There are times when the ship of state executes sharper turns than at others. In the aftermath of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, whether coincidentally or not, we have seen the emergence of a newly belligerent People’s Republic of China (PRC). Ramped-up Chinese military activity on the country’s frontier with India, a constant drumbeat of provocations in international waters in the East and South China Seas, and unprecedented levels of vitriolic anti-Western propaganda are developments that have been noticed widely, giving rise to an ongoing reassessment of China’s relationship to the United States, its allies, and the rest of the world. In a series of landmark speeches by senior American officials, foremost among them Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, the United States has signaled as clearly as possible that there will be no more business as usual with the PRC. In “China’s Global Navy: Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy,” James E. Fanell provides an authoritative survey of the all-important maritime dimension of the growing Chinese threat to the United States and the world. Both the scale of Chinese shipbuilding activity and the apparent scope of China’s global military ambitions are little short of staggering. The West appears to be paying attention, finally. Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.), is a former director of intelligence and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

At a time of growing tensions between Japan and the PRC over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, there has been growing discussion of the (somewhat tangled) history of the American position on this issue and its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance. In “Ameliorating the Alliance Dilemma in an Age of Gray-Zone Conflict: Lessons Learned from the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Michael M. Bosack provides an overview and analysis of the international relations literature on alliance management and the twin dangers of abandonment and entrapment. Using the U.S.-Japan alliance as a case study, he argues that there is much more scope than often is recognized for creative adjustments of alliance relationships to accommodate evolving security environments, especially one like the present, in which the nonmilitary aspects of such relationships have taken on increased importance. Michael M. Bosack is special adviser at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies.

In “‘Things Done by Halves’: Observations from America’s First Great-Power Competition,” Benjamin F. Armstrong usefully reminds us that so-called
gray-zone conflict is not a new phenomenon, but rather long has been a dimension of great-power competition, to use another fashionable term. Taking the neglected case of America’s Quasi War with France in 1798–1800, he shows how the infant U.S. Navy adapted to the requirements of an undeclared conflict with France in the complex and multisided strategic environment of the contemporary Caribbean. He argues that aspects of this experience have continuing relevance for the U.S. Navy today. Commander Benjamin F. Armstrong, USN, is a military professor at the U.S. Naval Academy.

The U.S. military today embraces the idea of “jointness”—if not altogether uncritically, then at least with a high degree of general acceptance. This can cause us to lose sight of just how unnatural this state of affairs is in terms of the basic dynamics of military organizations. In “‘Neither Fish nor Fowl nor Yet Good Red Herring’: Joint Institutions, Single-Service Priorities, and Amphibious Capabilities in Postwar Britain,” Ian Speller acts as tour guide to the checkered history of British efforts to do justice to the interservice character and requirements of amphibious warfare within the context of an overarching single-service military organization and culture. Ian Speller is director of the Centre for Military History and Strategic Studies at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth.

It is important to keep in mind that the history of the Cold War may have some surprises for us yet. In “A ‘New Look’ at Cold War Maritime Defense: The Royal Canadian Navy’s Seaward Defence Report and the Threat of the Missile-Firing Submarine, 1955,” Michael Whitby opens a fascinating window into planning that the Royal Canadian Navy conducted in conjunction with the U.S. Navy to counter the new threat to North America posed by Soviet conventional submarines armed with nuclear missiles in the early Cold War. His discussion focuses on the recently declassified Canadian study Seaward Defence Report. Michael Whitby is senior naval historian at National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada.

The problematic relationship between science and public policy in times of national crisis, now very evident in the current coronavirus pandemic, is far from new. In “Peak Oil, Progressivism, and Josephus Daniels, 1913–21,” Roger Stern revisits the efforts of Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, to deal with what experts claimed would be an exhaustion of America’s oil resources by the mid-1930s. This is a scandalous story of executive overreach and, indeed, patently illegal actions by the Navy during and after World War I. (At one point, U.S. Marines seized oil from a California supplier at gunpoint.) Stern reminds us that similar poorly substantiated predictions of so-called peak oil have had an outsize effect on U.S. national security policy in recent times—notably, in President Jimmy Carter’s formal commitment to
defend the Persian Gulf in the 1970s. As Stern shows, the Progressives’ habit of straight-arming the American public in the name of scientific expertise has been long with us. Roger Stern is a former fellow at the Collins College of Business of the University of Tulsa.

Franklin R. Uhlig Jr., Editor Emeritus of the Naval War College Press, peacefully passed away at his home on 27 August 2020.

After serving in the Navy, Frank began his career in publishing with twenty years at the U.S. Naval Institute. He visited U.S. Navy combat units in Vietnam and published an outstanding collection of essays on the war, Vietnam: The Naval Story (1986)—efforts that earned him the Navy League’s Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement.

Frank then became the leading contributor to the Naval War College Press’s publication of articles and books on sea power and naval operations. He came to the College in 1981 as Editor of the Press and quickly revitalized it; sixty-two issues of the Naval War College Review and fourteen books appeared during his tenure. He also authored the highly regarded book How Navies Fight (1994). Frank’s commitment to the Navy, to its sailors’ history, and to the promotion of education and research on naval affairs stands in the highest traditions of the Naval War College.

We offer our deepest sympathy to his family and many friends among our readers.