How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns

Andrew L. Stigler
goals. Asmus thinks more skill and resolution might have carried this through, but one wonders whether the bigger lesson isn’t really about the finite nature of national power.

DAVID T. BURBACH
Naval War College


Audrey Kurth Cronin’s engaging and enlightening book examines how terrorist movements come to an end, focusing almost exclusively on terrorist organizations over the last half-century. She offers six pathways by which terrorist groups end: decapitation, negotiation, success, failure, repression, and reorientation.

One of the book’s strengths is that it captures the full spectrum of possible outcomes for terrorist organizations and explains why particular campaigns did or did not end. The organization of the book is laudable—by looking in each chapter at tactics and strategies for ending terrorism, rather than simply marching through case studies, one is able to examine more soberly specific strategic approaches to counterterrorism and their effects. In this regard, this book will be very useful for policy makers and counterterrorism practitioners.

Cronin is cautious in making causal claims. For example, in her chapter on decapitation she recognizes that killing the leaders of terrorist organizations has sometimes contributed to the eventual end of the organization (Sendero Luminoso, for example) but in other cases has not (Hamas). Though she does offer insights into the different outcomes, she tempers her conclusions by emphasizing that the act of decapitation provides “critical insight into the depth and nature of a group’s popular support.” In effect, one cannot know in advance.

The final chapter, “How Al-Qaeda Ends,” attempts to apply some of these lessons. Cronin convincingly argues that decapitation will not end al-Qa’ida. Beliefs that decapitation will have a dramatic impact on that organization are “tinged with emotion, not dispassionate analysis.” Killing Bin Laden, Cronin argues, might “actually enhance his stature, in practical terms.”

Although Cronin firmly states that all terrorist groups end, this reviewer read the final chapter wondering whether there are numerous aspects of al-Qa’ida (all of which Cronin notes in some capacity) that make it a candidate for some form of irrelevant perpetuity among terrorist organizations. It is transnational in influence like no other group in Cronin’s study. In 2001, al-Qa’ida struck an unprecedented blow against the sole global superpower. Cronin asserts that the group’s message will have staying power for some people as a call for resistance that will endure for many years, no matter what Bin Laden’s fate. This may be an unprecedented recipe for unusual longevity.

A combination of increased counterterrorism measures, a military offensive in Afghanistan, and al-Qa’ida’s own underrecognized organizational and operational deficiencies have rendered the group unable to execute a successful
attack in the United States since 9/11. There is good reason to expect that 9/11 will prove to have been the apex of al-Qa’ida’s operational effectiveness. But a final ending for the group’s following may be generations away, when the memories of both 9/11 and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have faded.

ANDREW L. STIGLER
Naval War College


Developed by J. D. Brown over many years as the third volume of a trilogy, Carrier Operations in World War II is an exhaustively researched history, with the finest collection of aircraft and carrier photographs one can possibly imagine. Brown was an aviation observer for twelve years in the Royal Navy, a historian, and ultimately head of the Royal Navy Historical Branch. This work combines material from two earlier studies as well as new data.

At Brown’s untimely death in 2001, his close friend David Hobbs, curator of the Fleet Air Arm Museum at Yeovilton Air Base—himself a pilot in the Royal Navy for thirty-three years—took up the torch and completed the third volume. In doing so he produced a highly detailed narrative of carrier operations for every major theater of the Second World War, as well as the detailing of special carrier forces created for particular operations. Jumping directly to operations, without any preliminary explanation, Hobbs presents Brown’s meticulous documentation of carrier operations in a readable and highly narrative account.

Brown and Hobbs both have impeccable credentials for writing this book. Without question the material amassed by Brown represents a single-source gold mine for scholars and buffs alike. Unfortunately, though, there is not a single footnote in the entire volume. Thus what could have been a valuable scholarly work, replete with traceable linkage to original sources, is transformed into simply a detailed narrative. Yet it is well worth its price for the photographs alone.

The first half focuses almost exclusively on British carrier operations, moving from the Atlantic and Arctic oceans to the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, the Indian Ocean, and ultimately to the Pacific Ocean in the latter stages of the war. The remainder of the book focuses primarily on American and Japanese carrier actions from Pearl Harbor through preparations for Operation OLYMPIC and the projected 1 November 1945 invasion of Kyushu in the Pacific.

The volume includes an accurate listing of aircraft carriers and other ships, their embarked squadrons, the types and numbers of aircraft they flew, and the locations involved. Where appropriate, there are vignettes of ships’ personnel, pilots, and aircrew. The photographs included throughout—many of which are from Brown’s private collection and never before published—give an incredible insight into the aircraft and the carriers from which they flew as technology progressed throughout the war. Carrier Operations in World War II is an especially useful companion to other volumes considering specific naval battles or aspects of the war at sea.