Victory without Peace: The United States Navy in European Waters, 1919–1924

Angus Ross
The U.S. Naval War College

William N. Still Jr.

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Special Duty is recommended for the serious academic or intelligence practitioner, as it is not a light romp through the stirring escapades and game-changing events of global espionage and counterintelligence. Rather, it is a thoughtful book by a true academic who works to explain the complexities of the modern world of intelligence, within the even more complex world of Japanese culture and history. Besides providing the reader a look into the world of intelligence, Samuels offers the student of contemporary history and strategic intrigue a glimpse into the bureaucratic realities within which today’s intelligence services must operate—making their seldom-known “wins” even more impressive, and their usually very public failures all the more understandable.

ANDREW G. WILSON

Victory without Peace: The United States Navy in European Waters, 1919–1924,

This title is the third volume in the author’s well-known series covering the U.S. Navy’s operations in European waters from the end of the American Civil War until the Navy closed the European station in 1929. The volume under review covers the uncertain period immediately after the First World War, when stability in Europe was by no means certain and rival powers still were jockeying for positions of influence in areas that long had been in dispute. In particular, the demise of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, together with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, had released long-suppressed tensions that were threatening the peace process in a number of regions. Still vividly describes the stress this created for the great powers, which, after years of awful conflict, were understandably intent on a rapid demobilization and a return to “normalcy.” Instead, navies of the former Allies found themselves embroiled in a wide range of missions short of conflict—missions that required specialized skills, and for which they were, for the most part, poorly prepared. Still is an accomplished historian whose research is always of the highest standard, and this volume continues that tradition. The work is split thematically, and to some extent geographically, into ten chapters, each of which covers a given mission. The first three chapters look at the role that naval officers played in the Paris peace negotiations, demobilization, and the uniquely naval challenge that the removal of the North Sea Mine Barrage presented. Seven further chapters follow, each focusing on a specific mission within a particular trouble spot. Organizationally, this may be as good a way as any to present the material. However, the combination of Still’s focusing on the personal contributions of only a few key individuals whose responsibilities necessarily transcended many of the individual chapters with the fact that these events all were happening concurrently creates some challenges. For example, the Chief of Naval Operations and the notable naval
personalities in each station changed, sometimes more than once, over the five years under review. Yet with the start of each successive chapter Still takes us back in time through many of the earlier incumbents’ thinking and interactions, albeit from a different angle. This makes everything hard to follow, to the point where I found myself crying out for a chart depicting who relieved whom in each of the key naval positions over the years in question. Therefore, a good prior working knowledge of the key naval personalities of the 1920s and where and when they served would enhance the reader’s experience greatly.

Similarly, when it came to the geographic regions depicted in chapter 4 and beyond, it would have been useful to have included a map of some sort in each chapter, depicting each of the key places mentioned in the text. This would have allowed the reader to tie things together in terms of time and space and to appreciate better the enormous challenges posed by the shortages of platforms and the multiplicity of taskings. Although I am of European descent and spent most of my naval career in these waters, I was forced on many occasions to resort to online maps to appreciate better the author’s points—something that perhaps should not have been necessary.

Finally, it also might have been worth including a little more detail on what became known as the “Naval Battle of Paris” in the first chapter. After all, the U.S. decision to build a “navy second to none”—and the obvious impact this was going to have on a close ally, Great Britain—constituted a monumental policy decision for the United States, with ramifications to the present day. Such an enhanced discussion would have been of abiding interest to most naval officers and the readership of this journal.

These comments notwithstanding, this book still is a very worthwhile addition to the library of anyone with a passing interest in the development of U.S. naval policy. It covers a rarely addressed and largely unsung part of naval responsibilities: providing naval support to foreign policy in its widest sense; this makes it valuable in and of itself. Even though general readers may get a little lost in the minutiae, Still’s attention to detail and his intimate knowledge of the key naval personalities of the era give the book a wide application within the academic field, particularly for established naval historians of the period. The eighty-odd pages of endnotes alone are a rich source of material that can inspire any number of supporting studies and additional work. Finally, it should not be overlooked that this glimpse into how the U.S. Navy responded in a previous era of great-power maneuvering could have renewed relevance in today’s uncertain times vis-à-vis China and Russia.

ANGUS ROSS


Building Militaries in Fragile States is a classic example of a doctoral dissertation transformed into a book. The author seeks to find the reason that U.S. efforts to create strong militaries in weaker countries are successful—or not. Her answer highlights the role of external actors, as well as the degree to which the host nation is willing to allow the United States to get involved in deep and sensitive matters of state (e.g., the assignment of personnel,