embrace of the arguments of the Japanese “peace party” following the shocks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, together with the Americans’ acceptance of his continuing role in the Japanese polity, was decisive for the (in retrospect) amazing success of the postwar settlement, and, for that matter, the durability of an alliance relationship that continues today—as is evidenced by, among other things, this coauthored article (as well as the previous one). Richard J. Shuster is a professor at the Naval War College; Rear Admiral, retired, Takuya Shimodaira, JMSDF, is a senior research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo.

In other matters, a perusal of our masthead will show that some routine rotation has occurred in the membership of our advisory board. The Naval War College and the Press thank off-going members Adam Bellow, Gale A. Mattox, Robert A. Silano, and Marin Strmecki most sincerely for their long years of yeoman service, and welcome aboard Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky, Geoffrey Till, and Francis J. West, with thanks for their willingness to serve.

IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters Harbor Island complex. For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236).
WE live in a dynamic era. For our Navy and Marine Corps team, this dynamism will present challenges—known and unknown, seen and unseen. In fact, perhaps the most predictable thing we can say about the future is that it will be unpredictable. Preparing for that future surely means investing in more platforms and new weapons systems, but nothing will be more important than the investment that we make in learning, and in creating a force made up of people who thirst for it. Accordingly, the landmark 2018 Education for Seapower (E4S) report recognized that the intellectual capability of our Navy and Marine Corps team and a lifelong passion for continuous learning will be our foundation of any credible deterrent to war.

Further, the E4S report recommended organizational and functional changes designed to lift education to a strategic and budgeting priority alongside our platforms and weapons systems. It also identified, and follow-on Secretarial direction confirmed, the need for a comprehensive education strategy to unify the disparate elements of our Naval University System and to integrate education effectively into talent-management initiatives. With that direction in mind, the Department of the Navy’s Chief Learning Officer, in coordination with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, developed the following, first-ever Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 to align the policies and resources required to produce a better educated and more agile naval force—for officers, enlisted, and civilians alike.

Above all, this strategy provides unified Departmental leadership direction to regard naval education as a critical warfighting enabler. It is only through a sound educational foundation and supported, continuous lifelong learning that our naval leaders will be able to comprehend the dynamic geopolitical environment and make key decisions that will ultimately affect the security and prosperity of the United States. By implementing and iterating this Education for Seapower Strategy 2020, we will ensure that our Navy and Marine Corps team is prepared to meet the challenges of the future.
Strategy 2020 for the long run, we will continue to build an integrated naval force that is intellectually agile and adaptive—a decisive force from the sea that can out-think and out-fight any challenger to American interests, while better enabling our national security to prevail despite an unpredictable future.

INTRODUCTION
The United States Navy and Marine Corps have a long and successful history of creating world-class educational institutions to prepare their forces for all aspects of naval warfare. The United States Naval Academy, the Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, Marine Corps University, and the Naval ROTC programs have produced some of our nation’s finest leaders in war and peace. We are proud of this legacy, which provides an outstanding foundation as we move toward the future. We must, however, continually seek to improve our approach to education to ensure our competitive advantage.

In recent years, Defense and Naval Leaders have repeatedly called for a renewed emphasis on professional military education as a foundation of national security. The 2018 National Defense Strategy observed that “the creativity and talent of the American warfighter is our greatest enduring strength,” but warned that our professional military education system had “stagnated.” The following year, the landmark Education for Seapower (E4S) report concluded that to maintain naval power in an era of great-power competition and technological change, the Navy and Marine Corps need to strengthen and expand their educational efforts. In line with these conclusions, the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, the Chief of Naval Operations’ Fragmentary Order, and the Department of the Navy’s Human Capital Strategy all recognize the need for changes in the prioritization, integration, and resourcing of naval education.

On February 5, 2019, the Secretary of the Navy issued his E4S Decision Memorandum calling for a bold new direction for naval education. The E4S Decision Memorandum ordered, among other things, the development of a comprehensive naval education strategy. Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 responds to this mandate, and to calls for improvement from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, by providing a clear plan to help Sailors, Marines, and Department of the Navy civil servants develop the knowledge, critical thinking skills, and strategic perspectives necessary to prevail against any adversary across the full spectrum of conflict.

This strategy is informed by and responds to our current geopolitical context. At the end of the Cold War, the United States possessed a massive economic and technological edge over all potential opponents. Today, for the first time in decades, we are competing on a more level playing field and our advantage is declining. In this new era, the intellectual capability of our Navy and Marine
Corps team will be the primary military differentiator between our nation and its adversaries and the true foundation of any credible deterrent to war.

INTENT OF EDUCATION FOR SEAPOWER STRATEGY 2020
This strategy seeks to advance the intellectual capability of our naval forces. The strategy will create a decisive competitive advantage by:

- Developing leaders and warfighters who possess good judgment, creativity, a commitment to ethics, and excellent analytic and problem-solving skills;
- Providing naval forces with an intellectual overmatch against our adversaries;
- Making the naval force more proficient by improving strategic thinking, increasing geopolitical awareness, building key technical and professional capabilities, and deepening our understanding of the conditions in which military force can be used effectively.

Responsibilities
In order for this strategy to succeed, it will take much more than good plans, good intentions, and sufficient resources. Success will require every Sailor, Marine, and Department of the Navy civilian employee to invest in their educational and professional competencies.

Individual Sailors, Marines, and Civil Servants. Marines, Sailors, and civilians of all ranks should value learning as the cornerstone of their professional development. They have a responsibility to take full advantage of learning opportunities and to treat education as an integral component of their operational competence. They should value academic, technical, and ethical excellence and embrace a commitment to become lifelong learners.

Naval Leaders. Current and rising naval leaders bear a special responsibility in our education system. They should support, encourage, and advise the men and women they lead as those Sailors, Marines, and civilian employees chart their educational courses. Leaders must create a climate of intellectual exchange and take an active role in debates over the future of our force structures, strategy, and tactics. Most importantly, senior civilian and military leaders must ensure that our education system is properly designed, resourced, and supported so that we deliver on the educational promises we make to our force.

Senior leaders should seek to become warrior-scholars and warrior-diplomats, proficient in military history, strategy, planning, and operations. They must be lifelong learners and educational role models for the men and women they lead.

Naval Educators. Naval educators bear a particular responsibility to ensure that men and women in the Marine Corps and Navy receive the best military
education in the world. Leaders of our military education institutions must run world-class, cost-effective institutions that produce high-quality graduates with relevant strategic and warfighting skills. Faculty members must be leaders in their respective fields and consistently deliver high-quality education to Sailors and Marines operating across the globe, using the full range of education-delivery methods. Above all, naval educators should uphold and enforce rigorous academic standards, support academic freedom, and encourage intellectual preparedness among their students and colleagues.

Assumptions
The following key assumptions bear on this strategy’s approach to fulfilling the vision and specified tasks set forth in the Secretary of the Navy’s E4S Decision Memorandum:

- The Navy and Marine Corps are composed of diverse officer and enlisted communities that have unique career path requirements and high operational tempos, which our approach to education should respect and value.
- This endeavor should optimize the quantity, quality, and accessibility of our programs and curricula—creating the right number of programs of the right size and delivery method, offered in the appropriate subjects—to meet our educational requirements.
- To target appropriate educational opportunities to the appropriate audience, the Navy and Marine Corps must identify what everyone needs to know, what many people need to know, and what a few people need to know (All, Many, Few).
- Certain external laws and policies, such as the Blended Retirement System, Department of Defense Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements, and “Up or Out” policies bear directly on this strategy’s implementation. Where authority for change rests outside of the Department’s span of control, we will advocate for the changes necessary to achieve this strategy’s goals.
- Learning is integral to every aspect of a naval leader’s career. Formal education is complemented by both experiential learning obtained in the operating forces and self-directed study that taps into an individual’s natural curiosity and personal interests.

Naval Education Pillars
Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 is based upon three pillars. First, the Navy and Marine Corps must create a continuum of learning for the entire force. Second, our organization must integrate education into our talent-management frameworks. Finally, the Department of the Navy must strengthen and invest
in the Naval University System. For each of these pillars, this strategy identifies objectives that the Department of the Navy should accomplish in the near-, mid-, and long-term, as well as specific action items to accomplish these objectives.

Collectively, these three pillars seek to strengthen intellectual development in seven critical areas: creative and critical analysis; ethical decision-making; strategic thinking; warfighting excellence; geopolitical awareness; technical and technological competence; and resource management and acquisition acuity.

**PILLAR 1: CREATE A CONTINUUM OF LEARNING FOR THE ENTIRE FORCE**

Today’s Sailors, Marines, and Department of the Navy civil servants are well-educated. Many of them have graduated from great colleges and universities in the United States and abroad, attended rigorous professional military education and training programs, and pursued off-duty learning opportunities on their own time. Despite this, the Navy and Marine Corps have not taken full advantage of our force’s intellectual potential. Our enlisted Sailors and Marines should have the opportunity to study and learn in world-class education programs that are directly relevant to their professional careers. Our officers need a career road map that enhances their warfighting capabilities through professional military education and world-class civilian degree programs. Our civilian team members need access to long-term professional development support throughout their tenure with the Department of the Navy. Sustained career development through educational and professional opportunities contributes to the system of continuous learning that will forge the naval warfighters of tomorrow.

**Objective A: Create the U.S. Naval Community College**

Twenty years ago, General Charles C. Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, highlighted the growing strategic importance of the most junior non-commissioned officers. In the coming years, this trend will accelerate as warfighting becomes more technologically complex, the pace of combat decision-making accelerates, and ship crews become smaller and more versatile.

To fully capitalize on the potential capabilities of enlisted Sailors and Marines and to support their intellectual development, the Department of the Navy will establish the United States Naval Community College (USNCC). All enlisted Sailors and Marines will be enrolled in the community college upon enlistment and will accrue appropriate college credit on their USNCC transcript when they complete military training schools. These Sailors and Marines will be able to begin to earn an associate degree at the USNCC at no cost once they have completed their accessions training pipeline. Eventually, select civil servant cohorts will have an opportunity to learn alongside their uniformed peers.
The USNCC will ultimately be a fully-accredited higher education institution, but degrees will initially be issued by high-quality, accredited civilian education partners with successful track records of delivering associate degrees online. The USNCC will create and offer a small number of “navalized” general education courses, but the majority of course work will be offered by civilian university or community college partners in fields relevant to modern naval warfighting, including but not limited to cyber, information technology, management, data analytics, and computer science.

The USNCC will enter into transfer (articulation) agreements with its partners to ensure that all course work can transfer to civilian degree programs, which will provide a foundation from which Sailors and Marines can continue formal education. Since Sailors and Marines face many time constraints associated with service needs, the USNCC and its partners will offer courses in a variety of flexible formats—synchronous, asynchronous, and self-paced—so that rigorous naval education is available wherever and whenever needed. This new effort will supplement, not replace, traditional tuition assistance. Tuition assistance will still be available to Sailors and Marines to pursue degrees beyond the associate level, or in fields less relevant to warfighting.

**Action.** The USNCC is a top priority for the Department of the Navy. In support of this goal, the Department of the Navy will complete initial program design by February 28, 2020; seek Congressional authorization during 2020; and enroll students for its initial proof of concept in the January term of 2021. USNCC partnerships will continue to expand until the college is fully operational within the next five years.

**Objective B: Strengthen and Align Mid-career Officer Warfighting Curricula**

The basic elements of a first-class officer-education system are (a) an outstanding undergraduate education; (b) primary and intermediate career educational opportunities that advance professionalism, warfighting capability, and intellectual development; and (c) a senior in-residence strategic educational experience that prepares the officer for senior leadership positions. While the Navy and Marine Corps programs for undergraduate and senior strategic education are excellent, the current methods used to educate junior and mid-grade officers are not as well aligned to educational goals and career paths.

The Marine Corps offers the Expeditionary Warfare School and Marine Corps University Command and Staff College to officers in the O-3 to O-4 range through a wide variety of delivery methods. Comparable primary and intermediate curricula exist at the Naval Command and Staff College, but in-residence attendance is limited to O-4s and officer inventory makes filling its quotas a perennial challenge. The Navy also provides aspects of primary and intermediate
education through the warfare communities’ tactical and leader-development courses, but these do not uniformly bridge the gap between undergraduate and senior strategic studies programs.

Strengthening standardized primary and intermediate warfighting curricula for Navy and Marine Corps officers is critical to advancing naval officer education and to promoting naval integration. The curriculum should offer approximately twenty courses directly relevant to current warfighting challenges. The courses will be free-standing and stackable and eventually could be pursued to meet requirements for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) or a master’s degree in military science. These courses should continue the developmental effort that began during our officers’ undergraduate studies and set them on track to grow into tomorrow’s senior leaders. We will offer these courses through a range of appropriate learning formats, focusing primarily on online and executive courses, which combine short in-residence terms with study away from campus. To expand access to these programs to our entire Department of the Navy workforce, we will also explore the potential of open enrollment for these programs.

**Action.** Immediately, the Chief Learning Officer (CLO), in coordination with DCNO N7 and DC (CD&I), will create a process to identify learning outcomes to bridge the gap between precommissioning education and senior war college-level education for junior and mid-grade Navy and Marine Corps officers. The process will assess how best to deliver a curriculum across warfare communities, with a mid-term goal of piloting a small number of courses with two to four communities. The CLO will also immediately identify civilian education opportunities that meet these desired learning outcomes and work to make the courses available to our force by FY-21.

**Objective C: Adjust the Focus of Naval Education**

The CLO’s Coordinating Group (CLO-CG) consists of DCNO N7, DC (CD&I), Navy and Marine Corps leaders from the Fleet, the Naval University System, and Cyber, Naval Research, and Naval Intelligence enterprises. In its inaugural meeting in October 2019, the group determined that the Department of the Navy has gaps in knowledge about the value and limitations of emerging technologies and potential adversary capabilities and intentions.

**Action.** In the near term, the CLO, DCNO N7, and DC (CD&I) will form two working groups to identify what our force (All/Many/Few) needs to understand about emerging technologies and the capabilities, culture, and intentions of our adversaries. The CLO, DCNO N7, and DC (CD&I) will set clear learning outcomes for these working groups, and then propose curricula and education delivery mechanisms to achieve these outcomes. Once this work is completed, the
CLO’s Coordinating Group will review two additional high-priority areas: (1) leadership and ethics and (2) resource management and acquisitions.

**Objective D: Enhance Partnerships through Education**

The National Defense Strategy notes the fundamental importance of allies and partners in our efforts to advance the national security of the United States. From the Revolutionary War to the present day, the Navy and the Marine Corps have worked with allies and partners to achieve some of our greatest victories. Our history teaches us that interoperability is very difficult to build during wartime, and thus, we need to place great emphasis on building that interoperability during times of relative peace. Clearly, interoperability requires that weapons systems be complementary and that communications systems be linked, but intellectual interoperability—the ability to communicate and analyze problems jointly—is equally important. One way to enhance our intellectual interoperability is for officers to attend the PME programs of our allies and partners and for our allies and partners, in turn, to send their officers to attend our PME programs.

**Action.** In the mid-term, the CLO, in coordination with DCNO N7 and DC (CD&I), will develop a plan to increase the number of allied and partner nation students attending Naval University System institutions as well as the number of Navy and Marine Corps officers attending foreign schools. As this plan is developed, the CLO will take into account recent Secretary of Defense guidance calling for a 50 percent increase in the number of allies training alongside U.S. troops, as well as the security needs of our naval forces.

**Objective E: Modernize Education Program Delivery**

The Navy and the Marine Corps are our nation’s forward-deployed and expeditionary forces—the tip of America’s spear across the globe. Educating a force deployed in every ocean and on multiple continents with demanding operational commitments presents great challenges. Fortunately, the development of online education and the dramatic expansion of executive education, which requires only short or intermittent periods in-residence, provide more tools to meet the educational needs of our forces. Using these new methods will help us provide quality education while minimizing disruption to career paths and reducing personnel transfers.

**Action.** To modernize the delivery of education programs in the near- and mid-term, the CLO and NUS will:

- Expand our partnerships with top graduate schools to provide more executive educational opportunities to our force;
- Ensure that the new Mid-Career Officer Warfighting Curriculum is delivered using online and executive formats; and
• Evaluate existing and any new Naval Postgraduate School and Naval War College programs to determine whether they can be offered using new delivery models.

Objective F: Expand DON Civilian Education Development

In January 2020, the Secretary of the Navy issued a new Human Capital Strategy to be implemented for the Department’s civilian workforce. In this strategy, education and learning are elevated as national security enablers for the civilian workforce, mirroring the Education for Seapower report findings for uniformed members.

Many enterprises and commands have developed discrete education programs for their respective workforces, providing opportunities that increase performance in evolving and leading business systems, audit and accounting programs, and enterprise risk management, among other areas. We will investigate ways to build on these successes by implementing additional education programs to advance Department of the Navy civilian learning efforts.

Action. In the near-term, the CLO will work with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN(M&RA)) and establish, by October 1, 2020, a “Secretary’s Executive Fellows Program.” This program will send the most highly qualified leaders in our civilian workforce to top-ranked educational institutions for executive programs leading to master’s degrees in management or other areas necessary to support an integrated, effective, and efficient naval fighting force. The CLO will also identify potential cohorts of civil servants who would benefit from attending the new U.S. Naval Community College.

Objective G: Increase the Number of Officers Pursuing PME

Currently, as the chart below reflecting FY-19 attendance indicates, both the Navy and Marine Corps send significant percentages of their total officer corps to in-residence and distributed (online and executive) learning opportunities.

Action. Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 calls for the Marine Corps to maintain this education commitment. For the Navy, this strategy calls for an increase in the percentage of officers pursuing in-residence education to 3.9 percent and an increase in the percentage of officers pursuing distributed learning opportunities, such as online and executive courses, to 10 percent by FY-26. Beginning in FY-20, the CLO will work with DCNO N7, DCNO N1, and Fleet and Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>% Officers In-Residence</th>
<th>% in Distributed Learning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
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Commanders to ensure that we make measurable progress toward these goals each year. As the NUS improves its ability to provide more distributed and executive learning opportunities, the balance of in-residence and distance learning participation will be re-evaluated.

**PILLAR 2: INTEGRATE EDUCATION INTO OUR TALENT-MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS**

There is a close connection between an individual’s curiosity and aptitude for learning and their capacity to lead. As Sailors, Marines, and Department of the Navy civilians assume increasing responsibility, they should have access to educational opportunities to strengthen their professional capabilities and hone their leadership skills. Successfully integrating education into naval talent-management frameworks requires that our organization provide more diverse learning opportunities for naval leaders and reward those individuals who demonstrate learning excellence. Our talent-management systems must also incentivize and reward academic experiences and achievement to set institutional expectations for continuous learning.

We will enact new policies to encourage and reward the pursuit of professional military and civilian education. Our new approach will transform our performance-evaluation, promotion, and school-selection processes and create a culture of intellectual development in our Navy, Marine Corps, and civilian workforces.

**Objective A: Review Education Selection Boards**

Educational selection boards are critical for identifying naval officers who have demonstrated aptitude for operational command and would benefit from attendance at service war colleges, international war colleges, or equivalent civilian graduate institutions. The Secretary’s E4S Decision Memorandum requires that the Navy and Marine Corps institute selection methods for attending in-residence graduate education. In line with this requirement, our services will create and/or modify selection boards to identify top-performing officers for further educational opportunities.

Reliable, authoritative data is one of the keys to enabling educational selection boards to screen officers for education opportunities and our personnel systems to detail them to the right billets or assignments. The services have efforts underway now to transform the data systems they use to store and process personnel data, but these initiatives will take time to reach fruition.

**Action.** In the near term, we will leverage current administrative screening processes to identify talent for educational opportunities. Additionally, the CLO will review the adequacy of current selection boards and work through DCNO N7
and DC (CD&I) to ensure that ongoing data-transformation efforts incorporate requirements to record and process information regarding academic aptitude and educational achievement. In the long term, we will change administrative screening processes to refine how we assign personnel to educational programs and follow-on tours.

**Objective B: Update Officer Promotion Precepts**

The Secretary’s E4S Decision Memorandum states that the Department’s CLO, in collaboration with DCNO N7 and DC (CD&I), will recommend to the Secretary of the Navy educational requirements for selection to command and the next higher pay grade. These requirements will be included in selection board precepts as orders to the presidents of selection boards in both services. Promotion precepts that reward educational and intellectual excellence, and strict adherence to their guidance by selection board presidents, represent the fastest and surest method for us to move toward our goal: to become a force that values, respects, and rewards intellectual preparation for war.

**Action.** Effective immediately, the CLO will review all precepts pertaining to Officer promotion boards, command boards, and selection boards for Federal Executive Fellowships, Permanent Military Professors, the Acquisition Workforce, and SECNAV’s Tours with Industry and make recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy for all educational requirements. Any recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy affecting educational requirements of the Acquisition Workforce will be made in coordination with ASN (RD&A).

**Objective C: Integrate Education into Fitness Reports and Evaluations**

To become a great learning organization, performance evaluations should assess (1) the degree to which officers and enlisted personnel have pursued their own education, and (2) the degree to which they have advanced and supported the education of the men and women they supervise and command.

The Secretary’s E4S Decision Memorandum requires that the Navy and Marine Corps make demonstrated learning achievement a key discriminator in officer fitness reports and enlisted evaluations. Learning achievements—just like leadership, physical fitness, and other performance categories currently graded by each reporting senior—should be continually evaluated to ensure progress is made along the course of a career.

Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 considers diverse learning achievements relevant to the proper evaluation of subordinates. Examples of such achievements include but are not limited to the following:

- Academic achievement in college or university courses;
- Achievement in Primary and Intermediate Warfighting courses;
• Achievement in JPME;
• Noteworthy accomplishments in exercises, planning, or wargaming;
• Publication in scholarly or professional journals;
• Excellence as a faculty member; or
• Achievement of appropriate levels of language or computer programming proficiency.

Both services are currently pursuing initiatives to revise their performance evaluation systems as part of ongoing efforts to modernize our personnel systems. Including educational achievement in these efforts is a high priority.

Action. Prior to April 1, 2020, the CLO and Chief of Naval Personnel (N1) will present to the Secretary of the Navy a plan of actions and milestones to incorporate education into the personnel evaluation system of the Navy. The CLO will work with DCNO N7, DC (CD&I), and service personnel leaders to ensure alignment to the Secretary’s intent and implement bridging mechanisms, if required, until new evaluation systems come on line.

Objective D: Tailor Career Paths to Meet Department of the Navy Needs
Career path management and sensitivity to operational requirements must be central to this effort to improve and enhance naval education. In order to ensure that we maintain the balance between operational requirements and career path management, the Department of the Navy must align new education initiatives with the needs of the operating forces.

Action. In the near term, the CLO will work with DCNO N7, DC (CD&I), and the warfare communities to identify ways to tailor education to complement our various community career paths. An implementation plan will be staffed and promulgated separately by the end of 2020.

PILLAR 3: STRENGTHEN AND INVEST IN OUR NAVAL UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
The most successful businesses and nonprofit organizations in the world aspire to be “learning organizations.” A great learning organization constantly assesses the intellectual capabilities of its workforce, seeking to identify gaps that may prevent optimal performance. These organizations also provide world-class learning resources to their teams to close these gaps, with strong feedback loops between the workforce, managers, and educators to ensure that educational efforts are timely, relevant, and effective.

To become a true learning organization, the Department of the Navy will develop and improve the educational infrastructure of our entire organization.
We must invest in our learning institutions, our faculty, and the high-performing staff who support them. We must also develop a more powerful wargaming strategy and create new relationships for intellectual sharing and debate between the Fleets and Marine Operating Forces and our cyber, research, and intelligence enterprises. Together, these investments will strengthen our Naval University System and increase the intellectual preparedness of our Sailors, Marines, and civilians.

Objective A: Establish Naval University System Framework and Standards

The primary educational delivery system that undergirds this strategy is the Naval University System. The NUS consists of five learning institutions: the Naval War College, Marine Corps University, Naval Postgraduate School, United States Naval Academy, and the new United States Naval Community College. The NUS will be operated on the model of a great state university system: the CLO will provide leadership, oversight, and strategic guidance on finance, curriculum, and outcomes, but service leadership and individual campuses will retain the independence they need to chart their own course to mission fulfillment.

A key focus of this system will be ensuring that each component fulfills a complementary role within the learning continuum, integrates fully with others in the system as appropriate, and avoids duplication of effort. At this inflection point in our history, when demand for quality education is in tension with officer inventory and high operational commitments, we need to review our current menu of degree and nondegree programs to ensure they align to our strategic intent.

The NUS will maintain the highest standards for academic quality and sound fiscal management, the hallmarks of a premier academic institution. This will include:

- A diverse and high-performing faculty, staff, and leadership team;
- High emphasis on maintaining relevant accreditation;
- A student-faculty ratio in line with peer civilian and military institutions;
- An appropriate number of well-crafted degree and learning programs designed for long-term career development, with fewer specialized programs designed to meet only the narrow needs of a particular curriculum sponsor for one utilization tour;
- Costs per degree commensurate with those at civilian and military peer institutions;
- A graduate network supporting continued learning and mentorship for long-term career development;
Courses and degree programs offered in a mix of learning delivery methods; and
Low overhead costs consistent with sound management, to allow maximum resources to flow to the academic program.

**Action.** In the near term, the CLO will work with DC (CD&I), DCNO N7, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASN (FM&C)) to develop a long-term budget process for the Naval University System.

**Action.** The CLO, in collaboration with DCNO N7 and DC (CD&I), will conduct a curriculum review in FY-20 and FY-21 at all NUS institutions.

**Action.** To achieve these high standards, each school within the NUS, in consultation with the CLO, will apply the following best practices in higher education for their schools by the start of FY-21:

- Ensure their schools’ mission statements are aligned with this strategy and have sufficient clarity to test the appropriateness of continuing current programs or adopting new programs or policies;
- Align their schools’ strategic plans to this strategy, including plans for budget, staffing, and curriculum development;
- Adopt a plan to ensure that every academic program and department receives outside academic peer review and evaluation for quality and outcomes at least once every ten years;
- Adopt a thirty-year campus master plan that identifies, at a minimum, space for future campus development, projected new building needs, necessary adaptations due to climate change, and planned reconstruction and renovation;
- Adopt a clear faculty-development and -support plan;
- Adopt a plan for conducting 360-degree performance reviews for key leaders; and
- Adopt, with guidance from the CLO, an accurate, transparent, and uniform comparative metrics performance dashboard that will allow stakeholders to measure progress toward strategic goals and evaluate performance outcomes compared to institutional peers.

**Objective B: Support Naval University System Faculty and Staff**
Great professors are the lifeblood of any world-class university system, and thus their recruitment, retention, and support should be a top priority. In order to maintain the best NUS faculty, we must implement new initiatives that promote intellectual exchange and encourage academic excellence.
Action. By June 30, 2020, the CLO will promulgate a plan to create a number of Naval University Distinguished Professorships at each campus to recognize merit at the senior professor level and provide appropriate compensation.

Action. In the mid-term, the CLO will work with DCNO N7 and DC (CD&I) to explore avenues to attract quality officers with the appropriate skills to serve as military faculty without disadvantaging their career potential. Policy changes will be recommended to the Secretary of the Navy by the end of 2020.

Action. Institution leaders will jointly develop a plan for the CLO by June 30, 2020 to provide for faculty exchange and visiting professorships on each campus, so we can begin to share ideas across traditional campus and service silos.

Objective C: Integrate and Utilize Naval University System Advisory Boards
The Education for Seapower Advisory Board will provide expert advice to the Secretary of the Navy about the Naval University System and execution of this strategy. Each campus will also possess an advisory board or subcommittee specific to its institution to provide the advice necessary for excellent performance and maintenance of accreditation.

Action. By June 30, 2020, the CLO, in collaboration with DCNO N7 and DC (CD&I), will provide guidance to all institutions and their boards or subcommittees on best practices for use and operation of higher education boards in a governmental context.

Objective D: Reinvigorate Naval University System Infrastructure
Three of the four current campuses (Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, and U.S. Naval Academy) have significant infrastructure renovation challenges associated with maintaining aging buildings of major educational, historical, and architectural value. Failure to address these challenges will inhibit the achievement of optimal educational outcomes.

Action. By June 1, 2020, the CLO and DCNO N7, in coordination with the heads of the three institutions, will present a plan to address these challenges to serve as a basis for discussion with senior Department leadership.

Action. The creation of a unified NUS may provide opportunities to capture synergies in areas like information technology and library management. The CLO, in consultation with campus leaders, will develop a plan by June 1, 2020, to review current operations, identify potential synergy areas, and make recommendations for the future.

Objective E: Identify and Implement Wargaming Best Practices
Over the last one hundred years, wargaming has made an indelible impact upon how the Navy and Marine Corps have waged war on land and at sea.
The Education for Seapower report emphasized the importance of wargaming throughout a naval professional’s career to prepare them for future conflict.

Today’s wargaming technologies are growing in capability. Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and corporate technology partners alike have made great progress in developing wargaming systems that fuse decision science with problem solving. These developments warrant future investigation for integration into our learning continuum.

**Action.** In the near term, the CLO will convene a working group that is informed by NUS wargaming experts and other stakeholders in the private sector and academia. This group will develop recommendations for incorporation of advanced wargaming concepts and supporting technology into education programs. The working group will present its findings and recommendations to the CLO-CG no later than the first quarter of FY-21.

**Objective F: Expand the Use of Learning-Management Systems**

Major finance, business, and technology corporations use learning-management systems to help their workforce to grow intellectually and to assist their managers as they seek to identify, deploy, and reward the diverse talents of their workforce. Increasingly, these systems are powered by artificial intelligence to provide each employee with learning opportunities uniquely tailored to their education level, intellectual capability, available time, interests, and work needs. These automated systems identify the next specific learning intervention an employee may want to pursue to advance and grow, provide multiple educational options for paths forward, and measure strengths and outcomes. These systems help members of the workforce explore hidden talents and proclivities and develop diverse talents to meet the institution’s larger mission. They are also the foundation of a sophisticated talent-management system. Successful intellectual development within the system can lead to different job opportunities within the firm and boosts retention by providing employees with concrete paths toward their personal and career goals.

The Secretary of the Navy’s Human Capital Strategy, led by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN (M&RA)), identifies the use of learning-management systems as critical to developing a fully empowered 21st-century workforce.

**Action.** In the near term, the CLO, in coordination with ASN (M&RA), will review department experiments with learning-management systems, and explore the potential value of adopting a comprehensive DON learning-management system that meets the requirements of the NUS, DON civilian workforce, and the services. Recommendations and an implementation plan, if appropriate, will be presented to the Secretary of the Navy by January 1, 2021.
Objective G: Evaluate JPME Programs
This strategy is designed to increase educational opportunities and achievement while making naval education align with the sea-going requirements of the Navy and Marine Corps team. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops the future model of JPME, the Department of the Navy will provide advice and counsel to help improve and modernize the JPME program.

Action. In the near term, the CLO, DCNO N7, and DC (CD&I) will form a working group with stakeholders to develop JPME reform recommendations for the DoD and the DON that align to ongoing OSD and Joint Staff efforts.

Objective H: Establish E4S Metrics and Dashboard
We cannot make real progress unless we have a baseline understanding of what key communities know and do not know about critical subject areas and how well our institutions are performing. We have made two very preliminary steps in this direction. First, the Naval War College has administered an experimental intermediate warfighting knowledge test to a small subset of war college students, revealing significant gaps in necessary knowledge. Second, the CLO’s Coordination Group has determined that we possess potentially decisive gaps in knowledge about the value and limitations of emerging technologies and the capabilities and intentions of key potential adversaries. This represents a small step forward, but we need to conduct much more comprehensive assessments, founded on authoritative data, in order to successfully implement this education strategy.

Action. To achieve this goal, the CLO will develop an initial assessment plan for the force and for each NUS institution no later than end of 2020. Progress toward achieving the objectives outlined in this strategy will be assessed every year through a metrical dashboard that compares targets and results, to be reviewed by the Secretary of the Navy and the Education for Seapower Advisory Board.

CONCLUSION
Our current Naval University System has many strengths. We possess outstanding military educational institutions with brilliant and dedicated faculty and staff. We have a heritage of intellectual excellence that provided an essential margin of victory in World War II and laid the foundation for decades of naval dominance thereafter. We have created valuable pathways to additional learning experiences at civilian universities and through fellowships with outstanding private sector and governmental organizations. These strengths provide us with a remarkable foundation and legacy as we look forward to an even brighter future.

Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 provides initial direction to our force as we work to link how we learn directly to how we fight. As we move forward, this strategy will adjust to reflect new realities. As we evolve, we will, however,
remain constant in our fundamental commitment to intellectual preparedness and warfighting advantage.

War is the harshest auditor of institutions. To deter future conflicts and to win those we cannot avoid, we need to operate at or near our full theoretical potential. We cannot reach that level of maximum effectiveness without great education for our entire force. Out-fighting our opponents will require that we out-think them.
In February 2019, the Department of the Navy issued its landmark Education for Seapower (E4S) Report, calling for major reform and improvement of our system of naval education for commissioned and enlisted Sailors and Marines. The Department of the Navy is beginning to implement the report’s recommendations at the direction of Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer, through his memorandum to all naval forces. When fully implemented, these changes to our education and promotion systems will have a profound impact on our naval services. Because of this, it is essential that policy makers, and indeed our entire force, understand the report and its conclusions. I recommend that everyone read the full E4S report; it is filled with important insights into the nature of seapower in the 21st century and the essential contribution of education and intellectual development to maintaining naval dominance. Since, however, the main section of the report is 71 pages long, I thought it would be useful to summarize its main conclusions and recommendations. Accordingly, here is my take on the 10 most important takeaways you need to know about the future of Navy and Marine Corps education from the E4S report.

1. Education of Our Force Is Vital to National Security
After exhaustive study of the strategic challenges we face as a nation, the E4S board concluded: “The education of our naval leaders is the single most important way to prepare the Naval Services, and the Nation, for a dangerous and uncertain future.” As retired Admiral James Stavridis observed in the report, “In the end, 21st century warfare is brain-on-brain conflict, and we must build our human capital and intellectual capacity as surely as we produce the best pure war fighting technology if we are going to win the nation’s wars and advance its security.”

2. Our Current Educational Efforts Are Inadequate
Because our intellectual capital is so vital to our nation’s security, developing that capital through education becomes a top priority, at least as important as building
platforms and weapons systems. The E4S report concluded that our current system of educating Sailors and Marines is “insufficient to create the operational and strategic leaders needed for the modern Navy and Marine Corps.” Indeed, the report noted that, in some respects, we have gone backwards. “While 98% of flag officers had attended the Naval War College on the eve of World War II, today only roughly 20% have.”

3. Immediate Action Is Necessary
Unlike a weapons system, we can’t just buy a strategically minded senior noncommissioned officer or field-grade staff officer—it takes years of education and the right motivation to develop the creativity and critical thinking required to lead through an uncertain future. The E4S board concluded that inadequate intellectual development of our force “is THE fundamental problem that must be corrected now.” We need to strengthen our capabilities in leadership and ethics, strategic education, technology and science, organizational management, logistics, and acquisition. Failure to change and improve, the report noted, would be a “strategic blunder.” This will require a major cultural shift, so that every naval warfare community and discipline recognizes the full value of education to our national security.

4. We Must Invest in and Support Our Educational Institutions
After studying the Naval War College, U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, and Marine Corps University, the E4S board concluded that though these schools have proud histories and talented faculty, they are “underfunded, underprioritized, underutilized, and disconnected from one another, without any unifying strategic vision or purpose.” The report noted in particular that “[f]aculty are not receiving enough funding to teach effectively, develop professionally, and conduct research.” To fix these problems, the report calls for the creation of a unified Naval University System, changes to intellectual property rules for faculty, major budget process reforms within the Pentagon, and an increase in high-priority funding.

5. We Must Create a Naval Community College for Enlisted Personnel
Our enlisted Marines and Sailors represent a national treasure, both in terms of intellect and selfless dedication to service. Yet we do not provide adequate educational opportunities that will help them develop their vast capacity to help solve the strategic challenges of the future. The report notes that despite many programs to support enlisted education, “valuable talent from the largest part of the services is not being utilized.” To tap into and develop this talent, the report calls for the creation of a Naval Community College offering “rigorous associate of science degree programs for naval sciences, with concentration areas such as data analytics, organizational behavior, and information systems.”
6. We Need 21st Century Education
The E4S report recognizes that residential education delivered over an extended period in a traditional campus setting is a very valuable educational tool, but that deployments and operational and training needs often make residential education difficult to obtain. To address this problem, the report calls for adoption of more-flexible education-delivery models, including short executive courses, stackable certificates that lead to degrees over time, and better use of available technology to deliver education outside the brick-and-mortar classroom. The report also calls for two important changes in emphasis in our school curricula: coursework leading to “greater understanding of emerging technologies,” and “more theoretical education in order to develop true critical thinkers and leaders.”

7. The Navy Must Adopt School-Selection Standards
Achieving high-quality educational outcomes means much more than retaining the best professors or creating challenging curricula. The E4S report noted deep concerns about how Navy officers are selected for and perform at graduate professional military education schools. “Leaders candidly observed that the Navy often sends poorly qualified officers to fill quotas. This practice includes sending non–due course officers, junior officers to senior programs, and restricted line officers, such as dental officers and chaplains, to fill quotas meant for unrestricted line officers.” As a result, Navy officers “consistently underperform the officers of other services.” To remedy this problem, the report calls for “competitive in-residence graduate education selection boards” similar to those already adopted by the Marine Corps—a process that has already begun in the Navy and is still being refined by both services.

8. The Navy Must Change Its Evaluation and Promotion System to Value Education
For education to truly matter to the naval services, excellence in learning must be recognized and rewarded. The E4S report concluded that while Marine officers and enlisted personnel are required to pursue and complete education coursework to qualify for promotion, many Navy officers do not, because education is not seen as necessary or valuable to career advancement. “Education is currently viewed as an obstruction in naval career paths by the majority, an obstruction exacerbated by the needs of the personnel assignment system,” and “there are not enough incentives for the personnel to continue higher education.” The report thus recommends significant changes to how we evaluate and promote officers, to insure that career incentives promote, not discourage, educational and intellectual development.

9. Leaders Must Take Responsibility for Education in Their Command
If we want our forces to reach their full strategic and operational potential, our officer and enlisted leaders must model a commitment to excellence in lifelong
learning. The E4S report notes that although it is critical for leaders in our force to pursue their own intellectual development, this alone is not sufficient. In addition, our leaders need to “assume responsibility for the education of their charges.” This means that leaders at all levels, both commissioned and noncommissioned, must help the Marines and Sailors they command identify, obtain, and complete the academic coursework we need for our national security.

10. Improving Education Is a Team Effort
Finally, the E4S report makes clear that all of us, individually and collectively, are responsible for strengthening the intellectual capabilities of our naval forces. Individual Sailors and Marines must pursue more education and take their academic performance just as seriously as they do the performance of their operational duties. Our leaders must obtain world-class education while taking responsibility for the educational advancement of the men and women they lead. Our educational institutions need to reinvent their curricula and delivery systems so that greater educational impact can be achieved for sea services that are by definition continually deployed. And the Department of the Navy as a whole must invest in our schools and make badly needed reforms to our personnel systems so that education becomes a top priority. These reforms are not optional. This is a fight we must win if we are to do our duty to protect national security.

JOHN KROGER
Since 1 October 2019, John Kroger has served as the Department of the Navy’s first Chief Learning Officer.
Rear Admiral Shoshana Chatfield is the fifty-seventh President of the U.S. Naval War College and a career naval helicopter pilot. A native of Garden Grove, California, she graduated from Boston University in 1987 with a bachelor of arts in international relations and French language and literature. She received her commission through the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps in 1988 and earned her wings of gold in 1989. Chatfield was awarded the Navy's Political/Military Scholarship and attended the Kennedy School of Government, receiving a master in public administration from Harvard University in 1997. In 2009, the University of San Diego conferred on her a doctorate of education in leadership studies.
THESE ARE GREAT TIMES to be a part of the Naval Education Enterprise! Several recent events have demonstrated that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are focusing on the education of our Sailors and Marines with an intensity and commitment that is unprecedented in recent decades. In April 2018, the Under Secretary of the Navy directed that a comprehensive study of the education mission of both services be undertaken in a process called the Education for Seapower (E4S) self-study. The report of the self-study was released in February 2019, and the services began implementing a number of substantial organizational changes.

On February 5, 2020, the Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 was published. It directed that specific actions be taken to address many of the shortcomings that were identified in the E4S report. Owing to its importance for the future development of our Navy and Marine Corps, this landmark strategy document is reprinted in its entirety elsewhere in this issue of the Review. While I highlight some of the key points of the strategy below, I encourage our readers to study the new guidance in depth.

The skillfully crafted strategy addresses the full range of issues that in the past have prevented the naval services from maximizing the efficiencies that a broadly educated officer and enlisted workforce can achieve to meet the myriad challenges they will face today and in the future. The strategy rests on three pillars: creating a continuum of learning for the entire force, integrating education into all our talent-management frameworks, and investing in and otherwise strengthening a Naval University System. These pillars will enhance intellectual development in seven critical areas: creative and critical analysis; ethical decision-making; strategic thinking; war-fighting excellence;
geopolitical awareness; technical and technological competence; and resource management and acquisition acuity.

The Navy established two new senior leadership positions to provide guidance and oversight to the Naval Education Enterprise. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting Development (OPNAV N7) is now the “sole resource sponsor and strategic leader for naval education.” In this new position, Vice Admiral Stuart Munsch, USN, serves as the advocate for educational programs and is responsible for aligning all naval education and training efforts to advance warfighting advantage. The second newly established position is that of the Navy's Chief Learning Officer (CLO), who is serving as the Secretary of the Navy’s staff assistant for naval education. In this role, Mr. John R. Kroger, a veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and past president of Reed College, is responsible for aligning the efforts of the five major components of the Naval University System: the Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Naval Academy, Marine Corps University, and the soon-to-be-created Naval Community College. The CLO’s vision for Navy education is described succinctly in his article “Ten Takeaways: The Education for Seapower Report,” which also is reprinted in this issue of the Review.

Our full leadership team here at the College is focused on ensuring that our programs and initiatives are aligned with our new guidance contained in the E4S Strategy. It is not yet clear exactly what impacts the implementation of this strategy will have on our efforts, but several key provisions bode well for the institution. Specifically, we can reasonably anticipate the following developments:

- We expect to be funded more adequately for program costs such as labor, professional development opportunities and travel, and increased research and war gaming.
- We expect to see additional resources allocated to maintain and upgrade our campus facilities and improve information and educational technologies to advance our delivery modalities.
- We expect to have the resources to modernize our classrooms with the latest technology to enhance the learning experience further.
- We expect to see an increase in the number and quality of resident-student throughput and expansion of our distance and low-residence learning options.
- We anticipate that organizational/cultural changes will be made to the talent-management system for active-duty officers to enable them to complete assignments in teaching and educational leadership roles without a negative impact on their professional careers.
The E4S Strategy promises to be a game changer for our naval forces. Mr. Kroger has stated, “It’s somewhat of a shift, I think, from ways people think about the effectiveness of the armed forces. We’re not talking here about how fast our jets are, how powerful our missiles are. We’re talking about the brainpower of our team.”

As we have done since 1884, the Naval War College will lead the way in developing the intellectual capacity of the men and women who wear the cloth of the nation in defense of all that we hold dear.

SHOSHANA S. CHATFIELD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College

THOUGHTS ON THE CURRENT HEALTH CRISIS
As I write this (in early April 2020), the entire country, and the world at large, is dealing with a pandemic. Faced with the need to exercise social distancing to reduce the spread of COVID-19, our College shifted to a total distance-learning paradigm, and did so in record time yet with minimal disruption to our ongoing educational mission. Our in-house experts in technology-assisted education from our College of Distance Education and our Writing and Teaching Excellence Center led the faculty in transitioning rapidly all intermediate- and senior-level courses and face-to-face distance-education modalities to an online method of teaching. The move to remote learning enabled all students to isolate themselves safely in their homes, yet still interact in real time with each other and with their seminar moderators. We are committed to continuing our educational programs at a pace that will enable our students to graduate as scheduled in June 2020 with both their professional certification and the master’s degree on which they embarked at the beginning of the academic year. Unfortunately, given ongoing safety concerns, we will not have a traditional graduation ceremony. In the face of numerous constraints and challenges, I am proud of, and have been inspired by, the agility, teamwork, and creativity displayed by every member of our faculty, staff, and student body. I truly believe that we will emerge from this crisis stronger, more resilient, and more flexible in how we lead our daily lives. Stay safe and well.

S. S. CHATFIELD
Bradford Dismukes is a political scientist who worked with (1969–99) and directed (1974–89) a group at the Center for Naval Analyses that supported and critiqued ONI and Navy Staff planners in what was then OP-06. He is coeditor of Soviet Naval Diplomacy. He is a retired captain, USNR, with service in naval intelligence.
Great-power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. national security.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES N. MATTIS, 19 JANUARY 2018

These words of Secretary Mattis are momentous. Great-power competition is recognized widely as having been the root cause of the First World War, a powerful contributor to the Second World War, and a core element of the Cold War. Mr. Mattis raises the serious possibility that war with a major opponent lies on the horizon. Such a war might be fought for major, even existential, stakes; but smaller, indecisive wars among the great powers also could occur, as was the case during earlier centuries in Europe.

An immediate, tangible expression of the new orientation was the reestablishment of the U.S. Navy's Second Fleet. When Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John M. Richardson made the announcement in May 2018, he justified the need for the fleet as a response to great-power competition, specifically with Russia. The fleet's area of responsibility (AOR) centers on the North Atlantic Ocean, whose Cold War lessons from history include the importance of strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and defense of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). These would have constituted two of the original Second Fleet's three principal strategic missions had there been a war with the Soviet Union. Strategic ASW meant attacking Soviet ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) to affect the superpower nuclear balance; defending SLOCs is a particular form of sea control, defined as being able to use the sea when, where, and for the purposes desired. In this case, defending SLOCs meant protecting shipping between North America and Europe—where unimpeded passage was a sine qua non for the Western alliance to succeed in war at the conventional level. Strategic ASW arrived on the scene in the mid-1980s; SLOC defense long had been a fixture of U.S. naval strategy, born of the searing experience of two world wars and from geostrategic
Theories dating at least from the first half of the twentieth century. SLOC defense has been the most enduring single construct in the Navy’s strategic thinking, always in the back of the planner’s mind—a kind of default position; as will be seen, even strategic ASW was put to its service.

The immediate aim of this article is to contribute to the historical understanding of intelligence and planning during the Cold War. The larger aim is to draw lessons that may be useful for Navy planning in the new world of great-power competition. (Readers whose main interest is less in the history of the Cold War are invited to fast-forward to the sections following “Lessons for Today”)

The Cold War is viewed, properly, as a historic success. Yet, paradoxically, several of the lessons drawn from the Navy’s experience during it are negative ones—namely, what to avoid. That is because Cold War planning for both strategic ASW and SLOC defense experienced important failures, first in strategic intelligence, then in the way planners used that intelligence. Intelligence errors centered on varying levels of success in understanding Soviet strategic intentions—incorrectly, in the case of SLOCs, and too slowly, in the case of strategic ASW. Planning errors involved a failure to draw a bright line between the adversary that intelligence identified, as realistically as possible, and the one the planner contrived to fight. Planners carry multiple responsibilities—not all of which are related to the adversary. The first is to defend their own vulnerabilities, regardless of the strategic intentions imputed to the adversary. Planners also are responsible for promoting alliance solidarity and protecting Navy interests in interservice competition for the defense budget. The crucial nexus between intelligence and planning will be examined in the concluding sections.

Any effort to understand the Navy’s Cold War history must start with these two historically intertwined intelligence failures. In the case of strategic ASW, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) ultimately was correct. But well over eight years elapsed between (1) 1973, when the Soviets assigned their SSBNs a critical role in their war plans, and simultaneously assigned their general-purpose-force (GPF) navy the mission of defending those SSBNs in sea bastions; and (2) the early 1980s, when the IC properly recognized those roles. Shortly after that, Navy planners responded with the Maritime Strategy, publicly announced in 1986. But before the Maritime Strategy (i.e., between [1] and [2]), naval planning experienced approximately a decade of lost opportunity and misdirected effort.

This lengthy, if little recognized, intelligence failure was linked to a larger one. Intelligence about the SLOCs was simply wrong. From the beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940s until the mid-1980s, the Navy was convinced that in a World War III the Soviets intended to fight a “Battle of the Atlantic III.” This was incorrect. The Soviet navy’s primary mission was not to attack on the high seas
of the North Atlantic but to stay close to home to defend the motherland and, after 1973, its SSBNs in maritime bastions. Students of the Cold War U.S. Navy have known (from the work of Hattendorf and Ford and Rosenberg, published in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century) that the top priority accorded the threat to the SLOCs was a mistake. But the focus of these—the standard narratives of the period—was on the U.S. maritime strategy of 1981–86, and much less on what came before. If anything, the striking, widely recognized achievement that the Maritime Strategy represented served to redeem the Navy’s previous errors, allowing an attitude of “all’s well that ends well” to prevail.

Many might ask whether attention to the earlier period really is needed. This article answers yes, for two reasons. First, these mistakes had major, costly consequences, and you cannot learn from your mistakes by ignoring them. Second, if it happened once, it could happen again. And in this case, “once” means again and again over decades. When the behavior of a great institution that prides itself on intellectual rigor cannot be explained on strictly rational grounds, we have to ask why. To ignore this question is to risk unknowingly repeating yesterday’s errors today or in the future. This is not a criticism of the Navy’s Cold War leaders; they had to make hard choices to deal with a steadily burgeoning opponent, in the face of massive uncertainty—unlike the author, who has the benefit of hindsight.

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

How did the notion that the Soviet navy’s main mission was anti-SLOC become an idée fixe? Before 1974, there was no national intelligence estimate (NIE) on the Soviet navy; its capabilities and intentions were what the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) said they were, with the fairly uncritical approval of the Defense Intelligence Agency. For ONI, the Soviet navy, serving an aggressive Communist ideology, was as offensively minded as its senior partner, the Soviet army. From this perspective, an inventory at one point approaching four hundred submarines—a far larger number than defense alone might seem to justify—could indicate only offensive intent. Its apparent focus was the SLOCs of NATO that connected the continents—representing a vulnerability that two world wars had shown to be close to indefensible.

However, these inferences, while highly plausible, were essentially abstract. Just about all the concrete evidence pointed in the opposite direction: that attacking the SLOCs was, at best, a secondary priority for Soviet planners. Uncertainty always attaches to intelligence. (As intelligence professionals remind their consumers, “If it’s a fact, it isn’t intelligence.”) So the accounting below will identify, where possible, the topics about which the IC was reasonably confident and those where uncertainty prevailed. First we turn to individual pieces of evidence from
standard intelligence sources, held at the time with fairly high confidence, and then to open-source analysis of Soviet military writings, about which confidence was low or perhaps nonexistent.

**Evidence from Standard Intelligence Sources**

In the early 1950s, Whiskey-class submarines dominated Soviet building programs. Norman Polmar has noted that, in the Soviet categorization of the time, these boats were intended to provide direct, “regional” defense of the USSR. The “oceangoing” Zulu class formed less than 10 percent of the inventory. Soviet submarine designs in general were not optimized to perform the anti-SLOC mission; many classes had only small-capacity torpedo spaces. The standard load of conventional torpedoes for a Soviet diesel submarine was a fifty-fifty split between ASW and anti-surface ship weapons. The submarine force did not train to attack defended, maneuvering convoys. Routinely, only a small fraction of the Soviet navy’s order of battle deployed beyond home waters. The supporting infrastructure and logistics for distant operations were correspondingly weak.

No exercises of significant scale with an anti-SLOC theme ever occurred in the North Atlantic, or anywhere else. Anticarrier exercises, however, were a constant feature—often using U.S. carriers as training targets. These exercises were especially fraught when the Soviets employed them during crises in the Third World—the modern-day equivalent of training your guns on your adversary. An assessment of intent—indeed, of Soviet capabilities—drawn from forces, training, operations, and exercises would have concluded anticarrier, yes; anti-SLOC, no. (The Soviets did show great interest in ASW, but were unable to develop capabilities to detect and engage their adversaries’ much-quieter submarines.)

**Evidence from Open Sources**

In the 1960s and early ’70s, analysis of Soviet public statements about military doctrine and strategy by Herrick, MccGwire, Blechman, and others showed that the Soviet navy was committed to defense, mainly preoccupied with protecting the homeland and supporting the seaward flanks of the Soviet army. An important exception was Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovskiy’s authoritative Military Strategy; its 1962 edition added anti-SLOC efforts as an important priority. However, the 1968 edition then downgraded that mission to being an “important” task, relevant only in the later phases of a broken-back nuclear war. In general, when the Soviets did discuss SLOCs, they focused on action not on the high seas but against ports of debarkation, often emphasizing the efficacy of mines.

In the early 1970s, open-source analysis at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) delivered a conclusion that further ruled out anti-SLOC intent. The Soviet adversary now had radically new strategic priorities: SSBNs, forming a strategic
reserve; the rest of its navy was characterized as “pro-SSBN.” Structured and trained for the mission of bastion defense, the Soviet navy could not be committed at the same time to a campaign against the North Atlantic SLOCs.

It seems nearly certain that the bastions became operational in 1973. That year the Delta I–class SSBN, carrying the Soviet navy’s first intercontinental-range missile, the SS-N-8 Sawfly, entered service. For the Soviets, the SS-N-8 was a gift of technology that brought a revolutionary new military use of the sea. The SS-N-8 (and its successors) became the foundation of the Soviet nuclear reserve.

It seems inconceivable that the strategic-reserve/bastion-defense missions were established any later than 1973. One would have to believe—as few familiar with it do—that the Soviet general staff lacked thoroughness and foresight, that it initially ignored possible threats to its SSBN reserve, and that it only later improvised a response to a U.S. ASW threat that it perceived sometime after 1973. As Perse has shown, starting as early as 1970, statements by successive CNOs and other USN officials had given the Soviets strong reason to believe the United States intended to attack their SSBNs. In addition, the Soviets were well aware, from their day-to-day operational experience and their own human intelligence, of the acoustic advantage that American and other Western submarines enjoyed over their own.

Further, 1973 was exactly the time that Soviet navy chief Sergey G. Gorshkov was “announcing” the new Soviet strategy in a series of eleven articles (1972–73) in Morskoy sbornik, the Soviet navy’s equivalent of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Expressing ideas as sweeping as those of Sir Julian S. Corbett and Alfred Thayer Mahan, Gorshkov’s articles described a role for sea power never before seen in the modern era. The Soviet navy had become the ultimate guarantor of the Soviet state. When a war moved to the nuclear level, as the Soviets believed likely, their navy’s missiles would be withheld from initial nuclear strikes. They would stand as a force in being to deter (further) nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union, deal with defeated enemies and erstwhile allies, and dictate the terms of the postwar peace. It was a stunning message of self-importance, self-congratulation—and defiance of the West. Gorshkov was saying, in effect: We have our bastions. We know you are going to attack them. We will defeat you.

Unfortunately, for many years the U.S. Navy did not get this message. It did not recognize the existence of the bastions until 1980–81, when an extraordinary breakthrough in special compartmented intelligence (SCI) confirmed in every detail the validity of the conclusions that open-source analysts had been describing since 1973.
THE RECKONING

In the meantime, in 1974, the first NIE with an exclusive focus on the Soviet navy concluded that the Soviets viewed anti-SLOC as a secondary priority, with the possible exception of when a war became unexpectedly prolonged. The NIE underlined the deep historical roots of this judgment by observing that the anti-SLOC mission had exerted no observable influence on Soviet shipbuilding programs. Because shipbuilding is a process often measured in decades, this implies that the anti-SLOC mission never held an important priority for the Soviets during the Cold War. This assessment would seem to be borne out by Polmar’s observations regarding the Soviets’ categorization of their submarines built in the 1950s.

However, the 1974 NIE was silent on the bastions/strategic-reserve missions. Indeed, in a discussion of the variety of measures the Soviets might be taking to protect their SSBNs, the idea of employing their GPF navy for that purpose was simply absent. The IC remained blind to the Soviet navy’s main missions until the SCI breakthrough of 1980–81.

Office of Naval Intelligence

During this period, ONI fought a rearguard action, petitioning the IC to reconsider and reverse the low priority accorded the anti-SLOC mission—to no avail. Evidence indicates that ONI continued to pursue this goal even after the (Navy-derived) SCI breakthrough clearly revealed that bastion defense was the critical mission of the GPF navy, one that no other branch of the Soviet armed forces could carry out.

In 1978, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—authored document—of lesser standing than an IC-wide NIE—stated that the GPF navy had been assigned the mission of defending SSBNs. However, it did not indicate whether this judgment arose from new evidence or simply from a revised reading of the logic of the situation, as seen from the Soviet vantage point. A second NIE, prepared in 1982, corrected the IC’s error about the strategic reserve and clearly stated the top priority assigned to the GPF navy for its defense. Tellingly, nothing uncovered in the post-Soviet period has given reason to question the accuracy of the second NIE’s conclusions.

The question arises: Why did ONI reject the bastion/strategic-reserve concept for so long? Indeed, why did it not investigate it as a secondary hypothesis worthy of exploration via upgraded collection priority or concentrated analytical focus? One possibility is that the conviction that the Soviet navy would surge forward on D-day to attack the SLOCs ruled out contemplation of any other possible strategic role for it. Another is that ONI was affected by a totally incorrect suspicion, often encountered within the Navy at large, that conclusions drawn from open sources, as CNA’s were, could not be trusted, because the source materials from
which they were drawn were riddled with Soviet “disinformation.” Disinformation was and is a real thing (the word entered the English lexicon in the late 1940s from the Soviet/Russian dezinformatsiya). But while use of disinformation may have been widespread in Soviet propaganda, as it is today in Russia, disinformation never was injected into Soviet doctrinal writings. No information that has come to light since the fall of the Soviet Union has suggested otherwise.

However, evaluation of factors such as these does not seem to have played an important role in ONI’s attitude toward the bastion / strategic reserve. Rather, the reality was more prosaic: insights that CNA and others drew from open sources simply were ignored. In 2007, Richard L. Haver, a civilian former deputy director of ONI, looking back at events thirty years before, put it as follows: “I would also say, and to give people their due, there were people like Bob Herrick, Brad Dismukes, and Jamie McConnell . . . who were reading what the Russians were saying . . . who told us for nearly fifteen years that we had it wrong. And, frankly, the system ignored them.”

### Navy Planners

If ONI “had it wrong,” so, to a lesser degree, did Navy planners, whose senior position always gives them the last word. Regardless of contrary conclusions emanating from the IC, fixation with an offensive-minded, anti-SLOC enemy maintained its hold on Navy thinking. According to Hattendorf, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward (CNO 1978–82), on first being briefed about the bastions in August 1981, “found the concepts of Soviet strategy so completely different that he expressed disbelief that the Soviets could possibly operate their navy in such a [defensive] manner.”

However, once the validity of the “new” Soviet strategy was accepted, the Navy delivered its riposte with an alacrity rare in large organizations. In January 1986, Admiral James D. Watkins (CNO 1982–86) publicly announced the Maritime Strategy in the Naval Institute Proceedings. His tightly reasoned article described a new “war termination” mission for the Navy: by attacking the bastions and putting the strategic reserve at risk, the United States might gain strategic leverage over the Soviets before nuclear escalation occurred. In other words, the U.S. Navy would prevent its Soviet opponent from achieving its assigned mission, which was nothing less than to affect the course and outcome of the war as a whole.

The Navy itself would take up that role, through achievement of command of the (under)sea.

Attention to this extraordinary claim—that the Navy might have made a decisive contribution to the outcome of a World War III—has been muted, for at least two reasons. First, the CNO’s article immediately drew sharp criticism from advocates of the strategic doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), who argued vigorously that threatening Soviet SSBNs was dangerously escalatory.
A second possible reason is that after announcing the war-termination mission
the article addressed the SLOCs—with a logic that is difficult to follow. On one
hand, it stated that attacking Western SLOCs would be, for the Soviets, “second-
ary, at least at the war’s start,”
and protecting the bastions
was, for the Soviets, a “critical
role.” On the other hand,
it stated that by threatening
Soviet SSBNs the U.S. Navy
would “force Soviet subma-
rines to retreat into defensive bastions . . . den[y]ing . . . the option of a massive,
early attempt to interdict our [SLOCs].”

In 1986, one could not force an opposing navy to play what has just been de-
scribed as its critical role—the role for which much of it in fact had been created.
The notion seems particularly inapt when the mission in question was one the
Soviet navy had been executing for over a dozen years at that point. Nor does it
seem reasonable to seek to deny the adversary an “early attempt” to execute an
option described as merely “secondary” in its priorities “at the war’s start.”

This criticism is not an idle historical “gotcha.” The idea of threatening the
reserve to force the Soviets to defend it, and thereby to protect the SLOCs, is
found even in recent references. In an April 2018 book review in Foreign Af-
fairs, Stephen P. Rosen repeated Admiral Watkins’s formulation. This may be
seen today as just badly told history, but the disjointed connection between the
two strategic missions has proved enduring. Indeed, SLOC protection held sway
when the Navy’s Maritime Strategy soon was taken up at the national level. The
National Security Strategy of the United States, signed by President Ronald W.
Reagan in January 1987, did not mention war termination. Its announced intent
to threaten Soviet “submarines” was justified solely on the grounds that doing so
would “minimize the wartime threat to the reinforcement and resupply of Europe
by sea.” In this way, “attack the bastions and defend the SLOCs” entered the
national discourse at the highest level. Thus did a depiction of a Soviet adversary
that posed a threat to the SLOCs march on into the late 1980s—fifteen years after
the IC had concluded that such a use of the Soviet navy was unlikely.

An anti-SLOC Soviet adversary may not have comported with reality—but it
did fit other needs of Navy planners to a T. As noted previously, prudence dic-
tates that planners defend their own vulnerabilities. In the abstract—and in the
popular mind of Americans at large—the United States had no greater maritime
vulnerability than the North Atlantic SLOCs. Defense of the SLOCs was centrally
important in dimensions unrelated to the Soviets: showing solidarity with NATO
allies—especially the British, whose intelligence leaders shared ONI’s views about
the threat to the SLOCs—and supporting the Navy position in interservice budget rivalries. A Navy shaped to defend Western SLOCs drew staunch U.S. Army and Air Force support. And the importance of “getting the troops to Europe” hardly faced critical doubt on the Hill. So, for Navy planners the idea of an anti-SLOC Soviet navy was a perennial winner, one not to be relinquished lightly, and indeed to be defended—however unsupportable that defense might become.

A MISUNDERSTOOD ENEMY? SLOC DEFENSE—WHAT DIFFERENCE DID IT MAKE?
What difference did a misunderstood enemy make for force-employment plans and for planning the future force structure? American operational planners were planning to employ forces to defend the SLOCs; their defensive script paralleled that of their Soviet opposites, resulting in centers of gravity the mutually defensive warring forces foresaw for themselves that were nearly 1,500 miles apart, as shown in the figure.

Whatever its overall shape, a Third World War seemed highly unlikely to involve a Battle of the Atlantic III. Until the Maritime Strategy emerged in the

BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC III?

The gray diagonals, right, show where Soviet bastion/homeland-defense forces were expected to concentrate; the light gray area indicates where Soviet screening forces would seek to deny entry to NATO surface forces. NATO SLOC-defense forces could be expected to concentrate below the GIUK gap as shown by the diagonals on the left.

Source: Adapted from NIE 11-15-82D, p. 17.
mid-1980s, the two great navies might not even have been “ships that pass in the night.” Employment plans for the U.S. Second Fleet, intended to counter Soviet submarines flooding south on D-day, were aimed at a shadow. They were essentially pointless, except for possible use in dealing with Soviet “spoilers” sent into the Atlantic on a one-way mission to tie up larger American forces on the defense.44

Force-structure plans, which aimed at countering an anti-SLOC Soviet navy at the time and into the future, are more complicated to assess. This is because the aircraft carriers, while immensely potent, played little role in SLOC defense (or strategic ASW).45 And the rest of the Navy’s platforms and systems were inherently multipurpose. ASW and air-defense capabilities developed for one combat scenario could perform well in others. Nonetheless, particular investments in ships or other systems optimized for convoy defense against massed submarine and air attack well may have been misdirected effort. A prominent candidate in this regard was the fifty-ship FFG-7, Perry-class frigate program. Billions of dollars invested in it might have been spent better on forces optimized for carrier screening, countermine warfare, or other missions, such as attacking the bastions or striking ashore.

Some might argue that, despite these errors, U.S. defense efforts nonetheless deterred the Soviets from attacking the SLOCs. Such a view does not seem logical. There should be little ground for taking satisfaction in deterring an anti-SLOC “threat” that was essentially abstract. The actual Soviet navy that existed during the Cold War had not seriously contemplated attacking the SLOCs; had not bought forces for that mission; did not train or exercise to carry it out; and was not up to the task, in the highly unlikely event that it tried to accomplish it.

A MISUNDERSTOOD ENEMY? STRATEGIC ASW—WHAT DIFFERENCE DID IT MAKE?

In the case of strategic ASW, how history will view the consequences of the lengthy delay between the Soviets’ adoption of the bastions and the U.S. Navy’s development of plans to attack them will depend mainly on whether strategic ASW is seen as a bad idea or a good one. For those in the MAD camp or those who simply thought the prospects for success in an antibastion campaign were close to nil, the delay was an accidental blessing for the nation. From this point of view, the lengthy interval was a period during which the nation luckily avoided planning to do something that could have led to catastrophe.

For others, the delay in developing plans to threaten the bastions was a great strategic opportunity forgone. Consider assessments from two officials deeply involved in the decisions of the time. Former Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro said that the Maritime Strategy “had a lot
to do with helping end the Cold War.” Former Navy Secretary John F. Lehman has gone further, crediting the Navy with a major role not just in “ending” but in “winning” the Cold War. From this point of view, the nation surely would have been served better if the bastion defense / strategic reserve had been recognized for what it was soon after it appeared in 1973. The Maritime Strategy—with its anti-SSBN component—then might have been developed in the mid-1970s; that is, under the leadership of Admirals Elmo R. Zumwalt and James L. Holloway (CNOs 1970–74 and 1974–78, respectively), to be perfected under Hayward and Watkins.

This historical section must conclude with an important question, at best partly answered: If bad decisions were made (SLOC defense) and good/bad ones delayed (strategic ASW), did it really make a decisive difference in the history of the era? After all, the powerful, multipurpose Navy acquired during the Cold War did underwrite the nation’s alliances and successfully countered (this author believes defeated) the Soviet navy’s unprecedented attempt, in the early 1970s, to carry out a peacetime political mission “to protect the state interests of the USSR on the seas and oceans.” But success in a peacetime political mission says little about likely success in the number one task: achieving victory had there been war. And it says nothing at all about the uneven quality of the processes through which the Cold War Navy was brought into being.

LESSONS FOR TODAY
Our attention now turns to planning for today and for the future, drawing on the history just reviewed. The article will look, first, at what Cold War history may mean for SLOC defense, and then for strategic ASW. It will suggest specific ways in which repetition of the strategic errors of the Cold War might be avoided, and offer concluding thoughts about the broader meaning of what has been examined.

SLOC Defense Today
Today’s planning for the wartime security of lines of communication in the North Atlantic shows a strong continuity with that of the Cold War, expressed in historical metaphor redolent of that continuity. The mission statement of the new NATO Joint Force Command in Norfolk includes that the command will “help protect sea lines of communication between North America and Europe, in a ‘Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.’” Recent comments by senior Navy officials have made clear that, if there should be a “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic,” it will be fought against the Russian navy, which obviously would have to come out to fight it.

Unfortunately, this line of argument comes dangerously close to echoing the errors of the Cold War. The Soviet navy never was coming out to fight, and the
smaller, less capable Russian navy is even less likely to do so. One presumes that the aim of stating, nonetheless, the existence of a possible, even likely, concrete Russian threat to the SLOCs reflects non-threat-related objectives: to promote alliance solidarity and build political and public support in the United States for needed Navy programs. These objectives remain as legitimate as they were during the Cold War. However, seeking to promote them by deviating from reality-based planning is unlikely to be effective. First, public support may be difficult to sustain in the face of criticism that the Navy is distorting reality on behalf of the service’s self-interests. Second, the time-honored principle that the planner above all must defend his own vulnerabilities provides fully sufficient grounds for acquiring needed forces and exercising them to maintain their readiness. The greatest American vulnerability at sea continues to be control of the North Atlantic (with regard to SLOCs, undersea cables, and possible future strategic conventional or nuclear threats to the continental United States). Moreover, that control remains an essential condition for the integrity of the alliance.

Most importantly, the emerging strategic situation provides an alternative, offensive strategic use for forces that complements and promotes traditional SLOC defense. The rapid globalization of the world economy has made Russia far more dependent on the sea than in the past for the growth of its economy, in keeping with its aspirations as a great power. This suggests that the United States and its allies should adopt a blockade strategy in response. Neither Russia nor any other nation can use the surface of the world ocean except at the sufferance of the United States and its allies. In this sense, the West can be said to enjoy global command of the sea.

In the case of Russia, its assets at sea are mainly economic in nature: those engaged in cabotage, international hauling, general commerce for the merchant fleet (the second largest in the world, after the Chinese), and liquefied natural gas (LNG) and grain exports; a large fishing fleet; and scientific-research ships and the like. The potential vulnerability of these assets should be exploited—for deterrence; for crisis response; or, if war is unavoidable, to fight and terminate it successfully. Let us examine briefly two examples of a blockade strategy in action—recognizing that blockade is likely to be more effective in “small war” situations, where the political stakes and the scale of military operations are limited.

First, in peacetime, to buttress deterrence, the West would make clear that Russian aggression against a NATO ally will be met with blockade at sea as well as with ground and air forces ashore. Specifically, whatever the form or timing of NATO’s response on land, the United States and its allies immediately would deny Russia the use of the world ocean. Russia would face a choice between, on the one hand, seeking or holding on to territorial or political gains on its western
periphery and, on the other hand, forgoing the payoff from the vast investments it has made in LNG exports. Second, during a crisis, these sea-denial measures might be implemented gradually. It may be possible to calibrate these measures to correspond to the intensity of Russian threats, including ambiguous threats of “hybrid warfare,” in both its now-familiar forms and some perhaps still to be seen. Through marking, shadowing, and the like—without firing a shot—the United States and its allies could pose a tangible threat to Russian assets at sea, wherever found. 61

The blockade concept would seem to deserve careful examination as the Navy continues to develop plans for the new era. The idea likely has an even richer potential against China, which already is heavily dependent on seaborne imports of energy, raw materials, and even foodstuffs. 62 Navy planning for Second Fleet’s AOR obviously must be integrated globally across all AORs. The Maritime Strategy of the mid-1980s might be seen as an exemplar with respect to planning on a global scale across all phases of conflict, from peace to war termination and into the postwar world. 63 Whatever form a twenty-first-century maritime strategy may take, it likely should include a blockade component, on behalf of SLOC defense and to exploit its larger potential.

Strategic ASW Today
Strategic ASW is also an obvious candidate methodology for exploiting Western sea power today, as it was during the Cold War. This is not merely an abstract possibility; the Navy recently let it be known that it contemplates using its submarine force to “deny the bastions”: that is, to attack Russian SSBNs. 64 (While it would seem reasonable to presume that the stated intention reflects the existence of an operational capability to execute it, no such capability was stated specifically, nor do the remarks that follow here so presume.)

Strategic ASW is a complex subject deserving more extensive exposition than space allows. 65 But it can be said without qualification that executing the strategic ASW mission today would be one of those rare cases in which failure would be far better than success. First, success almost certainly would trigger the firing of Russian nuclear ASW weapons—to which the United States lacks the capability to respond in kind at sea, and in response to which it would have no incentive to escalate ashore. Second, it likely would result in nuclear ecological consequences of unknown but possibly catastrophic scale. Third—and of the highest possible importance—the mortal intercontinental nuclear threat to which successful strategic ASW would subject the nation would be suffered on behalf of no clear or feasible strategic objective.
The logic of strategic ASW during the Cold War cannot be applied to the new strategic situation against Russia. The United States should avoid threatening Russian SSBNs in almost all conceivable circumstances. As it did during the Cold War, the Navy should take the lead in framing strategy regarding the adversary’s SSBNs—paradoxically, no longer to maximize, but today to minimize, the threat that U.S. forces may pose. The Navy should seek explicit national-command-authority approval for the appropriate policy. The United States should adjust its declaratory policy, its military-to-military diplomacy, and the Navy’s own operational behavior accordingly.

In this last respect, Navy developmental and training exercises in the Arctic, such as the ICEX series, should be reviewed carefully. Their roots lie deep in the Cold War. Propelled mainly by the momentum of technical development, operational routine, and an established bureaucratic structure, they seem to have been continued since the end of the Cold War without conscious attention to their strategic effects. But in fact they convey a strong strategic message in the language of action: the only possible targets that exist for U.S. under-ice torpedoes today are Russian submarines, obviously including SSBNs. Faced with this reality, Russian planners are likely to prove hard to convince that the United States intends to give their SSBNs a wide berth.

Avoiding Yesterday’s Mistakes

It would seem logical to base measures aimed at avoiding yesterday’s mistakes on a deep understanding of why those mistakes were made. The author has found no satisfactory single explanation, and not one that suggests effective corrective measures. Not surprisingly, an intelligence-planning mistake that persisted for over forty years had many complicated, interacting causes. These must be left to others to explore and prioritize.

What does seem certain is that internal Navy self-corrective processes were absent or did not kick in with sufficient force. This article will suggest three specific process-oriented measures that may hold promise for minimizing the chance that today’s planning repeats the Cold War–era mistakes. They are advanced in a most tentative manner because of the radical differences between the Cold War’s binary simplicities and today’s multipolar mix of state and nonstate actors, in a milieu of the most rapidly accelerating technological change human-kind has ever experienced. Let us look first at intelligence, then planning, and finally the nexus between the two.

Intelligence. Homespun wisdom long has held that it’s not what you don’t know that gets you into trouble; it’s what you’re surest of. Despite its humble origins, this maxim suggests a key self-corrective measure: intelligence professionals and their consumers should be most skeptical of the conclusions about adversaries that the IC holds with the highest confidence and for the longest time. The Cold
War experience suggests that a certain bureaucratic inertia attaches to intelligence conclusions at the strategic level. On the intelligence side, analysts and the organizations they serve become associated with a particular reading of an adversary’s intentions, and so are inclined to resist accepting alternatives. During the Cold War this tendency hampered, even prevented, an unblinkered search for what the adversary actually intended. Intelligence analysts (and their consumers) must remain open to the possibility that the adversary may contemplate novel employment concepts, based on alien strategic priorities.

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish internal procedures within the IC to critically review and question its own “official truth.” During the Cold War Richard K. Betts showed how extraordinarily difficult it was to arrive at valid estimates in the first place. Independent assessment by outside groups is likely to remain the best means to confirm whether the IC’s depiction of the adversary is valid. The work of the most accomplished planner is likely to be useless if it is based on a spurious understanding of the world.

Planning. That planners always must defend their own vulnerabilities is a truth that stands without any reference to a potential adversary. There is an important difference between saying “I have a crucial vulnerability and I will defend it” and saying “I have a crucial vulnerability, and my adversary intends to attack it.” The first is always true; the second was not true during the Cold War, nor is it likely true today. This seems counterintuitive, because attacking the enemy’s biggest vulnerability is what an American planner would do, and it seemed logical to expect that the Soviets/Russians would do the same. But the Soviets did not see it that way, and for the United States that meant years of misdirected effort, and lost opportunity ensued.

Today, the characterization of adversaries should reflect as closely as possible reality-based planning. It would seem particularly important to avoid letting an abstract vulnerability such as the North Atlantic SLOCs become reified into a concrete Russian threat—no matter how useful such a public depiction might be.

The Intel-Planning Nexus. During the Cold War, Navy planners and ONI saw the same enemy. Planners never had to hedge against Intel’s uncertainties, because, when it came to the Soviet anti-SLOC mission, there were none. Planners saw the worst case as the most likely one. Thus the Cold War afforded little experience in the important business of hedging against Intel’s inevitable uncertainties; nor did the period after the Cold War, because of its chaotic strategic landscape and the focus on the amorphous threats that arise when the adversary is defined as “terrorism.”

In the current era, the planning process must be especially cognizant of the distinction between Intel’s job and that of the planner. The two intersect when defining the terms of reference for studies of future-force requirements. This—the
crucial first step in any such study—brings together Intel and planners to define study objectives, depict the nature of the adversary, and determine which uncertainties are being hedged against, why, and how. The enemy being engaged in a study of future-force needs might turn out to have much the same shape as the one that is driving today’s force-employment plans—but that conclusion should be reached only after thoughtful, explicit, and systematic consideration of the matter.

**Broader Lessons from the Cold War**

The Cold War experience seems to yield two broader messages as well. First, the Soviet bastion/strategic-reserve missions were a product of technological innovation: the development of an SSBN carrying missiles of intercontinental range. It seems quite likely that the next revolution in maritime affairs also will arise from technological innovation. An obvious candidate in this regard continues to be nonacoustic detection of submarines, but many other technological developments are possible. Second, analysis of open sources seems likely to remain the earliest and best means of insight into an adversary’s strategic intent. This implies the need to pay the closest possible attention to public statements by Russian (or Chinese) spokesmen about new technology affecting sea power. Statements regarding purely technological matters deserve top priority, but statements regarding the practical employment of new technology—so profitably exploited during the Cold War—should not be far behind.

The *Maritime Strategy* of the mid-1980s showed that the Navy—despite the errors cataloged in this article—is more than capable of conducting sound, comprehensive planning based on a valid understanding of the adversary and of the strategic environment. The emerging twenty-first-century version of that strategy should combine aggressive offense with judicious restraint: offense, to exploit the West’s global command of the sea through blockade, and so to defend the SLOCs and gain leverage against a continental adversary; and forbearance regarding the strategic ASW mission, execution of which would be a colossal mistake.

The Cold War U.S. Navy, like its predecessor in the first half of the twentieth century, was the most powerful the world had ever seen. It cannot be said with confidence that, in general over a forty-year period, this came about through effective intelligence or acutely rational strategic planning. Such shortcomings as were experienced in those areas were overcome through massive material investment, exploitation of technological advantage—and perhaps a measure of good fortune. Whether in the twenty-first century—in this new era of great-power competition—the Navy can succeed through reliance on superior investment
and technology is an open question. The author respectfully submits that more-careful and better-integrated intelligence-planning processes—of the kind that guided the Maritime Strategy—would improve our chances greatly.

NOTES

This article is drawn from remarks delivered at a panel discussion held on 7 November 2017 at the CNA Building, Arlington, Virginia. While the views expressed are solely those of the author, they are indebted to the work of his Cold War colleagues James M. McConnell and Robert G. Weinland and, for contemporary advice and encouragement, to Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.), Bruce F. Powers, and Thomas E. Anger.


2. Injudiciously pursued preparations for major war can make such a war more likely; it is recognized widely that this was the case with World War I. Of the considerable body of literature on this subject, see Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914 (New York: Humanity Books, 1988), and more recently, Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York: HarperCollins, 2013).

3. This possibility scarcely can be ruled out, given the absence of deep ideological competition or territorial disputes whose resolution the parties regard as vital. U.S. military planning henceforth should be oriented to deal with both a large war—approaching the scale of the Cold War—and wars of a much smaller scope. The latter, perhaps in a series over some years, would put a premium on judicious commitment of forces and the fleet-in-being concept. The presence of China as a potential opponent, along with Russia, also dictates careful attention to the conservation of forces.


5. A third strategic mission—bringing carrier tactical aviation (tacair) forward to bear on the flanks of the war in Europe or on Soviet territory proper—will not be addressed. This was an important part of the Navy’s Maritime Strategy (see note 8) from the U.S. viewpoint. In the author’s opinion, however, the Soviets saw carrier tacair as considerably less significant than the threat of strategic ASW. When the Maritime Strategy is discussed herein, assessments will be framed mainly with reference to strategic ASW. Two Russian writers have offered a different view—that the Soviets were more concerned with USN strikes from the sea than with the threat the Navy posed to their SSBNs. Vladimir Kuzin and Sergei Chernyavskii, “Russian Reactions to Reagan’s ‘Maritime Strategy,’” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (April 2005), pp. 429–39. But Kuzin and Chernyavskii also say that Soviet planners gave a high priority to SLOC interdiction as well—a proposition that is manifestly untrue. Nonetheless, the possibility that Navy tacair could have destroyed Soviet SSBNs in port and the logistic and maintenance infrastructure that supported them—and thus contributed to the success of the strategic ASW mission—cannot be dismissed out of hand. That question, like the possibility that Navy attacks on the Soviet flanks might have relieved pressure on NATO on the central front, simply lies beyond the boundaries of this investigation.

6. The return of great-power competition, after a generation of its absence—on top of two previous generations colored by the unique
The complex responsibilities of the planner—suggests that strategic thinking also should return to its primal elements. The Dutch American scholar Nicholas John Spykman took into account the second Battle of the Atlantic, still very much in progress at the time of his writing, to offer counsel on the shape of the postwar peace. He saw control of the oceans between the United States and the “rimlands” of Eurasia as mandatory. Control of the rimlands might itself give the United States a dominant position in world politics and, in any case, would be necessary to contain a single power that might dominate the continental “heartland.” Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, ed. Helen R. Nicholl (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944). Spykman drew heavily on, and also was a critic of, Sir Halford Mackinder. See Halford John Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York: Holt, 1919), available at archive.org/. The power and persistence of this idea were reconfirmed recently by historian Robert Kagan. After the Second World War, Americans were convinced that “their way of life could not be safe in a world where Europe and Asia were dominated by hostile autocratic powers.” Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World (New York: Knopf, 2018), p. 124. However unlikely it may seem today, the United States, at some future point, could withdraw to a “Fortress America” protected by two oceanic moats. In this case, there would be no SLOCs to defend. Nonetheless, as in the centuries before the twentieth, American seaborne commerce might well require protection.

7. The complex responsibilities of the planner, who must counter the threat that intelligence identifies, defend his own vulnerabilities, and also cope with non-threat-related concerns, such as the Navy’s position in the never-ending Defense Department budget battle, will be addressed several times in the narrative below. The term planner as used here refers to Navy officers carrying that designation and special study groups and others assigned planning functions. Planners rarely are anything other than unrestricted line officers, supported by long-serving Navy civilians, and are always the leaders in multidisciplinary groups. In the Navy hierarchy, the CNO is the chief Navy planner. This article does not delve into the organizational dynamics of Navy planning. It also refers to planners as masculine, reflecting the author’s experience during the Cold War—with apologies to any in more recent times who may prefer the his/her locution.


10. This article occasionally will use “Intel” as an alternative way to refer to ONI.

11. This is such an important discriminant, so let us look at a place—northern Norway—where uncertainty prevailed then, as it may well today. If the Soviets had intended an anti-SLOC campaign, they obviously also would have wanted to prevent the West from using the Norwegian littoral to bring its defensive forces to bear as far forward as possible: air defense against antiship missile–armed, long-range aircraft and, more importantly, ASW forces against Soviet submarines making the 1,200-mile transit to and from the presumed North Atlantic battle zone. But how might the Soviets go about seizing and occupying a sizable part of Norway? Would they violate Finnish or Swedish neutrality? While the IC pronounced its early assessment with apparent confidence (i.e., no Soviet initial plans for operations south of Finnmark), even its views evolved over time.

12. This insight was provided by Norman Polmar. Norman Polmar, e-mail to author, 10 February 2018. The author is indebted to Mr. Polmar for raising the question that triggered this article: When did the Soviets decide to give a low priority to attacking Western SLOCs? He posed the question during a question-and-answer session (Q&A) at the November 2017 conference at CNA cited at the beginning of these notes. Polmar recently has provided his own answer: that the Soviets never intended to attack the SLOCs. Norman Polmar, “Why 2000 or Even 400 Submarines,” Naval Submarine League Review (June 2018), pp. 140–46. The article adds the intriguing evidence that U.S. intelligence officials from the late 1940s through the mid-1950s turned to ex–World War II German specialists on the Soviet navy to understand Soviet purposes. It is not known how influential German views became, but it is hard to imagine a more biased departure point for the first generation of ONI’s Soviet analysts. The Germans had just had experience not only with their nearly successful offense against the North Atlantic SLOCs but also with the defense of their own Black Sea SLOCs against Soviet attack. For them, SLOCs were what modern naval warfare was about. See also Norman Polmar, “To Understand Russian Submarines, Think outside the Box,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 145/10/1,400 (October 2019).


15. There should have been no uncertainty about this point. The Soviet navy simply never practiced performance of the top mission the U.S. Navy ascribed to it. The Soviets’ largest ever exercise, the global-scale Okean in 1975, did involve simulated attacks on small numbers of Soviet merchant ships, which some construed to be an anti-SLOC scenario. Watson and Walton, both serving intelligence officers, limited their interpretation of those maneuvers to the Soviets “seemingly” attacking SLOCs. B. W. Watson [Lt. Cdr., USN] and M. A. Walton [Lt. Cdr., USN], “Okean-75,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 102/7/881 (July 1976). The CIA saw the merchant ships involved as simulating Western amphibious ships heading toward a landing on the Soviet littoral or on the Soviet army’s maritime


20. In preparing this article, the author encountered considerable curiosity about the methodologies that CNA’s open-source analysts used, particularly how they yielded accurate insights about Soviet strategic intent years before standard sources of intelligence did so. Because of their relevance to this narrative, I have posted a discussion of this subject on my blog. Bradford Dismukes, “CNA’s Open Source Analysis of Soviet Military Writings,” *Clio’s Musings: History and 21st Century US Naval Strategy* (blog), 9 January 2020, ciosmusing.blogspot.com/.


22. Road- and rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles have roots in the earliest days of Soviet intercontinental rocketry. Fully operational systems—the SS-24 Scalpel and SS-25 Sickle—were fielded by 1987. Nikolai Sokov, “Russia: History of Soviet/Russian ICBMs,” *Humus, win.progetthomus.it/* (Dr. Sokov, currently affiliated with the Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey, California, was a researcher in the 1980s and early ‘90s with the Soviet Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada in Moscow.) McCord argued that these could have served as the nuclear reserve, or at least part of it, making its sea-based component less critical. Michael M. McCord, “The Changing Role of the Soviet Navy,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 43, no. 7 (September 1987). However, land-based missiles fell under the purview of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRFs). The SRFs, for reasons described in Dismukes, “CNA’s Open Source Analysis of Soviet Military Writings,” were not designated in Soviet military writings as providing reserve capabilities. In any case, the Soviets continued to build growing numbers.
of SSBNs of ever greater capability, as have their Russian successors.


24. The most infamous Soviet intelligence penetration exposing information on Navy operational capabilities was the John Walker case. See John Prados, “The Navy’s Biggest Betrayal,” Naval History 24, no. 3 (June 2010).

25. Sergey G. Gorshkov [FAdm., Soviet navy], Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, “Navies in War and Peace,” Morskoy sbornik. There were eleven monthly installments (with two missing), starting with no. 2 in 1972.

26. This is the author’s interpretation. Gorshkov has generated an ample literature in the West. The Naval Institute Press has published translations of his works and several interpretive books about him, the latest and most definitive being Norman Polmar, Thomas A. Brooks, and George E. Fedoroff, Admiral Gorshkov: The Man Who Challenged the U.S. Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019).


28. Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Naval Policy and Programs, NIE 11-15-74 (23 December 1974), pp. 14, 22, FOIA Collection, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, available at www.cia.gov/. CNA’s interpretations played no role in the formulation of this NIE. However, the author has been given to understand by former DNI Rear Adm. Thomas Brooks, USN (Ret.), that they were, in his generous phrase, “invaluable” as an aid to SCI analysts “connecting the dots” from incoming intelligence to draw broad conclusions about their meaning. Thomas Brooks, e-mail to author, 10 September 2018.

29. The phenomenology of the intelligence world means that something does not exist until it is observed and duly reported. But when a new thing does appear, the IC usually tries to trace down its origins to determine whether and how it might have been detected earlier. If the IC has done this in the case of the Soviet navy’s bastions /strategic reserve, it has not been reported publicly yet.

30. Letter from DNI Rear Adm. Sumner Shapiro, referenced in “Comments on Navy Review of Revised OSR SLOC Paper.” The letter itself is not provided. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, p. 34, observes that “[a]t the same time, ONI set out to get the intelligence community to produce a National Intelligence estimate which would endorse the ONI analysis of Soviet force employment concepts [i.e., assigning a high priority to the anti-SLOC mission]. In November 1981, the Intelligence community completed an interagency Intelligence memorandum on ‘SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES FOR INTERDICTING SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN A WAR WITH NATO’ [uppercase in the original].” This document reconfirmed the “secondary” priority accorded to the anti-SLOC mission.

31. Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet Attack Submarine Force and Western Sea Lines of Communication. The author is grateful to Steven Wills for this citation.

32. Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs through the 1990s, NIE 11-15-82D (2 February 1983), FOIA Collection, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, available at www.cia.gov/. CNA’s interpretations played no role in the formulation of this NIE. However, the author has been given to understand by former DNI Rear Adm. Thomas Brooks, USN (Ret.), that they were, in his generous phrase, “invaluable” as an aid to SCI analysts “connecting the dots” from incoming intelligence to draw broad conclusions about their meaning. Thomas Brooks, e-mail to author, 10 September 2018.

33. Dismukes, “CNA’s Open Source Analysis of Soviet Military Writings.”

34. Richard L. Haver, “How Submarine Intelligence Collection Made a Difference” (lecture hosted by the Naval Submarine League, Naval Historical Foundation, and Naval Historical Center, U.S. Navy Memorial, Washington, DC, 11 April 2007). Transcript pages unnumbered; Mr. Haver’s remarks came during a Q&A at the seminar’s conclusion.

35. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, pp. 32–33. Hattendorf further recounts the considerable effort that ONI had to expend to convince
skeptical USN planners and operators of the veracity of the bastion/strategic-reserve missions. As a CNA briefer on these topics from 1975 to ‘81, the author encountered disbelief among a few Navy Staff planners that such alien strategic concepts even could exist.


39. Ibid.


41. *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: White House, January 1987), p. 30, available at nssarchive.us/. Although the mission clearly received the commander in chief’s imprimatur in 1987, it never again appeared in subsequent presidential national security strategy documents. While there is little doubt the mission was approved at the highest levels, publicly available information does not indicate how it did or did not pass through the standard Joint Chiefs of Staff or Office of the Secretary of Defense planning processes. It is hoped that emerging evidence can permit future historians to illuminate fully these uncertainties regarding a top mission of the submarine service of the U.S. Navy—often called the “silent service,” or sometimes the “service within a service.” The author is indebted to Rear Adm. Thomas Brooks, USN (Ret.), and Capt. Peter Swartz, USN (Ret.), for enlightening e-mail exchanges (conducted January–March 2019) on these matters, reflecting their own hands-on experience. Of course, they are not responsible for the author’s interpretations.

42. Although the Navy’s critics might argue otherwise, there is nothing illegitimate about seeking to bolster alliance solidarity, nor about answering the demands of inside-the-Pentagon policy processes. The point here is that a faulty version of the anti-SLOC threat was being used.

43. Note that this says nothing about a “Battle of the Norwegian Sea” pitting NATO sea power in support of the Northern Flank against Soviet sea-denial forces, nor a similar “Battle for Denmark and the Danish Straits.” As observed in note 11, the 1979 NIE saw the initial Soviet threat to Norway as being limited to Finnmark, while later NIEs revised upward the scale of Soviet intentions and commitment of forces against Norway. Addressing Denmark, an NIE of 1981 (NIE 11-14-81, p. 26) concluded that Jutland would be threatened from the south by Warsaw Pact ground forces thrusting westward toward Hamburg and the Channel ports—the critical terminals for the Atlantic SLOCs.

44. The NIEs of 1974 and 1982 on the Soviet navy both indicated that the Soviets might send submarines into the Atlantic in hopes of finding and attacking American SSBNs, particularly as they entered or exited their home ports. And indeed, Soviet writers always emphasized the high desirability of preventing American SSBNs from launching their missiles. But, as noted, the Soviets were well aware of the acoustic disadvantage their submarines faced. At the least, it is uncertain that they would have committed important submarine assets to a mission they seemed unlikely to be able to execute.

45. The exception is the ship type designated CVS, a carrier configured for ASW, which saw duty mainly in the North Atlantic, in the 1960s and ‘70s.


Mr. Lehman also raises the possibility (p. 273) that the Soviet SSBN-protection zone might grow southward over time and so pose a threat to NATO SLOCs.


49. Attention is confined to plans for the employment of forces currently in operation or entering service in due course. Acquisition of new forces or capabilities is not addressed.

50. Although the focus is on the Cold War, the aim of this article—returning to primal strategic principles—dictates that attention also encompass earlier eras. To do otherwise would mean excluding from consideration such historic strategic-employment concepts as the fleet in being, which dates from the late eighteenth century. See, for example, John B. Hattendorf, “The Idea of a ‘Fleet in Being’ in Historical Perspective,” Naval War College Review 67, no. 1 (Winter 2014), pp. 43–60. Another example is economic blockade. For a magisterial treatment, see Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 241, 375–83.


52. Recent characterizations of strategic requirements in the North Atlantic have implied that Russia intends to attack the sea-lanes. Regarding the major Northern Flank exercise TRIDENT JUNCTION in October–November 2018, Adm. James Stavridis, USN, stated beforehand that “there will be a U.S. Carrier Strike Group . . . operating in the . . . waters of the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom ‘gap,’ the body of water that NATO would have to control to cut off Russian naval forces in the event of a war.” James Stavridis [Adm., USN (Ret.)], “NATO Is in the Middle of an Expensive and Dangerous Military Exercise. Here’s Why Those War Games Are Worth It,” Time, 29 October 2018, p. 1, available at time.com/. Former CNO Adm. Gary Roughead has indicated that “[t]he reactivation of the U.S. Second Fleet on August 24, 2018, is a prudent and timely recognition of again having to deal with an increasingly capable and assertive near-peer Russian navy in the operational space of the Atlantic Ocean and its critical sea-lanes linking the United States to its NATO allies.” Gary Roughead [Adm., USN (Ret.)], “The Trident Returns: Reactivating the U.S. Second Fleet and Revitalizing Anti-submarine Warfare in the Atlantic,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 October 2018, csis.org/.

53. Beyond this history, the logic of the strategic situation also militates against a Russian decision to attack at sea. The most likely scenario for a NATO-Russia war—an article 5 defense of a NATO Baltic member—means Russia would enjoy local military superiority on the ground and would have no reason to expand the war to the sea, where it is inferior to its adversaries.

54. It seems improbable that the Navy could keep two sets of strategic “books,” an internal, private one reflecting a valid understanding of the threat Russia posed and a public affairs version in which that threat is exaggerated.

55. It is a given that if the United States and its allies were to let their capabilities to control the waters of the North Atlantic atrophy, they might indeed be inviting attack. That does not mean, however, that the Russians are otherwise poised to pose such a threat.

56. This is a crucial assumption. The specific degree of Russian dependence on use of the sea for international and internal (e.g., the Northern Sea Route) commerce needs to be established through careful analysis. Blockade was rarely, if at all, mentioned in Navy expressions of strategic purpose during and after the Cold War and essentially has been ignored in the post–post–Cold War years. Access via the sea by the United States to the world’s raw materials and trade is one of the objects of overcoming an opponent’s antiaccess/area-denial defenses. But the idea
of preventing another nation from engaging in such commercial activities did not appear in any of the seven documents that Tangredi recently reviewed as expressions of current Navy strategic thinking. Sam J. Tangredi, “Running Silent and Algorithmic: The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in 2019,” Naval War College Review 72, no. 2 (Spring 2019), pp. 129–65. Till notes that both the attacking and defense of merchant shipping have disappeared from the planning of most other nations as well. Till, Seapower, p. 245.

57. This characterization is based on a broad reading of relative capabilities. To the author, the advantage in numbers and quality of the West’s globally mobile forces versus those of Russia (or China) seems evident today and likely to grow as U.S. building programs bear fruit and NATO defense budgets increase. Of course, this matter also would need careful analysis. For elaboration on the blockade concept, see Bradford Dismukes, “Global Blockade vs. Russia,” 17 April 2020, and “Global Blockade vs. China,” 18 April 2020, both Clio’s Musings: History and 21st Century US Naval Strategy (blog), cliosmusings.blog/. PDs are likely to have even more appeal to our adversaries, and when they appear they will pose a major threat to U.S. and other Western surface ships.

58. Russia’s new LNG carriers are part of a multibillion-ruble program to exploit the nation’s vast reserves of natural gas. Key elements of the program are the Yamal LNG project in the Arctic and the Sakhalin II LNG project in the Pacific. Andrew E. Kramer, “Polar Thaw Opens Shortcut for Russian Natural Gas,” New York Times, 24 July 2013, p. 1; Henry Foy, “Russia Ships First Gas from $27bn Arctic Project,” Financial Times, 8 December 2017, available at ft.com/. Of course, this matter also would need careful analysis. For elaboration on the blockade concept, see Bradford Dismukes, “Global Blockade vs. Russia,” 17 April 2020, and “Global Blockade vs. China,” 18 April 2020, both Clio’s Musings: History and 21st Century US Naval Strategy (blog), cliosmusings.blog/. PDs are likely to have even more appeal to our adversaries, and when they appear they will pose a major threat to U.S. and other Western surface ships.

59. Most assessments of the ability of NATO ground forces to come through the Suwalki gap to aid a threatened Baltic member are fairly unfavorable. See Nikolai Sukov, “How NATO Could Solve the Suwalki Gap Challenge,” National Interest, 1 May 2019. Bringing NATO sea power to bear through a counterthreat of blockade would make use of forces that already exist.

60. Note that a blockade would threaten neither Russian territory nor the regime, and thus the approach is in keeping with NATO’s self-definition as a defensive alliance. It would not be a substitute for action ashore but instead would be its asymmetrical complement—showing that NATO is an alliance of navies as much as of armies and land-based air.

61. An ideal capability for this and later phases of conflict would be a propulsion-disabling (PD) weapon, a small torpedo-like device that would deprive a ship of its mobility without sinking it or causing significant casualties. A brief outline of the PD concept can be found in the author’s “Propulsion Disablers: Opportunity and Threat,” Clio’s Musings: History and 21st Century US Naval Strategy (blog), 16 April 2020, cliosmusings.blog/. PDs are likely to have even more appeal to our adversaries, and when they appear they will pose a major threat to U.S. and other Western surface ships.


63. Hattendorf and Swartz, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s.

64. Jeffrey Barker (remarks delivered at a forum entitled “The Arctic and U.S. National Security,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 4 December 2018). Mr. Barker is deputy branch head for policy and posture in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op 515B). The forum was streamed in real time, and the record is available from the center as a webcast. Mr. Barker’s remarks were not a part of his prepared presentation. In part 1 of the webcast, starting at 2:09:39, during a Q&A, Mr. Barker observed that the purpose of bastion denial was “[s]o that the Russians don’t have bastions to operate from defending the homeland.” And “what we [the Navy] are doing [strategic ASW] aligns with the National Security Strategy.” First reported by Richard R. Burgess, “Navy Must Be Agile but Sustainable,” Seapower, 4 December 2018, seapowermagazine.org/. It is not known how authoritative Mr. Barker’s remarks were; presumably they reflected the thinking of officials in at least some parts of the Navy. Strategic ASW apparently has an enduring attractiveness. In 2019, it was advanced as worthy of “careful consideration” by the United States and NATO allies, along with a number of other “principles” guiding strategy in the North Atlantic in the twenty-first century.


66. As observed in note 41, during the Cold War it was not clear whether or how this was done. It does not seem desirable that decisions regarding a matter of this gravity to the nation should be made by one of the military services.

67. Official explanations of the need for such exercises include quite plausible strategic objectives, such as protecting shipping lanes (seldom absent, as has been seen, when the Navy speaks of its strategic purposes) and the American exclusive economic zone in the Arctic. ASW, the mission of greatest interest to the Russians, is not mentioned. “ICEX 2018 Briefing Book,” 8 March 2018, pp. 1–12, available at navylive.dodlive.mil/.

68. The inventory of sixty-plus of the world’s quietest nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) comprises a fleet in being that seems guaranteed to keep the Russian navy in a defensive posture, whether or not U.S. SSNs execute the strategic ASW mission. (For elaboration on the possible contemporary meanings of a *fleet in being*, see the author’s “Fleet in Being: The 17th Century Calls Out to the 21st,” *Clio’s Musings: History and 21st Century US Naval Strategy* [blog], 6 February 2020, cliosmusings.blog/.) Whether, when, and how to exploit this undersea advantage on behalf of cooperative, as well as competitive, engagement with Russia should be the subject of further analysis. For a creative example in this regard, see Vince Manzo, *Nuclear Arms Control without a Treaty? Risks and Options after New START*, IRM2019-U-019494 (Arlington, VA: CNA, March 2019).

69. Polmar, “Why 2000 or Even 400 Submarines,” provides a plausible listing. More recently, see Brian Hayes [Lt., USNR], “Naval Intelligence, the CIA, and the Soviet-Russian Threat: The Cold War and Beyond,” *U.S. Naval Institute* (blog), 5 July 2019, blog.usni.org/. Hayes adds explanations at the psychological level of human perception.


71. Although this process has occurred countless times in the past and remains a staple of planning today, to the author’s knowledge little attention appears to have gone into systematizing it. It might be useful to survey, say, a dozen senior directors of recent force-structure studies to learn what commonalities and differences have marked the way in which study terms of reference have handled hedging at the intelligence-planning nexus. During the Cold War, as noted, this problem never arose—for the worst reasons.
As the Trump administration assumed the reins of power in 2017 with the promise of a maritime revival, it took command of a USN surface fleet primarily consisting of vessels designed during the Cold War. This fact is not surprising, since ships’ life cycles can span many decades. The leadership of the Navy believes, perhaps rightly, that its Cold War–era surface fleet may be ill equipped to deal with myriad future threats on the high seas over the rest of a century that will be marked by near-peer competition. The new century promises a range of new hardware and technologies combining with different maritime strategies, operations, and tactics that could challenge U.S. primacy on the world’s oceans.

For example, both China and Russia actively are pursuing maritime strategies involving the extensive use of land-based precision-strike complexes that feature long-range, accurate munitions and a new generation of digital sensors. China in particular has developed a new suite of “gray-zone” tactics that seek to test the limits of how states apply force on the high seas. These different strategies and tactics are integrating new weapons and technologies, ranging across accurate, long-range missiles launched from land, sea, and air; emerging cyber capabilities that potentially can disable critical parts of naval ships; small-boat swarms that can complicate countermeasures and targeting; and new systems yet to be fielded that integrate artificial intelligence, robotics, and modern manufacturing processes such as three-dimensional printing.
As Admiral John M. Richardson emphasized repeatedly when he was U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Navy believes it may be falling behind its opponents at sea. Underlying Richardson’s disquiet was the assumption that time and fate are not necessarily on the Navy’s side—a view that American political leaders echoed consistently. After nearly two decades of antijihadist campaigns, there is a belief that in the digital age adversaries are adapting more quickly than the U.S. Navy, so it needs to innovate now—and fast—to keep pace with, let alone preserve any advantage over, its rivals. Richardson clearly believed that the Navy is entering a new adapt-react cycle with adversaries such as Russia and China, which informed his call for a twenty-first-century fleet redesign. The new cycle coincides with a shift in U.S. security strategy away from irregular warfare and terrorism back to the geopolitical competition reminiscent of earlier eras.

Admiral Richardson’s call for a reinvigorated fleet would not mean much without high-level political support, especially in Congress. Perhaps not coincidentally, a number of recent studies (some of which the Navy funded) have recommended that the Navy increase the size of its surface fleet. Perhaps more importantly, there appears to be strong political support in Congress for the idea that the Navy should get bigger. Thus, at least three important sources of energy are in place with which to revitalize a twenty-first-century fleet: (1) a general recognition that adversaries are adapting quickly to challenge the United States on the high seas; (2) internal Navy emphasis on overhauling and expanding the fleet; and (3) political support to make available the funds necessary to pay for it. Even three such ingredients, however, do not ensure the success of the kind of naval revival the U.S. Navy has made previously at various points in its history. Most importantly, the Navy needs programs that will take a redesigned twenty-first-century fleet from the drawing board to the production line.

As the Navy stands on the threshold of the largest naval buildup since the halcyon John Lehman days in the Reagan administration, the irony of this situation is painfully apparent. Just as a consensus has emerged among stakeholders in the Department of Defense, the White House, and Congress that the Navy needs to increase its fleet from 308 to 355 ships, the Navy must address serious shortcomings in its capacity to conceive, develop, and build ships fit for battle. Recent programs such as the littoral combat ship (LCS), the Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyer, and the Ford-class aircraft carrier all have highlighted the Navy’s failure to produce innovative, affordable ships in the quantity and of the quality needed to configure a larger, redesigned fleet. Unless the Navy can address mistakes made in these programs it will have difficulty innovating as Richardson has suggested—with potentially disastrous consequences. This article argues that the Navy needs to examine critically its largely failed attempts at innovation during the post-1990s era if it is to meet its twenty-first-century challenges.
The article particularly focuses on the naval innovation cycle of the modern era, an era that flowed from the 1990s. This period featured the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the absence of near-peer competitors on the high seas in the wake of the 1990–91 Gulf War. Despite massive investments and the water-fall of 1990s digital technologies, most observers would agree that the Navy has not been successful at generalizing innovations into a new fleet design. Attempts to introduce three important ship classes (the LCS, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and the Ford-class carrier) have been nothing short of disastrous. The Navy intended that these ships would be cornerstones of the twenty-first-century fleet, but each ship class floundered, for a variety of reasons. The Navy gave up on purchasing its planned complement of LCSs and now is planning on decommissioning the first four ships in the class a decade early (opting for a new frigate instead); it stopped construction altogether on the Zumwalt-class destroyer; and the Ford-class carrier program remains mired in technical problems, schedule delays, and cost overruns.

This article addresses the U.S. Navy’s initial attempt to assemble a twenty-first-century fleet. Starting, as it did, with the world’s largest and most combat-effective navy, the United States, in its efforts to design, build, and field a fleet, provides the world’s best case study by which to examine the intersection of innovation, maritime strategy, and fleet design. The article nests the ongoing efforts to assemble a twenty-first-century fleet within cycles of naval innovation and maritime strategy over a period that, for purposes of this analysis, began in the 1880s and extends to the present.

This article explores the reasons why the post-1990s innovation cycle failed to move the Navy successfully in the direction for which Admiral Richardson advocated. Identifying and addressing the causes of failure in the latest innovation cycle are critical if the Navy hopes to design and build a twenty-first-century fleet successfully. If the problems of the post-1990s innovation cycle are not resolved the same mistakes likely will be repeated, catapulting the U.S. Navy into a dark future amid great-power competition; the Navy will be designing the future fleet continuously even as the present fleet continues its slow, expensive erosion. The result will be a future fleet design that remains an alluring, but ultimately a cursed, chimera—always offering a promise that cannot be realized, because of the array of impediments identified in this article.

INNOVATION CYCLES—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Admiral Richardson’s call to focus on the future fleet is not new, but rather is a time-honored tradition for all militaries seeking to position themselves favorably to meet future strategic uncertainties. The Navy envisioned a redesigned twenty-first-century fleet long before Richardson arrived on the scene. Ideas derived
in the 1990s called for development of a host of innovative platforms stuffed full of new technologies and advanced capabilities that were to form the basis of the twenty-first-century fleet.

This article does not argue that the Navy has not introduced new operational concepts or integrated new, innovative capabilities into the fleet since the 1990s—far from it. The Navy has digitized the existing fleet, adding new radars, sensors, communications equipment, and weapons to its existing ships, all of which have improved operational awareness and given crews afloat, as well as in the air, more-accurate, longer-range missiles to strike targets ashore and at sea. Looking to the future, it currently is experimenting with new operational concepts such as distributed maritime operations; launching programs to explore the possibilities that remotely piloted vessels offer; and introducing an array of new, digital-age technologies into the fleet that are meant to help win the next war on the high seas. Be that as it may, it still is hard to argue that the post-1990s innovation cycle has delivered fully on its promise of a twenty-first-century fleet design that looks dramatically different from that of the Cold War era.

One can argue that there have been three major cycles of naval innovation, spanning the late nineteenth, the twentieth, and now the twenty-first centuries. These cycles had many characteristics in common: continuous and iterative changes to organizational structures to accommodate new equipment and new operational concepts; the integration of new technologies to improve capabilities; different platforms and new weapons; and the operational concepts behind these systems, which in turn drove manning and training so as to integrate all the above into an effective operational force.

The glue binding these cycles together was the myriad organizations capable of generalizing the ideas and producing them in repeatable form—bureaucracies that successfully managed, and even directed, the innovation cycles. Indeed, a characteristic of the support bureaucracy is that it also changed during the innovation cycles, becoming ever more task specialized so it could manage the increasingly complex systems being fielded during the twentieth century. This task specialization has produced its own unintended consequences, as will be discussed later.

The first cycle saw the rise of the new Navy in the 1880s, with a transition to the big-gun dreadnought and the airplane and aircraft carriers of World War II—a fifty-year endeavor. The second cycle extended through the end of the Cold War, featuring nuclear weapons and reactors, radars and other electronics, and long-range missiles—a forty-year effort. Today we are in the midst of the third cycle, which began in the early 1990s under the rubric of the RMA. Defining these cycles as discrete, definable phenomena is a bit of scholarly artifice, since all the cycles overlapped in detail and were related to one another even as the geostrategic
circumstances surrounding the cycles shifted over time. For example, the fielding of the Aegis guided-missile cruisers in the 1980s represented a continuation of efforts to equip carrier battle groups with air-defense systems that could hit targets with greater accuracy and at far greater ranges in the face of Soviet tactics than initially had been the case when carrier battle groups were conceived during World War II. Another factor binding the cycles is the inherent nature of fleets themselves; they are composed of surface ships, submarines, and airplanes as the principal platforms. In the case of ships, their life cycles, stretching over many decades, ensured that ships built to battle the Soviet fleet on the high seas continued patrolling the world’s oceans in the post–Cold War era; therefore, they performed a variety of different missions created by a new strategic environment, one of post-1991 strategic dominance and of post-2001 strikes against jihadi insurgents. Nonetheless, segregating these distinctive eras is useful for illustrative purposes to address the phenomenon of designing a twenty-first-century fleet—an activity that itself resulted from twentieth-century innovation cycles.\textsuperscript{10}

It is no coincidence that these three innovation cycles correspond to different eras of maritime strategy: the period of naval rivalry in the imperial age that began in the late nineteenth century and extended through the end of World War II; the Cold War, which pitted the United States and its allies against the Soviet Union on the high seas; and the post-1990 era that, until recently, saw the United States in its celebrated unipolar moment. During the 1990s, for example, the Cold War–era carrier battle group gradually was abandoned and carriers often operated essentially independently, since such vessels faced no real threats on or under the water or from the skies. That has changed in the twenty-first century as states such as North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia aggressively have developed precision-strike complexes with land-based sensors and long-range ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{11} A conclusion of this article is that the conceptual drift in maritime strategy in the third cycle profoundly shaped the Navy’s initial attempts to design and build a twenty-first-century fleet.

Each of these innovation cycles introduced new capabilities and operating concepts into the fleet. It is easy to forget, however, that each of the cycles was fueled by one important common denominator: money, as an expression of policy and legislative will. Without money, none of the innovation cycles could have been brought to fruition—another timeless truism, which speaks to enduring realities about how defense and arms work in American politics and the record of the U.S. Navy in modern history. A regrettable and potentially devastating feature of the modern era’s innovation cycle is a cost growth of ships, aircraft, and projectiles that is unsustainable, even given a U.S. defense budget that in 2018 was almost larger than the defense expenditures of the rest of the world combined. In addition to programmatic ship-construction problems, significant cost growth has
characterized virtually every major procurement program the Navy has undertaken in the period. In short, the post–Cold War innovation cycle ran aground in the minefield of unacceptably high costs—even in a time when the defense budget topped $700 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2018.\textsuperscript{12} The exemplar of this phenomenon is the $406 billion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, currently estimated to be the most expensive weapons program in American history.\textsuperscript{13} Regrettably, the experience of the F-35 has proved emblematic for the Navy’s twenty-first-century fleet-design aspirations. The cost growth of air and sea platforms initially conceived in the 1990s has all but ensured that the Navy will be unable to field large numbers of the new \textit{Ford}-class aircraft carriers, \textit{San Antonio}-class amphibious transport dock LPD-17 ships, and \textit{Virginia}- and \textit{Columbia}-class submarines—all of which, like the LCS and DDX, were intended to be cornerstones of the twenty-first-century fleet. The Navy’s newly conceived FFG(X) guided-missile frigate is anticipated to cost nearly one billion dollars per vessel.\textsuperscript{14} The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the Navy would need an increase in its shipbuilding budget averaging 60 percent annually for the next thirty years to reach its desired end state of a fleet of 355 ships between 2035 and 2047—which is significantly more than Congress has appropriated for shipbuilding at any time over the last thirty years.\textsuperscript{15} An undeniable feature of the post–Cold War innovation cycle is that the Navy is pricing itself out of business with under-funded shipbuilding plans—at a time when Russia and China are expanding the sizes of their respective fleets.\textsuperscript{16} 

THE STRATEGY-INNOVATION NEXUS

A purposeful adapt-react interaction between and among rivals drove the innovation cycles of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as the Navy sought to lead its allies and keep ahead of its enemies. Cycles of action and reaction between adversaries are not new; indeed, they are a timeless feature of international politics. Early international relations theorists of the realist school noted that states seek armaments both to defend themselves and because they see them as a way to influence friends and adversaries.\textsuperscript{17} Like land and air forces, the navies of developed states inherently are nested within this larger phenomenon. Navy fleets historically have been deemed a vital, even a foundational, part of national power.\textsuperscript{18} This underlying tension of international politics produces a timeless rule applicable to these interactions: as nations arm themselves, they create insecurity in both friends and rivals, who then feel compelled to take corresponding actions, resulting in arms races.\textsuperscript{19} Innovation by antagonists in arms races is a central feature of the phenomenon, as each participant strives to counter the capabilities of the other.\textsuperscript{20} Navies around the world went through such an adapt-react cycle in the dreadnought era.
It happened again in the aircraft carrier era in the first half of the twentieth century—a cycle in which the U.S. Navy undeniably came out on top of its enemies.\textsuperscript{21} Importantly, these two adapt-react cycles occurred during an era (approximately 1880–1990) in which strong navies were thought of as synonymous with national power.

The experiences of World War II confirmed already-held beliefs about the importance of strong navies as instruments of national power and the strong influence that arms races had on the nature of the forces fielded on the high seas. During World War II, two types of maritime conflict unfolded, both of which were central to the Allied victory. In the Battle of the Atlantic, navies served in a more purely maritime role, in a context in which control over the seas enabled the application of force on land.\textsuperscript{22} Allied navies successfully overcame the U-boat challenge, moved the Army (and the Army Air Forces) across the Atlantic to Great Britain (as well as supplies to the Soviet Union and across the Mediterranean to North Africa), and then managed to deliver the Army across the channel into Europe. In the Pacific theater, navies sailed close to shorelines to land troops and deliver fire directly onto the enemy, and they engaged in naval combat at sea among surface ships, as naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan had suggested they would.\textsuperscript{23} The Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944 was the largest sea battle in history, and it came on the heels of significant sea-based battles in the Coral Sea, at Midway, and elsewhere that have gained prominent places in the historical annals of the war in the Pacific. In both theaters, Atlantic and Pacific, navies correctly were seen as instrumental to the Allies’ ultimate victory in the greatest maritime campaign in history.\textsuperscript{24}

After World War II, the Cold War featured its own adapt-react cycle, in which the United States and its allies on one side and Soviet-bloc countries on the other moved through various attempts to gain and maintain the upper hand. As an example of the cycle, the Soviet submarine buildup during the Cold War spurred the U.S. Navy to develop a formidable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability that incorporated ships, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft, and a fixed sonar network on the ocean floor, not to mention several classes of nuclear attack submarines.\textsuperscript{25} For both adversaries, a host of innovations appeared during the cycle. In the Cold War, the United States developed shipborne missile-launch systems (including deployment of tactical nuclear weapons at sea), in combination with radar, both to defend the fleet from new generations of Soviet aircraft and missiles and to attack targets at long range with sea-launched cruise missiles.\textsuperscript{26} Perhaps most significantly, the Navy deployed strategic nuclear missiles on submarines, stabilizing nuclear deterrence and the balance of terror. Importantly, these arms-race and innovation cycles depended on the ability of large institutions to produce generalizable innovation—new capabilities that were introduced into the fleet on a widespread basis.
During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy’s missions expanded to focus on deterrence and supporting overseas military operations in Korea and Vietnam. In addition to these missions it fulfilled and interactions it had with adversaries, interservice rivalries represented another shaping factor in the Cold War innovation cycle. While the newly created Air Force received principal responsibility for delivering the strategic nuclear deterrent, the Navy decisively clawed back an important part of that mission through the Polaris and later the Trident submarine ballistic-missile programs, beginning in the early 1960s. In this period, the Navy served as an important instrument of U.S. national power exercised under the strategy of containment. During the Cold War, the Navy operated at sea on a continuous and global basis, which established a concept of operations that continues to this day. In the 1980s, Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr. famously conceived of the Maritime Strategy to give the Navy an offensive strategic role in a potential war with the Soviet Union. The Maritime Strategy sought to take the war to the Kola Peninsula and the Soviet Pacific bases, to secure NATO’s northern flank in Scandinavia and secure Japan, and to bottle up the Soviet navy with its submarine fleet in its northern bastions. Lehman’s concept simply repackaged a version of the Navy’s maritime contributions during the Pacific War, updating them by applying the same ideas to a European war with the Soviet Union.

As had been the case in the era prior to and during World War II, Cold War assessments of adversary capabilities drove the Navy’s innovation efforts, with the bureaucracy operationalizing them into weapon-system requirements. Those assessments called for continuous iterative improvements in weapons, operating platforms, and operating concepts that were focused principally on defeating the adversary, both via direct confrontation at sea and by applying maritime power to support a land war. Despite civil-military tension and legislative rancor, the Defense Department bureaucracy operationalized these requirements successfully, for the most part, which ensured that Navy ships were equipped with newer, better radars; more-accurate, longer-range missiles; successively better jet aircraft; shipborne helicopters; and, for submarines, the capability to stay submerged for longer periods, resulting in greater stealth. With the support of Congress, the Navy procured, fielded, and—importantly—generalized throughout the fleet weapons, platforms, and technologies that were new, improved, or both. This description is not intended to romanticize a bygone era in any way; its intent simply is to emphasize that the bureaucracy successfully operationalized change, adaptation, and innovation that were linked to strategy, in the form of programs that delivered systems to the fleet.

However, the strategy-innovation nexus that had functioned with a certain logic during the first two cycles entered a new period in the post-1990 era, with important consequences for the processes that had worked successfully in the first...
two cycles. Following the first Gulf War in 1991 and a brief period of a “peace dividend,” the Defense Department and its allies in Congress and industry successfully fought off attempts to reduce dramatically the defense budget and the size of the military departments. New planning and operational scenarios emerged in response to threats from “rogue states” such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; this preserved force structures, missions, budgets, and programs. Attention focused particularly on such threats as the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons as well as long-range missiles—threats that came not from near-peer competitors but from weak states that chafed under a U.S.-led global order. As the 1990s progressed, the Defense Department moved away from specific war planning and eventually divorced the development of new weapons and operating concepts from those our enemies were developing. Instead, “capabilities portfolios” were emphasized, with risk trade-offs between the portfolios, to guide decision-making on what to develop and buy. This way of planning provided civilian decision makers with tools with which to evaluate the military departments’ choices on how to spend their money.

BUREAUCRACY AND INNOVATION
To be successful, all innovation cycles in any military organization depend on bureaucracy—an organizational structure created to produce repeatable and predictable outputs, among other purposes. Bureaucracy has a well-deserved reputation for being resistant to change; in fact, it could be argued that bureaucracy is designed to prevent change. For military organizations, repeatable output is a foundation of military effectiveness. Military organizations therefore are reluctant to abandon output, in the form of a practice in the field that has proved its worth. Conversely, however, it is equally the case that bureaucracy is instrumental to the process of change and innovation in military institutions. The tension between accepted practice and change sits at the heart of all questions of military innovation.

A truism for all modern militaries is that bureaucracy effectively functions as a translation agent in the innovation process; it takes the ideas for change, then develops a kind of source code that allows each idea to be generalized in the ways initially envisioned. It falls to bureaucracy to manage the process of innovation and change. The bureaucracy’s source code for innovation comes in the form of research-and-development (R&D) programs that mature into weapons-procurement programs and fielded systems, or as guidance that can change operational practice. To be completely successful, however, innovation cycles must reach the point of generalizability, so the change can be adopted on an affordable, organization-wide basis.

For all military organizations, including navies, the idea of generalizability is arguably the critical feature of efforts to innovate and produce new systems, new
operational routines, or both. As noted in the previous sections, during the Cold War the Navy successfully fielded new systems, built new organizations, and implemented new operational praxes. Many factors spurred the successful innovation cycle; one was a leadership that saw the potential of new systems, such as the nuclear-powered reactor for submarine propulsion, sea-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, radars capable of tracking multiple targets simultaneously, and missile-defense launch systems integrated on ships. These successful innovations also flowed from assessments of adversary capability, internal advocates within the organization who sought to develop a new theory of victory, a changing strategic environment that translated into a demand for new missions and capabilities, and interservice rivalries—whose existence is never to be gainsaid—that spurred organizations to propose new ideas and systems to preserve their missions and budgets.

Also worth noting is that during the Cold War the strategic and operational tasks facing the Navy and its force structure were relatively consistent with the uses of naval forces that had evolved over the course of the twentieth century. When the Soviet Union dissolved, however, the U.S. Navy found itself without a competitor on the high seas. In the 1990s, the Navy realized it had to think about what it wanted its fleet to look like in the twenty-first century—a future that it would have to conceive of well before it could field a new fleet to operate in it.

So during the ’90s the Navy began to plan to field a twenty-first-century fleet—for us today, the fleet of the present. In the ’90s the Navy envisioned a twenty-first-century fleet that would push the boundaries of its previous ship designs and incorporate a host of new capabilities enabled by the digital revolution. The Navy clearly wanted a twenty-first-century fleet that would incorporate the newest, most advanced technologies and operational concepts, which would preserve its leadership position well into the future. The digital revolution of the 1990s offered the Navy smaller, faster microprocessors that created a new generation of sensors and more-accurate, longer-range weapons and better intelligence capacities; real-time communications enabled via the Internet; enhanced situational awareness that promised to pierce the fog of movements at sea; and missile-defense systems to protect ships and shore-based installations. The hopefulness of the era of the RMA was not lost on the Navy (or the other military departments), which aggressively moved to operationalize its vision. Plans for a variety of new ship classes emerged during the period: the LPD-17 San Antonio–class amphibious transport dock, the SSN-774 Virginia–class nuclear attack submarine, two different variants of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer (Flights I and II), the LCS, the Zumwalt–class destroyer, and the Ford–class carrier. What follows focuses on three of these programs: the LCS, the Zumwalt class, and the Ford class.
The Twenty-First-Century Fleet: Program “Highlights”

This section briefly details the history of three ship-construction programs: the LCS, the DDX, and the Ford-class CVN. All were products of the 1990s-era innovation cycle.

Both the LCS and DDX grew out of decisions the Navy made in 2001 to reorient an R&D program started in 1994 called the SC-21 program (from Surface Combatant for the 21st Century). The SC-21 program itself grew out of studies dating to the late 1980s that called for ships that could operate in the Norwegian Sea during a potential war with the Soviet Union. The main idea was to develop a robust ship capable of attacking targets on land. The 1990s research programs focused on a number of vessel options, in sizes ranging up to forty thousand tons. One of its most celebrated proposals was the arsenal ship: a thirty-thousand-ton vessel stuffed with hundreds of cruise missiles and a vertical launch system. Then-CNO Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda championed the concept. Research efforts continued throughout the 1990s and up to the 2001 decision to proceed with two programs: the LCS and the DDX.\(^{34}\)

The LCS Program. The LCS program began in 2001; initial procurement occurred in 2005; yet as of mid-2019, the LCS has not been deployed to the field in support of combatant command requirements, owing to persistent technical problems.\(^{35}\) The Navy intended to use the LCS as a smaller, multimission vessel that could take advantage of “plug and play” modules to perform a variety of different missions: ASW, mine countermeasures (MCM), and surface warfare against smaller vessels. Other relevant missions included maritime-security and maritime-partnering operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, and support to special operations forces. By mid-2018, thirty-five vessels had been procured from a program that initially was projected to produce over fifty. The program’s orders were divided between two contractors (Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics) that provided different hull designs.\(^{36}\)

Virtually every aspect of the LCS has drawn the ire of critics, from both inside and outside government: costs grew (from initial estimates of $220 million per vessel to $478 million); early versions of the ships suffered from construction problems; and development of the modules to support the three mission areas (ASW, MCM, and surface warfare) has been plagued by repeated and costly delays. In July 2018, the Pentagon’s inspector general stated that the Navy had declared the MCM module to be operational without demonstrating that it had fixed the known problems with it.\(^{37}\) The Navy subsequently abandoned the idea of swapping out the mission modules and instead will equip each vessel with just one of the modules. Repeatedly the Navy has been forced to delay deployment plans for the vessels because of these technical problems. There also are persistent concerns about whether the ship is adequately armed—many doubt it can survive in combat.
In December 2016, the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, J.
Michael Gilmore, told lawmakers that the LCS had not demonstrated “effective warfighting capability in any of its originally envisioned missions: surface warfare (SUW); mine countermeasures (MCM); anti-submarine warfare (ASW).”

A year earlier, then–Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter ordered the Navy to reduce its program from fifty-two to forty vessels and to select a single contractor to construct future vessels. Carter acerbically noted in his missive to the Navy: “For the last several years, the Department of the Navy has overemphasized resources used to incrementally increase total ship numbers at the expense of critically-needed investments in areas where our adversaries are not standing still, such as strike, ship survivability, electronic warfare, and other capabilities.”

Carter’s criticisms followed a similar brouhaha in 2014 in which then–Secretary of Defense Charles T. Hagel ordered the Navy to add armament to the LCS. The then Senate Armed Services Committee chairman (and former naval aviator) John S. McCain III (R-AZ) also was a frequent and scathing critic of the LCS from its earliest stages, repeatedly citing “fundamental shortcomings” in the whole program.

The program displayed a number of embarrassing technical problems, including hull cracks in the ship’s aluminum superstructure and a faulty propulsion system. Various vessels had to be towed back to port and, in one case, driven all the way across the Pacific Ocean for repairs.

In FY19, the Navy decided to stop procurement of the LCS and instead shift to procurement of a new frigate in FY20. In December 2019, the Navy announced that it proposed to retire the first four ships in the LCS class from service more than a decade early to save money. Current plans call for the Navy to build twenty of the new frigates.

The DDG-1000 Zumwalt-Class Destroyer. The story of the DDG-1000 program bears some similarity to that of the LCS—except that in some ways it is worse. The Navy initially conceived of the ship as the most technologically advanced ever to be built, one that would substitute for several ship classes, including destroyers and guided-missile cruisers. It originally was designed to support troops ashore with long-range, accurate fires, although since then the Navy has shifted the ship’s mission to one focusing on surface-fire support at sea. The first two ships were procured in FY06 and FY07.

But less than three years after launching the program the Navy terminated the DDG-1000 program at three ships, proposing instead to purchase more Cold War–era DDG-51 Arleigh Burke–class destroyers. The Navy intended the DDG-1000 to be a stealth ship, with a small-to-nonexistent radar cross section—the Navy’s version of the Air Force’s F-117 stealth fighter. However, instead of becoming the basis (along with the LCS) for the twenty-first-century fleet, the DDG-1000

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/1
effectively became an expensive technology demonstrator platform. The Navy underestimated the costs of the program by 47 percent, seeing its initial $8.9 billion per-ship estimate in FY09 grow to $13.1 billion in FY20.\(^4\)

The stealth ship was to run as quietly as a submarine; provide greatly improved battlespace awareness through new sensors; and deliver precise, long-range fires, via advanced, ship-based guns, to support troops ashore. The promise seemed substantial, boasting a first-of-its-kind integrated power system that would be powered by a new electric-drive propulsion system that would feed new, power-dependent, directed-energy and laser weapons. The ship’s modular Linux-based computing system, with six million lines of software code, was the first onboard computing environment with its own Internet system. The advanced gun system was to deliver precision, accurate fires with 155 mm long-range, land-attack projectiles at shore-based targets over a hundred miles away, drawing on an advanced, integrated combat system. The DDG-1000 was to have been supported by a crew of just under a hundred, as opposed to the 275 required to operate a *Burke*-class destroyer; the Navy subsequently walked back that initial claim to a crew size of 175.\(^4\)

The DDG-1000 reportedly does in fact have the radar cross section of a fishing boat. However, almost none of the other promised capabilities has yet been realized, and, like the LCS, the ship has suffered persistent technical problems.

*The Ford-Class Carrier.* Perhaps the centerpiece of the twenty-first-century fleet developed during the 1990s was a new generation of aircraft carriers, known as the *Ford* class, to replace the aging *Nimitz*-class fleet that began entering service in 1975. While it was based on the *Nimitz*-class hull, the *Ford* class sought to incorporate a number of important improvements that would enable the ships to launch more aircraft sorties (a bigger flight deck, additional electrical power for the ship’s systems) while lowering the number of sailors required to operate the ship by several hundred, which promised to reduce operating costs. The first ship, *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN 78), was commissioned in July 2017 after procurement costs of approximately $13 billion. At least four carriers are to be procured; the Navy has estimated that the last ship in the class, CVN 81, will cost in excess of $15 billion. The first three ships in the class have seen their costs grow by an average of 21 percent over initial estimates. The Navy has exceeded Congress’s cost caps on every ship in the program.\(^4\)

Three major new systems are being integrated into the *Ford* class: a new aircraft-catapult system called the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, a new aircraft-arresting system called the Advanced Arresting Gear, and a new radar known as dual-band radar. According to the Pentagon’s Office of the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation, all three systems have been plagued by schedule delays, cost growth, and reliability problems—which calls into question the ship’s ability to perform as advertised in combat.\(^4\) The office noted the following:
Poor or unknown reliability of the newly designed catapults, arresting gear, weapons elevators, and radar, which are all critical for flight operations, could affect the ability of CVN 78 to generate sorties, make the ship more vulnerable to attack, or create limitations during routine operations. The poor or unknown reliability of these critical subsystems is the most significant risk to CVN 78. Based on current reliability estimates, CVN 78 is unlikely to be able to conduct the type of high-intensity flight operations expected during wartime.\textsuperscript{48}

Frequent \textit{Ford}-class critic and then–Senate Armed Services Committee chairman John McCain characterized the program as “one of the most spectacular acquisition debacles in recent memory.”\textsuperscript{49} As McCain noted (and the Government Accountability Office echoed), the entire twenty-first-century Navy shipbuilding program, as highlighted in the case of the \textit{Ford} class, suffered from a number of easily identifiable maladies:\textsuperscript{50}

- unrealistic business cases that invariably understated costs and underestimated the difficulties of production that relied on unproven technologies, resulting in schedule delays
- concurrent design and construction, without adequate testing
- lack of testing (and a reluctance to test) to demonstrate advertised capabilities
- new systems that were rushed into production despite the fact that they did not work
- a bewildering mix of different organizations that were responsible for different parts of the program, which made overall management accountability all but impossible\textsuperscript{51}

Teething pains are to be expected with any new platform or weapon system, particularly in the case of complex systems such as surface ships. Each of these three programs, however, fell prey to the same maladies that McCain noted.

In short, the innovation process meant to operationalize these systems came unglued. The Navy actually recognized this; it curtailed the DDG-1000 program at three ships and canceled the LCS program halfway through its planned production run, and the \textit{Ford} class still faces significant hurdles to deliver on its promise.

\textbf{Explaining the Perfect Storm}

The innovation cycle of the 1990s produced these three flawed platforms, which represented the Navy’s initial attempt to conceptualize its twenty-first-century fleet. In the cases of the DDG-1000 and the LCS in particular, nothing quite like these platforms had been attempted ever before. Both represented aggressive efforts at innovation that could have led to new generations of platforms that might have started the Navy down the path to its sought-after redesigned
twenty-first-century fleet. The *Ford* class represented more of an adaptation than
an innovation (although several brand-new systems, such as the electric catapult,
were introduced). Suffice it to say, if the Navy had succeeded in generalizing these
platforms as initially envisioned, Admiral Richardson might not have felt com-
pelled to call for a redesigned twenty-first-century fleet. Identifying what went
wrong with these programs in this innovation cycle is important if the Navy is
to avoid repeating the mistakes of this first attempt to reconceptualize its fleet.

Importantly, a lack of neither money nor political support doomed the pro-
grams; in fact, the situation was quite the opposite. Management within the Navy
and the Pentagon, supported by their providers in Congress, kept hoping for
success and threw ever-increasing amounts of money at the problematic systems.
While it is true that the country and the Defense Department budget increasingly
became focused on commitments associated with the post-9/11 irregular wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Navy’s requests for funding for its twenty-first-century
fleet were met, even as costs ballooned and production delays mounted.52

Choices made after the 1990s represent only part of the story. Just as important
were choices *not* made that could have produced different innovation pathways.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Navy’s choices were shaped by institutional identity,
institutional preferences, and intrabureaucratic communities (aviators, surface
warfare officers, and submariners) that drove investment priorities in the innova-
tion cycle. For example, the attempt to build an invisible ship was not simply a
matter of coincidence but instead reflected the preferences of the Navy’s power-
ful surface warfare community, which reside at the heart of the Navy’s strategic
essence. The idea of an invisible/radar-deflecting ship represented an important
attempt at innovation and appeared attractive for lots of obvious reasons. Such a
capability certainly would give the United States an edge on the high seas over its
adversaries, much as the Air Force’s development of its stealth fighter and bomber
gave it similar advantages. The point here is that this choice of developing a stealth
ship also was influenced by powerful institutional preferences.

The preference for a manned aircraft may provide an even better example of
innovation pathways not chosen.53 The 1990s delivered the era of unmanned
systems now on display on a daily basis over America’s global battlefields—an in-
novation choice that the U.S. Air Force has embraced. In contrast, commitment
to the F-35 represented the naval aviation community’s preference for a manned
platform—which preserved the career track and influence of the community
within the wider institution.

Instead of developing a stealth ship, the Navy instead could have chosen to
develop a stealth drone carrying multiple munitions launched off differently de-
signed ships. Such an investment almost certainly would have posed an engineer-
ing problem that was easier and cheaper to solve than building the stealth ship, the
Ford-class carrier, and the F-35. Instead, the Navy’s strike culture and commitment to carrier aviation clearly drove its investment strategy in favor of the F-35 aircraft and the Ford-class carrier.

As institutional preferences drove the investment strategy, no outside countervailing force emerged across the civil-military divide to force a different set of choices on the Navy. Just as important, no intraorganizational advocates emerged in the period to challenge accepted institutional orthodoxies with a different theory of victory that might have changed the organization’s investment priorities. The point here is not to make a normative argument regarding the relative merits of manned versus unmanned systems; it is simply to observe that institutional preferences limited debate encompassing alternative theories of victory that could have produced different innovation pathways.

When comparing the post-1990s cycle with those that preceded it, the obvious conclusion is that, in the cases of these three systems, the bureaucracy proved itself unable to generalize the innovations into executable programs. Bureaucracy could not fix the shared programmatic flaw that resulted from the disparity between the speed of technological change and that of the Navy’s plodding acquisition system. It was clear that systems that in some cases took a decade or more to develop and field would find themselves out of date when they arrived in the fleet. Program managers and their supervisors understandably were reluctant to nail down system requirements definitively, preferring instead to develop and build systems simultaneously so that, theoretically, the latest technological advances could be integrated into their platforms. But at least with regard to these three platforms, that approach proved disastrous.

For its part, industry obliged customer preferences, then demanded ever-increasing amounts of money to fix the flawed systems. A shrinking shipbuilding industrial base contributed to the debacles by limiting competition and alternatives as program schedules slipped and costs mounted. For example, Huntington Ingalls Industries, headquartered in Newport News, Virginia, is today the only shipyard in the United States capable of building aircraft carriers such as the Ford class.

In its quest to generalize the innovation, bureaucracy did adapt successfully to the ever-increasing complexity of the envisioned systems. Bureaucracy invariably brought about the task specialization within myriad organizations that was necessary to build technical and management expertise in particular programmatic areas. However, that adaptation did not produce generalizable innovation but instead ever-more-complex organizations that complicated program oversight and execution. As the ship classes became more complicated technically, program responsibilities became diffused across myriad organizations. The creation of different task-specialized organizations created span-of-control problems that made
it difficult to synchronize and coordinate different program elements. In each of
the three shipbuilding programs, vitally important systems grew disconnected
from production schedules. Instead of one coherent program, ship construction
became a process in which multiple specialized offices each managed different
project elements. Senator McCain complained repeatedly about the many orga-
nizations that routinely appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee
for hearings about the Navy’s shipbuilding program. As he noted, it meant that
no single organization or person had overall responsibility for the program, and
hence no accountability could be assigned. An exasperated McCain often com-
plained that nobody lost his job because nobody was held accountable.58 The
bureaucratic enterprise meant to generalize the innovation had become too vast
and complicated as a result of the demands the Navy placed on it. It provided only
what the customer actually asked for.

The bureaucracy’s struggles to generalize the innovation were known widely,
by all the organizations in the chain of command. Management and oversight
within the Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and
Congress all failed to correct the sideward spiral of each program; instead these
entities spent even more money, in the belief that the Navy would fix the problems.
Principal-agent relations can explain part of the behavior of the various oversight
layers and entities, but at the end of the day, as McCain emphasized, the entire
management and oversight system—stretching from the Navy all the way to the
halls of Congress—bore responsibility for the expensive acquisition disasters.59

Another feature of the 1990s innovation cycle is that the platforms were con-
ceived initially during the 1990s—a period of conceptual drift in U.S. strategy
following the Cold War. It is not that the Navy was not busy during the 1990s;
far from it. It spent the decade chasing after pirates in various places, conduct-
ing humanitarian relief operations, enforcing the trade embargo against Saddam
Hussein in the Persian Gulf, and helping to police the skies over Iraq in Operation
SOUTHERN WATCH. The Navy promulgated a bevy of new documents designed
to convince stakeholders of its continued relevance—and need for money—
pointing to its support of land forces and a host of other global constabulary mis-
sions.60 Importantly, over the decade, the Navy saw its fleet shrink by 40 percent,
from 526 to 318 ships, and its personnel end strength decline from 570,000 to
370,000.61

While the Defense Department successfully beat back attempts at generalized
disarmament, which had occurred in Europe, there was no way to gloss over the
lack of strategic consensus driving the arm-train-equip enterprise for the military
departments over the decade. Scenarios involving much weaker, so-called rogue
states eventually were substituted for the threat from the Soviet Union as a reason
to preserve programs and budgets. After the 1990–91 Gulf War and its swift and
purportedly decisive victory, the RMA offered obvious advantages, and the military departments understandably seized on its promise to guarantee their superiority over potential rivals. The RMA framed war as an engineering problem that could be solved through clever targeting with better, more-accurate, and longer-range weapons supported by an ever-improving sensor suite that cleared away the fog of war as if by magic. The RMA offered the prospect of victory through target destruction via a new generation of digital sensors and long-range, accurate munitions—a mind-set that implicitly encouraged the Navy and the other services to bet on the next technological leap before definitively nailing down their system requirements. Weapon-system requirements gradually became divorced from specific enemy threats and instead migrated to anodyne portfolios of capabilities.\(^6^2\)

The conceptual drift in national strategy fell squarely into the Navy’s lap. The 1990s saw questions implicitly raised about the strategic value of sea power that challenged foundational assumptions that navies were an instrumental component of national power. In World War II, navies enabled land forces by shipping men and their equipment to the fight. In the post-1990s era, however, America’s land forces, instead of storming ashore, mostly flew in chartered commercial airliners to airports in countries near the combat areas. While carrier aviation indeed supported troops and operations ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan, the reality was (and remains) that most combat-related air missions could be launched more efficiently from land-based airfields in or near the war zones.\(^6^3\) The Navy insisted on supporting troops ashore and went to absurd lengths to deliver, such as launching planes off the coast of Pakistan and sending them, via multiple aerial refuelings, to linger in lengthy orbits over Afghanistan to support ground troops (making for missions that Navy pilots described as “eight hours of boredom and twenty seconds of terror”).\(^6^4\)

The institutional preference for—even insistence on—conducting manned strike operations ashore also profoundly shaped the decision to proceed with the new generation of Ford-class carriers, which in certain respects were meant to be the “supercarriers” of the twenty-first century. The Navy never considered viable alternatives to the Ford-class platform. Congress forced the Navy to study the idea of building more, smaller, cheaper carriers, as potential platforms for strike missions—an idea in which the Navy appears uninterested for the present.\(^6^5\) There is little doubt that the Navy remains slow off the mark to adopt unmanned systems, having missed a golden opportunity during the post-1990s innovation cycle to get ahead of its competitors. This constituted an enormous opportunity cost of a road not taken. As strategy scholar James J. Wirtz pointedly observed, “One wonders exactly what, if anything, will be flying from those Ford-class carriers in 2063 or whether or not they will be at sea at all. One also wonders why the Navy plans to maintain and grow its fleet of aircraft carriers even though piloted
combat aircraft are headed for obsolescence. After all, in 2063 aviators may not be allowed to drive themselves to an airport. Would humans really still be at the controls of a combat aircraft?66

The reluctance to embrace unmanned systems represents a critical missed opportunity of the post-1990s innovation cycle, but it is unsurprising in an institution whose identity is grounded strongly in its carrier aviation community. One can only hope that the *Ford*-class carriers and their F-35 aircraft do not turn into versions of the *Iowa*-class battleships of the last century, which were obsolete even as they arrived.

Perhaps more basically, the Navy and its benefactors were unwilling to confront the uncomfortable reality of the post-1990s era: that unthreatened international trade routes did not need navies to protect them; and that, in any case, they were growing so full of twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) traffic that no single actor could disrupt those routes significantly.67 Seaborne support for U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan represented a mere trickle added to existing traffic on the vast global seaborne highways. The net effect of this undeniable feature of a globalizing world undermined traditional twentieth-century notions of the direct linkage between America’s economic strength through trade and the Navy’s protection of trade routes.

As in the Cold War era before it, in the 1990s the strategic backdrop framed the innovation cycle of the era. Yet given that the Navy of the 1990s lacked a near-peer competitor and faced pressure to shrink, it is not surprising that the innovation cycle took on a different character than had been the case during the Cold War. The service realized it had to do more with less, and understandably it viewed RMA-era technology as a way to square the circle. Absent the requirement to establish sea control to protect trade routes or to do battle on the high seas, the Navy gradually migrated to the idea that a central purpose of the fleet was to support operations ashore through strikes, in addition to close-to-shore maritime operations conducted to preserve freedom of maneuver. An original purpose of the DDG-1000 was to fire at targets ashore in support of troops, with the idea that the ships would have to sail relatively close to shore to do so. In 2017, the Navy shifted the emphasis to shooting at other surface ships. The LCS focused on support operations close to shore to deal with enemy vessel swarms and mines, among other things.

Unfortunately, even as the Navy struggled to operationalize these two innovative new platforms, the strategic environment changed. The irony is that, while the United States focused on the inconclusive, irregular land wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan—in which indirect fire from Navy ships frankly was not relevant—competitors emerged (or returned) with new capabilities to challenge the
Navy both at sea and in operations close to shore, via development of land-based antiship missiles that could overwhelm the fleet's antimissile defenses.

It is clear that the post-1990s innovation effort was shaped and disrupted by many different factors:

- Bureaucratic and programmatic difficulties in bringing ideas from the drawing board into being as actual systems that could be delivered to the fleet
- An ever-widening chasm between ponderous ship-development and acquisition cycles and the pace of change in technologies
- Management failures within the Navy that prevented the innovation cycle from moving at a predictable, affordable pace to deliver systems that worked as advertised
- Failure of oversight bodies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and Congress to force the Navy into corrective actions that might have kept the innovation cycle on track
- A lack of strategic consensus on the role of America's armed forces, which left the Navy to its own devices in connecting its systems to a clearly defined maritime strategy or a compelling rationale for its existence; in the absence of a clearly defined strategy, the Navy gravitated to strike operations, including direct support of ground forces, missing the opportunity to explore whether cheaper unmanned systems could perform the same missions for less money
- The shaping of the cycle by excessive cost growth at every step, which ensured (and still ensures) that budgets simply will not support the purchase of the proposed numbers of new ships, representing a disconnect of monumental proportions and a failure to ground the innovation cycle in a coherent linkage of ends, ways, and means

Action-reaction cycles remain a timeless feature within militaries—at least for those intent on staying ahead of their adversaries. The Navy faces significant hurdles to ensuring that the conceptual and systemic flaws that produced these three platforms during the 1990s are not repeated. In addition to these flaws, hanging over Richardson's call for a redesigned fleet is the critical issue of money. Naval innovation cycles need money, and lots of it, and it is not clear that there is enough of it to go around, even in the United States.68

All is not lost, however. Out of the ashes of the 1990s cycle can spring innovative ideas, technologies, and concepts of operations that can be generalized for a redesigned fleet. Perhaps the technologies of the DDG-1000 can be adapted usefully and applied in different and more-workable ways on new platforms. The same holds true for the LCS. The Navy must sift through these ashes carefully to
glean the ideas and practices it should use as the basis for a redesigned fleet. This must start as an inherently intellectual exercise, which in itself requires the institution to be capable of conducting critical self-evaluation before it takes corrective action.

Moreover, political and military leaders need to articulate clearly a set of strategic priorities that the bureaucracy and other stakeholders in the process can operationalize into weapon systems. Admiral Richardson’s call to arms that focused the Navy on overcoming its enemies in war on the high seas indeed may have a galvanizing effect, producing a shortened, more sensible innovation cycle that the bureaucracy can generalize, leading to the sought-after, redesigned, twenty-first-century fleet.

NOTES

5. As of early 2020, the Navy’s shipbuilding plans and its aspirational goals—eventually to achieve a fleet of 355 ships—appeared to be on somewhat uncertain footing. The Navy’s fiscal year (FY) 2021 budget submission cut its shipbuilding budget request by $4.1 billion, representing four fewer ships than requested in the FY20 budget. While in February 2020 Secretary of Defense Mark Esper indicated his support for growing the size of the Navy’s fleet to 355 ships, he declined to release the Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan to the House Armed Services Committee. For a summary of these developments, see Mackenzie Eaglen, “435 Ship Fleet Is the New 355 for the U.S. Navy,” RealClearDefense, 10 March 2020, realcleardefense.com/.
7. A case study focusing on the growth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy also certainly would be germane to this line of analysis.
As noted, while this article refers to these time spans as cycles, they just as easily could be defined as periods. Referring to periods as discrete elements is a common practice among researchers, used to illustrate generalizable trends. For two examples of the practice, see Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie, From Crossbow to H-bomb: The Evolution of the Weapons and Tactics of Warfare (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973), and Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009). The idea of an innovation cycle within distinctive periods also is illustrated in these works. This raises a definitional issue: What does the term innovation cycle mean? For the purposes of this article’s analysis, an innovation cycle generally mirrors the process identified in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962), which describes a cycle leading to paradigm change. An innovation cycle thus is a process through which commonly accepted assumptions are challenged successfully, resulting in new understandings of observable phenomena that are then operationalized. This article particularly focuses on the outputs of these cycles that are operationalized as equipment that is designed to improve organizational capabilities and performance. For an illustrative unpacking of the phenomenon of innovation cycles, see Henry Mintzberg and Frances Westley, “Cycles of Organizational Change,” Strategic Management Journal 13, no. 52 (Winter 1992), pp. 39–59.


12. Drawing from figures compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Peterson Foundation estimated that the United States spent $610 billion on defense in 2017, $32 billion more than the combined totals of China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan. “The United States Spends More on Defense Than the Next Seven Countries Combined,” Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 3 May 2019, pgpf.org/.


27. This is not to argue that the Navy did not envision a role for nuclear weapons in the 1950s, just that the Navy was on the losing end of the argument with the Air Force over how to share responsibility for the strategic nuclear deterrent. In the 1950s, the Navy fielded the nuclear-capable A-2 Savage medium bomber aboard its aircraft carriers. For additional details, see Jeffrey G. Barlow, *From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2009). For additional details on the bureaucratic politics of the strategic bomber program, see Michael K. Brown, *Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991). Also, preceding the Polaris program, the Navy fielded small numbers of nuclear-capable Regulus cruise missiles, with a range of three hundred miles, deployed on four submarines in 1963–64. The system was phased out as Polaris came on line.


31. This approach was a direct descendant of Robert McNamara and Alain Enthoven’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, which was introduced in the 1960s to give the civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense a way to choose between competing systems being offered by the services. See Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961–1969* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1971), and Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1960).


35. For a summary of the Navy’s plans for LCS deployment, see Megan Eckstein, “Navy May Not Deploy Any Littoral Combat Ships This Year,” *USNI News*, 11 April 2018, news.usni.org/.


41. The litany of problems is detailed in Hope Hodge Seck, ”New Details Emerge on Littoral Combat Ship Breakdowns,” Military.com, 9 December 2016.


48. Ibid.


51. McCain statement.

52. Certainly federal budget sequestration introduced in 2013 did not help in the execution of programs across the board for the military departments. For example, Navy readiness suffered from sequestration. Details provided in Michael Bayer and Gary Roughead [Adm., USN (Ret.)], Strategic Readiness Review 2017 (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Dept., 3 December 2017).

McNamara Ascendancy 1961–1965 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 2006). This episode recalled the fight between proponents of manned bombers and the pioneers of long-range missiles in the 1950s, which represents another significant case in the record of the U.S. armed forces of innovation and its opponents.


55. To be sure, there is a systemic lag in embedding technologies in weapon systems; it can take seven to ten years or more before these systems move through research, development, testing, and evaluation. Technologies envisioned at the beginning of these programs are sure to have advanced by the time fielding occurs. The phenomenon has worsened, however, as the pace of global, societal, and technological change has increased. This argument is perhaps best summarized in Thomas L. Friedman, Thank You for Being Late: An Optimist’s Guide to Thriving in the Age of Accelerations (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2016). Friedman draws on the exponential increase in computing power encapsulated in Moore’s Law to illustrate the accelerating pace of change and the difficulties humans and their organizations face in adapting quickly enough to keep pace. The relevance to the Navy is that the pace of change that Brodie discussed in Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1943) is relevant no longer; advances in technologies and their associated systems have overtaken the pattern of evolution in naval systems that Brodie illustrated.

56. Fifteen shipyards have gone out of business since the end of the Vietnam War, leaving the Navy with seven shipyards from which to source its shipbuilding needs. Details of the decline in the shipbuilding industrial base are in Chief of Naval Operations, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2019 (Washington, DC: February 2018), app. 4, pp. 16–18, available at secnav.navy.mil/.


58. McCain statement.

59. Ibid.


64. Naval aviators have made such observations to the author on numerous occasions. The lengthy strike missions of America’s war in Afghanistan were by no means new. In 1944, as part of Operation MATTERHORN, B-29 bombers under the command of the Twentieth Air Force staged from India and China to conduct bombing raids on Japan—a thousand miles away.

65. Bradley Martin and Michael McMahon, Future Aircraft Carrier Options (Santa Monica,
The study did not assess the prospect of launching unmanned systems off carriers.


67. For example, according to the World Bank, global TEU traffic increased from 224 million units in 2001 to over 750 million units by 2017. “Container Port Traffic,” World Bank, data.worldbank.org/.

The U.S.-Japan alliance is the most important bilateral relationship in the world for international peace and security, yet it operates within two very different national legal systems. For decades, the alliance between Japan and the United States has underwritten political and economic development in East Asia, generating confidence and stability that impact the global system. Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye Jr. have described Japan accurately as “the most capable U.S. ally in the most important part of the world.” Situated astride the confluence of China, North Korea, and Russia, Japan makes a greater contribution to international peace and security than any nation other than the United States. In particular, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is the most professional, advanced, and capable conventional naval partner of the U.S. Navy.

While the two states share values of dignity and human rights, individual and economic freedom, and a state system governed by the rule of law, they have different languages, cultures, and legal systems. These legal systems take distinct approaches to authorizing military operations and implementing the inherent right of self-defense under international law, and they vindicate these rights through dissimilar legal doctrines, decision-making processes, and national command authorities.

This article explores how Japan and the United States manage and pursue the authorization for employment of military forces and the conduct of operations within their respective legal systems and how the two approaches converge within the alliance structure. Further, the article compares...
how the United States and Japan develop and implement the international law of self-defense, and in particular explores how this concept is expressed within Japan’s unique and complex legal regime. While the two allies share strategic interests and an integrated vision of regional security, understanding their separate legal systems can facilitate combined operations and help the two allies work together more efficiently. Making this process more transparent helps to inform American and Japanese decision makers and operational planners, reassures neighboring states that the alliance is strong and the two states are synchronized, and thereby dissuades potential adversaries.

This article proceeds as follows. First, we examine the relationship between the United States and Japan and the bilateral defense treaty that binds them. Second, we identify the key differences between the national security laws of the two countries. While U.S. forces conduct operations at the command of the president through executive power under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, each operation the JMSDF conducts requires a specific, underlying law, since military operations are considered administrative actions by the government. Third, we explore the legal basis for self-defense in the face of armed attack, as applied within the two systems. While the U.S. president as commander in chief has a relatively simple legal basis for initiating self-defense actions, Japan must set in motion precise procedural and legislative processes before it can exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense. Finally, this article identifies how the United States and Japan lawfully may contend with threats short of war, or what Japan first termed the gray zone. While the United States responds to such challenges within the paradigm of self-defense, including unit self-defense, Japanese military action must be authorized under Japanese municipal law, not as self-defense but as a “use of weapons,” a related concept that is separate from national self-defense.

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

The two pillars of Japan’s national security policy are national self-help and collective self-defense with its treaty ally, the United States. The two approaches these pillars represent are reflected in the original and the current bilateral security treaties; the premises and purposes of the two treaties diverge widely. The first U.S.-Japan security treaty was signed on 8 September 1951 in San Francisco on the same day that Japan signed the Treaty of San Francisco (or the Treaty of Peace with Japan), which officially ended the Allied postwar occupation and returned sovereignty to Japan. Under article 1 of the 1951 security treaty, the United States accepted the responsibility to deploy armed forces to Japan to “contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan.” The treaty recognized that Japan was unable to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because of postwar disarmament. The United
States, therefore, was solely responsible for defending Japan from external threats, as well as large-scale riots or internal disturbances, which at the time potentially included action by former imperial military forces.6

**Treaty Obligations**

The second bilateral treaty was signed on 19 January 1960 by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (grandfather of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe) and U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter. This agreement is still in force. The new treaty confirmed that Japan was entitled to the right of self-defense and that the United States and Japan shared a common interest in international peace and the security of the Far East.7

This treaty is composed of ten articles that set forth three principal obligations: (1) self-help and mutual aid, (2) mutual defense, and (3) the provision of bases in Japan for U.S. forces. First, article 3 requires the parties to develop and maintain the capacity to resist armed attack, “individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, subject to their constitutional provisions.”8 This obligation originally arose from the Vandenberg Resolution, which the U.S. Congress passed in June 1948. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-MI) crafted the resolution as the United States was joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to clarify U.S. security policy. The resolution insisted on incorporation of the principle of self-help and mutual aid into the NATO agreement to prevent free riding by European allies, which would impose an excessive burden on the United States. **Self-help and mutual aid** means that “the participants must be prepared fully to carry out their obligations under the Charter [of the United Nations], resolutely to defend their liberties against attack from any source, and efficiently to develop their maximum defense potential by coordination of their military forces.” Therefore, NATO members have an obligation to develop and maintain their defense capabilities, regardless of the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The resolution was designed to save the Europeans from the moral hazard posed by free and unlimited defense provided by the United States and to insulate the United States from “open ended or unlimited commitments.”9 This sense also made its way into the U.S.-Japan agreement, and is codified in article 3 as the legal basis for Japan’s defense budget. Japan spends just over 1 percent of its gross domestic product on national defense.10

Second, the 1960 treaty commits each state to mutual defense. Article 5 recognizes that an armed attack against either party in “the territories under the administration of Japan” would endanger the security of both parties. Therefore, Japan has a legal obligation to prepare and act to counter threats to territories it governs. The geographic scope of this provision always has included outlying
Japanese territories, such as the Senkaku Islands, as “territories under the administration of Japan.” In 1996, for example, the United States stated explicitly that the bilateral security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and presumably to any other territory under the administration of Japan, such as Okinotorishima.\textsuperscript{11} Importantly, however, the treaty does not obligate Japan to exercise mutual defense to protect areas outside its territory or those under its administration.

Third, Japan has a legal obligation to provide bases in Japan for the use of American forces, and it has done so. For example, the U.S. Seventh Fleet flagship, USS Blue Ridge, is forward-deployed to Yokosuka, along with Task Force (TF) 70, an aircraft carrier strike group led by USS Ronald Reagan, and TF 76, an expeditionary strike group with warships forward-deployed to Sasebo and a headquarters element located at White Beach, Okinawa.\textsuperscript{12} Article 6 ensures that U.S. forces may use facilities and training areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.\textsuperscript{13} This provision provides the legal basis for Japan to grant U.S. forces the use of military facilities and training areas. Rules on the status of U.S. forces in Japan, such as criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed by U.S. servicemembers, fall under a separate agreement, the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{The 2015 “Guidelines”}

While the 1960 treaty sets the general terms of the relationship and bilateral obligations, more-detailed policies are contained in the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” This document has been formulated three times: in 1978, 1997, and 2015. The latest iteration emphasizes five areas of cooperation: (1) seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; (2) synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; (3) a whole-of-government alliance that leverages interagency coordination; (4) cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and (5) recognition of the global nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which produces security benefits that reverberate worldwide. These guidelines were written to be consistent with each nation’s constitution and national laws, as well as international law.\textsuperscript{15}

The guidelines are not legally binding, but they contain policy on alliance coordination mechanisms, bilateral planning for contingencies, ballistic-missile defense, cooperation abroad, and cooperation on outer space and cyberspace. The document is critical for shaping Japan’s laws concerning defense cooperation, because it includes some specific goals that are impossible to achieve without progressive legislation. For example, the 2015 iteration states that “the [Japan] Self-Defense Forces [JSDF] and the U.S. Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan . . . including during training and exercises.”\textsuperscript{16} In response to this
mandate, Japan reformulated the legal basis for the JSDF to protect U.S. weapons and assets in peacetime, a function that earlier laws did not cover.\textsuperscript{17}

**PARALLEL APPROACHES TO NATIONAL SECURITY LAW**

There are fundamental differences between the American and Japanese approaches to national defense. While the operations of the U.S. armed forces emanate from the executive power in the form of an execute order (EXORD) issued by the Secretary of Defense, the operations of the JSDF flow from the government’s administrative actions. For this reason, U.S. military operations are implemented flexibly, whereas JSDF operations require specific statutory authorization.

*The President’s War Powers*

In the United States, the president exercises the “vast share of responsibility” for the conduct of foreign relations and national security.\textsuperscript{18} Article II, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution states as follows: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” The president also is designated by Section 2 as commander in chief of the Army and the Navy. These powers allow the president “to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command.”\textsuperscript{19} This remit includes the authority to direct U.S. military forces in engagements necessary to advance American national interests abroad.\textsuperscript{20} Even in the absence of specific prior congressional approval, the president’s power to employ military force abroad derives from his constitutional responsibility as commander in chief.

This authority is confirmed by long-standing practice.\textsuperscript{21} In defending the authority of President George Washington, for example, to issue the 1793 Neutrality Proclamation during the French Revolution, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the president’s “executive power” in Article II of the Constitution and his duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” included the power unilaterally to proclaim neutrality in armed conflict.\textsuperscript{22} This custom was followed by his contemporaries—Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe—and more-recent American leaders have expanded presidential powers even further.

It was when President John Adams was criticized for extraditing Thomas Nash, alias Jonathan Robbins, to Great Britain (to stand trial for a murder committed on a British ship) that John Marshall as a member of the House of Representatives in 1800 argued that the president had the authority to do so because he was the “sole organ” of the nation in foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{23} In 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court repeated this characterization of presidential power in *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*\textsuperscript{24} In that case, the court ruled that the president has plenary powers in foreign affairs, which has led to the axiom “Curtiss Wright and the president is always right!” The president’s virtually unlimited authority in foreign
affairs became an article of faith, with Senator J. William Fulbright stating in 1961 that it was “clear and unalterable” that the president enjoyed “pre-eminent responsibility” in managing U.S. foreign relations. Contemporary presidents have continued to hew to this position. In October 2016, for example, President Barack Obama used his constitutional authority to direct U.S. military strikes against radar facilities in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. Likewise, in April 2018 President Donald Trump ordered U.S. forces to attack chemical weapons sites in Syria, without congressional approval. Trump followed up with a strike in Baghdad on 3 January 2020 that killed Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Efforts by Congress to limit presidential powers have been controversial. The War Powers Act, passed—over President Richard Nixon’s veto—on 7 November 1973, states that the president, as commander in chief, possesses constitutional powers to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities or into situations where hostilities are imminent, but only pursuant to one of three conditions: (1) a declaration of war by the U.S. Congress; (2) specific statutory authorization by the U.S. Congress; or (3) a national emergency created by an attack on the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. The act requires the president to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. armed forces into hostilities, and to report such military intervention within forty-eight hours to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. The president also is required to terminate any employment of the armed forces within sixty days after the report unless the operations are validated through congressional authorization. All U.S. presidents, however, have rejected as unconstitutional this and other attempted congressional limitations on their freedom of action, and the War Powers Act remains contentious. In recent years, the Supreme Court has appeared to defer to the executive power of the president, placing “significant weight” on a division of authority weighted toward the president. Throughout the debates over presidential power, Congress has acquiesced, and the president continues to act unilaterally.

The Diet’s Use-of-Force Powers
The Japanese system is more complicated. While the legal basis for U.S. military operations derives from the executive power of the president, the JSDF may act only pursuant to authorization by the national Diet, Japan’s bicameral legislature. It is unlawful for the prime minister to order a deployment of the JSDF without a specific authorizing law. This arrangement reflects the war-renunciation clause of the constitution (article 9), which reads as follows: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
“In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

The Japanese government interprets article 9 as banning the maintenance of armed forces whose purpose is to threaten or use force as a means of settling international disputes, but preserving the nation’s inherent right of self-defense. It is constitutional for Japan to maintain the JSDF, to the minimum extent required to ensure self-defense. Because the constitution does not permit maintaining armed forces and a war potential, it does not specify or provide for command and control (C2) of operations of the armed forces. There is no executive power or authority analogous to that of the commander in chief, so C2 functions are based on article 72 of the constitution, which states that the prime minister represents the cabinet and submits bills to the Diet for the “exercise of control and supervision over various administrative branches.” Consequently, C2 of the JSDF is conducted through administrative orders to a general administrative branch, on the basis of existing laws. In sum, this unique constitutional framework means that Japan must contend with any armed attack, or the threat of an armed attack, through the nation’s emergency-management apparatus and administrative control process. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Japanese constitution does not confer executive power on a single political leader.

NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE IN RESPONSE TO ARMED ATTACK

Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations. The inherent right of individual and collective self-defense is reflected in article 51, and may be invoked “if armed attack occurs.” The meaning of armed attack as a matter of international law is debatable. In the 1980s-era case between Nicaragua and the United States (referred to as the Paramilitary Activities Case), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) distinguished the most grave forms of the use of force from other, less grave forms. Only the former constitute an armed attack and therefore are subject to action in self-defense. Consequently, the ICJ and most scholars suggest there lies a gap between an unlawful use of force in article 2(4) and the right of self-defense against an armed attack in article 51. On the basis of the Paramilitary Activities decision, Japan believes that the gap theory accurately describes the test for the lawful exercise of self-defense in international law. The United States, in contrast, has rejected the idea of a gap, and reserves the right to use force in self-defense even against less grave forms of aggression. In the American view, the United States may respond with force against a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent if it believes it constitutes an armed attack.
In addition to the difference of interpretation of an armed attack, there is a difference between Japan and the United States in the process that triggers the right of self-defense. While the U.S. president can deploy and tactically maneuver U.S. armed forces through an EXORD issued by the Secretary of Defense at any time before, during, or after a crisis or armed attack, Japan must obtain a cabinet decision and Diet approval to conduct such operations.

The U.S. AUMF and Executive Orders
The United States recognizes three circumstances in which states may employ military force in international politics. First, states may use force pursuant to the authority of the UN Security Council, acting under the authority of chapter VII of the UN Charter. Second, force may be used in self-defense, in accordance with article 51; but again, the United States takes a rather elastic view that most states do not share. And third, force may be used with the consent of the territorial state in which force is exercised, such as when a state requests assistance in suppressing a rebellion. Regardless of which basis is invoked, for the United States the use of force overseas must satisfy at least one of two legal conditions: congressional approval of the use of force, typically through an authorization for use of military force (AUMF); or presidential action under his own authority.

An example of the first case occurred when, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed an AUMF that authorized the president to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against nations and terrorist organizations that had conducted the attacks and those who aided them in doing so or harbored them. Presidents Obama and Trump relied on this AUMF as the legal basis for conducting military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and in East Africa and Libya. In the second case, the president may use force unilaterally, regardless of authorization from Congress, pursuant to his power as commander in chief. Examples include the bombing in Libya (1986); the intervention in Panama (1989); troop deployments to Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1995), and Haiti (twice, 1994 and 2004); air patrols and air strikes in Bosnia (1993–95); and a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia (1999). In short, the United States relies on presidential action, albeit sometimes in parallel with specific congressional authorization. Congress has attempted to limit this second type of military operations under the aforementioned War Powers Act.

Japan’s Three Principles and Three Situations
Because of its constitution, Japan operates within a restrictive national defense policy. Generally, force may be employed only in the event of an armed attack—as the Nicaragua decision has shaped that term—and then using only the minimum force necessary. The United States, in contrast, holds that it may use force to repel all illegal threats to the nation or U.S. forces. Importantly, Japan defines armed
attack strictly as the “organized and premeditated use of force against Japan.” The criteria “organized” and “premeditated” are not perfunctory and must be satisfied; sporadic and occasional combat or accidental or unauthorized action by foreign armed forces may not always constitute armed attack, in the Japanese view. Japan must assess whether an attacker had a clear intention to attack before it makes a determination that the aggressor actually conducted an armed attack. Consequently, Japan maintains only limited military capabilities necessary for minimum self-defense.

Three principles clarify the meaning of minimum self-defense in Japan. First, a minimum level of force may be used in self-defense to resist an armed attack against Japan once it occurs, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger that might fundamentally overturn the Japanese people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The principle that Japan can use force in self-defense in the face of an armed attack against a “country in a close relationship with Japan” clearly references the United States. Second, a minimum level of force may be employed in self-defense when there is no other appropriate means available to repel an attack and such force is necessary to ensure the survival of the nation of Japan and protect its people. Third, when force is used it must be the minimum necessary to defend Japan or another country in a close relationship with Japan.

The JSDF will use force for self-defense when an armed attack against Japan occurs, but Japan may exercise the right of self-defense only in special or designated situations, and with the approval of the Diet. The three types of situations, or specific scenarios, are (1) an anticipated armed-attack situation; (2) an armed-attack situation; and (3) a survival-threatening situation. There is no lawful basis for the JSDF to mobilize and use force unless the Diet declares one of these situations to exist.

**Anticipated Armed-Attack Situation.** Japan lawfully may deploy JSDF units when an armed attack has yet to occur but threatening circumstances are alarming and a future armed attack is anticipated. Although in this circumstance an attack is said to be anticipated, that term differs from the idea in the international law of jus ad bellum that states may use force in “anticipatory self-defense” to strike against a gathering threat. The theory of anticipatory self-defense is based on the response of a state facing a threat, when the aggressor has taken concrete steps toward the initiation of an attack, thereby justifying the exercise of the right of self-defense on the part of the defending state. By contrast, in the case of anticipated armed-attack situations, armed aggression is expected, but the aggressor has not taken any tangible steps toward conducting an attack. The government of
Japan determines the existence of an *anticipated armed-attack situation* through a cabinet decision, with approval by the Diet.\(^{53}\)

In such a case, the JSDF can redeploy self-defense forces to new locations and order them to execute duties as a legal obligation to ready the force to act immediately should an armed attack occur.\(^{54}\) Under this legal authority, the JSDF also may construct facilities for operations in the planned area to prepare to counter an attack, and it may provide logistics support for U.S. armed forces that would be responding to the armed attack, in accordance with the current U.S.-Japan security treaty. Examples of support the JSDF may provide to U.S. forces include supplies; transportation; communications; military repair, depot, and maintenance facilities; medical services; construction and operation of seaports and airports; and access to military bases for accommodations, storage, facilities, and training.\(^{55}\) The JSDF even may supply ammunition to U.S. forces, but it cannot deliver missiles, mines, torpedoes, nuclear warheads, chaff, or chemical weapons.\(^{56}\) Under this scenario, the JSDF also may recall reserve personnel to active duty.\(^{57}\)

**Armed-Attack Situation.** In this second situation a foreign power has conducted an armed attack against Japan or there is an imminent danger of such an attack. Assessment of this situation is performed ad hoc. The government then promulgates what is called a “basic response plan,” which requires a cabinet decision and Diet approval.\(^{58}\) After such approval, the prime minister may order the JSDF to conduct a *defense operation,* which may include the use of force.\(^{59}\) Under article 88 of the JSDF law, in this situation the JSDF may employ “necessary force to defend [the] country.” Although Diet determination of the basic response plan—which includes recognition of the existence of an armed-attack situation and the intended response to it—normally is a precondition for the use of force, in an emergency the prime minister can ask for Diet approval after the operation already has been ordered.\(^{60}\)

Under the order of a defense operation, the JSDF acquires additional authorities besides the use of force. For example, the minister of defense can exercise C2 of Japan Coast Guard (JCG) forces as part of the national response. The JSDF can requisition hospitals, vehicle maintenance facilities, shipyards, and port facilities, and even may seize private property and homes.\(^{61}\) Further, to prevent a neutral state’s vessels from transporting foreign military supplies (limited war contraband, such as weapons or ammunition) toward enemy states in an area where an armed attack against Japan is occurring, the JSDF can conduct naval operations to control and interdict international shipping, including directing foreign-flagged vessels into port for inspection.\(^{62}\) Such an operation is distinct from the peacetime right of approach and visit.\(^{63}\) It also is somewhat different from the
belligerent right of visit and search during time of war, since an inspection team conducting a boarding during a defense operation is not authorized to destroy a ship carrying contraband goods.\textsuperscript{64}

**Survival-Threatening Situation for Collective Self-defense.** This third scenario involves collective self-defense, of a sort.\textsuperscript{65} From the institution of the first bilateral security treaty until 2015, Japan held the position that the bar for exercise of the right of collective self-defense is higher than the threshold for the minimum exercise of self-defense. The latter is permitted by the constitution, whereas Japan possesses the right of collective self-defense as a matter of international law.\textsuperscript{66} On 19 September 2015, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party passed new legislation that reinterpreted the Japanese constitution to permit certain carefully prescribed operations for collective self-defense. The new law entered into force on 29 March 2016.

A survival-threatening situation for collective self-defense exists after an armed attack occurs against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan, and as a result Japan’s survival is threatened. While the Japanese government has not clarified the specific application of this provision, generally this concept envisions an attack against the United States or U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{67} Such an attack would be regarded as posing a clear danger to Japan, with the potential fundamentally to overturn the rights of the Japanese people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This new approach was explained in a cabinet decision as follows:

\begin{quote}
[A]s a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, the Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn in a fundamental way people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

The cabinet must certify that these conditions exist and gain Diet approval to formulate a basic response plan.\textsuperscript{69} Unlike emergency circumstances that give rise to the **armed-attack situation**, the cabinet decision and Diet approval for the **survival-threatening situation** of collective self-defense may not be made after the assessment; however, the prime minister may order a defense operation, under which the JSDF can exercise the use of force.\textsuperscript{70} This approach reflects the right of collective self-defense in international law.\textsuperscript{71} In Japan’s case, however, the JSDF’s
exercise of collective self-defense is limited to situations in which Japan’s survival is threatened, and the sole purpose is to protect Japan. More broadly, even though collective self-defense is recognized as a principle of international law, Japan cannot exercise its full scale or scope because of its constitutional limitations. For example, although the Gulf War was conducted under the auspices of the UN Security Council as a lawful operation in collective self-defense, Japan could not participate in large-scale air strikes or take actions against enemy forces, because such engagement in hostilities would have been deemed unconstitutional, since the operations did not bear directly on the survival of Japan.

**TACTICAL SITUATIONS SHORT OF WAR**

Japanese law does not provide authority to act in tactical situations short of war. Yoram Dinstein refers to operations short of war as tactical, small-scale, armed attacks in situ, and the employment of counterforce in defense. For the United States, such situations may exist even when there is neither a specific AUMF nor an executive order authorizing actions in response to small-scale armed attack; the president acts pursuant to his powers as commander in chief. Under such circumstances, while U.S. forces confronting these limited attacks may exercise individual or unit self-defense, the JSDF responds in accordance with laws that permit the use of weapons, since none of the three situations discussed previously provides authority to act in such scenarios. The statutes that authorize use of weapons are law-enforcement statutes; they include the Law for Protection of SDF’s Weapons and Other Equipment, the Law for Protection of the Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Countries, and the Law for Guarding Facilities.

First we will describe the U.S. approach, then contrast it with that of Japan. The U.S. system is simpler and more flexible than Japan’s.

**U.S. Rules of Engagement for Unit Self-defense**

The U.S. decision-making system employs a flexible approach to responding to low-level attacks. American commanders have a right—indeed, an obligation—to protect their units from any threats by exercising unit self-defense. The U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement, for example, states as follows:

Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless a unit commander directs otherwise, as detailed below, military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When individuals are assigned and acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense should be considered a subset of unit self-defense. As such, unit commanders may limit individual self-defense by members of their unit. Both unit and individual self-defense include defense of other U.S. military forces in the vicinity.
The exercise of unit self-defense is deemed an expression of the inherent right of national self-defense, as recognized by article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law. Consequently, unit self-defense is derived from customary international law, and it may be extended to protect units and individuals from other nations, which then would be authorized by the applicable rules of engagement (ROEs).

**Law Enforcement and the Use of Weapons by Japan**

In contrast to U.S. practice, the Japanese response applies a law-enforcement approach in all situations short of war. The same cautionary rules for the use of force apply as when responding to the actions of common felons, and other criminal matters. Even though it is the JSDF conducting operations, the legal basis for doing so lies in law enforcement, not national self-defense. This is so mainly owing to Japan's strict definition of *armed attack* and the country's strict procedures for authorizing the use of force. Japan refers to these law-enforcement acts as the *use of weapons*, to distinguish them from the *use of force* under the exercise of the right of self-defense. Since the use of weapons in these situations is deemed to be merely acts of law enforcement, Diet approval is not required. The JSDF has authority to use weapons under this law-enforcement paradigm in three specific situations, as detailed below.

**Protecting JSDF Weapons and Equipment.** While the JSDF cannot use force except when the prime minister issues a defense operation order on the basis of the existence of certain situations, under certain other conditions it actually may employ weapons to protect JSDF property, including weapons and munitions, ships and aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment, and fuel. Members of the JSDF who are specifically on duty to protect these assets may use weapons to the extent reasonably necessary, in accordance with the requirement of proportionality, under the right of individual self-defense. The situation requires that it be impossible to protect the weapons by other means, such as withdrawal. In Japan’s system, such a use of weapons is different from the exercise of self-defense under international law or unit self-defense in the U.S. conception.

The penal code authorizes the exercise of “individual self-defense” and “aversion of a present danger” in cases involving the use of weapons to protect weapons in urgent situations. The JSDF’s right to use weapons ceases if the objects whose protection is intended are destroyed completely or the attackers abort the attack and break off contact. That is, the right to use weapons is a rather narrowly construed law-enforcement measure; for instance, it does not even permit pursuit of the attackers. In national self-defense and unit self-defense, defensive action may continue until the threat has disappeared completely, even after the attack is interrupted and the aggressors begin to flee. In the case of a use of weapons, however, defensive rights must be proportional to the threat, narrowly...
circumscribed to the immediate zone of attack, and include only limited rights of protection.

**Japan’s Use of Weapons to Protect U.S. and Other Foreign Assets.** To protect foreign weapons, equipment, or other assets, the JSDF required additional legal authority. Section 2 of article 95 of the JSDF law authorizes the use of weapons to protect U.S. and other foreign armed forces’ weapons and other assets if they actually are engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the JSDF, including peacetime activities such as joint exercises and training. The use of weapons is authorized only in situations in which reasonable grounds for action exist, and only to the extent reasonably necessary. Importantly, this protection is provided during routine peacetime operations and does not require the Diet to issue a specific national defense authorization on the basis of one of the aforementioned situations.

To distinguish the use of weapons from the use of force by other countries, the JSDF will not conduct this protection in an area of hostilities. Therefore, Japan does not regard this protection as either a use of force or an act of collective self-defense against an armed attack. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except in a case of individual self-defense or “averting present danger.”

Furthermore, this option may be exercised only after the JSDF receives a request from U.S. or other foreign armed forces.

**Use of Weapons to Guard Facilities.** Military facilities may be protected by yet a third type of authority for the use of weapons. While every ministry has the administrative right to operate facilities and guard its installations, this authority by itself does not permit the use of lethal weapons to protect them. The JSDF, however, has additional legal authorization, under the statute on guarding facilities, to use weapons to protect its installations.

This law applies only to JSDF facilities in Japan and persons in those facilities, including personnel who are not members of the JSDF, and does not apply to JSDF members outside these facilities. The JSDF personnel assigned to guard or patrol duties on these installations may use weapons when reasonable grounds exist to protect themselves or others, and to the extent reasonably necessary. This law provides law-enforcement authority, and the use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons except for the two exceptions specified in the penal code (self-defense and averting present danger). Likewise, the JSDF must cease its use of weapons if the attackers halt the attack and withdraw.

**FILLING GAPS IN JAPANESE LAW**

While U.S. forces operate flexibly—by executive order, and without considering gaps between the gravest forms of the use of force and other, less grave
forms—Japan requires specific laws that direct the JSDF to conduct operations in response to threats that constitute the gravest forms of the use of force (i.e., armed attack). Japan then is permitted to respond under the right of national self-defense.

Owing to the stricter definition of *armed attack* in Japan, however, the country must consider whether an attack is organized and reflects the belligerent intention of an aggressor state or quasi state (e.g., Hezbollah) to qualify as an armed attack. This threshold is high, and the JSDF may act only under specific laws discussed in the preceding “Tactical Situations Short of War” section on the use of weapons to respond to threats that lie below the threshold of armed attack. This section explores the JSDF laws enacted to fill these gaps in the use-of-force architecture, including maritime-security operations (MSOs) and destruction measures against inbound ballistic missiles.

**Maritime Security Operations in Response to Gray-Zone Challenges**

In peacetime, the JCG is responsible for confronting ships that violate Japanese law in the territorial waters of Japan; the JMSDF does not have such authority. However, if the challenge overwhelms the capabilities of the JCG, the JMSDF may respond under provisions providing for the ordering of an MSO. 84

The JMSDF has authority to conduct MSOs, with this authority deriving from the Coast Guard Law, so the exercise of this authority is deemed to be necessary for law enforcement. 85 Applicable sections of the statute include article 16 (request of cooperation for citizen and ship), article 17 (query, order to submit documents, order to stop ship, and ship visit), and article 18 (measures of displacement, expulsion, takedown, and stopping a vessel). There are three types of MSOs: operations against merchant shipping, operations against foreign warships that have sovereign immunity from Japan’s jurisdiction, and operations against submerged submarines. For example, in November 2004, the JMSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating in Japanese territorial waters near the Sakishima Islands. In response, an MSO order was issued and JMSDF warships and aircraft tracked the submarine until it left the territorial sea. 86

During MSOs of the first type, the JMSDF may take measures against civilian merchant ships to determine whether they are violating Japan’s domestic law, in three circumstances. First, the JMSDF may confirm a violation, at which point it hands the merchant ship off to the JCG, which has judicial authority to investigate and charge suspected criminals. Second, even if a ship has not violated the law, the JMSDF may expel it from Japan’s territorial waters if the vessel is believed to pose a threat to or contribute to a deterioration of public order in the territorial sea. 87 Third, the JMSDF may use weapons against civilian ships if necessary
for unit self-defense and to overcome resistance, but the use of these weapons to harm people is limited to “averting present danger.”

In the three circumstances discussed above, the use of weapons is limited to that extent reasonably necessary in the circumstances. Weapons may be used, for example, if a foreign ship ignores an order to stop or attempts to resist the JMSDF. In such a scenario, the minister of defense must certify that the following four conditions are met: (1) An alleged civilian ship is a foreign-flagged vessel, is conducting noninnocent passage in Japan’s territorial sea, and has no justification for its actions. (2) If the ship is left unchallenged, it is highly likely the harmful conduct will be repeated in the future. (3) There is a suspicion that the presence of the ship is in preparation for conducting some “serious and heinous” (felony) crime. (4) It is impossible to prevent these criminal acts simply by obtaining information from, stopping, and visiting the suspect ship. In addition to the defense minister’s certification, there is an additional condition: (5) The commanding officer of the JMSDF warship must believe there is no alternative to firing at the ship to stop it.

In the second type of MSO, the procedures may be used against a foreign warship that is in the territorial sea but not conducting innocent passage. This application of authority is different from that used against a civilian ship, because a warship has sovereign immunity from foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, the JMSDF may not use force to compel compliance on the part of the foreign warship but instead must request that it comply, requiring it to leave the territorial sea. In such a case, Japan operates in accordance with article 30 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which requires foreign warships not in innocent passage to “leave the territorial sea immediately.”

In the third type of MSO, submerged submarines operating in Japan’s territorial sea are in violation of innocent passage and pose yet another scenario that requires countermeasures. Under UNCLOS, a foreign submarine in the territorial sea is required to transit on the surface and show its flag. The JCG is not equipped to respond to the threat of submerged submarines, so the JMSDF may conduct MSOs in such circumstances. Although MSOs normally require a cabinet decision and the approval of the prime minister, these formalities are dispensed with in the case of a submerged submarine; the prime minister may approve this type of MSO without awaiting a decision of the cabinet. The JMSDF may track and report underwater contacts until the prime minister issues an MSO, which authorizes the JMSDF to request any submerged submarine to surface. Even if the submarine continues to navigate submerged in the territorial sea, force (the use of weapons) may not be employed to repel it until an MSO is issued.
Ballistic-Missile Defense

Japan and the United States also differ in how they approach authority to conduct ballistic-missile-defense operations. The U.S. president has authority to respond to and destroy inbound ballistic missiles that threaten the United States. In Japan, the JSDF can use force in such a scenario only after the Diet makes the determination of an armed-attack situation or survival-threatening situation and the prime minister initiates an order for the JSDF to commence defense operations. If a ballistic missile is launched against Japan under this situation, the JSDF has authority to intercept it in flight; however, the elapsed time between the launch of a missile by North Korea and its impact on Japan might be just four minutes, so requiring the procedures discussed above would not be practical. North Korea often has launched ballistic missiles under the guise of placing a satellite into orbit. Given the ambiguity involved in each such launch, Japan's government has no time to approve the determination of an armed-attack situation or survival-threatening situation, or to deem that the launch constitutes the gravest form of the use of force, or to interpret the action as an armed attack, any of which could trigger the national right of self-defense.

To address this dilemma, the Japanese government enacted the Law Concerning Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles to provide separate legal subauthority to counter the threat of ballistic missiles. This law applies when the intention of the nation launching a rocket into outer space is unknown, the timing of the launch is unknown, and the object to be launched into space is not known but may be harmful if it strikes Japan. Under the category of “destruction measures against ballistic missiles,” the JSDF may use advanced weapons for ballistic-missile defense, including the Standard Missile–3s installed on JMSDF Aegis destroyers and ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability–3s. These measures constitute another form of the use of weapons and not the use of force. Ironically, this means that Japan uses what is essentially a law-enforcement authority to respond to time-critical threats from ballistic missiles, rockets for artificial satellites, and other objects in flight (except aircraft) flying toward Japan that may cause serious damage to citizens and properties. Importantly, this law targets only missiles incoming to Japanese territory; it does not cover the interception of ballistic missiles bound for the United States or other countries. While this authority might be used to counter inbound hypersonic glide vehicles, antiballistic-missile technology may be ineffective against them.

Public-Security Operations

In the United States, the National Guard of each state may respond to a collapse of public order or security that police forces cannot handle. In contrast, the Posse Comitatus Act restricts the U.S. Army from engaging in law enforcement within
the United States. But since Japan does not possess a National Guard or an equivalent militia force, the JSDF would respond in such situations.

In Japan, there are two legal bases for the JSDF to conduct operations to secure the public safety. The prime minister, with the consent of the Diet, may order a public-security operation when it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by law enforcement alone, including because of indirect aggression, such as an insurgency. The prime minister also may order a public-security operation if a prefectural governor requests such, to maintain the peace in serious situations. In both cases, the JSDF is authorized to exercise police functions and use weapons to prevent, control, and quell riots and to guard high-priority officials, without the necessity to consider questions of self-defense under article 36 or averting present danger under article 37 of the Penal Code, which are beyond the purview of the policy.

JAPAN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE

While historically the maintenance of international peace, more generally considered, was beyond the purview of the U.S.-Japan alliance, in recent years Japan has taken steps to contribute more fully to global society. Section V.B. of the 2015 “Guidelines” sets forth the global importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the need for greater cooperation with regional and other partners. After the 2015 version of “Guidelines” was adopted, Japan enacted several laws to authorize the JSDF to conduct operations related, and contributing more broadly, to the maintenance of international peace and security.

For these purposes, three statutory bases exist. First, Japan may conduct operations to support U.S. forces and those of other foreign countries. Second, the JSDF may initiate maritime operations to enforce UN Security Council sanctions effectively. Third, the JSDF may engage in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). When operating under one of these three authorities, the JSDF may be required to comply with special limitations imposed on its operations. To facilitate interoperability, it is imperative for U.S. forces and other partner nations operating with the JSDF to understand the scope of those limitations.

Situations That Influence Japan’s Peace and Security

In limited situations, Japan may support U.S. forces engaged in operations aimed at containing or unwinding local or regional conflicts. Japan’s constitution allows the JSDF to operate to promote peace in Japan, so the supported operations must have some nexus to Japan’s security. In these operations, the JSDF is permitted to act in situations or scenarios deemed to have an “important influence on Japan’s peace and security” but that fall below the threshold of an armed-attack situation in national self-defense or a survival-threatening situation under collective self-defense. The law defines “situations that influence
Japan’s peace and security” as those that, if left unattended, could result in a direct armed attack on Japan, with important consequences for Japan’s peace and security. In such situations, the JSDF can support U.S. and other foreign armed forces engaged in operations that contribute to the objectives of the bilateral security treaty and promote the goals of the UN Charter. Importantly, there is no geographic limitation to this authority, so Japan could decide that a situation that occurred outside the region could influence Japan’s peace and security, such as a NATO contingency in Europe. The Diet must approve a finding in advance that this type of situation exists, although ex post facto approval is allowed in an emergency.103

The law to authorize operations in response to “situations that influence Japan’s peace and security” covers provision of military logistics, search-and-rescue (SAR) capabilities, ship-inspection operations, and other necessary measures. Japan differentiates ship-inspection operations from maritime-interception operations, as discussed in the next section. The JSDF also may provide supplies; repair and maintenance services; communications; medical services; airport, seaport, and other transportation services; base activities (lodging, storage, and military use of facilities); and training services. While the provision of weapons is not included within the scope of this authority, the supplying of combat-related ammunition and the refueling and maintenance of aircraft are included. These measures may be undertaken in other countries, with the consent of the foreign states involved.104

Ship-Inspection Operations
In an armed-conflict situation, the JMSDF may conduct the belligerent right of visit and search to determine the character of ships and cargo, locate contraband, and identify potential military targets. Such operations are conducted pursuant to Japan’s right to use force in national self-defense. In such cases, Japan also may regulate neutral shipping.105

The belligerent right of visit and search during armed conflict at sea is distinguished from peacetime ship-inspection operations (SIOs), which may be conducted to secure effective compliance with economic sanctions. The JMSDF may conduct an SIO under the domestic legal authority of an important influence situation, pursuant to the International Peace Support Act and to enforcing UN Security Council resolutions, or through obtaining the consent of the flag state.106

Compared with SIOs, maritime-interception operations (MIOs) encompass a broader range of activities at sea, including querying the master of a vessel; ordering it to stop; boarding, inspecting, and searching it; and even seizing the vessel and cargo. In addition to exercising its belligerent rights under the law of naval warfare, Japan may conduct MIOs pursuant to flag-state and master’s consent, as
enforcement measures against stateless vessels, when exercising the right of self-defense, and as a condition of port entry. MIOs also may be used to enforce Security Council mandates, including diversion into port for inspection, while SIOs are limited to requesting a change of destination. While in an MIO the firing of warning shots is permitted as a communications signal to a noncompliant vessel, in an SIO warning shots are not permitted. Because MIOs and SIOs are so different, the separate geographic areas in which they apply are specified.

Peacekeeping Operations
Japan has considered deploying JSDF units in support of PKOs to signify that the country has shouldered the role of responsible stakeholder in the community of nations. The JSDF may conduct international peace-cooperation activities not directly related to Japan's security under two laws: the International Peace Cooperation Act (IPCA) and the International Peace Support Act (IPSA). Both require Diet approval, in two-year increments.

The IPCA provides the legal basis for the JSDF to contribute to UN PKOs, international humanitarian-relief operations, and international election observations. When such JSDF deployments are made, they are subject to five conditions: (1) The JSDF will not participate unless an agreement on a cease-fire has been reached among the parties to an armed conflict. (2–3) Consent for the conduct of UN PKOs, as well as Japan's participation in such operations, shall have been obtained from the host country and the parties to the conflict. (4) The operations shall maintain strict impartiality and not favor any of the parties in the conflict. (5) The International Peace Cooperation Corps of Japan may suspend operations if these rules are not followed.

IPCA operations must be based on resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council; or requested by UN organs established by the General Assembly or specialized agencies, funds, and programs, such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; or otherwise specified by an order from the cabinet, regional organizations as prescribed in article 52 of the UN Charter, or organs established by multilateral treaties. The missions must be undertaken at the request of the countries in the area in which they are conducted.

JSDF personnel who are engaged in duties under the IPCA may use their weapons to the extent considered necessary and proper in light of the situation. This standard is determined according to the following formula:

1. When there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means other than the use of weapons will protect against physical harm or death of (a) themselves (the JSDF personnel in question); (b) other JSDF personnel operating with them; or (c) personnel of Japan's International Peace
Cooperation Corps working in the line of duty or who have come under the protection of JSDF personnel

2. When there are attacks against JSDF personnel jointly stationed with foreign personnel, such as foreign armed forces’ units, and there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together

3. With regard to JSDF personnel engaged in so-called safety-ensuring operations and JSDF personnel engaged in *kaketsuke-keigo* operations (the protection of individuals in response to an urgent request), when there are reasonable grounds for determining that there exist no appropriate means of overcoming such situations except for the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies, or assets or those of other individuals, or to eliminate actions that obstruct their duties \(^{113}\)

The use of weapons under the IPCA shall not cause harm to persons except for cases falling under article 36 (individual self-defense) or article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code of Japan.

The IPSA provides a second legal basis for the JSDF to participate in international-cooperation activities. \(^{114}\) While the IPCA covers PKOs, the IPSA covers logistics support, SAR activities, and SIOs. These operations may be conducted in accordance with resolutions of the UN General Assembly or Security Council. Since such operations, as conducted by the JSDF, do not constitute an exercise of the right of collective self-defense, deployed units must avoid integration with the operations of the armed forces of foreign states during this type of mission. \(^{115}\) Therefore, the JSDF does not conduct such support activities in combat zones.

Use of weapons under the IPSA is more limited than under the rules set forth in the IPCA. While the rules for the use of weapons are similar under the two statutes, under the IPSA safety-ensuring operations and *kaketsuke-keigo* are not authorized. In the event of an attack within a military installation or camp, JSDF personnel may use weapons when there are no alternative locations within the vicinity to ensure the safety of JSDF units and other personnel. As with the IPCA, the use of weapons pursuant to the IPSA shall not cause harm to persons except for cases falling under article 36 (individual self-defense) or article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code of Japan.

The bilateral U.S.-Japan security partnership is the most important alliance in the most important part of the world. It upholds the values that undergird international peace and stability in East Asia. The two powerful democracies, however, operate within distinct national legal systems and their interpretations
of international law sometimes differ. The U.S. Constitution affords the president virtually unlimited authority to respond to foreign threats, deploy forces, and use force to defend U.S. interests, whereas the prime minister of Japan typically must seek a specific legal basis for every JSDF action. The Japanese approach requires time to coordinate the action with the Diet and gain the approval of key lawmakers, which opens a vulnerability that an adversary might exploit during a time of crisis. While Japan may exercise the right of collective self-defense in limited situations—when faced with existential threats to its security—not first going through the Diet, the American approach is much less restrictive.

Compared with the United States, Japan defines armed attack and use of force more strictly. It allows the JSDF to use force, but in narrowly prescribed situations, and then only after adhering to strict intergovernmental processes. Japan also recognizes a gap between an armed attack and the right of self-defense in international law, while the United States does not. The United States, therefore, may resort to the use of force against a hostile act or even a demonstration of hostile intent. These differences in interpretations of international law and constitutional structures have produced distinct legislation and authority for the JSDF and U.S. armed forces.

The current security environment is most likely to highlight these differences in three situations. First, the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance is changing from one focused purely on defense of Japan toward an alliance that contributes more broadly to international peace and security in East Asia. The 2015 U.S.-Japan Guidelines, for example, have embraced this broader vision and make it clear that the alliance is important for regional security and the protection of the global commons. Because of this shift, the JSDF will be required to conduct combined operations with U.S. forces in a manner not contemplated in the 1950s or ‘60s. On such occasions, the two countries’ distinct interpretations of international law and their different ROEs will have to be integrated into operational force planning.

Second, the United States and Japan are encountering gray-zone challenges that add an additional layer of complexity, as they fall between clearly articulated legal doctrines of peacetime law enforcement and the use of force during armed conflict. For Japan, Chinese encroachment on the Senkaku Islands is the greatest among these threats. With regard to Japan’s legal system, the concept of the gray zone encompasses scenarios that arise before the Diet makes the determination of an armed-attack situation, which means the JSDF cannot use force in national self-defense; instead, Japan must respond to such situations by applying law-enforcement rules on the use of force, which include restriction of the use of force to that necessary and reasonable under the circumstances, and only as a last resort.
The United States and Japan will act jointly in a global commons that is threatened by states’ use of advanced technology to weaken the bilateral alliance. Threats in the cyber domain and outer space can keep the two allies off balance and confused, while the conventional land, air, and sea domains are affected by disruptive new methods and means of war that upset traditional legal paradigms, such as unmanned systems and artificial intelligence. While states and scholars grapple with these emerging threats through efforts such as the Tallinn Manual in cyberspace and the forthcoming Woomera Manual in outer space, the JSDF and U.S. armed forces can gain an edge by ensuring greater interoperability and synchronizing their understanding of the law of naval operations. The revision of the San Remo Manual also is indicative of emerging threats, such as autonomous, distributed naval forces, and the Japan Maritime Command and Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College have aligned their efforts in this regard. Given the difficulty in obtaining agreement on international law in these areas, the United States and Japan can serve as thought leaders to shape the progressive development of international law.

Although the two allies share similar values favoring a free and open international order, their histories, cultures, and political systems diverge. The differences do not affect the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance or its commitment to respond to security threats large and small. Therefore, the allies should invest more effort into improving legal interoperability and ensuring synchronization of integrated operational force planning, to be better positioned to respond to contingencies arising in East Asia. This article provides a point of departure to achieve greater alliance cohesion.

NOTES

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8. Ibid., art. 3.


12. The air wing embarked in USS *Ronald Reagan* is based at Naval Air Facility Atsugi and Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. U.S. forces operate from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa and Iwakuni, Yokota, and Misawa Air Bases on Honshu.


16. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


35. Prime Minister Ryōtarō Hashimoto, Zenko Suzuki, Shuōgin Gin Mori Kyōshi-kun Teishutsu Kenpou Kyūjyou no Kaishaku ni kansuru Shitsumensho ni taisuru Toibensho [Reply to the questions concerning the
interpretation of article 9 of constitution) (5 December 1977).
36. Constitution of Japan, art. 72.
46. The President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 6 June 2017, available at www.whitehouse.gov/.
52. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence, pp. 222–23.
53. AAS/STSR Act, art. 9.
54. SDF Law, art. 77(2).
57. SDF Law, art. 70(1).
58. AAS/STSR Act, art. 9.
59. SDF Law, art. 76.
60. AAS/STSR Act, art. 9(4)2.
61. Ibíd., arts. 80, 103.
62. Maritime Transportation Restriction Act, Law No. 116 of 2004. As a matter of law, Japan separates ship visits against military targets to be carried out as part of the use of force from ship inspection of neutral ships as an exercise of the belligerent right of visit and search to determine any enemy character of the cargo. The authorities in the Maritime Transportation Restriction Act are not based in article 88 of the SDF Act’s authorization of the use of force.
65. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Shugyin Giin Fujisue Kenzo-kun Teishutu Somitukijijitai to Shuudan Anzenhoshou no Kane ni kansuru Shitumonsho ni taisuru Toubensho [Reply to the questions concerning relation between survival-threatening situation and collective security], 15 September 2015, available at www.shugyin.go.jp/.


67. Special Committee of the House of Councillors on the Bill for Peace and Security of Japan and International Community, 189th Diet Sess., 1 June 2015 (remarks of Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister) (Japan).


69. AAS/STSR Act, art. 2(3).

70. Ibid., art. 3.

71. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence, p. 303.


73. Special Committee of the House of Councillors on the Bill for Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community, 189th Diet Sess., 27 May 2015 (remarks of Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister) (Japan).


75. SDF Law, arts. 95, 95(2), and 95(3).

76. CJCS, Standing Rules of Engagement, p. 2.

77. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence, p. 262.

78. SDF Law, art. 95(1).


80. Ibid.

81. SDF Law, art. 95(3).

82. Ibid., art. 91(2).

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., art. 82.

85. Ibid., art. 93.


87. Act on Navigation of Foreign Ships through the Territorial Sea and Internal Waters, Law No. 64 of 2008, art. 8.


89. SDF Law, art. 93(3).

90. UNCLOS, arts. 30, 32, 95. Article 30 states: “If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.”

91. Ibid., art. 20.


93. Ibid.

94. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93rd Cong. § 2(c) (1973).


96. SDF Law, art. 82(3).

97. Ibid.


99. SDF Law, art. 78.

100. Ibid., art. 81.

101. Ibid., art. 90.


103. Law No. 60 of 1999.

104. Ibid., art. 2(4).


109. In 1992, the JMSDF conducted its first PKO, in Cambodia. The first JMSDF deployment abroad had occurred the year before, when JMSDF vessels conducted minesweeping patrols in the Persian Gulf.

110. Law No. 79 of 1992 [referred to as the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law].

111. Ibid., art. 6.

112. Ibid., art. 6(1).

113. Safety-ensuring operations include monitoring, stationing, patrolling, and inspecting at checkpoints, as well as security escort and protection for the purpose of maintaining the safety of specified areas, including prevention and suppression of injury to or harm against local populations, afflicted persons, and others requiring protection.

114. Law No. 77 of 2015 [[IPSA]].


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CONDITIONAL SURRENDER
Conflict Termination in the Pacific, 1945

Richard J. Shuster and Takuya Shimodaira

Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

EMPEROR HIROHITO, 15 AUGUST 1945

With the statement above, Emperor Hirohito announced to his people that Japan had accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, bringing to an end the savage fighting in the Pacific. Two weeks later aboard the battleship USS Missouri, as General Douglas MacArthur, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and a host of other senior Allied leaders looked on stoically, the Japanese military and civilian leadership signed the Instrument of Surrender officially terminating hostilities. The three and a half years of fighting between the United States and Japan had been particularly ruthless and bloody, with an estimated 110,000 U.S. military personnel killed in the Pacific theater. Casualty figures for Japan were staggering, with over two million military personnel and civilians killed, while entire sections of major Japanese cities had been reduced to ashes.¹

Although the United States remained focused throughout the war on planning and executing campaigns and operations to defeat both Germany and Japan, it also spent critical time planning how best to terminate the conflict—on terms favorable to American interests. Although by August 1945 the United States had established military ascendancy, casualties had continued to mount with each successive operation. The unprecedentedly grim numbers of casualties for combatants and civilians combined that were projected for an invasion of Japan easily would surpass those of previous campaigns, so it was essential to avoid them if at all possible. Furthermore, Allied statesmen hoped that all the war’s military and civilian casualties would not have been in vain but would lead to a postwar world free of German and Japanese militarism, and authoritarianism in general. How and why this global conflict reached its conclusion in the Pacific as it did, and the
nature of that conclusion as seen from the perspective of both the United States and Japan, will be the subject of this article.

This study focuses on the military aspects of conflict termination but does not ignore the higher-level, political influence on terminating military operations. In general, a combatant seeks to terminate hostilities so as to make peace on terms that are aligned with its national interests over the long term. In the Pacific in 1945, the question of the future of the emperor was a key facet of both military and political aspects of termination; agreeing to a compromise of unconditional surrender that allowed continuation of a role for the emperor influenced Japan’s decision to surrender and helped set conditions for the longer-term development of democracy in Japan, as well as the stability of U.S.-Japanese relations.

Conflict termination is the formal end of major combat operations. The process of terminating a conflict can be more difficult than initiating combat actions. Often civilian and military leaders must address numerous complex challenges if they are to terminate conflict and create conditions conducive to successful postconflict operations. In other words, starting a war is much easier than ending one. How the critical transition from high-intensity conflict to termination of hostilities and then to postconflict operations is accomplished has a direct impact on whether operational victory can be transformed into strategic success. Consequently, political and military leaders face key planning considerations in terminating conflict.

The challenge of conflict termination is not simply to accomplish the discontinuation of hostilities at any particular point in time but to transition from combat to postconflict operations effectively. In essence, successful conflict termination should set the conditions for successful stability operations and lead directly to the achievement of the strategic objective. Normally, the strategic leadership of the victorious side in a conflict sets the terms and conditions of termination, but—as with everything else in war—the enemy certainly has a role. The cessation of hostilities cannot be a unilateral process, as ultimately the losing side decides when to terminate conflict. In World War II, both Germany and Japan continued to fight long after any reasonable expectation of attaining their objectives had vanished. In short, conflict termination can be a disorderly process. Setting the stage for a continued military and civilian presence after the termination of major combat operations is critical to any long-term success in a region. In other words, theater- and operational-level planning should not focus on ending hostilities at the expense of what comes next.

Despite the combatants’ strategic and operational focus on achieving military victory, the process of considering how to terminate the U.S.-Japanese conflict in the Pacific did not begin in 1945 but as early as mid-1943, after the United States had assaulted Saipan, Guam, and Tinian in the Mariana Islands. Notwithstanding
the intense fighting between the combatants up to that point, with even larger and more-costly operations to follow, the strategic political and military leadership on both sides began to see the inevitability of a U.S. victory over Japan. Consequently, each combatant began to study how to bring the war to an end on terms favorable to its own national interests. The United States pushed relentlessly for unconditional surrender, while Japan sought to force a negotiated settlement.

In planning for the termination of hostilities and the transition to postconflict operations, U.S. strategic planners feared the worst: revenge, retaliation, and insurgency. Fighting in the Pacific was particularly brutal, perhaps matched in its utter ruthlessness and racial overtones only by the four years of carnage between Germany and the Soviet Union. Yet the outcome of Japan's defeat ended up having a much different postscript: a peaceful transition to a new world order and the development of strong relations between the former enemies.

An examination of conflict termination in the Pacific in 1945 reveals three major themes: (1) its shaping by America's relentless offensive operations aimed at defeating Japanese military power and obtaining political leverage; (2) a comprehensive U.S. understanding of the operational environment that helped frame detailed planning and termination criteria; and (3) the Japanese emperor's ultimate embrace of the peace faction, upon realizing the futility of continued fighting. In the end, the victory came about through a conditional surrender that set the conditions for a smooth transition to postwar stability in Japan.

EFFECTIVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION, 1943–45: THE RELENTLESS PUSH TO THE END
The essence of conflict termination is “political leverage borne of battlefield success,” and the Pacific theater in World War II provides the perfect illustration of this truth. The United States, after declaring that it sought nothing less than the unconditional surrender of Japan (and Germany), dedicated its offensive capabilities to destroying the Japanese armed forces to a point at which the United States could enforce its will over the defeated nation. For its part, Japan aimed to inflict high casualties on U.S. forces to precipitate a conditional peace. Consequently, even after the final outcome became obvious to all, Allied offensive operations and strikes continued—right up until the final seconds of the war. In fact, both sides’ continued fierce fighting in ongoing operations and their planning of future operations for the remainder of 1945 and beyond were characterized by an acceptance of the likelihood of staggering casualties, to position themselves better to support their national interests.

Although the United States had stated clearly its strategic priority in the overall war effort as the defeat of Germany, it never lost sight of the ultimate strategic objective in the Pacific: the defeat of Japan. Only destruction of the Japanese armed
forces could prevent Japanese aggression in the Pacific and restore U.S. national interests in the region. From President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s initial December 1941 call for “absolute victory” to the more comprehensive January 1943 declaration of the goal of “unconditional surrender,” the United States transitioned from an initial strategic defensive into an all-out offensive to destroy Japan’s war-making capability and enforce its will on a defeated enemy.

At a higher level, America’s desired end state is more difficult to determine than the concise declaration of “unconditional surrender” communicates. Discriminable from the war aims listed in the Cairo Declaration of November 1943 and other strategic-level policy statements, the desired end state of the Allies amounted to the restoration of Japanese-occupied territories, the creation of conditions that would prevent Japanese aggression against peace and security, and the emergence in Japan of a government that respected the international world order.6

By the start of 1943, the tide of war in the Pacific had turned decidedly in favor of the United States. American forces had halted Japanese advances in New Guinea and extended their own lines of operation along its coast, while gaining a critical base of operations on Guadalcanal. Toward the end of January 1943, at the Casablanca Conference, President Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston S. Churchill agreed that the Allies would seek a more definitive strategic objective in both Europe and the Pacific: the unconditional surrender of both Germany and Japan. The two leaders were determined to bring peace “to the world only by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power,” with “the simple formula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan.” Instead of destroying the “populace” of the enemy nations, they advocated destroying the “philosophy” that was based on “conquest and subjugation.”7 In other words, the strategic objective had two major elements, military and political, that amounted to the destruction of enemy armed forces and the development of democratic governments that aligned with the Allies’ national interests.

Planning at the theater and operational levels of war had a significant impact on termination of the conflict in the Pacific on terms favorable to U.S. national interests. In essence, planning is where battlefield success begins. The overall strategic plan for the defeat of Japan was to advance westward and northwestward, along two main axes of advance from the central and southwest Pacific, respectively, with the two campaigns conducted at a mutually supportive distance from each other. Campaign plans developed by the planning staffs of the two major theater commanders, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, employed U.S. forces in a series of logical steps toward the ultimate objective: the Japanese mainland. MacArthur’s forces in the Southwest Pacific Area would advance
northwest from New Guinea to the Philippine Islands, while Nimitz’s forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas would advance west through the Solomon, Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana Islands before supporting MacArthur’s forces in the Philippines in October 1944. Both MacArthur’s MUSKETEER plans to seize the Philippines and Nimitz’s Campaign Plan GRANITE, which laid out the sequence of island-hopping assaults in the Pacific for 1944, illustrate the two theater commanders’ mastery of the application of operational art to achieve theater strategic objectives. By the end of 1944, the success of these two prongs would destroy the bulk of Japanese naval and air power, pushing Japan to the brink of defeat by the spring of 1945.

By mid-1943, when Nimitz’s forces still were fighting for control of the Solomon Islands and MacArthur’s forces were continuing to fight in New Guinea, the U.S. Joint Staff planners had developed an accurate assessment of Japanese intentions and capabilities that would be instrumental in planning for Japan’s defeat. In short, the Joint Staff knew that Japan’s ability to “establish undisputed control of an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific” and to be “self-sufficient economically” even then was slipping away. Japan was now on the strategic defensive, with any hopes for achieving victory resting on (perceived) Allied war weariness. American planners understood that Japan’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) had become vulnerable to attack, and that “ultimately greatly superior forces can be directed against her.”

But even in mid-August 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff—the Allies’ strategic planning staff that oversaw all operations in the war—still had some differences of opinion with regard to how to end the conflict with Japan. Together they were optimistic that termination of the conflict in Europe would allow a “reorientation” of Allied forces to the Pacific. While agreeing that the overall strategy to defeat Japan required retaining China as an ally, destroying Japanese naval and air power, blockading Japan, and conducting large-scale strategic bombing of the homeland, American and British planners disagreed on the details. Britain thought the target date of defeating Japan one year after Germany was too optimistic, and pushed for Nimitz’s central Pacific campaign to be the main effort, as opposed to the mutually supporting campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff advocated. But these differences were worked out in short order—building a consensus in planning for the defeat of Japan that, while difficult to achieve, was a necessary condition for a lasting victory.

By the end of 1943, the United States and Britain had agreed on how best to defeat Japan. A Combined Chiefs of Staff report entitled “Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan” laid out a clear strategy to achieve victory, and it drove all subsequent planning at the theater level of war. No longer disagreeing about whether the campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur had to be mutually supporting, but instead acknowledging that the central Pacific drive could result in “a
more rapid advance toward Japan and her vital lines of communication,” the United States and Britain agreed to conduct intensive bombing and to establish an air and sea blockade of Japan, thereby setting the conditions for an assault of the Japanese mainland, if necessary. The result would be the destruction of the Japanese fleet and air force, the isolation of Japan, and the conduct of carrier-based attacks on the home islands. The two allies also agreed to take advantage of any Soviet intervention in the Pacific War. The planners still hedged their bets with regard to plans for future operations, stating that a major assault would take place in spring 1945 in the Formosa-Luzon-China area. Nonetheless, Nimitz’s Campaign Plan GRANITE was the clear result of the Combined Chiefs guidance, and the admiral and his staff sequenced all subsequent operations in the central Pacific (including in the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas) “to force the surrender of Japan.”

As U.S. operations throughout 1944 successfully swept up from the southwest Pacific and central Pacific, strategic planners wrestled with what should come next. The critical question was whether to seize Formosa or Luzon on the way to Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) believed that a key to the defeat of Japan lay in China; the United States planned to launch an “overwhelming air offensive” from bases there, and eventually to seize a port in China. Therefore, seizing Formosa was a strategic priority, because doing so would cut the SLOCs between Japan and its Southern Resource Area, provide a base from which to bomb Japan, and establish a supply route to China.

Differences of opinion between Nimitz and MacArthur over what would contribute most to the defeat of Japan led to a meeting with President Roosevelt in July 1944 to resolve the issue. MacArthur argued decisively that Luzon offered the greater advantages, both militarily and politically, while Nimitz favored bypassing Luzon for Formosa. Nimitz eventually would change his mind, after the Japanese seized coastal areas in China in September 1944. By December, the JCS directed MacArthur to assault Luzon and Nimitz to execute his planned assaults of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Interestingly, the JCS never officially terminated planning for Formosa; in the end, events simply would make the point moot.

Once the decision to strike at Luzon was made, the major question that remained in the Pacific—which drove heated discussions through the spring of 1945—was whether the United States could defeat Japan through blockade and bombardment or instead would have to conduct an actual massive assault on the industrial heartland of Japan. The joint planners still hedged their bets at the start of 1945; they believed an assault on Kyushu would help intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan, as well as set conditions for a follow-on assault on Honshu. The Joint Chiefs knew that difficult fighting remained and warned that such an invasion might have to wait until 1946. In fact, the British Chiefs of
Staff now feared that it would take up to two years after the defeat of Germany to force unconditional surrender on Japan.\textsuperscript{17}

The key to defeating Japan was to destroy Japanese military and economic power by advancing closer to the home islands incrementally. By the beginning of 1945, the United States had cut the critical SLOCs between Japan and the Southern Resource Area, established bases closer to Japan for follow-on operations, and all but destroyed the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) as an effective fighting force. The series of campaigns and operations that seized decisive points throughout the southwest and central Pacific, through the Philippines, and toward Japan itself had established the necessary conditions for a final assault on mainland Japan. The penultimate stage of the war included the seizure of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, two more decisive points along the main line of operations toward the ultimate objective. The capture of Iwo Jima gave the United States a forward air base at which to refuel B-29s from the Marianas and from which to provide fighter cover for the attacks on the main islands, as well as to act as a sanctuary at which damaged aircraft could make emergency landings.\textsuperscript{18}

Despite the plethora of military successes at the operational and theater levels in the Pacific, the United States still expected prolongation of the conflict. In May 1945, as Germany surrendered to the Allies only after a titanic battle in the streets of Berlin, the Joint Chiefs feared that Japan too would fight on at any cost to prevent the invasion of the home islands. They understood that “the prospect of the Emperor and the Imperial Family being in the hands of a foreign invader is repulsive and unthinkable to the Japanese.”\textsuperscript{19} Wary that the Japanese might sue for peace to prevent an actual occupation of Japan and fearful that the American public’s war weariness would lead to acceptance of such a conditional surrender in the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs reemphasized that their objective was unconditional surrender.\textsuperscript{20}

To compel Japan to surrender, the United States continued to conduct strikes and attacks throughout the summer of 1945, right up to the final moments of the war. Once Okinawa fell to U.S. forces in June 1945, continued bombing by the Strategic Air Force in the Marianas, the Tactical Air Force on Okinawa, and the Third Fleet intensified pressure on Japan. Strategic bombing, especially by B-29s conducting incendiary and low-level attacks, devastated Japanese cities and industrial areas, killing thousands of civilians in the process. Offensive mining, conducted under the aptly named Operation STARVATION, continued to isolate Japan from its critical SLOCs.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, the blockade of Japan through the destruction of its merchant shipping and naval fleet by air attacks and submarines cut off Japan from essential imports such as oil, coal, and iron ore.\textsuperscript{22}

As the Japanese political and military leadership debated whether to terminate the country’s military operations, U.S. strategic air, carrier-based air, and surface
forces continued to pound targets on the main islands of Japan. On 10 August, Nimitz warned that “the public announcement by the Japanese of counter proposals for the termination of the war must not be permitted to affect vigilance against Japanese attacks” and that “offensive action shall be continued unless otherwise specifically directed.” In addition, on 14 August, General Carl A. Spaatz’s Twentieth Air Force bombed northern Honshu with over eight hundred B-29s, from the Marianas. Even on 15 August, the day on which Japan formally announced its surrender, over a hundred aircraft from Admiral William F. Halsey Jr’s Third Fleet carriers struck Japanese airfields on Honshu—minutes before Nimitz’s order to “suspend attack air operations” was received.

The United States also leveraged its “information instrument of power” to compel Japan to surrender. Information operations aimed to convince Japanese decision makers and the Japanese people that continued resistance was hopeless. From February 1945 through the end of the war, U.S. naval aircraft and B-29s dropped millions of leaflets on the home islands. With the objective of cracking Japanese morale and pressuring the people to petition the emperor, the leaflets eventually warned civilians that their cities would be destroyed by B-29 raids and informed them of the text of the Potsdam Declaration, the atomic bomb attacks, and Soviet entry into the war.

With U.S. forces occupying Okinawa and preparing for the final assault, Hiroshima and Nagasaki in ruins, and Soviet forces driving deep into Manchuria, Japan’s strategic leadership eventually decided that it could resist no longer. In the end Japan surrendered, even as 2.5 million combat-equipped troops prepared to defend against the American assault forces poised to seize Kyushu and Honshu. Thus, by August 1945 successful U.S. military operations finally had created sufficient political leverage to force Japanese decision makers (both civilian and military) to cease hostilities.

PLANNING FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION AND BEYOND: UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Thorough understanding of the operational environment played a key role in winning the war in the Pacific and would play a crucial role in winning the peace. Allied intelligence estimates, based on intercepts and decryption of Japanese diplomatic and military communications, allowed the United States to offset Japan’s advantages and exploit its weaknesses. In the final phase of the conflict in the Pacific, the United States developed a comprehensive picture of Japanese capabilities and intentions, which supported Allied plans for the final campaign against Kyushu and Honshu while simultaneously enlightening planners and decision makers regarding the primacy of the emperor to the nation of Japan. With this combination of a clear idea of how the Japanese military was preparing
to defend the mainland and the thinking of Japan’s national strategic leadership, the United States was able to conduct thorough planning for the final assault of Japan while concurrently developing termination criteria that not only suited its own national interests but also, eventually, appealed to the emperor and members of his inner circle.

In planning for conflict termination, the United States (and Britain) had developed a comprehensive assessment of the state of Japan’s military and political strengths and weaknesses. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had an accurate picture of Japan’s intent and capabilities that helped shape planning for the final campaign of the war, as well as termination criteria that fell short of unconditional surrender. They correctly surmised that the Japanese equated unconditional surrender with “national extinction” and understood that the Japanese government in July 1945 wanted to “fight as long and as desperately as possible in the hope of avoiding complete defeat and of acquiring a better bargaining position in a negotiated peace.”

In addition, the U.S. State Department had formulated a plan to shape the termination debate and to establish a postwar occupation policy. Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew understood that preserving the institution of the emperor was an “irreducible” Japanese condition for surrender and that trying the emperor as a war criminal or abolishing the throne would lead to “prolonged resistance.” His counterpart in the War Department, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, agreed that if the United States acceded to maintaining a constitutional monarchy under the present emperor, then Japan would be much more likely to surrender. These powerful voices would help influence President Harry S. Truman to accept conflict termination on terms short of unconditional surrender.

**Planning the Final Assaults: OLYMPIC and CORONET**

The campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur had set the conditions for the final assault on the main islands of Japan itself. The critical question that remained, however, was whether such an assault was necessary to compel Japan to surrender or the same objective could be achieved with fewer American casualties via blockade and continued bombing.

By April 1945, the Joint Chiefs had come to the conclusion that the invasion of Japan was a prerequisite to forcing unconditional surrender. They feared that bombardment and blockade could lead to a negotiated peace, and that only an assault on the Japanese home islands would force absolute surrender. They also questioned whether Japan ever actually would surrender and argued that the United States was compelled to bring about a “decisive military defeat.” The Joint Chiefs believed that only the military instrument of national power would achieve the ultimate objective of defeating Japan: “Unless a definition of unconditional surrender can be given which is acceptable to the Japanese, there is no
alternative to annihilation and no prospect that the threat of absolute defeat will bring about capitulation.”

Additional fighting would not be easy. The planned operations—OLYMPIC and CORONET—were given an end date of June 1946, under the overall cover name DOWNFALL. Casualty estimates were high for both sides; for Operation OLYMPIC alone, casualties for U.S. forces were projected to be 150,000–160,000, including upward of 38,000 killed in action, while Japan was expected to suffer upward of 250,000 combatants and 380,000 civilians killed.

Yet clearly the Joint Chiefs had listened to General MacArthur, who believed firmly that invading Kyushu and Honshu would be necessary. In a communication to General George C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff, MacArthur recommended an attack on Kyushu, to provide land-based air cover for the ultimate objective, “a decisive assault on Honshu.” Dismissing two other courses of action to force Japan’s surrender—continued bombardment and blockade—as being too time-consuming, MacArthur argued that the assaults on Kyushu and Honshu “would permit application of full power of our combined resources, ground, naval, and air, on the decisive objective.” In his estimation, the approach could force Japan to surrender earlier than anticipated. Amphibious assaults had been a staple of successful maritime warfare in MacArthur’s island-hopping campaigns in the Pacific throughout the war, and the general had no intention of dismissing the method that had been perfected over the preceding three years.

While MacArthur wholeheartedly supported an invasion of Japan, Nimitz advocated an alternate course of action. He saw great risk in a major assault on Kyushu and Honshu, for three reasons: Japan’s fighting capability in defensive warfare, the traditional Japanese refusal to surrender, and the use of suicide attacks. Nimitz firmly believed that the defeat of Japan was inevitable and a direct assault rash. In a communication to Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, Nimitz argued in April 1945 that “unless speed is considered so important that we are willing to accept less than the best preparation and more than minimum casualties, I believe that the long range interests of the U.S. will be better served if we continue during 1945 to isolate Japan and to destroy Jap[anese] forces and resources by naval and air attack.” Thus, the two U.S. theater commanders in the Pacific initially were at odds over how best to defeat Japan and bring the war to an end.

Soon, however, they would be coordinating their efforts in planning for the final assaults on Japan, because on 25 May the Joint Chiefs put an end to any remaining relevant discussion over the invasion of the Japanese home islands. They issued a planning directive to the theater commanders for the assault of Kyushu, Operation OLYMPIC, with a target date of 1 November 1945. The amphibious assault would be the largest in history and would be the first of two major
operations planned to seize Japan and force the enemy to surrender. American strategic leadership believed that success in these final operations would compel the Japanese to terminate the conflict and provide the United States with the utmost leverage to set conditions for long-term stability within the context of U.S. national interests. In a meeting with President Truman on 18 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with Stimson and Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal, were unanimous in their agreement that Operation OLYMPIC offered the best chance to defeat Japan once and for all.35

Planning the Peace: BLACKLIST and CAMPUS

Although the Joint Chiefs had come to the conclusion that capturing the home islands likely was the only way to compel the Japanese to surrender, they also ensured that contingency plans were drawn up so they could be executed if the Japanese surrendered at any time. On 14 June 1945, the chiefs directed both Nimitz and MacArthur to plan for the “sudden collapse or surrender of Japan” to ensure that the United States could take advantage of such a situation with regard to the subsequent occupation.36 As a result, both theater commanders drafted contingency plans—CAMPUS and BLACKLIST—that could be executed on Japan’s surrender. Thus, while winning the war was difficult enough, now the United States also would plan to win the peace. Once again, employing the right force at the right time and place would be paramount in translating a military victory into long-term strategic success.

Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur synchronized their efforts in planning for the sudden surrender of Japan. By 3 August, just days before the surrender occurred, the two theater commanders had worked out all major issues.37 Nimitz developed Operation CAMPUS to have three distinct phases: (1) the “emergency naval occupation of Tokyo Bay”; (2) the “complete deployment of naval occupation forces”; and (3) “amphibious operations connected with the occupation of Japan by U.S. Army forces.”38 CAMPUS became the naval component of Operation BLACKLIST, detailing the naval and amphibious phases of the overall operation, focused on the rapid occupation of Tokyo Bay and other strategic areas as a prelude to the entry of U.S. Army forces. Its major tasks included conducting the amphibious phases of BLACKLIST and supporting the land phases of the occupation, maintaining the lines of communication to Japan, clearing minefields, ensuring the destruction or seizure of the remaining IJN fleet, and establishing naval and naval air facilities for follow-on operations.39 The plan also gave American occupation forces the authority to impose “drastic penalties” if they encountered Japanese noncompliance with U.S. postconflict directives. Possible sanctions and reprisals included the forced evacuation and destruction of communities, bombing, the destruction of property, and the taking of hostages.40
MacArthur distributed the plan for Operation BLACKLIST on 8 August, one week before the Japanese surrender. The plan acted as a guide for “prompt action upon termination of organized resistance in the areas to be occupied,” including the control of Japanese military forces and civilians and the enforcement of the final terms of surrender. Overall, the plan consisted of a progressive occupation of fourteen areas in Japan (and some areas in Korea) that ensured American control of Japan’s instruments of national power. A key component of the plan was to use existing Japanese military and political organizations. This would reduce the number of U.S. forces required for occupation duty and allow for a degree of stability in the rebuilding process of Japan. Still, the plan called for the occupation of Japan with a total force of over seven hundred thousand U.S. forces. The initial focus of BLACKLIST would be to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including disarming Japanese forces immediately and establishing control over communications. BLACKLIST would go into effect immediately on Japan’s surrender.

The Atomic Bomb and Entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War
Two final factors—the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific War—exerted additional pressure on the Japanese government to surrender and emphasized the point that the United States was still seeking unlimited means to destroy Japan. There were, and would be, few, if any, restrictions on the means pursued and efforts wielded to achieve battlefield success in pursuit of political leverage to affect a postwar settlement. Historians have written much about the atomic bomb being the decisive factor in forcing surrender, somewhat less assessing the overall impact of the Soviet intervention. However, the use of atomic bombs against Japanese cities and the Soviet invasion of Japanese-occupied territory were merely additional, and certainly not the only, factors in forcing the Japanese government to surrender. Asserting any such single or narrow explanation for Japan’s surrender ignores two critical contributions up to that point: the relentless push of offensive operations that already had driven Japan to the brink of military defeat, and a comprehensive understanding of the strategic and operational environments that had allowed the Allies to plan for war termination and to develop effective termination criteria that would lead the Japanese to accede to surrendering. Although these issues still are debated hotly today, the fact that by 1945 the United States had reduced Japanese military strength significantly and had captured key island chains already had established the conditions in which these final two events took place.

The use of the bombs certainly stunned Japan’s strategic leadership, but mostly it reinforced the existing intentions of both the war and peace factions, respectively to continue or terminate operations. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 9 August added to Japan’s desperate situation. Earlier in the war, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had supported Soviet armed intervention against Japan, arguing
that “every effort should be made to bring the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date.” After Germany surrendered, the Soviets had agreed at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 to launch an invasion of Japanese-held territory. News of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria stunned Japan’s strategic leadership, but it too essentially reinforced the existing beliefs of both the war and peace factions that surrounded the emperor.

The confluence of ongoing U.S. operations, the use of the atomic bombs, and the Soviet invasion of Japanese territory emphasize the nearly unlimited nature of the war the Allies waged to gain political leverage. One final piece—American willingness to compromise on unconditional surrender—would give Japan’s strategic leadership an olive branch to grasp.

Potsdam and Conditional Surrender
One of the greatest challenges for American strategic leadership in the Pacific War was the transition from war to peace. At the end of a conflict characterized by its brutality, enormous cost in military and civilian lives, and racial overtones, how could the United States establish long-term stability in the region, to ensure that the achievement of the strategic objective of (almost) unconditional surrender would not be ephemeral? By developing and acting on a holistic understanding of the operational environment—particularly the primacy to the Japanese people and leadership of the imperial family—the United States was able to appeal to the peace faction and make inroads into the war faction, enabling it to end the conflict without conducting a bloody assault on the main islands.

The Potsdam Declaration, signed by the United States, Britain, and China on 26 July 1945, made it clear to Japan that continued resistance would be met with a united military response. The Allies offered a simple but blunt choice: unconditional surrender or “prompt and utter destruction.” Continuation of the war therefore promised Japan a grim future. Unconditional surrender amounted to acceptance of the occupation of Japanese territory until Japan eliminated militarism, disarmed its armed forces and industry, and accepted war crimes trials. At this point, there was no specific mention of the fate of the emperor and the imperial system, but it soon became a key sticking point affecting the decision whether to terminate hostilities.

Although unconditional surrender had been the clear American objective for over two years, cracks in its foundation began to appear in 1945. The critical issue that emerged within U.S. (as well as Japanese) strategic leadership circles in the waning days of the war was the role of the emperor in postwar Japan. In fact, short of conducting an all-out assault on the Japanese home islands, achieving a cessation of hostilities in the Pacific depended on it. There were two schools of thought in the United States; those who favored keeping the emperor included Secretary of War Stimson, Under Secretary of State Grew, and Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief Admiral William D. Leahy, while those who advocated his removal included Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Assistant Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, and former Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

The first group argued that failure to preserve the emperor would prolong the war—in particular, that Japanese forces would recognize only the authority of the emperor with regard to surrender. As early as 1943 Grew had argued that after the war the Japanese throne could “serve as a cornerstone for healthy and peaceful internal growth.” He believed that maintaining the emperor could hasten Japan’s surrender without the need for a bloody assault on the home islands. Stimson agreed that if the United States proposed maintaining “a constitutional monarchy” under the present emperor, then Japan would be much more likely to surrender. Leahy, who as military adviser to the president had considerable influence on this question, warned President Truman that insistence on unconditional surrender would lead to Japanese desperation and increased U.S. casualties.

The second school of thought believed that keeping the emperor—the symbol of Japanese militarism—would encourage the militarists and thereby prolong the war, as well as create political problems back in America. Hull considered that anything short of unconditional surrender was “appeasement,” while Byrnes argued that the United States must set the terms of surrender. In addition, “unconditional surrender” was a powerful motto back home; the majority of Americans supported it and saw the emperor as a war criminal.

In the end, conditional surrender won the day. Sizable Japanese forces still waited in the home islands and others were scattered across China, Southeast Asia, and the Netherlands East Indies. Allied civilian and military leaders understood the critical importance of the emperor as the figure who could order the surrender of fighters who otherwise would be willing to carry on to the death.

Navy Secretary Forrestal’s proposal to keep the emperor in place but follow the intents and purposes of the Potsdam Declaration provided a way out for both combatants. On 10 August, Japan finally agreed to accept the Potsdam Declaration, with the added condition of preserving the emperor. The following day, Secretary of State Byrnes sent a reply through official channels in which the Allies insisted that the authority of the emperor be subject to the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (General MacArthur). In this way an uneasy, and rather vague, compromise to unconditional surrender was worked out. President Truman feared domestic political backlash but agreed to the compromise, stating simply: “They wanted to keep the Emperor. We told ’em we’d tell ’em how to keep him, but we’d make the terms.” Despite contentious debates within American and Japanese strategic leadership circles, the former combatants had found an acceptable solution to end the war in the Pacific.
THE EMPEROR AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE PEACE FACTION

History is rife with instances in which a combatant facing certain defeat continued to fight on long after there was any chance of achieving his or its objectives. This is particularly true when a nation is confronted with an existential threat to its way of life.

Yet political leverage still can exert a significant influence on conflict termination—even when wielded by the vanquished. The acquisition and retention of political leverage was a primary factor that drove Japanese planning for the final defense of the mainland. The concept was no different from plans Japan had made and executed the previous year, when Japanese forces fought to the death on the battlefield in pursuit of a negotiated settlement to the conflict. By forcing an unprecedented bloodletting on American forces, and at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens, Japan sought to exact concessions from the United States to achieve a postwar settlement that fell short of unconditional surrender. The importance of maintaining the emperor became the primary factor that brought the Japanese to a willingness to terminate the conflict.

Faction versus Faction

Once the tide of war turned against the Japanese, political factions emerged in Japan that would help shape its surrender. Throughout the war the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and the IJN held divergent views on the direction of the war, and achieving any reconciliation between them or any compromise on how to terminate the conflict proved as challenging as ever. Hostility between the two services was nothing new in Japan, as it had existed in the years leading up to outbreak of the war. Now, with the military situation leaving Japan in dire straits, the split between the views of the two political factions, including between the services, created difficulties for the emperor. The ministry of the IJN’s Security Research Division averred that “the present state is confrontation. The country must become one.”

As early as September 1943, former premiers (known as jushin [principal subjects]) advocated seeking a peace settlement on favorable terms. They wanted to replace Premier Hideki Tōjō, an IJA hawk, with a more moderate premier. When Tōjō resigned in July 1944 after the devastating loss of Saipan, the jushin selected retired general Kuniaki Koiso and retired admiral Mitsumasa Yonai to lead the government (Koiso became premier). However, the Koiso cabinet’s stance remained one of “all-out prosecution of the war” because Koiso believed that only a military success could improve Japan’s power to negotiate an end to the war on more-favorable terms. Thus, Japan too believed that achieving battlefield success was a prerequisite for exerting political leverage.

By January 1945, with the United States in control of Saipan and the Philippines, the emperor had expressed concern that Japan’s hopes for victory were
fading fast. At that point, however, the emperor was in favor of continuing the war, and he approved a directive to defend the homeland against invasion in “the final decisive battle of the war.” But when he met in February with members of the *jushin* to hear their views on Japan’s situation at the time, the emperor discovered that some favored peace, with former prime minister Fumimaro Konoe going so far as to advise the emperor to “end the war as soon as possible.” Continued defeat on the battlefield combined with diplomatic setbacks (e.g., the breakdown of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact) forced the resignation of Koiso in spring 1945. Members of the peace faction, however, faced a conundrum. They had to select as a replacement someone who advocated peace yet also would be acceptable to the hawks. Admiral Kantarō Suzuki became the clear choice, and his cabinet, consisting of General Korechika Anami as war minister, Admiral Yonai as navy minister, and Mr. Shigenori Tōgō as foreign minister, would govern from 7 April 1945 through the final surrender.

Upon taking over, Suzuki believed that the emperor wished to reach a settlement of the war, but the new premier advocated continued hostilities until the moment was right for a negotiated settlement. This decision also would help keep his cabinet intact. So even as U.S. forces assaulted Okinawa and B-29s continued to pound Japan’s cities, Japan’s strategic leadership had split into two diametrically opposed factions, and the factors that prevented conflict termination in Japan—insistence on preserving the emperor, the desire to save face, and fear of a coup—remained dominant.

Even as U.S. forces captured Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, Japan’s strategic leadership sought to protect its diminished gains by continuing to fight so as to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict. In June 1945, despite overwhelmingly negative reports from the battlefield, a deteriorating diplomatic effort regarding the possibility of Soviet mediation, and indications of Soviet troop movements toward Japanese-occupied Manchuria, the official policy of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War on 8 June was “to prosecute the war to the end in order to preserve the national polity and protect the Imperial Homeland.” The military was in the midst of planning the *KETSU-GO* operation—the final decisive battle to annihilate any Americans who attempted to invade mainland Japan—so as to obtain political leverage for a negotiated settlement. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of Japan Kōichi Kido, a key advocate of the peace faction, now conducted a last-ditch effort to appeal directly to the emperor. He aimed to achieve “an honorable peace” with his “Draft Plan of Countermeasures to Meet the Situation,” which warned of the inevitability of mass civilian casualties from Allied bombing and worsening starvation with the coming of winter. At this point, the emperor was moved by Kido’s plan, favoring diplomatic efforts over a decisive battle. However, the opposition faction, composed of
War Minister Anami and the chiefs of the army and navy, believed Japan could secure more-favorable conditions if their services defended the mainland against invasion and inflicted heavy casualties on U.S. forces. In short, political leverage could be bought at the cost of thousands of American and hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives.

The release of the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July had a polarizing effect on the two major political factions. The doves feared that rejecting the terms would lead to serious consequences, while the hawks considered acceptance tantamount to unconditional surrender. This divided stance led to maintaining the status quo in terms of continuing hostilities while clinging to the false hope of either a breakthrough in the pursuit of Soviet mediation or a military success that forced the United States to negotiate. So at this point Japan rejected the Potsdam Declaration. Prime Minister Suzuki claimed that Japan simply would ignore it. However, after reports of the devastation of Hiroshima reached Tokyo on the afternoon of 6 August, Foreign Affairs Minister Tōgō again urged acceptance of the declaration. The emperor finally agreed that Japan no longer could delay the decision to terminate the conflict.

The dropping of the second bomb, on Nagasaki, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and northern Japan exposed once again the deep divisions within Japan’s strategic leadership. Even as the doves argued that continuing the conflict would lead to the ultimate extinction of the nation itself, the hawks continued to counter that once severe casualties had been inflicted on the expected invasion force favorable terms still would be possible. Eventually the combined effect of recent events proved to be too much for the emperor, however, and he met with the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War on 10 August—a day of reckoning. Tōgō pushed for acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, with one condition: “the defense of the Constitution.” Yonai, the minister of the navy, and Kiichirō Hiranuma, lord president of the council, supported him. On the other hand, Anami, the minister of the army, demanded a number of conditions: (1) the Japanese, and not the Allies, would disarm all overseas Japanese forces; (2) only the Japanese government itself could prosecute war criminals; and (3) the Allies would not occupy Japan. Despite the fact that insisting on these conditions would mean continuation of the war, General Yoshijirō Umezu, the chief of the army general staff, and Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the chief of the naval general staff, supported the position.

The one issue on which both factions unanimously agreed was the necessity to maintain the emperor, in victory or defeat. The emperor was a sacred figure in Japan, and his wishes were a decisive influence over policy. Finally, at this desperate hour, the emperor forced an uneasy reconciliation of the factions, stating as follows: “I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and
abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation.” Consequently, at 0400 on 10 August, the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War agreed to accept the Potsdam Declaration—with the caveat that the emperor remain as sovereign ruler. Although the political factions continued to argue over interpretations of Byrnes’s note, which left the emperor on the throne but under the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, they sensed a coup d’état looming, so they resorted to a final conference with the emperor on 14 August. An emotional emperor reiterated his stance that “it is pointless to continue the war any longer.” He finally had broken the deadlock. The ultimate decision to surrender was sent through official channels to the Allies, who accepted promptly, and an imperial rescript was broadcast to the people the next day. U.S. strategic leadership thereby had compromised on unconditional surrender, accepting the continuation of the emperor but under the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The decisions of the emperor to intervene to break the deadlock in the council over the direction of the war and to broadcast his resultant surrender decision to the people of Japan were key components of the successful conflict termination. Those actions, combined with an additional imperial rescript on 2 September that directed the people to comply with the surrender demands, showed that the emperor had embraced peace, belatedly but assuredly. Given the emperor’s sacred position and authority in Japan, the imperial rescripts exerted a tremendous influence, leading to a successful transition to peace throughout Japanese-occupied territories and in the home islands.

A Key Advocate for Conflict Termination: Rear Admiral Sōkichi Takagi
To understand the emperor’s final decision to capitulate, it is necessary to examine the role of Rear Admiral Sōkichi Takagi, IJN. This respected naval officer wielded a decisive influence within the peace faction.

Takagi’s relationship with the Kyoto school was the source of a critical portion of that influence. The Kyoto school was a philosophical and interdisciplinary movement centered at Kyoto University that assimilated Western philosophy and religious beliefs with Japanese philosophy and religious beliefs; in particular, it embraced a synthesis of the Eastern philosophy of religion with Western scientific culture. From early on the Kyoto school had criticized the entire idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as constituting an empty motto, believing it was impossible to establish cooperation in the occupied areas.

Takagi’s role in ending the war began in earnest in 1943. Shortly after his promotion to rear admiral, Takagi received a secret order from Shigeyoshi Inoue, undersecretary of the IJN, tasking him with assessing the true situation in the Pacific War. By 1944, Takagi was engaged actively in determining how best to terminate the war, by providing key influence and support to IJN minister Yonai.
At the end of August 1944, Takagi resigned his post as Bureau Chief of Military Education at the Navy Ministry, having been ordered secretly by Minister Yonai and Vice-Minister Inoue to inquire into possible ways to terminate the war. To that end, he frequently moved among senior statesmen, IJA and IJN officers, and imperial family members to collect information and coordinate actions. After months of research, in May 1945 Takagi developed a proposal based on the rapidly deteriorating military situation. The report included the idea of conducting peace negotiations via Soviet mediation, with the intent of terminating the conflict prior to any possibility of a decisive battle on the Japanese mainland. Takagi then worked to influence the positions of the emperor and additional IJN officers. However, when the Suzuki cabinet held its first imperial conference on 8 June, it decided once again in favor of a decisive battle on the mainland, intended to exact concessions from the United States.

With the IJA intent on continuing the conflict to the bitter end, regardless of military and civilian losses, Takagi emerged as an influential moderate. Holding frequent discussions with adherents of the Kyoto school, Takagi helped provide the IJN with a voice of reason. The relationship between the IJN and the Kyoto school produced a combination that emerged as “the only power [that could] control the reckless war expansion of the IJA.” Discussions among members of the Kyoto school and Takagi focused on analysis of the historical background of the war, the current domestic and foreign situations, possible modifications to the national war strategy and policy, and the prospects for ceasing hostilities. With Takagi reaching out to the Kyoto school to produce a body of ideas that could help terminate the conflict in the Pacific, the IJN eventually was able to help modify the war policy of the emperor and the imperial faction that up to that point had advocated the extreme-right nationalism tied to the IJA.

As the Japanese political and military leadership debated how the war in the Pacific should end, Takagi worked hard to influence key decision makers to terminate the conflict and prevent additional devastation and bloodshed. He was not afraid to speak his mind and assess Japan’s situation in objective terms. To counter the IJA’s desire to carry on the fight, Takagi continued to urge the emperor to terminate the war. He criticized the IJA for “madly proclaiming that the time had come to stage a great decisive battle on the homeland that would defeat the enemy.” Takagi continued this work to enlighten other members of the Japanese military and political leadership right up to the end of the war, contributing his objective assessments to the emperor’s cabinet when Japan was in the throes of uncertainty and desperation about what lay ahead. He fully understood the difficulty of terminating a conflict that many in Japan had believed was certain to end in victory. Takagi commented that “there were few people who knew the hardship of the front that was near to the IJA and the IJN, the internal conditions
and destruction; the government and supreme command were desperate, although we hid the truth."\footnote{82}

Takagi, however, was a realist, and he emerged as a critical influence over the emperor in the final phase of the war in the Pacific. By August 1945, Takagi had become an instrumental figure as the “master of war termination,” advocating behind the scenes for an unpopular position: convincing the emperor and key cabinet members to seek an end to the war.\footnote{83} Eventually his efforts helped sway the emperor to make a decision amid a factious cabinet. In the end the emperor took the position that Takagi and the peace faction supported.

Takagi, along with the intellectuals of the Kyoto school, was able to influence the IJN in the final phase of the Pacific War, giving the peace faction within the emperor’s cabinet an accurate assessment of Japan’s true situation. Together they provided Japan’s strategic leadership with sound military advice that took into consideration the impact that continued military operations would have on the civilian population. More importantly, they helped shape the emperor’s evolution from war to peace.

The surrender ceremony, held on the deck of the Third Fleet flagship USS Missouri, was a solemn affair—punctuated by a clear message to the political leadership, armed forces, and people of Japan. During the signing of the Instrument of Surrender, the United States and its allies demonstrated, in the air and on the sea, their enormous military power. Hundreds of U.S. Army and Navy planes flew overhead, while over 250 ships from the United States, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand filled the expanse of Tokyo Bay.\footnote{84} There would be no way for a “stab in the back” myth to arise in Japan; a massive armada had come to the very doorstep of the Japanese mainland to emphasize the vast military power that had defeated Japan and that could be called on again if Japan did not comply with the Instrument of Surrender. Five days later, General MacArthur arrived in Tokyo and raised above the U.S. embassy the American flag—in fact, the very same flag that had flown over Washington, DC, on 7 December 1941 and on the battleship Missouri during the surrender.\footnote{85}

The American victory over Japan was complete. Not only did Japan agree to terminate its military operations and disarm, but it also pledged to work in good faith with U.S. forces in the occupation and rebuilding of Japan. In signing the Instrument of Surrender, Japan agreed to the unconditional surrender of all military forces and to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The emperor would remain in power—under the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. In essence, the arrangements constituted an unconditional surrender for the military but a conditional surrender for the nation. Setting the conditions for a peaceful occupation, Japan also agreed “to obey and enforce all proclamations”
of the supreme commander (MacArthur) and “to carry out the provisions of the
Potsdam Declaration in good faith.”

The transition to a peacetime occupation proceeded remarkably free of con-
flict. Although U.S. occupation forces were given the authority to impose severe
penalties in cases of Japanese noncompliance with occupation directives, the
words of the emperor had allowed the Japanese to absorb their shocking defeat
and begin to work with their former enemy to rebuild their nation. The United
States, however, took no chances. Third Fleet forces, anchored in Tokyo Bay and
the Sagami Sea, trained their big guns on targets ashore, while the initial airborne
and amphibious landing forces on 30 August were equipped with full combat
equipment. Despite a last-ditch coup d'état attempt by a few hard-line IJA offi-
cers who refused to accept the emperor's surrender proclamation, Japanese army
commanders took steps to surrender their sizable forces in Japan and throughout
its overseas empire. General MacArthur was impressed with the level of com-
pliance, reporting that the Japanese in general were “acting in complete good
faith.” This level of compliance would last throughout the seven-year period of
occupation. Leaving the emperor on the throne, despite an outcry in the United
States demanding his removal and punishment, was a critical decision that led to
the relatively smooth transition to peace.

Conflict termination in the Pacific in World War II occurred despite the fact
that each of the combatants was willing and able to carry on the fight into 1946.
Driven by their different strategic objectives—unconditional surrender and a
negotiated settlement—each side sought to translate military action into politi-
cal success, trading lives for political leverage in the postwar period. The United
States was ready to conduct a final campaign to seize and occupy the home is-
lands, while the Japanese planned to incur (and suffer) unprecedented casualties
to force the United States to negotiate a peace short of unconditional surrender.
Fortunately, the strategic leadership on each side was open to compromise. Com-
prehensive understanding of the operational environment allowed the United
States to set the conditions for termination and to understand and appreciate the
importance of the emperor’s continued authority, while the emperor himself un-
derstood Japan's desperate situation and ultimately embraced the peace faction's
willingness to end the fighting.

Compelling Japan to surrender without an Allied invasion of the mainland
prevented tremendous destruction and the unnecessary loss of countless lives. This
represented the epitome of political leverage borne by success on the
battlefield. Postwar analysis by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded the
following: “Japan's acceptance of defeat without invasion while still possessed of
2.5 million combat-equipped troops and 9,000 Kamikaze airplanes in the home
islands, reveals how persuasively the consequences of [U.S.] operations were
translated into political results. With clear strategic and operational objectives, U.S. planners had devised and conducted a series of campaigns and operations in a logical sequence that brought U.S. military forces closer and closer to Japan. By 1945, with U.S. forces poised at the doorstep of the Japanese mainland, the United States had set the conditions for terminating the conflict, while the dropping of the atomic bombs and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria provided the final push to capitulation.

Throughout much of the war, the United States had a clear picture of Japanese capabilities and intentions, and this thorough understanding of the operational environment helped shape detailed planning and the development of termination criteria. With U.S. forces preparing for the final assault on the home islands that would compel the Japanese to surrender at great cost, key strategic leaders, such as Stimson and Grew, understood that unconditional surrender, especially the elimination of the emperor, confronted Japan with an existential threat to its way of life that would prolong the conflict. This understanding of the primacy of the emperor to the nation of Japan allowed President Truman ultimately to embrace the idea of a conditional surrender, at least to the extent of maintaining the emperor under the authority of MacArthur. This compromise appealed sufficiently to the emperor and his inner circle for them to accept it.

The ultimate factor leading to the termination of hostilities in August 1945 was the emperor and his decision to embrace the peace faction in Japan. Under the keen influence of Rear Admiral Takagi, a key segment of Japan’s political and naval leadership pushed for termination to avoid additional bloodshed and save the mainland from certain destruction. Despite the splitting of his inner circle into two camps, the emperor finally made the decision to terminate Japanese military operations when it became clear that continued resistance offered far more risk to the nation than the possible reaction from hard-liners in the IJA. In doing so, he accepted the weakening of his authority in postwar Japan under U.S. leadership, but set the conditions for a successful transition to a peaceful occupation and the rebuilding of his nation.

The thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen who died thousands of miles from home, as well as the hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers, sailors, and civilians who perished right through the waning minutes of the war, are testament to the unprecedented destruction resulting from a global conflict that often did not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. Only relentless operations and careful U.S. planning that resulted from a thorough understanding of the operational environment finally pushed key Japanese civilian and military leaders to terminate the conflict on terms they once had considered unimaginable. In the end, each side was just flexible enough to seek a compromise, modifying their strategic objectives to set conditions for a better
future. In doing so, hundreds of thousands of lives were spared. The occupation of Japan began immediately, and Japan slowly began to rebuild from the ashes of war. More importantly, the United States and Japan would develop a lasting relationship that has been a foundation of stability in the Pacific for almost seventy-five years.

NOTES


2. Although there is no consensus on the definitions of the terms conflict termination and war termination and the terms often are used interchangeably, it is important to note that they are two complementary pieces of the same strategic puzzle. In this article, conflict termination will mean the formal end of military operations (directly related to the military strategic objective), whereas war termination will mean the political process by which civilian leaders come to an agreement on a defined end state (directly related to the national strategic objective).


12. Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, “Campaign Plan Granite,” 13 January 1944, Strategic Plans Division Records, box 138, Record Group 38, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.


15. Ibid., pp. 13–17.
17. Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Planning Date for the End of the War against Japan,” 13 September 1944, in Occupation of Japan.
23. CINCPAC Advance to ALPOA, 10 August 1945, in “Command Summary of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN” [hereafter “Nimitz Graybook”], vol. 7, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI.
27. Joseph Grew to the President, “Analysis of Memo Presented by Mr. Hoover,” 13 June 1945, NSA.
28. Stimson to the President, memorandum, “Proposed Program for Japan,” 2 July 1945, NSA.
29. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Pacific Strategy.”
37. Nimitz to King, 3 August 1945, in “Nimitz Graybook,” vol. 7.
43. For recent assessments of these issues, see Hasegawa, The End of the Pacific War; Tamon Suzuki, Shusen no Seijishi 1943–1945 [Japan’s road to surrender; Political history, 1943–1945] (Tokyo: Tokyo Univ. Press, 2011); and Kanji Akagi and Ryosuke Takita, “Syusenshi kenkyu no genzai: Genbakutouka Sorensansen Ronso to Sonogo” [Japan’s decision to surrender: A historiographical review], Keio Univ. Graduate School of Law Journal of Law, Politics, and Sociology 89, no. 9 (September 2016).

44. In its postwar analysis the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey argues as follows: “In all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.” U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan’s Struggle to End the War, p. 13. Historians have criticized this analysis roundly; see Kort, The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb, pp. 82–85.


46. Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff,” 2 September 1944, in Occupation of Japan.

47. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: Which Was More Important in Japan’s Decision to Surrender?,” in The End of the Pacific War, ed. Hasegawa, p. 114. Hasegawa argues that the Soviet assault was more influential than the atomic bombs in convincing Japan to surrender but admits that “neither the atomic bombs nor Soviet entry into the war served as a ‘knock-out’ punch that had a direct, decisive, and immediate effect on Japan’s decision to surrender.”


51. Stimson to the President, “Proposed Program for Japan.”

52. “Minutes of White House Meeting, 18 June 1945,” p. 207.

53. Sigal, Fighting to a Finish, pp. 127, 250.


55. Ibid., pp. 3–7.


57. Kaigunsho Chosaka [The Navy Ministry’s research section], “Touron Tekki” [Discussion summary], Kaicho Kenkyushiryo (Toku) P Dai 2gou furoku [Navy research material (special) no. 2 supplement].


63. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan’s Struggle to End the War, pp. 4–5.


69. Frank, Downfall, p. 272.
71. Sigal, Fighting to a Finish, p. 269.
73. Sigal, Fighting to a Finish, p. 272.
76. Takagi emerged from humble beginnings to become a successful naval officer and a key advocate for peace. Born in Kumamoto Prefecture on 9 August 1893 to a life of poverty, he worked diligently to receive a degree in physics from Tokyo Imperial University before graduating from the IJN Academy in 1915, ranked twenty-seventh out of ninety-six. After Takagi was commissioned an ensign he was assigned to the cruisers Chitose and Akashi. Graduating from Japan’s Naval War College in 1927 before serving as naval attaché to France until 1930, Takagi served as a secretary to the navy minister for two years and then as an instructor at the Naval War College from 1933 to 1936. In the following year Takagi was promoted to captain and became chief of the Navy Ministry’s research section, where he began to exchange opinions with outside experts, including Dr. Kitarō Nishida of Kyoto University. Concerned with the direction of the IJN, he organized a “brain trust” of private intellectuals that played an active part in intelligence, policy making, philosophy, politics, and diplomacy. After the war, Takagi became deputy cabinet secretary in the Higashikuni cabinet in September 1945. In addition, he lectured about war guidance in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Staff College for eighteen years, from 1958 to 1975, always seeking to advise the younger students. He died in 1979 at the age of eighty-five.
82. Kajiojiteitai Kanbugakko [JMSDF Command and Staff College], “Kaigun no Naibu” [Inside IJN], Takagi Sōkichi Bunko [Sōkichi Takagi Library].
85. “Naval Operations in the Pacific from March 1944 to October 1945.”
86. Instrument of Surrender (Japan), 2 September 1945, available at www.archivesfoundation.org/.
89. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan’s Struggle to End the War, p. 1.
IT’S A GRAY, GRAY WORLD

Nadia Schadlow

In a thought-provoking essay for the Winter 2020 issue of the Naval War College Review, Don Stoker and Craig Whiteside argue against the utility of two terms: gray-zone conflict and hybrid war. These terms, they explain, are intended to capture a range of political, economic, military, and technological activities that our adversaries and competitors use to shape political decisions and outcomes, but that fall below the threshold of violence. Stoker and Whiteside contend that although these constructs are “prominent and fashionable” they detract from America’s ability to think clearly about political, military, and strategic issues and “their vitally important connections.” The authors go so far as to advocate the elimination of these terms from the “strategic lexicon.”

I believe the opposite. The concepts, ideas, and activities comprising the gray zone as well as hybrid war remain quite useful, since they reflect the nature of today’s ongoing political competitions; help to explain the mind-sets and modes of operation of our adversaries and competitors; and compel a broader group of Americans to consider their role in the competitions currently under way.

THE WORLD IS NOT BINARY

Stoker and Whiteside argue that the gray-zone concept feeds a “dangerous tendency to confuse war and peace.” The authors reject the idea of a “spectrum of conflict” because it “fails to delineate between war and peace”; in fact, they reject any analysis that fails to honor “the critical distinction.” They argue that peace and war are defined best in opposition to one another: when states
go to war they are “using violence to get something they want,” and most “new so-called classifications of war would be instantly killed if properly examined” through this lens.

This binary lens, however, belies the geopolitical realities we face. The world is not as neat or precise as the authors wish it to be. It is shortsighted to reject an entire set of activities that are not violent (although they may lead to violence) because they do not fit into their paradigm of the “critical distinction” between war and peace. As I have written in the past, the “space between war and peace is a landscape churning with political, economic, and security competitions that require constant attention.” In the authors’ binary conception, peace is oddly static (whereas it actually is not), and all other activities must be closer to violence if they are to be considered part of war.

One need glance at only a few weeks’ worth of news to see the range of strategically competitive activities that fit into neither the war nor peace paradigm. These include China’s recent decisions to buy up U.S. firms going bankrupt because of COVID-19, so as to acquire key technologies, as well as Beijing’s disinformation campaigns related to the virus. The authors’ binary view of the geopolitical landscape seems to ignore Sun Tzu’s observation that “the perfection of strategy would be to produce a decision without any serious fighting.”

How would the authors interpret efforts by China to encourage Europeans to adopt Huawei’s telecommunications hardware—a key part of an unfolding competition over control of information and data? It is not purely “peace,” yet neither does it encompass the violence of war; however, it is strategically important. What would they call China’s building of artificial islands in the South China Sea? This is an act without violence, but one that has shifted the status quo fundamentally. Is that an act of war? Or part of a competition designed to shift circumstances in Beijing’s favor, without violence? Is that purely peaceful?

The authors’ binary view also contrasts with the emerging view of the Department of Defense (DoD), captured in the Joint Staff’s draft manual on campaigns and operations, which notes that “competition is its own unique, challenging, and indefinite contest for influence, position, and leverage”; which describes a concept of campaigning that explicitly can take place below the threshold of armed conflict; and which explains that the most “successful competitor accomplishes its aims without invading, occupying, or destroying other regimes, but rather subordinating them.”

Moreover, Stoker and Whiteside are somewhat inconsistent in their complaint that the terms are “fashionable” (which suggests contemporary), and yet that there is “nothing new” about them. Discussions about hybrid war have become “fashionable” again because the activities associated with that concept continue to occur, and because Americans needed to refresh their memories. Russia was
revving up its disinformation bots to sow divisions within our democracy, China was continuing its aggressive theft of intellectual property, and North Korea kept hacking U.S. databases. In recent years, policy analysts and historians had a chance to remind policy makers—many of whom are too young even to remember the Cold War(!)—that while these types of activities may not be new, they warrant fresh study in the current context.

UNDERSTANDING THE OTHER
Second, precisely because our key competitors have developed a body of thinking related to the gray zone, there is reason enough to study these concepts. A central part of strategy—whether military or grand—is the need to understand “the other,” the object of the strategy. This creates the dialectic inherent in the way strategy unfolds and the adaptations that must be made along the way. The concept of “red teaming” is based on this need to adapt and update, depending on how an adversary responds.\(^2\) Zachary Shore’s excellent book *A Sense of the Enemy* describes the need to develop strategic empathy—the “skill of stepping out of our own heads and into the minds of others.”\(^3\)

Activities such as political subversion, cyber-enabled economic theft, and control over lines of communication (to mention just a few) are part of our competitors’ playbooks; understanding the range of these activities can help American leaders, policy analysts, and private-sector decision makers develop a more realistic picture of the geopolitical landscape. However imperfect these terms are, they describe an important part of the lexicons of our adversaries and competitors, and how they think about strategy, competition, and war.

In recent years, General Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s chief of the General Staff, captured the essence of Russia’s thinking about hybrid and gray-zone activities. His 2013 article, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” describes the blending of political, economic, and military power exerted against adversaries.\(^4\) The scholar Dima Adamsky explained that Russia’s concept of *warfare* has as its conceptual core “an amalgamation of hard and soft power across various domains, through skillful application of coordinated military, diplomatic, and economic tools.” Other experts have explained that key characteristics of this type of war include the idea of *persistence*, which breaks down the traditional binary delineation between war and peace, since hybrid strategies are “always underway.”\(^5\) Even though some analysts criticize those who read too much into Gerasimov’s view, the fact is that Russia thinks about and develops operational concepts that use a range of nonkinetic tools that fall below the threshold of conventional conflict to shape strategic outcomes.\(^6\)

China too operates in the gray zone. Its range of activities includes not only those that are overtly military, such as military intimidation, but others within
the political and economic domains, such as the co-opting of state-affiliated businesses, information operations, lawfare and diplomacy, and economic coercion. Experts have described the “five shades” of China’s gray-zone strategies.

In his recent book *The Dragons and the Snakes*, strategist David Kilcullen observes that there are specific, sequenced activities that take place in a “liminal warfare campaign.” He describes *liminal warfare* as competition at the “threshold” of war and advocates learning from our adversaries, to include Russian notions of *decisive shaping* and *creative ambiguity*. Kilcullen explains that China’s expanded conception of *warfare* includes “mobilizing multiple dimensions of national power outside the traditional military-owned domains.” He urges Western countries to do better at conceptualizing these domains and organizing within them.

The gray zone might sit uncomfortably between war and peace, but that is due to our narrowly defined constructs of war and peace; our competitors are more flexible. When Stoker and Whiteside argue that these techniques are not real or legitimate, they inadvertently show how hybrid operators exploit the rigidity of our conventional concepts to achieve an advantage before we even understand what they are doing. Continued study and awareness of these concepts can help us avoid getting caught off guard.

**PERPETUAL WAR?**

A third reason for thinking twice about discarding these concepts is that contemporary democracies are uncomfortable with operating in a state of perpetual war. In our democracy, it will be a long time, if ever, before organizations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will think of their activities as a part of war. Yet USAID’s tools and instruments of aid can be as strategically important as the movement of an aircraft carrier. Forcing the range of strategically meaningful hybrid activities to fit into the category of war is simply not accurate, and demanding that they stay within the construct of peace avoids a consideration of the competitive element of these nonkinetic instruments. Moreover, this binary view detracts from the ongoing imperative that individuals outside our military and intelligence structures play important roles in the competitions we now face. The gray zone concept, while imperfect, captures the continuum of competition in which other parts of our democracy must engage.

And that is a good thing. It gives a broader group of Americans a stake in this competition. In a democracy, a whole-of-government approach requires improving and deploying a set of important activities that fall below the threshold of violence. In democracies such as the United States and its allies and partners, it is impractical to think of key economic, political, and informational activities as a part of war. It has been hard enough to inject a more competitive mind-set
into nonmilitary and nonintelligence agencies! It is difficult to imagine that our diplomats at the State Department or our experts at the Departments of Energy and Agriculture ever will see themselves as being in a continual state of war; they are much more likely to understand the competitive space we face.

In addition, since so many required U.S. capabilities are tied to different congressional authorities, the “all war” construct does not work within our legislative branch, where committees and authorities that shape our nonmilitary instruments are not the same as those that control our defense or intelligence agencies. Yet we must ensure that other U.S. government agencies remain a critical part of the campaign to protect the country from subversion, precisely because, as the authors state, while neither Russia nor China is at war with the United States, “both constantly practice forms of subversion against the United States, such as meddling in political campaigns and all forms of hacking.”

Many of the elements required to prevail in long-term competition with China are not in the hands or within the purview of DoD. These include the many activities and tools within the economic domain, from understanding how China uses our capital markets to its advantage, to forced tech transfers, to supply-chain vulnerabilities. We could lose the “war” without violence, before DoD was even involved. Conceptualizing gray zone or hybrid warfare is not an effort to create an “illogical, imaginary category of war” but rather a recognition that departments and agencies beyond DoD, as well as businesses and academia, have a role to play.

The strategist Colin Gray, who passed away recently, was correct in his observation that the United States often lacked the “extreme patience” required to achieve its political goals. He attributed this impatience to public pressure to achieve swift, decisive victories. He explained that “time is a weapon, [and] the mindset needed to combat an enemy who is playing a long game is not one that comes naturally to the American soldier or, for that matter, to the American public.” Achieving long-term political goals is the reason that states engage in this long game—one that entails a range of competitions that fall below the threshold of violence—even if this constant campaigning fits only imperfectly into our intellectual constructs.

NOTES


KEY PUBLICATIONS FOR THE ESSENTIAL STUDY OF WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY

Mary Raum


The year 2020 will mark the twentieth anniversary of the formal beginning of the global initiative on women, peace, and security (WPS) introduced by the United Nations (UN) Security Council, when that body unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 in acknowledgment of the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women and girls. The year 2020 also will mark ten years of the Naval War College formally recognizing WPS as a program of effort.

Today, Resolution 1325 is considered a watershed political framework highlighting that women and gender perspectives are relevant to negotiating peace agreements, planning refugee camps, developing programs for conflict inclusion, conducting peacekeeping operations, and reconstructing war-torn societies for sustainable peace. While the word “women” is part of the title of the resolution, the scope of the WPS field is not so narrow. The field no longer is regarded as just a gendered set

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of issues; replacing that singular scope are programs, ideas, and missions that are part of the global peace and security platform that involves all populations experiencing preconflict, conflict, and postconflict situations.

Crucial records of conversations in the area are hard to find. As occurs in all paradigm shifts, while the WPS domain has achieved maturity over two decades of growth and change, the creation of original written installations and inputs, by those who were in the WPS arena from its inception, has reached a plateau. Many originators—those with the deepest and longest-lasting experience as initiators of WPS programs—have moved on. Now there is arising the publication of second-and third-tier books claiming an association with WPS. This new wave tends to underestimate the globalized, interdisciplinary expertise required to publish a seminal work. Keeping the WPS agenda crisp and moving forward requires filtering through the piles of junk that keep appearing to recognize writing that is of long-term value and high quality and that demonstrates theoretical and practical knowledge and penetrating analysis about WPS. It is the latter sort of works that will pay benefits to future generations.

The three books reviewed here fit that category, not only because of their future value, but also because their authors have devoted a minimum of a decade of effort to some aspect of WPS, whether as military personnel, researchers, program organizers, or field-workers.

CONFLICT-RELATED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: TRANSFORMING TRANSITION

While book specialists place Aisling Swaine’s Conflict-Related Violence against Women under the category of international law, her work is far more than a legal treatise. Sexual violence and its impacts on conflict and peace constitute a critical and growing area of interest. The subject has received increased attention at the UN level as constituting a challenge to peaceful societies. Between 2008 and 2019, the institution passed six new resolutions directed at the problem. Two primary events brought official attention to this form of violence: the 1993 mass rapes of Yugoslavian women, which helped lead to creation of the International Criminal Tribunal; and the 1994 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which for the first time defined rape as a war crime. Swaine’s book stands out among those that address sexual violence and war because the author, as a humanitarian aid specialist, has met and lived among women and in their communities. The book’s approach to the subject is unique because it does not merely present alarmist data and stories, as most examinations do. Swaine’s discourse does more than measure violence and report on it; it offers new thinking about the qualitative nature of the phenomenon of sexual violence.

The course of the conversation does not keep to the normal, narrow, definitional range, that of the war rape of women; instead, its scope expands to include
all people who experience these extremely damaging and demeaning situations, including investigating physical, emotional, and economic injuries linked to the abuse. Violence is defined in a new way: as being ambulant, not static. The author considers transgressors who commit acts of physical criminality and inflict forms of emotional and physical loss as being the paramount factor in the sexual violence equation. The book also explores whether peacetime violence can provide a clue to what may happen during a conflict. The discussion differentiates between the prevailing “transitional” attitude applied to sexual violence after a conflict and a recommendation to embrace transformational approaches, and especially to take into consideration the numerous additional harms arising from and associated with this form of viciousness.

As support for these ideas, the author presents three case studies covering sexual violence: in the Southeast Asian nation of Timor-Leste, in Northern Ireland, and in the West African coastal nation of the Republic of Liberia. Selecting three distinct cultures to serve as backdrops enhances understanding of sexual violence’s ties to conflict. Conflict-Related Violence is well researched, with all referenced citations drawing on informative sources, and it is evident that the work is a first-person creation, not a jog through Google hits. Its only weakness is that at times its “dissertation-speak” outweighs the author’s more naturally formulated philosophical thoughts and ruminations.

WOMEN AND GENDER PERSPECTIVES IN THE MILITARY: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
Another must-read for any person connected with WPS is a review of the newest work, edited by Robert Egnell and Mayesha Alam, titled Women and Gender Perspectives in the Military: An International Comparison. Egnell is one of the most significant documenters of WPS themes and stands as an important change agent in putting forward ideas about the global WPS agenda, with an emphasis on the security and military aspects of WPS. Egnell's role as an active-duty captain in the Swedish army reserve, his advanced theoretical knowledge, and his current post as vice-chancellor of the Swedish Defence University make his contributions unique. He knows the military, knows the security sector, and thinks deeply about WPS. His coeditor, Mayesha Alam, is one of the founding members and served as deputy director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security in Washington, DC, and she has experience in policy design and implementation with the UN and the World Bank.

Included in the volume are twelve pieces by different authors, all of whom are recognizable to those who have been involved with WPS over the past two decades. Both cross-national analyses and process and contextual elements—from Sweden, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, the United States, NATO, and UN peacekeeping—are represented. Inclusion of treatments of the nations
of Australia, the Netherlands, and Sweden was essential owing to their cutting-edge approaches to accepting WPS thinking and inculcating it into their defense psyches. If there are any weaknesses to this selection they are a heavy emphasis on nations that have not experienced and are not experiencing conflict intrusions and a reliance on examples from social democratic systems of governance. It also is well past the time when the female engagement team, dating from the era of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, should continue to serve as the U.S. example of WPS security-sector experience. More essential now is to ruminate on the modernization of the U.S. military, which formally has sanctioned the entrance of women into the combat arms; as that evolution unfolds, there will be numerous important new areas for discussion.

The book has value as both a text and an informational resource. It embraces a wide swath of important topics specific to the security sector. It provides a meaningful review regarding military patriarchies, and a walk through both the four pillars of UN Resolution 1325 (known as participation, prevention, protection, and gender mainstreaming) and the positive repercussions that result when a gender perspective is added to military systems. One piece covers the history of how the UN resolution evolved and who was influential in inserting the gender question into global affairs. Other unique ideas presented are soldier discrimination, internal military gender regimes, and case-based studies highlighting the Australian Defence Forces and the South African military gender programs. The editors conclude with a set of concise, thoughtful, and vital takeaways drawn from the contributions chosen for this volume; they also emphasize the difficulties involved in generalizing about such a complicated field of effort.

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY

Every person involved in the WPS field should at least review the content of this first Oxford handbook on the subject. It is likely to be the most crucial, exhaustive resource on WPS extant in this decade. Coeditor Sara E. Davies holds a professorship at the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University in Australia; Jacqui True occupies a professorship of international relations, serves as director of the Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre, is an Australian Research Council Future Fellow, and is a Global Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo in Norway.

The size of this work—869 pages—precludes it from being a mobile resource, so its greatest value is as a desk reference. As is typical of products from Oxford University Press, given its high standards, this presentation is of exceptional quality and range. The sixty-seven contributors are all leading scholars, advocates, and policy makers with links to WPS. The scope of the ideas treated is vast, so the handbook is organized into six primary parts: concepts of WPS, pillars of WPS,
institutionalizing WPS, implementing WPS, cross-cutting agenda connections and mainstreaming, and ongoing and future challenges. Not only is the content within each part useful to researchers and practitioners of WPS, but the organization of the content also is well developed. Very few existing compilations ensure first that the theoretical and contextual ideas represented in the formal aspects of Resolution 1325 are dealt with, then follow up by recounting implementation experiences. Nor is the effort often made, as it is here, to incorporate the field’s updated philosophy: that WPS is a cross-cutting security-sector platform, no longer merely a one-dimensional concern. A final segment highlighting future challenges allows a review of the qualitative and quantitative ideas that some of the best thinkers in the field see as fundamental to achieving progress.

Some exciting content in the first half of the handbook includes the discourse on the contested meanings of WPS, as well as what produces success and what tends to fail programmatically across the four WPS pillars. The international relations topics treated are broadly inclusive, embracing transnational networks; NATO; and the world’s least-addressed regions—the African Union, Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Americas. Both the programmatic and field-experience aspects of implementation programs are described for the nations of Afghanistan, Australia, China, Norway, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Syria. This geographical selection provides a mix of information, ranging from that drawn from the more peaceful Western societies of Norway and Australia to that pertaining to parts of the world where women have experienced extensively documented gendered violence and abuse. PNG is representative of places where levels of violence against women are particularly virulent, owing to the social legitimization of abuses of human rights. In Sierra Leone, the brutality visited on women over an eleven-year civil war, the current situation of food insecurity, and the lack of access to agricultural resources portray a cross-cutting example of the long-term stressors that impact women particularly. Syria provides an example in which formal rights for women exist on the statute books but extremists continually impose restrictions on these same statutory rights.

Some of the insights presented, while perhaps not exclusive to this volume, are included in WPS readings only rarely. Among these are deliberations about gender and disabilities, LGBTI inclusivity, and postcolonialism; the last mentioned examines the impacts on present-day cultures of the social and political bases of past societies. Also worth noting is coverage of two of the newest WPS debate zones: the contested meaning of WPS; and the challenges involved in, but also the importance of, formally monitoring and analyzing the field of WPS regarding scholarship, book content, and academic programs.
It is a daunting task to attempt to write a single-volume history of World War II at sea from 1939 to 1945, covering all the participants in all the theaters of that global conflict. I am intimately aware of the many pitfalls that await the historian who has the hubris to try, since I too wrote a book on this topic, published two years ago (World War II at Sea, Oxford Univ. Press, 2018). I therefore applaud Evan Mawdsley of Glasgow University for taking up the challenge. It is a bit delicate for a reviewer to evaluate a book so similar to one that he himself has written, but since the works complement one another, I think it can be done fairly.

Interestingly, both books divide the war into five parts of about five chapters each. The fact that the authors did this independently suggests that the war in fact can be differentiated into identifiable phases: the European war, Britain alone, the global war at sea, the growing Allied domination, and the final victory. Each of us also covered the Battle of the Atlantic, or the war on trade, in three chapters embedded in separate parts of the narrative; this too suggests that we are on to something.

The first decision the writer of any complex subject has to make is whether to approach it chronologically or topically. World War II was, after all, a huge, sprawling conflict, so telling its maritime story in sequence means bouncing around from theater to theater all over the globe. Mawdsley instead chooses the topical approach, offering separate chapters on naval aviation, intelligence, and amphibious warfare, for example. This allows him to develop themes and follow through with the consequences of one or another technology or decision. On the other hand, that approach compels him to insert periodic notes into the text indicating that issues raised while developing particular themes were “discussed previously,” “have already been described,” or are forthcoming, “as will be seen.” These create a kind of narrative speed bump, especially for those not grounded in the chronological structure of the war.

Another decision concerns coverage. Including every convoy, skirmish, and naval confrontation in the war would transform the book into a compendium or an encyclopedia rather than a history. And, of course, including more of the...
smaller actions necessarily means devoting less space to the critically important ones. Coverage is always a delicate matter, for while leaving something out invites criticism that the book is incomplete, limiting coverage of the critical turning points invites criticism of another kind.

Mawdsley has chosen to be inclusive, and he covers a number of events that are overlooked in most general histories (including my own), such as the British raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway (Operation CLAYMORE) in 1941 and the invasion of Madagascar (Operation IRONCLAD) in 1942, as well as extensive coverage of the Soviet navy in both the Baltic and Black Seas. All that comes with a cost, of course; running to six hundred pages, Mawdsley’s book is not short, and yet it occasionally feels crowded as events pile up on one another—although no doubt that is how the war felt to those who fought it as well.

Mawdsley is not afraid to make judgments. He argues, for example, that the role of “special intelligence” (ULTRA) has been greatly exaggerated and that Hitler gave up on the invasion of England (Operation SEA LION) before the Battle of Britain even began. He defends Churchill’s decision to attack the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, asserting that it was “correct” (p. 71), and concedes that the Dieppe raid was “badly planned,” for which Mountbatten “deserves some blame” (p. 282). In the Pacific, Mawdsley concludes that Kimmel and Short were “rightly held responsible” for being unready on 7 December 1941 (p. 182) and that Nagumo was “surely right” not to approve a third aerial attack against Pearl Harbor (p. 181).

It would be inappropriate for me to recommend one of these books over the other. Therefore I merely will suggest here that those interested in the naval war from 1939 to 1945 should read (and buy) both of them.

CRAIG L. SYMONDS


As Charles D. Allen states in the foreword, “70 to 80 percent of organizational change efforts fail” (p. vii). Numerous reasons exist why initiatives to improve an organization’s performance, effectiveness, or morale do not succeed: incorrect problem diagnosis, poor planning or resourcing, strategy mismatch to culture, and resistance, among others. U.S. Army War College professor Thomas P. Galvin’s well-researched primer effectively distills numerous organizational change philosophies and strategies into a practical and intuitive guidebook for military professionals at all levels.

A plethora of books on organizational change exists, with an Amazon.com search returning hundreds of results. Professor Galvin tailors his approach to the unique challenges of the military, which prepares for an uncertain future environment that before the crucible of operations and combat can only be simulated.

He argues that most change efforts are too process oriented, at the expense of the often-overlooked context of the environment and the content of the change effort, which explain its purpose and the path to success. To this end, he develops a framework similar to the military’s planning process that emphasizes context and content,
with sequences of questions to aid in navigating all stages of change efforts. Galvin argues that understanding the context requires correctly diagnosing the problem, gauging receptivity to the proposed change, and determining whether it even warrants expending the resources. Although hierarchical, military organizations are complex adaptive systems, highlighting the difficulty in tracing causal links and often resulting in misdiagnosis. Factors that gauge receptivity to the change include internal and external environmental pressures; the level of trust and empowerment within the organization; and, for distributed organizations, the fit between the change agenda and local contexts. We live in an age of data analytics, and often suffer from survey fatigue. Therefore, taking the time to determine what data to collect for analysis is essential and may flush out fundamental issues that need to be addressed before implementation can proceed.

The most valuable section deals with forecasting, which is the glue of the content portion of the book. This links the vision, plan, and communication effort. While still an endeavor of uncertainty, forecasting is differentiated from prediction in that it is more quantifiable and probabilistic. Although many tools exist within the Department of Defense to paint this picture, making a convincing case remains a challenge from the strategic to the tactical level. As General Martin Dempsey said in an interview with Kelly Brownell for the 9 September 2016 Making It Matter podcast concerning the significant cuts imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Act, “When people ask me if I have any regrets during my four years as Chairman, one of them in particular is I really never managed to convince the Congress of the United States that what they were doing to the military budget would have a detrimental effect over time . . . It’s hard to articulate words like risk, they can be parsed and they can be twisted or turned, or words like readiness.” His salient point highlights the difficulties leaders have in articulating future risk and promoting change.

Professor Galvin recommends constructing dual narratives of future undesired and desired end states, with the former describing a status quo that risks mission failure and the latter a version in which competitive advantage is restored. His principles of preparedness consist of a series of questions to spark development of these competing stories and include tangible and abstract performance metrics. While vivid imagery, framing, and marketing can help sell an idea, Galvin correctly asserts that credibility demands rigor. Narratives must limit negations, refrain from sounding unduly alarmist, and avoid one's being perceived as simply a cheerleader. Once all elements are established, the concept should be expressed as a cognitive journey in practical and actionable terms, with obstacles and barriers presented as challenges that can and must be overcome.

Galvin's primer is filled with invaluable insights, frameworks, and anecdotes. He provides examples of failed changes, including General Eric K. Shinseki's decision to switch from standard headgear to the black beret and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld's attempt to transition to the National Security Personnel System. However, selection of a case study, vignette, or scenario applicable to any number of situations and woven throughout the
entire primer or as a separate annex might have stitched the elements of the book tighter together and made it resonate more. Regardless, leaders at all levels who want to increase their chances of successfully implementing and sustaining an organizational change effort will benefit from making this an essential addition to their tool kit.

KENNETH M. SANDLER


Despite battlefield success in both Iraq and Afghanistan over the past fifteen years, the threat environment confronting the United States and its Marine Corps only has grown more dangerous. The United States now confronts a variety of challenges both old and new, including the return of great-power conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and Europe; operating in (what until recently has been called) an antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) battle space; nuclear proliferation; and navigating the effects of global climate change on military operations. Such an environment calls for both refining old solutions and thinking in new, bold ways to ensure that the U.S. military—and especially, for purposes of this review, the Marine Corps—is ready to meet, fight, and defeat any future threats.

Author Anthony Piscitelli leverages his years of State Department and academic experience to map the evolution of the Marine Corps’s approach to war in the post–Vietnam War era, all the while highlighting the personalities involved in that process. Piscitelli’s work ultimately is most useful, though, not for reviewing why the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare but for providing a model for instituting structural changes at the service level necessary for future battlefield success.

Following the Vietnam War, a combination of external and internal pressures led the Marine Corps to institutionalize and train to a war-fighting philosophy it had practiced to varying degrees throughout its history. The Marine Corps Way of War details how the Marine Corps had practiced elements of maneuver warfare from Belleau Wood to Beirut. This historical survey provides the context for the interpersonal and bureaucratic battles that Piscitelli then recounts that led to the Corps’s full embrace of maneuver warfare in the post-Vietnam era.

Piscitelli then uses an excellent combination of first-person interviews and after-action reports to summarize how the Corps’s success in all the humanitarian operations, low-intensity conflicts, and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after Vietnam resulted from the major internal and external bureaucratic struggles over the service’s future during that era. The book’s emphasis on education and the impact of maneuver warfare on Marines’ professional development also deserves mention. Piscitelli’s decision to explore how the adoption of maneuver warfare also forced the Corps to rethink the professional development of its enlisted and officer populations underscores how the human element of war remains the most important variable in any conflict. One should be forgiven for thinking that parts of the book serve as justification for MCDP-1, Warfighting.

Yet, despite providing an excellent analysis that explores how the Corps
evolved into its current form, the book disappoints readers who want to learn more about the implications of maneuver warfare on future battlefields. Although one might argue that such a discussion falls outside the scope of this work, it seems like a missed opportunity not to devote some pages to answering that question. How will the Marine Corps use maneuver warfare to fight in an A2/AD environment? What capabilities does the Corps need to exploit Russia’s or China’s critical vulnerabilities? How does the service operate effectively and jointly in a twenty-first-century great-power conflict? Similarly, one also wonders how changes to the Marine Corps’s maneuver-warfare theory that may be necessary to succeed on future battlefields will alter the professional development and training of the service’s next generation of recruits. Institutions such as the Basic School or Marine Combat Training might need a face-lift. Military occupation schools also will need to rethink how they equip their students with the skills necessary to support the Corps’s war-fighting philosophy in future fights.

One question Piscitelli does answer about the future of maneuver warfare is how the service can promote the institutional change necessary to confront future challenges. His discussion of the informal civilian advocacy networks and formal top-down leadership that Marine leaders used to transform the Corps after Vietnam provides a possible blueprint to effect future force shaping. This might be the book’s greatest contribution to current national security narratives, because it highlights how America’s most unique service can facilitate effectively the necessary structural, service-level changes to the force.

ADAM TAYLOR


The last few years have seen a surge in titles covering different aspects of the Royal Navy’s submarine service during the Cold War. Together, these have provided the armchair naval enthusiast with welcome insights into a famously understated and secretive part of that service’s recent history. Whereas the majority of these titles have been written either by those who have commanded ships and submarines or by historians with long naval connections, this book is distinctly different, coming as it does from neither of these backgrounds. Instead, this is an intensely personal account of one man’s naval journey: from curious schoolboy learning the naval “religion,” through some early personal disappointments, and finally to his emergence as a successful and highly respected member of the elite brotherhood of nuclear-qualified engineers. The book is different because the mystique of command at sea is not the centerpiece, having been replaced by the equally demanding but far less well understood world of nuclear safety, with its attendant “zero defect” mentality.

Thompson is perhaps perfectly suited to weave this tale. A career naval officer and early volunteer for submarines who was forced to make an early “course change” into the engineering specialization on account of his eyesight, his destiny became inextricably bound up with the buildup of the nuclear submarine force in the United Kingdom. In his case, this was reinforced further by the adoption of the Polaris missile system and the ballistic-missile
submarine as the major elements of that nation’s independent nuclear deterrent. Although he glosses over it, he was one of the few to make the transition successfully into higher-level nuclear management, which took him right to the pinnacle of his specialization. He therefore can offer his readers an almost unique perspective into the world of nuclear engineering, from the deckplates right through to higher-level policy making. Paradoxically, though, his illustrious career almost was cut off at the knees when his earnest, and in some ways naive, early efforts attracted some unwarranted judgment from colleagues with a less-than-nurturing disposition. How many others of us suffered similar, “there but for the grace of God” moments like these? Endowed with a wry sense of humor and a literary bent, Thompson paints at times a disquieting picture of the darker, human side of life in submarines. His characters are portrayed vividly, and anyone who has served will recognize their types instantly. Some may take exception with what, at times, seems a lengthy preoccupation with his own youthful insecurities, so the book will not be everyone’s cup of tea, focusing as it does on the author’s personal experiences and observations as opposed to the larger policy issues of the day. That said, the book does in passing provide some useful insights into the development of the Tigerfish wire-guided torpedo and the administration of nuclear safety directives at the higher command level. There are also memorable, lighter moments, such as the vivid description of “corporate constipation,” caused by the failure of the sewage treatment plant, as well as the many mishaps that inevitably befall mariners who essentially are deprived of their senses with regard to their immediate surroundings.

In sum, this is a book for those interested in knowing what it was like to live in submarines during the Cold War. Those seeking coverage of matters of policy and strategy probably will be better served elsewhere.

ANGUS ROSS


Americans often think of the vast Indian Ocean as the “rear area” of the Pacific Ocean—a featureless expanse notable mainly for the goods, services, and military forces that traverse it. The view from New Delhi and Beijing is profoundly different. Beijing recognizes that the flow of energy, raw materials, and finished goods across the Indian Ocean is essential to China’s economic success. Chairman Xi Jinping’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is, in part, a strategic investment in securing these sea lines of communication. In just over a decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has gone from being an occasional visitor to the Indian Ocean to a constantly deployed presence, supported by its first formal overseas base, at Djibouti. The Indian Ocean will become, as one Chinese scholar writes, “a normal region for the PLAN’s combat reach in the future” (p. 94). India, traditionally the dominant regional power, views these developments with concern, even as it considers its own interests in the traditionally Chinese-dominated areas of the western Pacific.
In response, David Brewster, a specialist in Indo-Pacific maritime security at the Australian National University, has assembled Indian, Australian, Chinese, and American experts to consider the maritime trajectory of the region. Indian scholars make up the majority of the contributors, while the Australian authors offer views influenced by the unique position of their nation: politically close to the United States, economically tied to China, and physically at the crossroads between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

As the subtitle suggests, competition is an assumed reality throughout the thirteen collected essays. Through the diverse views in this volume, the complexity underlying this competition emerges—and with it a discussion of why both India and China struggle to understand, much less assuage, each other’s suspicions. On the Indian side, intellectual understanding of China’s genuine interests in the region collides with an “Indian Monroe Doctrine” dating to the administration of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister. Unclear and inconsistently articulated, it remains an idea that, if “not actually a policy . . . is at least a preferred objective” of Indian policy makers (p. 20). The Indian view of Chinese maritime activity also is influenced by ongoing conflict with China over land borders and a perception that China has worked to minimize India’s rightful role in multiple international organizations.

Meanwhile, contributions from Indian, American, and Australian scholars are particularly harsh in describing China’s failure to consider the suspicion and resistance that Chinese maritime expansion has produced. India scholar Pramit Pal Chaudhuri quotes former Indian national security advisor Shivshankar Menon’s characterization of China as an “autistic superpower”—unable, by its very nature, to understand India’s concerns (p. 61). American John Garver asserts that a constructed narrative of national exceptionalism and peaceful Ming dynasty voyages of discovery limits China’s ability to understand India’s apprehensions about China’s rise as a naval power. Australian Rory Medcalf describes official and unofficial Chinese explanations of its Indian Ocean presence as being so conspicuously inconsistent with regional perceptions that they themselves contribute to suspicions.

Calling India “oversensitive,” Yunnan University economics professor Zhu Li offers a case study in that narrative. Asserting that OBOR is an international, rather than a Chinese-led, initiative, he outlines the essential choice being offered to India—since it cannot stop the OBOR initiative, it should partner with China and claim a slice of the economic benefits. You Ji from the University of Macau, in contrast, offers a blunt vision of the Chinese military role in the Indian Ocean. Noting that the 2015 revision to China’s National Defense Strategy calls for “projecting battles far away from China’s homeland,” the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is working to extend its “war fighting into the global commons” (pp. 91–92). In this context, he asserts that “the PLA’s land reclamation in the Spratlys was meant to . . . establish forward deployment en route to the Indian Ocean” (p. 96).

Nonetheless, Darshana Baruah describes India’s evolving maritime domain awareness strategy as a response to issues beyond just China. Terrorism and the proliferation of advanced naval capabilities in the region have pushed India
toward new partnerships, especially with Southeast Asia and Japan. While promising, they face the significant challenge of what Baruah diplomatically calls India’s “history of working in isolation” (p. 172).

If, as one Australian scholar asserts, “the great game in the Indian Ocean is still in its early phases,” it will be increasingly important for the United States to understand the Indian Ocean region and its residents (p. 232). Students and specialists will find India and China at Sea a succinct and well-crafted overview of the disparate voices influencing maritime competition in this vital ocean region.

DALE C. RIELAGE


Scholars long have understood the power of the map. In To Master the Boundless Sea Jason W. Smith explains and explores the power of the nautical chart, masterfully weaving his observations into the history of the U.S. Navy. It is an exceptional work, strong in its scholarship, and boasting a compelling—at times lyrical—narrative.

Smith’s book follows a chronological approach, culminating in the years following the Spanish-American War—the presumed height of the American empire; more-modern hydrographic activities are mentioned only in passing. Major themes include the interrelationship between commerce and the Navy, bureaucratic rivalries within the Navy and with other government agencies, the linkages between hydrography and U.S. imperialism, and the evolution of the nautical chart into a weapon of war.

To some degree, hydrography would seem to be—and is—a natural adjunct to the naval service. No environment is more dangerous to mariners than coastal and shallow waters; accurate charts are a necessity to avoid deadly groundings. Shallow-water craft, whether engaged in smuggling or combat operations, if provided with accurate depth and current information, can bedevil larger foes who lack that local knowledge. A chart—an accurate one—makes this knowledge exportable. However, such knowledge does not come easily; Smith details the painstaking and backbreaking repetitive work, usually conducted by sailors and junior officers, needed to gather these data. This was work for engineers, not poets.

However, as Smith notes, hydrography—as part of the larger science of oceanography—always has involved more than engineering. At least in its early stages, understanding the coastlines of distant shores also involved understanding the nature of the peoples who lived on those shores. This required abilities and skills associated with anthropologists; linguists; and, when these meetings became confrontations, military officers. The dangers of early hydrographic work were considerable, sometimes deadly.

Smith also highlights tensions between naval hydrographers and the wider community of scientists. Naval officers were then and are now essentially pragmatists. They do not lack for curiosity or imagination, but they energize those traits for the attainment of a practical objective, such as a knowledge of safe passages or the best sailing directions. While a generalization, it can be asserted that mariners,
less concerned with knowledge for its own sake—and at times more rough-hewn than their academic counterparts—were not always welcomed by pure academics, and vice versa.

Smith details how a powerful connection between the Navy's ever-increasing knowledge of the maritime environment and seagoing commerce was forged and strengthened from the beginning. Time (and safety) was money to merchant captains and the owners for whom they worked. Matthew Fontaine Maury's wind and current charts cut days or weeks from sailing times, and time saved was money earned. One of the book's illustrations—a whaling chart produced by the Navy and used extensively by the captains of Herman Melville's era—speaks to the cooperation between the commercial and military spheres. And whaling was not the only industry to have such close ties to the Navy; as underwater cables began to knit together continents and colonies, the requirement to map the topography of the deep ocean floor became more significant as the mechanisms to achieve this goal advanced.

As steam supplanted sail and Alfred Thayer Mahan's strategic insights grew to dominate naval thinking, charts became essential enablers of U.S. imperial ambitions. Using the Spanish-American War as a backdrop, Smith demonstrates how charts became tools of conquest. Spanish charts of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines were incomplete, and without accurate hydrographic information American naval commanders' difficulties increased. After victory in the Spanish-American War, accurate charts were vital in selecting the locations of future naval installations and coaling stations. The diligence of U.S. hydrographers in accurately charting these waters is nowhere more apparent than in a comparison of prewar charts of Guantánamo Bay with those created after the American victory.

To Master the Boundless Sea also acknowledges the Naval War College's role in the development of naval hydrography and the evolution of the nautical chart into not only an aid to war but also a critical component of campaign and battle planning. Of particular note was the work of Captain William McCarty Little in bringing wargaming to Newport. Whereas Mahan articulated a strategic vision, McCarty Little's wargaming charts mapped ways of making that vision a strategic reality.

Smith fills a major niche in understanding the role of nautical charts, the people and organizations that created them, and how they all advanced scientific understanding and a larger American identity. To Master the Boundless Sea is a superb work that will reward the interested and discerning reader.

RICHARD J. NORTON


One of the bigger questions in history—right up there with why did the Roman Empire fall—is why did the Cold War end. This question becomes even more significant when one remembers that the United States and its allies defeated the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact without a direct, military confrontation. Other long-term strategic confrontations
did not end so well. There are many examples, but three will suffice: Athens versus Sparta generated the Peloponnesian War, Rome versus Carthage produced the Punic Wars, and Britain versus Germany resulted in World Wars I and II. As a result, the issues that Michael Morgan explores in *The Final Act* are rather large.

While historians will continue wrestling with the issue of why the Cold War ended, it is a testimony to the intellectual power that Morgan brings to bear that this book, in all likelihood, will remain the book on the final act of the Helsinki Accords for decades to come. Why? Both the depth and breadth of the research are nothing less than astonishing. Morgan draws on material from fourteen archives in eight nations; this material, combined with published sources, is in nine different languages. There are 103 pages of notes for 258 pages of text. The writing also is quite impressive, with sections reminiscent of Barbara W. Tuchman's work; Morgan even invokes her book *The Guns of August* with a chapter entitled “The Pens of August.” With that point made, some sections read as if a PhD dissertation committee wrote and rewrote some paragraphs until all the flavor was removed—which actually might have been the case. Fortunately, these passages are not frequent.

What does Morgan do with these strengths? The short answer: he looks at the accords of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe “in the round,” examining the perspectives of powers large and small. After a series of crises in the 1960s that raised questions about the legitimacy of the Soviet Union, Leonid I. Brezhnev pushed for the conference, desiring Western European recognition of the post-1945 borders in Eastern Europe—which also would constitute an acknowledgment of the validity of the Soviet system. The United States agreed to this gathering because it had suffered significantly in the 1960s from the trauma of Vietnam, which raised questions at home and abroad about the United States and its leadership in world affairs. While the Soviets pushed for the conference, the smaller states of Europe were the ones most eager to take part. The gathering granted them a voice, and in Morgan's narrative they often play key roles—for instance, in resolving diplomatic deadlocks.

Americans also were important, but more in support than in the lead. Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford both saw the gathering's potential. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, on the other hand, did not believe in this diplomatic effort, and the best thing that can be said about his role is that he did not get in the way of its progress. American diplomats were good, and often bested their Soviet counterparts, but mainly because Brezhnev wanted to reach an agreement quickly, so he often compromised on issues involving personal freedoms, conflict resolution, and sovereignty, in ways that ended up working against the long-term interests of the Communist system. As Morgan notes (turning some issues upside down), “Human rights provided a weapon for fighting the Cold War, not an escape from it” (p. 6).

The most intellectually impressive part of the book is the epilogue. Morgan looks at the legacy of Helsinki on bringing about the end of the Cold War. What gives this chapter power is that he uses the words of the defeated. Using source after source from the other side of the Iron Curtain, he shows how the final act changed Communist policies and behavior.
Wars and conflicts end only when the defeated accept their loss, and this section shows how new thinking developed in the capitals of the Warsaw Pact. Even with all these points made, not everyone will accept Morgan’s arguments. The crisis of legitimacy in the 1960s certainly explains Soviet actions, but the decade was not identical for the United States. The constitutional legitimacy of the U.S. government and American leadership of its alliance were different and much, much, much stronger than those of the Soviets. Despite all the persuasive power of the epilogue, it comes up a bit short of convincing its readers, even if Morgan is right . . . probably. In the end, though, most historians are lucky if they produce one book that endures; odds are that Morgan has done that. Expect to see this book in print for five or six decades—it is that good.

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

OUR REVIEWERS

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Kenneth M. Sandler, a U.S. Marine Corps communications officer, serves as a military professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the College.

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Craig L. Symonds is the Ernest J. King Distinguished Professor of Maritime History at the College and a professor emeritus at the U.S. Naval Academy. He is the author or editor of twenty-nine books, including The Battle of Midway, Operation Neptune, and World War II at Sea: A Global History (Oxford Univ. Press). He is a recipient of the Roosevelt Prize, the Lincoln Prize, the Morison Prize, and the Dudley W. Knox Medal for Lifetime Achievement.

Adam Taylor is a first lieutenant stationed aboard Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina. He is pursuing the MA in international relations from American University’s School of International Service, and previously interned at the Hudson Institute and Project on Middle East Democracy in Washington, DC.
This year marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the end of World War II, the largest and most destructive war in human history—as many as eighty-five million people died as the result of combat, genocide, and disease. Throughout 2020, commemorations will recognize the commitment and courage of men and women of character, both in and out of uniform, who brought the conflict to a righteous end.

While thousands of books have been written about the war, there remain stories about innovative weapons developments that largely have been forgotten or relegated to the category of “things that cannot be believed.” The paragraphs that follow shed light on two such almost-mythical subjects: bat bombs and balloon bombs!

**Bat Bombs**

When its welfare is threatened by an aggressive adversary, a nation energizes the talents and creativity of its industrial base and of individual citizens to design, manufacture, and employ innovative weapons to meet this aggression and carry the conflict to the enemy. Such was the case in the United States in the 1940s. The efforts of the massive Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bombs used against Japanese cities have been documented well. But little is known about a different approach that sought an alternate method to destroy targets on the Japanese home islands. In January 1942, a Pennsylvania dentist named Lytle Adams sent a letter to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt suggesting that thousands of Mexican free-tailed bats, each with a tiny, time-delayed, incendiary bomb attached to its body, could be dropped in bomb-shaped canisters from long-range bombers. The bats were expected to seek shelter in the eaves and attics of Japan’s wood-and-paper structures, and the subsequent ignition of the newly invented napalm would set massive fires across large areas.
FDR passed the idea on to the Army Air Forces for development with a note that said, “This man is not a nut. It sounds like a perfectly wild idea, but it is worth looking into.” During tests conducted in May 1943 at the Carlsbad Army Airfield in New Mexico, a group of armed bats was released accidentally, resulting in the fiery destruction of the test range! The Army passed the project to the U.S. Navy in August 1943, and the U.S. Marine Corps assumed responsibility for Project X-ray in December 1943. Successful tests were conducted at the Dugway Proving Ground at the end of 1943.

However, despite the fact that the National Defense Research Committee concluded that the bat bomb could be “an effective weapon,” Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King canceled the program when he learned it could not become operational until mid-1945, so plans to produce one million bat bombs were never executed. The project was relegated to the dustbin of history. Additional information can be found in the fascinating book _Bat Bomb: World War II’s Other Secret Weapon_, by Jack Couffer, published by the University of Texas Press in 1992.

**Balloon Bombs**

While American scientists and engineers were working on the Manhattan Project and Project X-ray, their counterparts were hard at work on their own remarkable weapon: the _fu-go_ balloon bomb. These thirty-three-foot-diameter hydrogen-filled balloons were constructed of strips of paper made from _kozo_-tree bark glued together with a starchy paste made from a potato-like vegetable. Suspended below each balloon was a lightweight metal ring that carried sandbags for ballast and both incendiary and antipersonnel bombs.

Launched from the Japanese home islands, the balloons would ride the jet stream eastward, crossing the Pacific in about three days. Daytime heating of the 17,000 cubic feet of gas combined with nighttime cooling caused the balloons to vary their altitude; they dropped ballast as necessary to stay aloft. After the final sandbag was dropped the bombs would be released, in hopes of starting forest fires in America’s Pacific Northwest region. From November 1944 to April 1945, over nine thousand _fu-gos_ were launched against the United States.

It is not known how many balloons crossed the Pacific, but the remains of at least three hundred balloons were discovered in the United States and western Canada. In an attempt to avoid public panic on the West Coast from silent bombs that were nearly impossible to detect and engage, the U.S. War Department imposed censorship on all reports about these mysterious weapons. This news blackout likely contributed to the deaths of one adult and five children who apparently discovered and disturbed an unexploded _fu-go_ in the forest near Bly, Oregon. They were the only casualties attributed to the balloon-bomb attacks, and were the only civilians killed in the continental United States by enemy
action during the war. The fu-go bombs have the distinction of being the first intercontinental weapon ever used in warfare. A balloon was discovered in British Columbia in 2014—seven decades after the weapons were sent flying eastward on what have been described as “wings of paper.”

Portions of a number of fu-go systems are on display in the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC; the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio; and the International Balloon Museum in Albuquerque, New Mexico. You can find more details about these attacks in *Fu-go: The Curious History of Japan’s Balloon Bomb Attack on America*, by Ross Coen, published by the University of Nebraska Press in 2014.

The scientists and engineers of the twenty-first century are seeking equally exotic weapons today, including robots and flying cars. Necessity is, indeed, the mother of invention.

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