George C. Marshall and the Early Cold War: Policy, Politics, and Society

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William A. Taylor

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despite an inauspicious beginning and the subsequent controversial execution of Admiral John Byng (and the end of Anson’s initial term as First Lord), the Royal Navy had reinvented itself successfully under fire, becoming the dominant naval force in Europe by the end of the Seven Years’ War (1763).

Lord Anson did not take office with specific reforms in mind; instead he repeatedly responded to demonstrated deficiencies in the Royal Navy. On the other hand, he left for the attentions of future First Lords such as Sandwich and St. Vincent the reform of the royal dockyards. With the establishment of the Impress Service, Anson’s administration made the practice of impressment more efficient, though not more palatable to British mariners.

Lavery’s work compellingly illustrates how the Royal Navy under Anson’s leadership took the first critical steps needed to face a resurgent France at the turn of the nineteenth century and to ensure that Britannia would continue to rule the waves.

MICHAEL ROMERO


Almost everyone reading this journal knows that George C. Marshall is one of the most important figures in the history of the national security of the United States. His role as U.S. Army Chief of Staff dominates the historical literature, but his achievements as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense also were huge.

It was to study these later achievements that William A. Taylor assembled this anthology, which focuses on Marshall’s record during the early portion of the Cold War. Since a variety of authors are involved in these types of projects, there is always a range in the quality of the contributions. The authors of the various chapters are a diverse mix, ranging from junior assistant professors to emeriti, but the bulk seem to be at the junior associate level. It is a credit to Taylor’s editorial and administrative skills that the variance in the quality of the offerings is rather small.

The topics the authors explore include universal military training, the effort to mediate the Chinese civil war, the creation of an independent U.S. Air Force, the National Security Act of 1947, the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Korean War, and the racial integration of the armed forces. While Marshall was a major player in affairs of state for the whole period between 1939 and 1951, his presence throughout was less than total; for instance, despite the authors’ assertions in the chapters on the National Security Act of 1947 and the desegregation of the military, he barely played a role in those evolutions. Some of the material is hardly new; the chapters on the Marshall Plan and nuclear weapons are short versions of the authors’ books on the same topics.

Like all editors of books of this type, Taylor ties all the essays together in an introduction and a conclusion. These sections in anthologies often are not that useful, but Taylor makes some solid points in his conclusion about the importance of tying defense and foreign policies to social values, and also regarding the importance of alliances and how to make them stronger.
However, several other themes emerge in two or more chapters that get no mention in Taylor’s bookend sections.

- Marshall won more than he lost, but he did lose often, when he did not have the stronger argument. Universal military training and military unification are two perfect examples.

- A significant element in Marshall’s approach to strategy was his effort to find initiatives that were economically sustainable. He knew there were limits to power, even U.S. financial power, and he wanted to find mechanisms that could be sustained over the long term.

- The logic of military power is the logic of military power. Marshall did not turn a blind eye to new technology—he saw the great potential and value in air-power, for instance—but new weapon systems, even nuclear weapons, were just tools; they did not invalidate strategic plans and concepts. Put another away, the more things changed, the more Marshall stayed the same.

- Marshall was not beholden to the institutional interests of the U.S. Army. Even though he had spent most of his adult life wearing brown and khaki uniforms, he often prioritized the contributions of the air and sea services over those of the Army. He never let bureaucratic concerns direct national-security policy or strategy.

- Marshall always took a core-and-periphery approach to geopolitics and strategy. Europe was the main theater in both World War II and the Cold War. Even though he had spent part of his career in China as an early version of a foreign area officer, going so far as to learn Chinese, he never developed a case of “professional localism” in policy toward China. The United States needed to limit its involvement in East Asia, and during the Korean War he worked hard to keep the conflict from spreading to other regions—to avert it from becoming the Cold War version of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Individuals looking for strategic guidance from the career of George C. Marshall, or on any of the topics addressed in this book, will find the time they invest in these pages a worthwhile endeavor.

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES


This is an ambitious book about China’s geostrategic initiative known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR). The main benefit to be gained from reading Freyman’s well-researched volume is the macro understanding gained about the massive, continent-spanning efforts under way by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). By adopting a macro assessment built on microlevel case studies of select OBOR investments in ports located across the globe, the author succeeds in providing both a big-picture understanding and a detailed depiction of what OBOR represents to China and potentially to the world.

Because documenting China’s OBOR is an overwhelming task, few have tried to capture the program in its entirety. In attempting to do so, Freyman’s monograph provides a public service.

Rather than just reviewing newspaper headlines and press releases, the author