Ameliorating the Alliance Dilemma in an Age of Gray-Zone Conflict—Lessons Learned from the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Michael M. Bosack
Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation
Bosack, Michael M. (2020) "Ameliorating the Alliance Dilemma in an Age of Gray-Zone Conflict—Lessons Learned from the U.S.-Japan Alliance," Naval War College Review. Vol. 73 : No. 4 , Article 5. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
Two key concepts in alliance theory that remain ever relevant in practice today are those of abandonment and entrapment. In short, whenever there is an expectation of a military commitment, whether formal or informal, there may be two accompanying fears. The first is that the ally will fail to meet its end of the bargain—that it will abandon its obligations in a time of need. The second fear is that a security commitment will draw an ally into a war it did not want to fight; that is, it will be entrapped in conflict. These fears of abandonment and entrapment influence alliance interactions, although their impacts on security relationships are the source of debate among practitioners and academics alike.

These concepts, as employed in international relations studies, emerged in the late Cold War era against the backdrop of bipolar superpower competition. Certainly, things have changed since the Cold War, both in practice and in academic understanding. A wealth of studies have been performed within the field of foederology; much of that work centers on the notions of abandonment and entrapment. There also have been significant changes to the strategic environment; the prevalence of interstate and extrastate warfare involving alliance commitments has decreased, and security conflict among states has expanded into new domains, with greater emphasis on the application of non-military instruments of power. This has created
an increased need for a “whole-of-government” approach to security issues that goes beyond traditional defense sectors. At the same time, the nature and role of alliances within competition and conflict have evolved.

From this, two problems emerge associated with collective understandings of abandonment and entrapment. The first is the absence of a compilation of key takeaways from scholarship, especially those that apply the two concepts to the present security environment. But scholars have tested and refined the theories surrounding the fears and risks of abandonment and entrapment, to a degree sufficient to warrant an update to our understanding of what they, taken in aggregate, mean for alliances in the present day.

The second problem is the gap between scholars and practitioners in understanding abandonment and entrapment. Academia offers much toward comprehending those issues, but applying existing scholarship is difficult, given the absence of a study that connects it to the current strategic environment in a practical manner. There must be a way to compile existing scholarship in a way that is useful to practitioners.

This article seeks to remedy those problems by answering the question of how abandonment and entrapment can affect alliance management in a modern strategic environment marked by gray-zone conflict. To accomplish this, it first defines alliances and explains how they function in response to security incidents that may warrant allied response. Next the article curates notable takeaways from the wealth of scholarship on abandonment and entrapment. Then the article explains some of the defining characteristics of the modern security environment—specifically, the type of security incidents that affect formal alliances. From there, it applies the aggregated theoretical takeaways to the U.S.-Japan alliance to yield better understanding of how abandonment and entrapment influence alliance interactions.

This examination is important for academics and practitioners alike. It aggregates seven key takeaways from existing literature on the concepts of abandonment and entrapment. The article also posits that in the age of gray-zone conflict adversaries can undermine alliance relationships without reaching the threshold to trigger an alliance response. It further highlights that the influences on traditional military alliances of diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power have increased. Those factors reveal that although alliances formed in the Cold War era have succeeded in deterring interstate military disputes, adversaries are seeking means of changing the status quo through security incidents short of an armed attack. This means that designs predicated on response to armed attack and focused primarily on military guarantees must be adapted to meet the needs of the modern strategic environment. There are examples of how alliances are adapting, and this article offers one in the form
of the U.S.-Japan alliance and its employment of the negotiated “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” to prepare seamless responses to gray-zone threats.\(^4\)

There are limits to this examination. First, the article focuses on formal alliances that contain an obligation for the use of military force in support of one or more parties to a security relationship. In other words, the focus is on alliances codified by an international treaty that includes a military guarantee. This is necessary for a couple of reasons. Treaty alliances are recognized under international law, so decision-making related to those formal instruments has important institutional and reputational impacts.\(^5\) It will be important for future studies to examine *alignments* as opposed to *alliances*, but that is not the aim of this article.\(^6\) Also, the fears and risks of abandonment and entrapment are not uniformly applicable across neutrality, nonaggression, and consultation pacts as well, even though some alliance scholars prefer to include those types in their examinations of alliance reliability.

The second boundary is that this article focuses only on the present security environment. While some conclusions detailed here feasibly could apply to other eras of conflict, the article makes no claims of universal applicability.

Finally, the case study focuses on a bilateral alliance to minimize variables in understanding how the fears of abandonment and entrapment operate within an alliance relationship. However, the arguments made here open the door to applying them in future examinations of multilateral alliances.

**DEFINING ALLIANCES AND HOW THEY FUNCTION IN PRACTICE**

To understand abandonment and entrapment from a practical perspective, one first must define an alliance clearly, since scholars and practitioners alike disagree on the subject. For the sake of clarity, this article focuses on *treaty alliances* that contain a formal obligation for the use of military force in support of one or more allies. This use of force occurs when a certain threshold is met—the *casus foederis*.\(^3\)

In many alliances, some rights and obligations apply even in the absence of security conflict. This article refers to these as *peacetime trade-offs*. Such trade-offs may include basing rights, security assistance, intelligence sharing, peacetime military training, and transfer of defense technology. They are privileges and obligations that distinguish allies from nonallies, even in the absence of conflict.

Still, at the core of any alliance are the *casus foederis* and the obligation for one or more allies to use military force in support of another. The obligation kicks in to use military force or to provide certain exceptional rights and privileges for the purpose of responding to military conflict following a security incident. A *security incident* is any event that has the potential for triggering the *casus foederis*
(i.e., when the threshold for alliance response is reached). The incident can be offensive or defensive in nature, meaning an ally can initiate it (such as by carrying out a preemptive strike against an adversary) or it can be reactive (such as responding to an armed attack against an ally).

This is the point at which the potential for abandonment or entrapment comes into play. The state involved in the security incident must decide whether to invoke alliance obligations, and the ally (or allies) then must decide whether to answer the call. If the state involved in the security incident decides not to invoke the casus foederis, the alliance continues with normal peacetime trade-offs. If the state does invoke it, there are four potential outcomes. First, an ally could recognize the validity of the casus foederis but choose not to meet its obligations. This constitutes abandonment. Second, the ally could argue that the security incident does not meet the threshold for alliance response, and elect not to meet the obligations expected. This is more nuanced, but ultimately represents a form of abandonment, at least in the eyes of the ally invoking the casus foederis. Third, the ally could engage in a conflict it does not want to fight, which would constitute a form of entrapment. Fourth, the ally could answer the call unreservedly.

There are two takeaways from this. First, the casus foederis is important from a practical perspective, because it is what a state uses to prompt its allies to provide obligations that go beyond peacetime trade-offs. Second, there is no such thing as an ironclad alliance guarantee or an automatic alliance response; there are always the questions whether the casus foederis should be invoked and whether an ally should answer the call.

KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM SCHOLARSHIP

Beginning in earnest in the 1980s and continuing since then, scholars have been trying to define how the fears of abandonment and entrapment shape alliance politics. This article summarizes relevant alliance literature from the intervening decades and curates conclusions with a practical view in mind. There are seven key takeaways.

1. **Alliances tend to deter militarized interstate conflict.** Scholars have demonstrated that the formation of alliances contributes to a decreased likelihood of military conflict among states, for various reasons. Not only does this bear on the risk of entrapment, but it highlights an issue for present-day security. Naturally, a decreased risk of military conflict means less risk of becoming involved in war. However, it does not mean that security competition among states ceases altogether, so in the context of the modern strategic environment it suggests that adversaries will compete in other ways and using instruments of power that do not result in open military conflict.
2. **Risk of entrapment is low.** Although some academics and practitioners still support the notion that entrapment is a major risk for allies, newer research compellingly argues that entrapment is a narrower concept than previously discussed and not as prevalent as once thought. The narrow scope of entrapment and the fact that states design alliances to minimize the risk of entrapment mean that the possibility of being pulled into a conflict that a state did not want to fight in the first place is low. In the context of the modern strategic environment, this means that, while fear of entrapment still impacts alliance politics, it often is inflated, and the problem typically lies in the irrationality of one or more leaders within the alliance-management framework.

3. **Alliance designs matter in managing the risks of abandonment and entrapment.** States that enter formal alliances negotiate treaties in ways that seek to maximize their interests while minimizing their costs. As part of minimizing costs, leaders anticipate the possibility of entrapment and carefully design alliance agreements accordingly, or they avoid entering into alliances in the first place. The explicitness of the designs and the language employed in alliance agreements help clarify arrangements and thereby reduce the risk of abandonment and entrapment. Additionally, alliance literature demonstrates that a state can leverage alliance designs to influence its partner’s behavior. Those designs can be employed in shaping the direction of a state’s military buildup, can influence foreign policy decisions, and can be used in restraining potentially risky behavior, among other things. The important point here is that alliance designs matter significantly in managing abandonment and entrapment, which means that alteration of those alliance designs can be an active tool in alliance management for influencing those risks.

4. **Alliance designs include nonmilitary benefits that factor into abandonment and entrapment issues.** In some alliances, a state cedes autonomy to a militarily superior ally or allies—a key trade-off, especially in asymmetric alliances in which only one member offers a guarantee for the use of military force. Other trade-offs may include the provision of bases, cost sharing (for the stationing of foreign forces), economic concessions, public support for the ally’s policies, and coordination of foreign policy. The presence of nonmilitary benefits means that abandonment may not be an issue of a failure to employ military force against an adversary; rather, it simply may be a failure to provide some contribution that is necessary for a state to achieve its security objectives following a triggering of the *casus foederis.* Regarding entrapment, the provision of
nonmilitary objects still may present a risk of being drawn into conflict, the most obvious example being provision of bases for an ally’s military forces. What this means for scholars and practitioners is that one cannot overlook the risk of abandonment of nonmilitary contributions, as well as the entrapment risk that is associated with provision of those contributions. It also suggests that competition short of armed conflict increases the importance of nonmilitary aspects of alliance rights and obligations.

5. **Risk of abandonment increases over time because alliance treaties remain static, while other factors do not.** Scholars have established that changes in political administrations, age structures, and threats, among other factors, all can affect alliance reliability. The simple fact is that an alliance agreement, unless renegotiated or clarified through implementing instruments, is static, while other variables are dynamic. Over time, this could introduce gaps where alliance designs fail to meet particular threats or where new expectations emerge that are not codified formally within agreed-upon obligations. What this means for the present strategic environment is that alliances that are not updated, through either renegotiation of the treaty or the provision of clarifying instruments, may be outmoded. Allies who fail to manage their core arrangements could be unwittingly allowing the risk of abandonment to grow.

6. **Adversaries attempt to undermine alliances, divide allies, or both.** Existing literature demonstrates that even as allies seek to manage the risks of abandonment and entrapment, adversaries seek to undermine or break up alliance relationships. In other words, adversaries actively work to increase the risk of abandonment. They have attempted to exploit seams in alliances and will continue to do so, especially in ways that lead to ineffectual responses to security incidents.

7. **Allies can take steps to reduce risks of abandonment and entrapment.** Since alliance designs can manage the risks of abandonment and entrapment, since allies have the ability to influence partners through those designs, and since circumstances change over time, there are steps allies can take to reduce abandonment and entrapment risks. In the context of the present strategic environment, allies can seek to alter alliance designs to reduce risks of abandonment and entrapment. Allies then can leverage those designs in attempting to influence their allies’ behavior. They can do this through renegotiation of the alliance treaty or the creation of clarifying instruments.
ALLIANCES IN THE MODERN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

This section characterizes the modern strategic environment in the context of security alliances that incorporate both peacetime trade-offs and obligations that follow invocation of the *casus foederis*. As previously noted, alliances tend to deter militarized disputes, but they do not eliminate security competition altogether. States seeking to change the status quo simply have looked for methods to achieve their goals without overtly violating international law and thereby prompting responses from the international community, especially by allies of the offended state. In circumventing international law, some states have sought to act in new domains to achieve their interests, especially the cyberspace domain. They also use nonmilitary instruments of power. This has made Cold War–era alliance designs outmoded, since those were predicated on a military response to an armed attack in conventional domains of conflict (land, air, and sea). Outmoded alliance designs create seams within security relationships that adversaries actively seek to exploit. Fortunately, there are ways allies can adapt.

The current liberal international order is predicated on the United Nations system, which built on customary international law and institutions and reshaped many of the rules of interaction among states. The central tenet related to security and defense is found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, specifically article 51, which states as follows: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” In principle, postwar alliance agreements are founded on this definition of conflict, in which the security guarantees inherent in those alliances are based on “collective self-defence” to be exercised in the event of an “armed attack.”

What is an armed attack? The UN Charter does not offer a clearer explanation, but the 1986 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in *Nicaragua v. United States* does. Stated plainly, the court held that an armed attack is an armed incursion into another state’s sovereign territory attributable to a specific member of the international community. It further clarified that, even in the event of an armed-attack situation, a UN member state is not permitted to exercise collective self-defense until the state under attack has declared the occurrence of an armed attack and has requested support.

Thus, an armed-attack situation is the threshold for collective self-defense under international law and it fulfills the *casus foederis* for many alliance relationships; however, there are many types of security incidents that may occur prior to an armed attack. Some of these are depicted in the figure, arranged by level of intensity and impetus for response.
Violations of domestic interpretation of international law are incidents that a state may view as legal violations but that do not necessarily comport with internationally accepted legal interpretations. For example, Japan recognizes only five of its maritime straits as constituting international passages, whereas the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) maintains that any strait can be navigated under the right of innocent passage. If Japan were to respond militarily to the transit of Chinese naval vessels through a strait that it does not recognize as an international passage, this action would be based on a domestic interpretation of international law, and therefore would not necessarily fall within the scope of alliance agreements.

Violations of international law or sanctioned activities may include situations such as illegal arms transfers, piracy, and state sponsorship of terrorist organizations.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--related activities are any that involve nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Examples include North Korean nuclear testing and the illicit transfer of WMD assets and technologies.

Incidents with impact to sovereign territory but dealing no damage to personnel or property could include a territorial incursion short of an armed attack (e.g.,
nonmilitary personnel landing on an uninhabited island) or a failed missile test from which debris lands in an empty field.

Security incidents with *impact to sovereign territory that includes damage to personnel or property* represent the next level of intensity. In the missile-test example, debris from a failed missile might fall on a housing area or in a commercial zone. Another relevant example is a cyber attack that disrupts a state’s critical infrastructure.

The next level up includes any of those incidents that result in *loss of life.*

All those security incidents could occur before reaching the level of an *armed attack*—the traditional *casus foederis* and international legal threshold for individual and collective self-defense. The space where security incidents occur before an armed attack often is referred to as the *gray zone.*

Two types of gray-zone conflict have become prevalent in the present security environment: lawfare and hybrid warfare. *Lawfare* is the “strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.” In other words, it is the misuse of customary international law and UN-sponsored judicial systems to achieve strategic military or political ends. An example is Chinese territorial expansion in the South China Sea. Even though international tribunals have sided with other countries (e.g., the arbitral tribunal’s 2016 ruling in *Philippines v. China*), China has managed to expand its foothold by constructing man-made islands and conducting coercive engagements in the region.

*Hybrid warfare* is the “synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergistic effects.” A key feature of hybrid warfare is that it often is nonattributable, thereby avoiding international legal thresholds for any broad response involving the use of military force. Russia provides the best example of this threat, with its employment of cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, “volunteer” military forces, and other activities, all of which contributed to the annexation of Crimea and pose an ever-present threat to NATO allies.

Through gray-zone conflict, an adversary can challenge the status quo without reaching the level of an armed attack, meaning that there is no clear impetus for the use of military force for individual or collective self-defense in response. Yet security incidents that contribute to changes in the status quo are likely to warrant expectations for response from a state and its allies.

This tells us three things. First, traditional alliance relationships focused solely on military trade-offs are inadequate for meeting contemporary security challenges. Certainly, militaries are the principal actors in the execution of war, but what about when conventional interstate warfare no longer is the primary form of interstate security conflict in the world, as is the case today? Given the
costs associated with militarized disputes, adversaries have incentives to employ alternative instruments of power in their attempts to further their interests. Thus it is no longer practical to treat alliances as principally military in nature, because doing so privileges military responses, perhaps leaving other options for security arrangements and activities unexplored or ignored.

Second, legal foundations that have not been updated to address evolving security challenges create seams between allies. Conventional security guarantees are predicated on the notion of interstate defense. When the term *defense* is not clarified in formal or informal agreements, its definition defaults to customary international law (as represented in the UN Charter and the ICJ ruling, as detailed earlier). This does not prevent a state from acting in support of an ally without an armed-attack declaration, but the absence of an armed-attack situation creates ambiguity that increases the risk of abandonment within alliance relationships.

Third, adversaries can exploit those seams. Through lawfare and hybrid warfare, adversaries can take actions up to but not exceeding the threshold of an armed attack without triggering an alliance response. Since adversaries can “make plays” in the gray zone, security relationships that have not been updated to provide strategic and operational clarity are exploitable, and again the risk of abandonment increases.

Fortunately, there are ways for allies to adapt. As the literature survey highlighted, alliance designs have a profound effect on the risks of abandonment and entrapment, meaning that instruments that update, amend, or clarify alliance designs are likely to help eliminate seams in security relationships. Two key features of these instruments should be formality and publication, since those have institutional and reputational effects while signaling commitments to potential adversaries.

Given this, the simplest solution is renegotiation of the alliance treaty itself. However, since treaty language typically is vague and not directed at specific adversaries or security situations, a more practical solution is the creation or renegotiation of clarifying instruments under the alliance treaty. Clarifying instruments include exchanges of notes, agreements, memorandums, and other formally negotiated documents. A variety of informal means of clarification, such as joint statements, also exist, but those lack the institutional or reputational checks that negotiated instruments provide.

**CASE STUDY: THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE**
The U.S.-Japan alliance offers a prime case study for the consideration of abandonment and entrapment. It is bilateral, meaning that there are only two parties to the alliance agreement, which eliminates variables present in the case of multilateral alliances. The alliance was formed in the Cold War era, meaning...
the treaty explicitly calls for response to an “armed attack,” with a focus on military guarantees. Further, it is an operative alliance, meaning the rights and obligations are still meaningfully in play today.\textsuperscript{36} The alliance is asymmetric, in that one ally—in this case, Japan—receives a security guarantee, while the other receives separate, nonmilitary benefits in return.\textsuperscript{37} Most importantly, there are clear examples of the occurrence of abandonment and entrapment fears, as well as an instance in which the allies responded to them.

The fears of abandonment and entrapment weighed heavily on alliance management for the United States and Japan in the early 2010s. In two scenarios in particular those fears affected alliance politics: the Korean Peninsula crisis and the defense of the Senkaku Islands.

**The Korean Peninsula Crisis**
The 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis and the missile launches of the late 1990s reawakened the U.S.-Japan alliance to the threat the Kim regime posed.\textsuperscript{38} For Japan, the fear of entrapment was no theoretical matter. The United States already had used Japan as a rear-support base of operations during the Korean War; that involvement had contributed to Japan's desire for inclusion of a “prior consultation” requirement in the renegotiation of the Mutual Security Treaty in 1960.\textsuperscript{39} Since then, the North Koreans have demonstrated missile technology capable of reaching Japanese territory.\textsuperscript{40} With a demonstrated threat from North Korea that included the potential for Japan to be drawn into a conflict on the Korean Peninsula with nuclear consequences, the preexisting fear of entrapment was renewed.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government had fears on the opposite end of the spectrum, worrying that Japan might abandon its treaty obligations in the event of a crisis or contingency on the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese government gave U.S. officials cause for concern in 2010 following the sinking of ROKS \textit{Cheonan} and the shelling of Yeonpyeong-do.\textsuperscript{41} In each of those situations, personnel from Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan requested activation of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM), but each time they were rebuffed because there had been no political declaration of a \textit{Nihon Shūen Jitai} (situation in area surrounding Japan, or SIASJ).\textsuperscript{42} Without activation of the BCM, U.S. officials were skeptical that they could garner the necessary Japanese interagency support for U.S. operations in response to those security incidents, should de-escalation efforts fail.\textsuperscript{43}

The Japanese government further reinforced this concern with its treatment of the “prior consultation” requirement. There long had been a debate within the U.S. government regarding whether the requirement simply meant “consultation” or it implied that “consent” from the Japanese government was necessary.\textsuperscript{44} During a parliamentary committee meeting on 15 July 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe offered his government's position on the matter, stating that
Okinawa-based U.S. Marines would not deploy to support Korean contingency operations without Japanese government consent. This served as a strong signal to the United States that it might not receive the level of support it had expected in responding to security situations on the Korean Peninsula.

If not guaranteed military support, what sort of assistance does the United States expect? The Mutual Security Treaty and its associated status of forces agreement legally afford the U.S. government access to all Japanese air- and seaports and permit free transit through and across Japanese territory. There also are arrangements for the support of logistical, medical, and billeting needs for military personnel, civilian officials, and noncombatants; the list goes on. However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense do not have purview over civilian authorities or organizations. Therefore, execution of alliance obligations following those security incidents would have required interagency coordination and exceptional authorization from the Japanese cabinet in the context of a SIASJ—something the Japanese government was not prepared to perform in 2010.

**Defense of the Senkaku Islands**

The Senkaku Islands are a group of small, uninhabited land features located along the first island chain, and are the focus of territorial disputes among Japan, China, and Taiwan. The Senkakus have been under Japanese administration since U.S. reversion of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, but China and Taiwan both have laid sovereignty claims to the islands. While Japan has worked out and maintained exceptional fishing agreements with Taiwan for activity in the waters surrounding the islands, the PRC’s China Coast Guard (CCG), fishing, and (occasionally) military vessels have operated in the vicinity of the islands for years, especially following the Japanese government’s purchase of the Senkakus from private Japanese landowners in 2012.

When the Japanese government nationalized the Senkakus and tensions grew, it introduced fears of both abandonment and entrapment within the U.S.-Japan alliance. For Japan, there was a fear that the United States would not respond if the Chinese seized the islands by force. For the United States, the fear was that explicit security guarantees would increase Japanese adventurism; that is, Japan would be more emboldened in its responses to Chinese activity in the vicinity of the Senkakus, which might drag the United States into a war with China.

But the issue was even more nuanced than those basic fears might suggest. The question emerged of what would happen if a paramilitary group landed on the islands. If Japan could not declare an armed-attack situation, what authority would the U.S. military have to provide collective self-defense in support of its ally? What if there were a clash between coast guards, not militaries? Would the
U.S. Navy have any authority to get involved if the dispute were between law-enforcement entities? What if the CCG vessel capabilities were equivalent to those of naval forces?²⁵⁰

While some dispute the nature of Chinese intentions in the East China Sea, the Japanese government’s assessment is clear.²⁵¹ Chinese activity in the vicinity of the Senkakus aims to create a situation of “coadministration” rather than Japanese sole administration of the islands and their surrounding waters. From there, China could make a play for sole administration. The Chinese use of gray-zone tactics around the Senkakus is a clear example of seeking to change the status quo without triggering a militarized dispute under international law, and gray-zone tactics that fail to trigger the *casus foederis* increase the risk of abandonment.

**The Alliance Response: The “2015 Guidelines”**

After and while dealing with this pair of scenarios, the two allies in question addressed their fears of abandonment and entrapment, and pursued other goals, through renegotiation of the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” The guidelines are a bilaterally agreed-upon framework of alliance roles, missions, and capabilities (RMCs). They are not a direct supplement to the existing alliance treaty; instead, the guidelines exist as a separate implementation framework dependent on each nation’s own laws. There have been only three versions of the guidelines in the nearly seventy-year history of the alliance, those of 1978, 1997, and 2015.

More than simply providing a road map for cooperation, the guidelines represent a de facto clarification of the *casus foederis*. They reorient the alliance for different threats, clarify core values, and manage expectations for when and how the allies will apply their respective capabilities in response to both peacetime conditions and security situations.²⁵² In places the content of the guidelines is aspirational; in others it serves as a starting point for the allies to initiate a new RMC; in still others it formalizes initiatives already under way. Whatever the case, once published the guidelines provide a constant point of reference for the allies, as illustrated by the repeated references to them in joint statements at all levels of alliance management, but most notably by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee.²⁵³

The “2015 Guidelines” dealt with the fears of entrapment and abandonment in the following four ways. First, the document explicitly defined the role of the alliance in all situations, from peacetime through armed attack. For the allies, an armed-attack situation is the explicit *casus foederis* under article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation.²⁵⁴ With the “2015 Guidelines,” the allies formally broadened the *casus foederis* to include gray-zone threats as well, calling for “seamless responses,” highlighting the need for
whole-of-government approaches to security issues, and identifying categories of
security incidents that require alliance response. Those categories of cooperation
include “Cooperative Measures from Peacetime,” “Responses to Emerging
Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security,” “Action in Response to an Armed Attack
against Japan,” “Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country Other
Than Japan,” “Cooperation in Response to Large-Scale Disaster in Japan,” and
“Cooperation in International Activities.”

Second, the guidelines called for establishment of the Alliance Coordination
Mechanism (ACM). There are three reasons the U.S.-Japan alliance requires a
coordination mechanism. The first is the necessity to manage policy decisions that
affect the alliance in times of crisis or contingency. The second is the operational
coordination that must occur among separate organizations, given the alliance’s
bilateral structure, as opposed to a combined-forces structure. The third rea-
son—which is not stated explicitly, but lies at the core of the purpose for the co-
ordination mechanism—is to manage the risks of abandonment and entrapment.

The Mutual Security Treaty establishes specific rights and obligations, and the
ACM helps ensure that the allies honor their commitments. For example, if there
were to be a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. government would use the
ACM to provide the entire Japanese interagency structure with the information
and requests for support needed to be able to ensure provision of necessary ac-
cess and support codified under alliance designs. These could include garnering
Japanese civilian and defense logistics support for an operation or the opening up
of Japanese civilian airports for use as intermediate staging bases and safe havens
for noncombatant evacuees. Conversely, the Japanese government might use the
ACM to ensure that it influences U.S. decision-making and gets its say before the
United States attempts to take potentially escalatory actions that could lead to
retaliation against bases in Japan, thereby entrapping Japan in conflict.

Third, the guidelines expanded the domains within which the allies may co-
operate. As part of the desire to prepare to provide seamless responses to security
threats, the two governments decided to broaden alliance responsibilities beyond
the air, land, and sea domains, to include space and cyberspace. For the United
States, space and cyber had been recognized domains for security operations for
some time, but the same was not true of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF). Hampered in part by budget restraints, the JSDF did not have its first military-use
satellite in orbit until 2017, and its first cyber unit did not stand up until 2014. The “2015 Guidelines” capitalized on Japan’s unilateral expansion in those do-

Fourth, the “2015 Guidelines” expanded the reach of the alliance to the whole
of government. Previous iterations of the guidelines focused on foreign policy
and defense organizations, but the “2015 Guidelines” recognized the challenges
of gray-zone conflict and sought to incorporate law-enforcement and other organizations that wield nonmilitary instruments of power. While the guidelines did not succeed in incorporating an explicit call for cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard, National Police Agency, Ministry of Finance, or others, they were included under the scope of “relevant agencies.” Similarly, the guidelines called for cooperation with civilian authorities for the conduct of site surveys necessary to prepare for U.S. contingency operations, such as those that may occur on the Korean Peninsula.

How have the guidelines done in managing entrapment and abandonment? Since publication of the “2015 Guidelines,” the two governments have employed the ACM in response to numerous North Korean provocations, coordinating alliance responses and exchanging information on the incidents. The U.S. military has conducted site surveys at multiple civilian airports in preparation for potential contingency operations. Meanwhile, while much of the intra-alliance discourse on the Senkakus is classified, U.S. officials have reiterated the security guarantee over the islands while supporting development of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s amphibious brigade and continuing bilateral training on missions specifically tailored to remote-island defense. All of this demonstrates the effectiveness of the guidelines in updating the alliance for the modern strategic environment, since they redefined the casus foederis, provided a list of applicable RMCs, declared mechanisms for managing them, and presented a road map for implementation.

The fears of abandonment and entrapment continue to influence alliance relationships today. Scholarship offers seven key takeaways for academics and practitioners alike. First, alliances tend to deter militarized interstate conflict, which decreases the risk of warfare for alliance members but suggests that adversaries will compete in ways short of military conflict. Second, the risk of entrapment is low, although individual leaders within alliance management may inflate this risk in intra-alliance bargaining. Third, alliance designs matter in managing the risks of abandonment and entrapment. States carefully craft alliances to mitigate the chance of being abandoned or entrapped, and once the security relationship is formed they leverage alliance designs to support their desired security outcomes. Fourth, those alliance designs include nonmilitary benefits that factor into abandonment and entrapment issues. States are concerned with what the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of those obligations may mean for their own security objectives. Fifth, risk of abandonment increases over time because societies, administrations, and expectations change but alliance designs do not—unless the allies deliberately take steps to modify them. Sixth, adversaries attempt to undermine alliances,
divide the allies, or both, which increases the risk of abandonment. Seventh, allies can take steps to reduce the risk of abandonment and entrapment through renegotiation or clarification of alliance designs.

Understanding these takeaways is necessary for determining what posture allies should take in the modern strategic environment. Alliances have worked well in deterring armed-attack situations, but adversaries intentionally are avoiding the thresholds for military conflict while seeking to change the status quo in their favor through gray-zone tactics. Alliance designs that have not been reworked to respond to security incidents short of an armed attack require updating. Fortunately, there are examples of allies that have taken the necessary steps to modify alliance arrangements for present-day security challenges, including expanding the *casus foederis* beyond armed-attack situations, incorporating new domains for cooperation such as space and cyberspace, and focusing on coordinated employment of nonmilitary instruments of power. The U.S.-Japan “2015 Guidelines” document provides a useful model for other alliances today.

While this article offers useful conclusions for academics and practitioners alike, additional research is necessary. First, the conclusions drawn here should be applied to case studies in alignments rather than alliances. There has been a decline in usage of traditional treaty alliances and a rise in alignments, and initial impressions are that abandonment fears will increase as a result, since the resulting obligations are not explicit, merely implicit. Second, additional research is necessary for examining abandonment and entrapment in multilateral as opposed to bilateral alliances. For example, how do those risks influence alliance management in NATO compared with the U.S.-Japan alliance? Finally, more research should be dedicated to understanding the tools that allies have to mitigate the risks of abandonment and entrapment. This article offered one example—the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation”—but other institutions and instruments are available, demonstrating varying degrees of effectiveness.

**NOTES**


2. *Foederology* is the study of alliances.


20. For example, North Korea, China, and Russia all have active cyber units that engage in disinformation campaigns, cyber crime, and other illicit behavior that cannot be attributed directly enough to justify deterrence through punishment under international law.

21. For example, see Chinese “debt diplomacy,” Chinese island building in the South China Sea, Russian disinformation campaigns, and North Korean theft of Bitcoin currency.


24. This is the model for every U.S. alliance treaty since 1945, including the North Atlantic Treaty, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, and the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. A prominent example of a non-American alliance treaty built on this framework is that between China and North Korea, of which article 2 states, “The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.” Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances, 1648–2008 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), p. 423.

26. Both level of intensity and impetus for response are predicated on international legal frameworks and precedents for the use of instruments of power in response.


33. This is especially true if one ascribes to Schweller's argument that alliances are formed on the basis of a balance of interests, the most basic being interest in the status quo vs. revisionism. Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72–107.

34. Wigell reinforces this notion with his concept of hybrid interference, which is the use of hybrid tactics specifically as part of a wedge strategy to divide a target country or coalition and weaken its counterbalancing potential. Mikael Wigell, “Hybrid Interference as a Wedge Strategy: A Theory of External Interference in Liberal Democracy,” International Affairs 95, no. 2 (March 2019), pp. 255–75.


38. The 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis consisted of a series of escalatory security incidents following discovery of North Korean nuclear weapons development, North Korea's denial of entry to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, and the Kim regime's decision to withdraw North Korea from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a result, the United States placed regional military forces on alert for the possible execution of military strikes against known nuclear weapons facilities. The most notable missile launch was the 1998 Taepodong launch, in which the missile traveled over Japanese territory.

39. The prior consultation requirement was clarified via a formal exchange of notes, having following as the subject matter: “Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty.” Exchange of Notes Incorporating Agreed Consultation Formula, Japan-U.S., 19 January 1960. Article 5 details the obligation for defense of Japan. Article 4 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty states: “The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.”


41. In March 2010, ROKS Cheonan, a South Korean naval corvette, sank off the west coast.
of the peninsula, killing forty-six sailors. A formal investigation conducted by the UN Command Military Armistice Commission concluded that the vessel was sunk by North Korean forces, despite the Kim regime’s denial of any involvement in the incident. In November 2010, North Korea shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong-do, killing four and injuring sixty-eight. Situation in the Republic of Korea, Article 5 Report (Int’l Crim. Ct. 23 June 2014), icc-cpi.int/.

42. In 2002, the allies formally established the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism to handle coordination in the event of crises or contingencies, including those related to “situations in areas surrounding Japan.” Situations in areas surrounding Japan (often referred to as SIASJs, pronounced “sai-es-jays”) were codified officially under Japanese law as those that, if allowed to go unchecked, would have an important influence on Japanese peace and prosperity. If declared, the existence of a SIASJ would grant authorities to the JSDF, cabinet, and relevant ministries and agencies that normally are not available for peacetime operations. Following the publication of the “2015 Guidelines,” the Japanese government updated the SIASJ law to align with alliance expectations for support. The archived law is entitled Shūhenjitai ni saishite wagakuni no heiwa oyobi anzen wo kakuho surutame no sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Law concerning measures necessary for securing peace and security in situations in areas surrounding Japan], Law No. 253 of 1999. The updated law is entitled Jyūyō eikyō jitai ni saishite wagakuni no heiwa oyobi anzen wo kakuho surutame no sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Law concerning measures necessary for securing peace and security in important influence situations], Law No. 60 of 2015.


44. This issue was handled in the 1960s via two secret agreements known as the “Kishi (or Korean) minute” and the “Korea clause.” The former came in 1960 as a concession from Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s government, asserting that the U.S. military had the administration’s tacit agreement to launch immediate military action from Japan in the event of a North Korean armed attack. The latter was part of the November 1969 joint communiqué that, on the basis of a verbal affirmation, noted that if the U.S. military was required to respond to either a Taiwan or a North Korean crisis, the Japanese government would say yes in response to U.S. prior consultation. However, these arrangements never have been renewed, and neither side has negotiated a current position on the matter. Michael M. Bosack, “The Relationship between United Nations Command and Japan: 1950–2018,” International Journal of Korean Studies 23, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2019), pp. 71–105.

45. House of Councillors of Japan, Dai 186 kai kokkai, Yosan iinkai dai 1 go [No. 186 Diet Session, Budget Committee No. 1 Session], 15 July 2014, available from kokkai.ndl.go.jp/.

46. A status of forces agreement lays out the legal provisions covering one or more foreign militaries operating within a state’s sovereign territory. Provisions include but are not limited to taxation, basing, entry and exit procedures, criminal jurisdiction, and host-nation support.

47. Prior to reversion, U.S. military forces used the Senkaku Islands as bombing ranges.


50. For example, several CCG vessels have the same displacement and armament as naval frigates. Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst, “Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and
Beyond?,” *Naval War College Review* 72, no. 2 (Spring 2019), pp. 11–34.


54. Article 5 reads as follows: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

55. “2015 Guidelines.”

56. Such emerging threats include the so-called *jyūyōeikyō jūtai* (important influence situation), which replaced SIASJ and includes, among other scenarios, response to a Korean Peninsula crisis. The section regarding response to an armed attack against a country other than Japan expanded the *casus foederis* to include limited exercise of collective self-defense in support of the United States. Despite the absence of such a military obligation under the Mutual Security Treaty, the guidelines clearly state the conditions under which Japan could use military force in support of its U.S. ally. Definition of a major natural disaster as a security incident warranting alliance response represented another change to the *casus foederis*. International activities were included within the scope of the alliance in the 1997 guidelines, but the “2015 Guidelines” expanded the RMCs associated with this category of cooperation.

57. The ACM was formally established in November 2015 via secretary/minister-level affirmation of a bilaterally negotiated implementation instrument.

58. Part of this necessity is borne from article 4 of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty, which dictates that the allies will consult “whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.”

59. Given Japanese constitutional limitations, the JSDF is prohibited from operating within a command-and-control structure in which partner militaries have rules on the use of military force that are different from its own (a concept known as *ittaika*). As a result, the U.S.-Japan alliance operates bilaterally with parallel command structures, unlike NATO or the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Basic Policy for the Development of New Security Legislation,” pt. 2, chap. 1, sec. 3 in *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo: 2014), available at www.mod.go.jp/.

Michael M. Bosack, “Article 9, *ittaika*, and Japan's Liaison Officer Corps,” *Japan Times*, 29 January 2020, japantimes.co.jp/.


61. In adherence to a policy set in 1976, Japanese defense spending was capped at 1 percent of gross domestic product every year but one (1986) until 2019. Matt Williams, “Japan Becomes a Military Space Player with Latest

62. Early versions of the negotiated guidelines included language specifically naming Japan’s law-enforcement entities, but those were struck owing to Japanese domestic political constraints. Michael M. Bosack, “Realizing a ‘Seamless Response’: Incorporating the Japan Coast Guard in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” *Sasakawa USA Forum*, no. 13 (15 May 2018), spfsusa.org/.

63. “2015 Guidelines.”

64. Notably, the ACM was employed in response to the 2016 North Korean nuclear test, coordinating the execution of a “sequenced bilateral” show-of-force mission with the South Korean government. Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) Video-Conference at the Director-General Level,” press release, 10 September 2016, mod.go.jp/.

