Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future

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the first time in naval history when a third-rate navy might threaten the largest fleets in the world effectively. Second, the industrial powers’ need for resources and markets on a global scale widened the scope of naval strategic responsibilities immeasurably. This navies were slow to appreciate, but (to cut a long story very short) the likes of Admiral Fisher in Britain with his battle cruiser ideas in 1905 and Admiral Fournier in France with his general-purpose cruisers (“bon à tout faire”—able to do anything) a few years earlier slowly but inexorably moved the focus away from a defensive clash of battle fleets around the point of decision toward the use of offensive power-projection fleets around the periphery to ensure protection of these wider strategic interests. This offensive approach was taken up most notably by the carrier power-projection fleets of the U.S. Navy in the post–World War II era. In other words, the “capital ship theory” that the U.S. Navy has held dear through all these years is this offensive power-projection version, not the original Mahanian ideas of a half-century earlier. Watts does not make this distinction clear.

Watts’s third discontinuity, which is more of an omission than anything else, is his lack of consideration of network-centric warfare (NCW) as a possible alternative to his capital ship theory. While he mentions the concept very briefly in passing (p. 129), he chooses not to explain that it actually argues against capital ship theory by maintaining that, in this era of reliable and near-instantaneous data sharing, it is the integrity of the network among the various platforms that is vital, not the security of any individual unit attached to it. No one ship needs to have all the “sensors and shooters” in a discrete package if each can draw what it lacks from the others in the network. This again makes it something of an antithesis of capital ship theory, considering the latter’s focus on the platforms involved. As such, the NCW concept is worthy of inclusion here, if only to explore why the U.S. Navy supposedly rejected it (although aspects of it have survived in the current “distributed lethality” idea).

In the end, this reviewer was not persuaded by the arguments as presented, but this in no way should be taken as a rejection of the book’s core idea itself. Watts’s volume is valuable insofar as it encourages the reader to think of alternative organizational strategies for the U.S. Navy; it is, however, incomplete, in that formulating a comprehensive conclusion requires the three objections discussed above to be addressed at some point. The book also does not offer any defense for the generalist position and the many virtues of capable, multipurpose ships across the range of military operations, nor any alternative to this force, which presumably would have to include a larger number of specialist platforms. One hopes this will form a new point of departure for future work in this area.

ANGUS ROSS


Henry Sokolski has been a fixture of Washington’s nuclear nonproliferation community for several decades and in
various roles, including as practitioner, analyst, educator, and advocate. This short volume represents his second effort, after more than a decade and a half, at encapsulating a holistic understanding of the long-standing U.S. nuclear proliferation prevention project. Sokolski takes up the challenge of tackling this vast and complex subject in a monograph-length treatment with confidence and aplomb. He does so in a way that is approachable by those who may not have extensive knowledge of the subject but is likely to offer new insights to experts in the field. In doing so, he succeeds on many levels, though not all.

The greatest strength of Underestimated is its ability to bridge issues and perspectives that are all too rarely bridged. For example, Sokolski displays a rare combination of an insider’s applied knowledge of what is practical in the real world of technology, bureaucracy, and diplomacy with an outsider’s ability to think creatively outside the box of official logic. Indeed, over the years he developed a reputation as a disruptive—in a useful way—insider. He also makes a conscious effort to bridge the policy and academic divide, as well as what he sees as the loosely associated ideological divisions between nuclear hawks and doves. Further, he seeks to bridge the long-standing conceptual cleavages among the cognate nuclear areas of arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation, counterproliferation, deterrence, and war fighting, as well as to treat nuclear weapons and missiles as two sides of the same coin across all these areas. Finally, he approaches all this ranging across geographic regions, and both casting back in history and looking out to the future. In doing so, he helps the reader to consider all these areas together, as aspects of and tools for understanding the same, larger picture: namely, the enduring and systematic U.S. interest in curtailing the threats posed by the spread of strategic weapons. This alone is an invaluable contribution to the literature that should enrich the perspectives of all types of readers, expert and otherwise.

Unfortunately, the work suffers from failing to deliver consistently on its ambition to cast a wide historical, geographic, and conceptual net. In part this is owing to the constraints of trying to cover a great deal within a very constrained space. Put simply, this is a very small book taking an expansive look at a big topic.

However, there are also some specific weaknesses. Sokolski is not an academic, and his attempts to engage international relations theory are unlikely to impress scholarly readers. For example, while offering intriguing insights about competing perspectives that have emerged within strands of structural realism—notably, contrasting the differing perspectives epitomized by Kenneth Waltz and John Mueller—he offers nothing whatsoever on any applicable insights from neoliberal institutionalism, social constructivism, or neoclassical or liberal (English school) realism. This represents a serious omission when one considers that the seminal English school scholar Hedley Bull is one of the giants in theorizing about the differences between arms control and disarmament; the constructivist lens has been used extensively to explicate nuclear proliferation dynamics; and liberal institutionalism underpins much of the current thinking about disarmament in its contemporary incarnation in the “global zero” movement. Likewise, in the end the author’s real focus narrows down to his obvious true
passion, nonproliferation, as becomes clear when the book concludes with a series of policy recommendations. While there are a few ideas involving nuclear force posture or arms limitation, such as a ban on forward nuclear deployments, the thrust of the package is on preventive nonproliferation.

These are real weaknesses. But they do not detract from the real strengths here that commend this as a worthy addition to the nuclear weapons literature. At its best, Underestimated succeeds admirably in synthesizing the swirling policy debates surrounding these complex and interrelated issues, framing them in a wider context that is also widely accessible.

DAVID COOPER


War presents many opportunities and temptations to do wrong and to choose injustice and evil over good. How are we to know how to act when situations are not black-and-white, or when emotions cloud our judgment? These questions are not new, and the discussion surrounding them has been going on since Saint Augustine of Hippo penned the first recognizable form of just war theory in the fifth century. Philosopher Christopher Eberle brings his clear thought and humble wit to the discussion using his particular viewpoint as both a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy and a Christian.

Viewing the just war tradition as the best available framework for reflecting on the morality of war, Eberle aims to “provide a conceptual and propositional resource that citizens, soldiers, and statesmen can employ as an aid to moral formation.” This book is a natural outgrowth of his weighty responsibility to form the morals of the nation’s future warrior-leaders. What makes his voice particularly worth listening to about this topic is that, while he is a philosopher interested in discussing ideas, he translates these ideas into practical wisdom using historical and generic examples that are easy to follow for anyone interested in the topic. This book is valuable to a range of people, from undergraduates through adult learners who have a basic familiarity with just war theory to seasoned experts in the field. Dr. Eberle brings a Christian element into a discussion that is often bereft of it, as well as an examination of the interior mind and intent, which also are often ignored.

Eberle’s Christian faith is valuable in that he presents just war theory from the perspective out of which it was created: the heart of Western Christianity. This brings us to his second aim: “to provide an understanding of the morality of war that is open to religious contributions both to the justification and limitation of military violence.” This is particularly important given how Osama Bin Laden framed the events of September 11, 2001—as religious “just war.” It is only by considering a just war theory reunited with religion that one can meet these claims accurately and reveal them as false. This reunification of just war theory and religion is the raw material that forms the core of what Eberle uses to guide all decision making with regard to right action in war.

In his discussion, Eberle focuses narrowly on the justificatory and