Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer for Senior Leaders

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Thomas P. Galvin
smaller actions necessarily means devoting less space to the critically important ones. Coverage is always a delicate matter, for while leaving something out invites criticism that the book is incomplete, limiting coverage of the critical turning points invites criticism of another kind.

Mawdsley has chosen to be inclusive, and he covers a number of events that are overlooked in most general histories (including my own), such as the British raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway (Operation CLAYMORE) in 1941 and the invasion of Madagascar (Operation IRONCLAD) in 1942, as well as extensive coverage of the Soviet navy in both the Baltic and Black Seas. All that comes with a cost, of course; running to six hundred pages, Mawdsley’s book is not short, and yet it occasionally feels crowded as events pile up on one another—although no doubt that is how the war felt to those who fought it as well.

Mawdsley is not afraid to make judgments. He argues, for example, that the role of “special intelligence” (ULTRA) has been greatly exaggerated and that Hitler gave up on the invasion of England (Operation SEA LION) before the Battle of Britain even began. He defends Churchill’s decision to attack the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, asserting that it was “correct” (p. 71), and concedes that the Dieppe raid was “badly planned,” for which Mountbatten “deserves some blame” (p. 282). In the Pacific, Mawdsley concludes that Kimmel and Short were “rightly held responsible” for being unready on 7 December 1941 (p. 182) and that Nagumo was “surely right” not to approve a third aerial attack against Pearl Harbor (p. 181).

It would be inappropriate for me to recommend one of these books over the other. Therefore I merely will suggest here that those interested in the naval war from 1939 to 1945 should read (and buy) both of them.

CRAIG L. SYMONDS


As Charles D. Allen states in the foreword, “70 to 80 percent of organizational change efforts fail” (p. vii). Numerous reasons exist why initiatives to improve an organization’s performance, effectiveness, or morale do not succeed: incorrect problem diagnosis, poor planning or resourcing, strategy mismatch to culture, and resistance, among others. U.S. Army War College professor Thomas P. Galvin’s well-researched primer effectively distills numerous organizational change philosophies and strategies into a practical and intuitive guidebook for military professionals at all levels.

A plethora of books on organizational change exists, with an Amazon.com search returning hundreds of results. Professor Galvin tailors his approach to the unique challenges of the military, which prepares for an uncertain future environment that before the crucible of operations and combat can only be simulated. He argues that most change efforts are too process oriented, at the expense of the often-overlooked context of the environment and the content of the change effort, which explain its purpose and the path to success. To this end, he develops a framework similar to the military’s planning process that emphasizes context and content,
Galvin argues that understanding the context requires correctly diagnosing the problem, gauging receptivity to the proposed change, and determining whether it even warrants expending the resources. Although hierarchical, military organizations are complex adaptive systems, highlighting the difficulty in tracing causal links and often resulting in misdiagnosis. Factors that gauge receptivity to the change include internal and external environmental pressures; the level of trust and empowerment within the organization; and, for distributed organizations, the fit between the change agenda and local contexts. We live in an age of data analytics, and often suffer from survey fatigue. Therefore, taking the time to determine what data to collect for analysis is essential and may flush out fundamental issues that need to be addressed before implementation can proceed.

The most valuable section deals with forecasting, which is the glue of the content portion of the book. This links the vision, plan, and communication effort. While still an endeavor of uncertainty, forecasting is differentiated from prediction in that it is more quantifiable and probabilistic. Although many tools exist within the Department of Defense to paint this picture, making a convincing case remains a challenge from the strategic to the tactical level. As General Martin Dempsey said in an interview with Kelly Brownell for the 9 September 2016 Making It Matter podcast concerning the significant cuts imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Act, “When people ask me if I have any regrets during my four years as Chairman, one of them in particular is I really never managed to convince the Congress of the United States that what they were doing to the military budget would have a detrimental effect over time. . . . It’s hard to articulate words like risk, they can be parsed and they can be twisted or turned, or words like readiness.” His salient point highlights the difficulties leaders have in articulating future risk and promoting change.

Professor Galvin recommends constructing dual narratives of future undesired and desired end states, with the former describing a status quo that risks mission failure and the latter a version in which competitive advantage is restored. His principles of preparedness consist of a series of questions to spark development of these competing stories and include tangible and abstract performance metrics. While vivid imagery, framing, and marketing can help sell an idea, Galvin correctly asserts that credibility demands rigor. Narratives must limit negations, refrain from sounding unduly alarmist, and avoid one's being perceived as simply a cheerleader. Once all elements are established, the concept should be expressed as a cognitive journey in practical and actionable terms, with obstacles and barriers presented as challenges that can and must be overcome.

Galvin’s primer is filled with invaluable insights, frameworks, and anecdotes. He provides examples of failed changes, including General Eric K. Shinseki’s decision to switch from standard headgear to the black beret and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s attempt to transition to the National Security Personnel System. However, selection of a case study, vignette, or scenario applicable to any number of situations and woven throughout the
entire primer or as a separate annex might have stitched the elements of the book tighter together and made it resonate more. Regardless, leaders at all levels who want to increase their chances of successfully implementing and sustaining an organizational change effort will benefit from making this an essential addition to their tool kit.

KENNETH M. SANDLER


Despite battlefield success in both Iraq and Afghanistan over the past fifteen years, the threat environment confronting the United States and its Marine Corps only has grown more dangerous. The United States now confronts a variety of challenges both old and new, including the return of great-power conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and Europe; operating in (what until recently has been called) an antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) battle space; nuclear proliferation; and navigating the effects of global climate change on military operations. Such an environment calls for both refining old solutions and thinking in new, bold ways to ensure that the U.S. military—and especially, for purposes of this review, the Marine Corps—is ready to meet, fight, and defeat any future threats.

Author Anthony Piscitelli leverages his years of State Department and academic experience to map the evolution of the Marine Corps's approach to war in the post–Vietnam War era, all the while highlighting the personalities involved in that process. Piscitelli's work ultimately is most useful, though, not for reviewing why the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare but for providing a model for instituting structural changes at the service level necessary for future battlefield success.

Following the Vietnam War, a combination of external and internal pressures led the Marine Corps to institutionalize and train to a war-fighting philosophy it had practiced to varying degrees throughout its history. The Marine Corps Way of War details how the Marine Corps had practiced elements of maneuver warfare from Belleau Wood to Beirut. This historical survey provides the context for the interpersonal and bureaucratic battles that Piscitelli then recounts that led to the Corps's full embrace of maneuver warfare in the post–Vietnam era.

Piscitelli then uses an excellent combination of first-person interviews and after-action reports to summarize how the Corps's success in all the humanitarian operations, low-intensity conflicts, and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after Vietnam resulted from the major internal and external bureaucratic struggles over the service's future during that era. The book's emphasis on education and the impact of maneuver warfare on Marines' professional development also deserves mention. Piscitelli's decision to explore how the adoption of maneuver warfare also forced the Corps to rethink the professional development of its enlisted and officer populations underscores how the human element of war remains the most important variable in any conflict. One should be forgiven for thinking that parts of the book serve as justification for MCDP-1, Warfighting.

Yet, despite providing an excellent analysis that explores how the Corps