2008

China's Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning

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scenarios, such as those involving Taiwan, might motivate China to attempt to deter American intervention by the threat of nuclear strikes or damage to U.S. space assets.

O’Rourke’s study raises important questions as the United States develops a new maritime strategy. If preventing Taiwan independence and promoting reunification is the present focus of China’s naval development, what other national interests might fuel such development in the future? What is the proper balance for the U.S. Navy between supporting operations in the global war on terror and maintaining (if not increasing) its presence and operational capabilities in the vast, strategically vital Asia-Pacific region? What resources will be required to meet the latter requirements, and how should they be allocated? Finally, what fleet and basing architecture can best accomplish this at sustainable cost to taxpayers?

Critical procurement decisions with ramifications for years to come are being made in Beijing as China develops a new five-year plan. As this dual strategic crossroads looms ever larger, it is to be hoped that the two Pacific powers can reach an understanding about their respective regional roles and thereby keep competitive coexistence from degenerating into a new cold war.

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In China’s Nuclear Forces Larry Wortzel has delivered an exceptional monograph that demands the attention of both nuclear strategists and China experts. The author, a leading authority on China, Asia, national security, and military strategy, is currently serving as a commissioner on the congressionally mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. He previously served as the director of the Asian Studies Center and vice president for foreign policy at the Heritage Foundation. Wortzel’s distinguished thirty-two-year career in the U.S. armed forces, during which time he served as both assistant Army attaché and then attaché at the American embassy in China, culminated with an assignment as director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College.

The title of this monograph promises an expansive scope, and Wortzel delivers quite ably. While the scale of the work is extremely helpful in keeping the various aspects and issues in perspective, the most important new contributions to understanding the evolving Chinese nuclear posture are Wortzel’s treatments of “no first use” and nuclear command and control. As stated by the author, “The major insights . . . come from exploiting sections of . . . A Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory[,] . . . an unclassified ‘study guide’ for PLA officers on how to understand and apply doctrine.” These insights, however, which Wortzel so adeptly lays forth, are corroborated in other reliable Chinese-language material.

It has become conventional wisdom among China scholars to take Chinese declaratory policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons at face value, excluding away various past unofficial statements
suggesting that “no first use” ought not to be taken quite so literally. Wortzel offers a counterbalance to this view, elucidating both the concept of preemptive counterattack and the current debate within China on the viability and utility of adherence to “no first use.” His conclusion on this crucial issue is that the debate within China on “no first use” is real, that a new generation of officers, diplomats, and scholars leans significantly toward modifying or jettisoning such a declaratory policy. In fact, this conclusion is quite in accord with the one developed and briefed by the Mahan Scholars student research team at the Naval War College in the spring of 2007.

Regarding nuclear command and control, Wortzel finds that the originator of valid firing orders for the Second Artillery is the Central Military Commission (CMC), “the highest and most centralized level of military leadership in the Chinese Communist Party.” While we would agree that tongshuaibu, or “supreme command,” probably refers to the CMC in the context of nuclear release authority, this is not completely clear, and explicit phraseology to bolster that conception was uncomfortably dropped from defense white papers of 2004 to 2006. Furthermore, in other writings it appears that conventional-missile firing authority during conflict is certainly delegated downward, to the Second Artillery itself. Such delegation is, of course, to be expected, but in a conflict that involved the movement of nuclear forces and became intense, the concomitant risks of unauthorized or inadvertent nuclear missile launch would grow alarmingly.

In addition to solid scholarship regarding the question of “no first use” and nuclear command and control, this monograph offers substantial original material on missile-force readiness levels, survivability issues, and targeting. Overall, as expected from an academician of Wortzel’s caliber, this work expands our understanding of the Chinese nuclear posture. As such, it demands the attention of all China specialists and nuclear strategists.

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