Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective from Japan

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There are countless books written on war but fewer on the problems of post-war or even intrawar peacemaking. This work thus offers top-quality case studies on a subject of enormous relevance. It will be of value to policy makers, academics, and general readers alike.

The Making of Peace is a collection of essays written by eminent historians known mainly for their writings on war. Sir Michael Howard’s preface sets the bar high, observing that the usual war/peace dichotomy is artificial, since the historical default is perpetual conflicts “that need not necessarily be resolved by force, and it is the business of statesmen to ensure that they are not.”

The book’s central argument is that effective peacemaking requires in-depth knowledge of the past; a healthy awareness of the political, historical, and cultural context within which a war has taken place; and a full appreciation of the characteristics of the “other.” As Murray writes in the introduction, “Without guideposts from the past to suggest paths to the future, then any road, no matter how irrelevant and inappropriate, will do. And such roads will inevitably lead to future conflicts.” However, that is not to imply that there are easy solutions. At the core of this book are eleven rich case studies of postwar peacemaking in the Western world, including chapters by, of course, Williamson Murray, as well as Paul Rahe, Derek Croxton and Geoffrey Parker, Fred Anderson, Richard Hart Sinnreich, James McPherson, Marcus Jones, John Gooch, Colin Gray, Jim Lacey, and Fred Kagan. Sinnreich offers a thoughtful conclusion, “History and the Making of Peace,” which ties together the major themes and offers three interesting “theories” of peace, all the while echoing B. H. Liddell Hart’s dictum that the best way to formulate effective grand strategy is to look beyond a war to the nature of the peace.

Curiously, the editors stress the importance of knowing your adversary in peacemaking, but the volume suffers from scant attention to non-Western case studies. Although they anticipate this criticism, their ethnocentrism detracts from an otherwise sterling collection of cases, especially when the United States and its Western allies actively chase peace with non-Western adversaries. A more minor flaw is the absence of a bibliography of key sources on peacemaking, or even just those used in this book. Nonetheless, this is an impressive collection for students of strategy and history, as all serious policy makers, practitioners, and informed citizens ought to be.

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This carefully researched book painstakingly corrects the diplomatic history surrounding Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. The author is a retired Japanese ambassador who was the young son of the Japanese counselor in Washington, D.C., on 7 December 1941. Unlike too many Japanese writers, Iguchi
is no apologist for the sneak attack. Rather he objectively analyzes recently released empirical evidence that reveals the individuals truly responsible for delaying lawful notice to the United States about the coming attack. The fault did not rest with the embassy staff, as portrayed to the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, but with a conspiracy to cover up facts, a conspiracy that is now traceable to high-level officials who deliberately delayed Foreign Ministry telegrams. Moreover, the Japanese notes delivered to then–secretary of state Cordell Hull shortly after the attack were not declaration-of-war ultimatums as required by international law but watered-down notices about the termination of bilateral negotiations. The unmistakable conclusion from the evidence is that the officials in power wanted to catch the Americans off guard.

Iguchi writes from firsthand experience and with convincing passion about those in Japan who even now do not want to accept responsibility for their country’s perfidious actions. He cites authoritatively from official, insider records, not only placing blame where it belongs but also clearing up the record to allow closure, moving to more open and honest U.S.-Japanese relations.

The book provides a detailed time-line context for the foreign policy pursued by Japan between 1940–41, when the focus of the Japanese military was on China and the Soviet Union. Iguchi rejects the thesis that American economic sanctions and demands for a complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from China forced Japan into war. Iguchi identifies powerful Japanese strategic thinkers who believed that the only way resource-poor Japan could win a war against the United States and Great Britain was by a quick and devastating surprise attack. Iguchi also documents contrary views held by influential Japanese leaders at the time who tried to halt the momentum for war.

Iguchi does not believe there was an American conspiracy to provoke war with Japan. He also rejects such myths as that Roosevelt knew in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack or that Churchill was responsible, meaning to draw the United States into war against Hitler.

The value of this book is in how candidly and accurately Iguchi documents the historical context for the Pacific War. He explains Japanese motives based on his unique personal experiences, reinforced by formerly classified internal Japanese records. There is no forgiving Japan’s cowardly attack on Pearl Harbor, but there is much to admire about a senior Japanese diplomat who courageously does his best to set the record straight.

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American journalist and historian Evan Thomas has once again proved why he is among the foremost modern scholars of American history, culture, and politics. The War Lovers is a captivating chronicle of war fever and calculated crisis manipulated by key leaders in the run-up to the twentieth century and culminating in the Spanish-American War. Thomas assembles a compelling