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Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great Campaigns

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combatants,” with both the protections and restraints implied, and that PMCs, along with the state governments, have a shared responsibility to conduct the war in a way that is consistent with command and control accountability.

Outsourcing War is a compelling analysis of the reemergence of nonstate actors in the implementation of warfare. With scholarly credibility and political savvy, Eckert displays an understanding of both the past and the present as the just war tradition impacts the future development of PMCs, offering reasonable solutions to the current problems posed by the outsourcing of war. In applying the jus ad bellum and jus in bello modifications to the status and conduct of PMCs, Eckert’s central assertion in Outsourcing War makes us wonder whether these modifications negate the very reasons for using PMCs in the first place. This question raises even further the critical issue of whether it is more important to alter PMC practices to align with just war principles or to alter just war principles to align with PMC practices. Eckert seems to advocate a middle course that balances the time-honored principles of the just war tradition with the reality of contemporary PMC practices through responsible applications, and that balance is one for policy makers, academics, and warfighters to debate in the outsourcing of war to PMCs.

EDWARD ERWIN


John Kuehn’s objective is to analyze the Napoleonic Wars “along principally operational lines” (p. xi). Kuehn claims that, of the three levels of war, “the one that is least understood and written about resides in that always uncomfortable middle ground, the operational level” (p. x). He explains that he chose the period of the French Wars (1792–1815) because they lend themselves “particularly well to an operational-level analysis” (p. ix). His goal is to provide “something of an impressionistic result that suggests the operational-level approach adopted here illustrates effectively the more esoteric concept of operational art—how military genius, as best defined by Clausewitz, operated in space and time in the uncertain environment at the operational level during the era of a veritable ‘God of War’” (p. xi). In particular, Kuehn, who holds the General William Stofft Chair for Historical Research at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, maintains that “an operational examination of Napoleonic campaigns has value because so many of their characteristics resemble current American military thought and practice” (p. 9).

The book begins with an interesting discussion of the evolution of the operational art as a level of war to be studied. Kuehn provides definitions and an explanation of his methodology, which is to analyze Napoleonic operations through the frameworks provided by the Soviet school and by James Schneider, formerly of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Successive chapters generally follow the chronology of the coalition wars that France fought between 1792 and 1815. Chapter 3, which covers the War of the Second Coalition, examines Russian and
French operations in Italy and Switzerland but does not include Napoleon's second Italian campaign. Chapter 4 is devoted to an interesting study of the naval war between Great Britain and France, in particular the operational art of Admiral Horatio Nelson, which is well done. Kuehn concludes his book with a very short epilogue that covers Napoleon's last campaigns in 1814 and 1815. No bibliography is included.

Professor Kuehn makes it very clear that his conclusions are not based on archival research or a fresh look at the primary sources: “[M]ost of the sources used for this book are secondary and may appear dated with respect to their interpretations. They are used to get basic facts, which at the operational level of war are largely established” (p. xi). His notes demonstrate a heavy dependence on David Chandler, John Elting, Steven Ross, Christopher Duffy, Rory Muir, Gunther Rothenberg, and Charles Oman. One curious omission is the works on 1806, 1807, 1809, 1813, and 1814 by the early-nineteenth-century British staff officer Francis Loraine Petre, who provides much better operational studies than does Chandler. Moreover, only a handful of references were drawn from recent scholarship by Roger Knight and Alexander Mikaberidze. Completely missing from Kuehn's notes are Huw Davies's groundbreaking 2012 work Wellington's Wars: The Making of a Military Genius, which might have persuaded Kuehn that his interpretation of Wellington's way of war needed some revision, and John H. Gill’s three volumes on 1809, Thunder on the Danube. Conversely, Kuehn consulted Gneisenau’s life of Blücher, which must be used with extreme caution because at times it borders on fiction. For example, the Krümper system did not produce 150,000 trained men in three years (p. 175).

The problem with Professor Kuehn's research is that the “basic facts” these dated works provide are the material from which he draws his conclusions, and they are not always accurate. Moreover, the work is replete with generalizations and oversimplifications that likewise are not always accurate. For example, Yorck did not conduct “extensive negotiations” with Clausewitz in December 1813 (p. 174) but with the Russian general Diebitsch; Germany did not explode in revolt in early 1813 (p. 179); and the “ubiquitous Czernicheff and his Cossacks” were not responsible for the destruction of Girard's division on August 27, 1813 (p. 195)—that was the work of Prussian general Hirschfeld's mainly Landwehr (militia) brigade of twelve thousand men, supported by Czernicheff’s five Cossack regiments, at the battle of Hagelberg. Blücher's army in 1815 was not “a veritable Prussian Grande Armée” (p. 209), as it lacked any reserves or specialized units at the army level, and 75 percent of one of its four corps consisted of newly raised Landwehr, while another corps was 50 percent Landwehr.

This reviewer had hoped that with ABC-CLIO's acquisition of Praeger some quality-control measures would be introduced to the latter's publishing process; sadly, this has not been the case. Although no fault of his, Kuehn's book is in dire need of professional copyediting. Misspellings, omissions and commissions in punctuation and capitalization, missing diacritical marks and nobiliary particles, redundant vocabulary, and less-than-clear sentences mar this book. Kuehn is not entirely blameless. Minor yet irritating errors such as "the army of
Prussia created by Frederick the Great and his father Frederick William II” (p. 16) undermine the author’s credibility. Austria’s Hofkriegsrat was not “also known as the Aulic Council” (p. 24); they were very different entities.

Maps are an issue as well. The maps in this book would have been considered archaic fifty years ago; today they are abominable and practically illegible—a magnifying glass might be of some assistance. Any operational study depends on good maps to help the reader understand the course of the campaigns, but this reviewer gave up on trying to use this book’s maps.

It is difficult to state where this book fits in the massive literature on the Napoleonic Wars. This study can be seen as an extension of Robert M. Epstein’s 1994 work Napoleon’s Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War. Kuehn does accomplish his stated goal of describing the Napoleonic “campaigns, armies, and leaders using the lens of operational art” (p. 10). However, the descriptions of the campaigns are not detailed enough for any but a Napoleonic Wars expert to grasp the points that Kuehn is trying to make. He admits that some will object to his use of twentieth-century military theory to explain eighteenth- and nineteenth-century events (p. xi). Kuehn does have moments of brilliance, especially in the chapters on the evolution of the operational art and the naval duel, as well as the short paragraphs he employs to summarize his chapters, but in the end an analysis based on outdated scholarship provides a weak foundation that jeopardizes the stability of the entire structure.

MICHAEL V. LEGGIERE


Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 is the second volume in a comprehensive history of the impact of the submarine on maritime warfare. Engaging their significant expertise in the history of naval warfare and military technology research and development, authors Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman chronicle the development and employment of the submarine as a weapon of war at sea and the resulting response by navies to counter the effectiveness of the submarine through antisubmarine warfare (ASW).

This book examines submarine and antisubmarine technology, tactics, and doctrine chronologically, commencing with World War II submarine operations in the Atlantic and Pacific and culminating with twenty-first-century ASW concepts and contemporary issues. This history captures the asymmetry between the submarine and antisubmarine warfare as these two forms of maritime warfare competed for tactical and operational superiority. The book discusses contributions the science and technology community made to ASW, as well as the actions of operational and tactical innovators. The scientists and innovators collectively developed ASW capabilities that reignited further competition between the submarine and the ASW operator. The book’s chronological approach studies the pace and trajectory of evolutionary and revolutionary changes in submarine operations and antisubmarine warfare by explaining the tactical and operational