Military Education: Past, Present, and Future,

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The author’s attempt to weave a straight course through the warfare of three ethnicities suffers from a few shortcomings. As the author seeks to produce history, there is a great deal of personal recollection. If the author is attempting an autobiography, there is a great deal of history. Some might say his own ethnic identity prevents a balanced account of Serb or Croatian media. Kurspahic understands this; his damning indictment of his own country’s media and how Bosnian nationalism translated into violence speaks for itself. Nevertheless, the author also accepts the necessity to play the ethnic card and laments that Oslobodjenje’s “selected editing” in Sarajevo was necessary for its survival.

Concluding with the current changes in the Balkan media and a list of future policy options to prevent media nationalism, Kurspahic returns to the optimistic tone of the beginning of the work. Reviewing the policy recommendations of the last chapter, Kurspahic yearns for a free and independent press, one worthy of, anddesiring, outside critique. The author would also welcome a press that challenges the government. This optimism, though warranted, may be premature. It remains to be seen if international media-watchdog groups can bring about any of these changes. 

Prime Time Crime commands an important place on the bookshelf of anyone studying the former Yugoslavia. Kemal Kurspahic trains an unblinking eye on the nationalist Balkan press and its contribution to the war. In particular, the first chapter and the appendices should be required reading for any officer posted to duty in this troubled region. Although addressing just one small piece of the puzzle that was the fall of Yugoslavia, Kurspahic’s narrative of the rise of a nationalist press answers many questions about the society of former Yugoslavia, its destruction, and its ability to prosecute such a horrendous conflict. In a much broader sense, Prime Time Crime reveals what may happen when any government, political leader, or nationalist ideal captures or co-opts the media.

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This collection of ten essays is largely historical. Only three deal with current military education, and none focuses substantially on the future. Six examine European institutions, while three address military education in the United States and one recent change in Canada. The editors and authors are seasoned historians; some teach at civilian institutions, some at military schools. The essays report the continuing tension between academic officer-preparation and hands-on experience, and the contrast of both approaches with the military’s more usual method of preparation—training. All agree that technology and its continued development mean education is required. History is agreed to be crucial to military education, but there are critiques here of how it is used and of its tendency to direct attention to the past rather than to consider the past’s meaning for the future. T. G. Otte discusses the influence of the French Revolution and German
philosophy on von Clausewitz’s discussion of the development and value of leaders with “genius.” Dennis E.
Showalter describes the evolution of Prussian military education in the direction of merit criteria for officer selection and the resulting increase in the number of officers who were commoners. Lori Bogle of the U.S. Naval Academy then addresses how Prussian lessons were applied at the Military Academy at West Point by Sylvanus Thayer, superintendent from 1817 to 1833. She describes his emphasis on moral education, which included religious revivals and rigorous mental and physical discipline. Equality, honor, competition, and formal training in ethics were all part of Thayer’s efforts to tame what Bogle calls “boy culture” and its individualistic definition of personal honor—characteristic of the antebellum American South—in terms that entailed military obedience.

Several essays consider British military education. Andrew Lambert notes that militaries believe experience is crucial, but in fact many officers do not actually have experience, so academics are important. Academics, he says, should stimulate real thinking, but too often that comes only after military defeat. Further, the “edge” provided by critical thinking is too often of short duration. Lambert argues that selection for intellectual prowess and assignments to posts that use prowess is all-important and that poor leadership leads to setbacks. One example of poor leadership, he says, was that of First Lord Winston Churchill, “who would not listen to advice.” David French discusses officer training in the regular British army between the two world wars. A not entirely successful effort was made to broaden the social class of officers, broaden their education, expand their view beyond that of the regiment, recruit officers with university degrees, and promote by examination as opposed to primarily by seniority. A weakness of officer education that appeared in the early years of World War II was its lack of training in “all-arms cooperation.”

Mark R. Grandstaff gets to tell the story of the founding of the U.S. Air War College in the heady days of the newly created service after World War II. Its motto? “Unhampered by Tradition”; its education was to be “pewar not post-war.” One goal was to develop military strategists, but from the beginning there were also some who argued that the purpose was to develop “air statesmen” who could “stand up to the politicos” and gain a “full share in the formulation of national policies.” Grandstaff credits the Air War College with excellent methodology but finds the value of its educational content variable. He does not consider how method, in fact, affects content.

The one important change in U.S. military education since Vietnam has been the emphasis given to joint education. This shift was imposed by Congress. Thomas A. Keany details the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s requirements, noting an assumption that education on jointness can occur only in a joint environment and arguing that emphasis on campaigns diminishes the attention given to the many other ways in which the services should be cooperating. Ronald G. Haycock explores another example of civilian intervention, recounting Canadian changes since its military’s “Last Traumatic Experience.” (Canadian troops murdered a Somali...
teen in 1993.) The National Defense College was closed, officers were required to get college degrees, the content of their education was greatly expanded, and the publication of a new college journal was ordered. Haycock’s essay on the changes and their potential should be required reading as Canada endeavors to find its way out of the “colonial cringe” through emphasized tactics and technology.

In his overview of current European military education, Peter Foot describes three types that exist today: “Jena” schools, which look to professional, in-house education; “Falkland” schools, which “bolt on” new material; and “Kosovo” schools, which address complexity and ambiguity and seek external, civilian accreditation. Foot notes a trend toward commonality, including more joint and combined training and advanced distance learning. He gives particular attention to military training in Eastern Europe, noting in particular developments in Bulgaria and in the Baltic republics’ tristate institution.

In all, this is a collection worth reading, especially to remind us of the impediments to change and the perpetual tension between training and education (within its critical thinking), between tradition and innovation, and between technology and strategy. The debate over military education began as early as Plato, and it will not end with Kennedy or Neilson.

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There are so many books about the Vietnam War and the Vietnam experience that the message of one more risks being lost amidst a vast ocean of tragic tales told with great pain. However, Hackworth and England have provided something more than a reminiscence of an Army combat unit in the post–Tet Offensive world of Vietnam; they have presented readers with a tactical reform primer for infantry. All the information is there in stark GI English, beginning with the first sentence of chapter 1 (not repeated here out of delicacy), and finishing up with the last sentences of the last chapter: “We now need to fight smart as much as we need to get even. There is no other choice. We do it right or we lose. We win—or we die.”

Hackworth and England are referring to the new war against terrorism in the post-9/11 world. The quotation applies to the current day, and it applied to Hackworth’s nightmare battalion in the Mekong Delta in 1969.

His unit was the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The troops making up the battalion were, as the authors state, citizen draftee soldiers, not the volunteers that had filled the first combat units that went into Vietnam back in 1965. These soldiers did not want to be in Vietnam. They had come from a country where protests against the war had become large-scale performance art, widely publicized by news media and, most importantly, were supported by a large portion of the population. These reluctant warriors were doubly cursed, for they were part of an army the leadership of which had started to unravel in the face of the stubborn refusal of an enemy to admit defeat, an enemy who still could attack U.S. soldiers with skill,