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Sharon Ritenour Stevens
D.K.R. Crosswell
William K. Wyant

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In aggregate, the book’s treatment of the principal subject is noncritical, with only occasional allusion to his limitations. This is not an unusual fault of a contemporaneous historian. All in all, Thunderbolt is an outstanding piece of work. It is well researched, nicely written, and likely to remain the definitive work on this major leader of the American Century.

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In retrospect, fifty years after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, American success in World War II appears to have been a foregone conclusion. Once the nation mobilized its vast reserves of manpower and industrial might, victory seemed somewhat assured. The reality was actually much different, but seldom in this country’s history has the United States been blessed with such an array of military talent as in the period of 1941–1945. Two recent biographies and the publication of George C. Marshall’s public papers profoundly illustrate the complexities of joint operations and coalition warfare that ultimately led to decisive victory in World War II.

Perhaps no soldier contributed more to American success than Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. Heralded by Winston Churchill as the “organizer of victory,” Marshall assumed his office on the day Hitler invaded Poland. In volume three of The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, editors Larry Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens focus on the first year and a half of the war. Published under the auspices of the George C. Marshall Foundation, the current volume does not seek to publish the records of the Office of the Chief of Staff but only those papers written by Marshall himself. The result is a compilation of 632 documents, 46 illustrations, and 8 maps that reveal the intricacies of joint and combined planning in a wartime environment.

The Marshall who emerges from these pages is an officer who is aware of the enormity of the task before him. As Marshall wrote to a comrade in 1943, “I am naturally deeply interested in you and your career, but I am much more interested, through necessity, in the development of the fighting spirit in our Army.” Ever conscious that the pace of modern war had increased the burdens on leaders of all ranks, Marshall remained convinced that highly efficient and energetic leadership was essential to
success and that no compromise was possible.

His papers also reveal his active participation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff and his close association with Chiefs of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark and Ernest J. King. Unity of command was one of the more controversial topics that dominated Marshall’s relationship with the Navy. Aware of the disastrous consequences of service bickering and dual command structures during World War I, Marshall directed his commanders in the Pacific to abide by presidential directives that assigned unity of command to the Navy in Hawaii while the Army maintained unity of command in Panama. In spite of some Army staff objections to assigning purely Army assets to naval control, Marshall felt that the decision would add immeasurably to American security, whatever the local embarrassments. Additionally, he regarded these decisions as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involving his relations with the Navy and European allies. This is not to say that relations with the Navy were always smooth, but differences between Marshall and King were legitimate differences between honest men with varying opinions on the best method of waging global war.

As indispensable as Marshall was to the national war effort, so was General Walter B. Smith to the success of the European theater of operations. So claims author D.K.R. Crosswell in *The Chief of Staff*. The functions of staff officers have been largely ignored by most military historians in favor of studies of more renowned combat commanders. Crosswell’s latest work is an attempt to address this void in the historiography of American participation in World War II.

In examining Smith, whose career pattern, says Crosswell, is typical of the generation of officers who rose to command the armies and staffs of higher headquarters, Crosswell presents three essential objectives for his study: to examine critically the professionalization process within the officer corps in the interwar period, to analyze the evolution of the U.S. and Allied command and staff structures in World War II, and to survey the distillation and execution of Allied strategy in the Mediterranean and European theaters of war. The result is an interesting analysis of combined operations at the highest level.

Throughout the book, Smith emerges as a central figure in the formation of allied strategy and an adept manager of bureaucratic politics. According to the author, the success of the “Ike-Beetle” team lay in the near perfect blend of Eisenhower’s human qualities and Smith’s calculating, detached professionalism. Perhaps Crosswell exaggerates Smith’s importance when the author claims that the German General Staff’s failure to assess properly the Ike-Smith team was a contributing factor to their defeat in the Ardennes offensive. However, despite the outward appearance of Ike-Beetle solidarity, Smith became frustrated at his superior’s unwillingness to exercise command and his
alleged refusal to undertake any action that might jeopardize his popularity. Summarizing Smith’s final years, Crosswell portrays an embittered man who felt betrayed by Eisenhower for denying him five stars and the appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army. Yet the author balances this darker side of Smith’s personality with a genuine appreciation of a brilliant staff officer whose greatest accomplishment was the welding together of an allied staff.

In the final analysis, it is better to remember the Ike-Beetle team that led a truly integrated combined effort to defeat Nazi Germany than to fall prey to the partisan military politics and petty jealousies that sometime characterize large allied headquarters. That criticism aside, The Chief of Staff is a valuable addition to the historiography of World War II and an important contribution to understanding combined operations.

In Sandy Patch, William Wyant presents a highly flattering portrait of his subject that concentrates primarily on Alexander Patch’s command in Europe, but he fails to give proper attention to Patch’s interwar years and his command on Guadalcanal. This is understandable, albeit regrettable, since Wyant served as the secretary of the general staff to Patch in the 7th Army.

What is clear from the biography is that Patch found the Allies less troublesome than the Department of the Navy. Assigned to the defense of New Caledonia and neighboring islands in the South Pacific in early 1942, Patch was vociferous in his criticism of the Navy for lacking a plan of logistics for the Guadalcanal campaign and not using his own Americal Division in the fighting. Patch’s remarks eventually reached Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who vented his anger on “Hap” Arnold, the Chief of Army Air Forces.

To his dying days, Patch remained resentful at what he perceived as an unfair lack of publicity for the Army’s role in the first major defeat suffered by the Japanese army. Returning to the United States after victory in Europe, Patch headed the “Patch Board,” whose task it was to examine the organization of the War Department and to propose an organization appropriate for postwar adoption. While not within the purview of his study, Patch recommended that the Marine Corps be abolished. Although he had a great deal of admiration for the individual Marine, he felt that the Marine Corps was better suited for amphibious operations than sustained land combat. What he faulted was the hierarchy, whom he perceived to have failed to distinguish the difference.

The central theme that dominates all three books is the realization that victory could only be achieved through improved cooperation with the Navy and the Allies (principaliy Great Britain). Marshall, King, Arnold, Eisenhower, and countless others clearly understood the intricacies of waging joint operations and coalition warfare on a global scale. Ever partisan to their own service,
they subordinated any personal views
to the overall task of defeating their
enemies. Perhaps Marshall said it best
when he wrote, in the aftermath of the
Battle of Midway and the successful
invasion of North Africa, extolling the
merits of unity of command and the
effectiveness of joint and combined
operations. In his words, this new
efficiency "should not be kept secret.
It will be most depressing news to our
enemies. It is the declaration of their
doom." By 1945 the declaration
spoke for itself.

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Hoopes, Townsend and Brinkley,
Douglas. Driven Patriot: The Life and
Times of James Forrestal. New York:
Knopf, 1992. 587pp. $30

Dorwart, Jeffrey M. Eberstadt and For-
restal: A National Security Partner-
ship, 1909–1949. College Station:
237pp. $35

The beautifully crafted biography of
James Forrestal by Townsend Hoopes
and Douglas Brinkley recounts an
American tragedy played out in the
first half of the twentieth century.
Throughout his life Forrestal dis-
played a Horatio Alger–like drive to
succeed, which ultimately ended with
his leap to death from an unattended
window of the sixteenth floor of the
tower of Bethesda Naval Hospital. He
committed suicide after he had been
dismissed from his post as Secretary of
Defense by Harry Truman. Readers
of the Naval War College Review will
probably find most interesting the ac-
count of Forrestal's leadership of the
Navy during World War II and the
study of his struggle after the war to
create a new national defense struc-
ture.

Beginning with his childhood,
Hoopes and Brinkley go on to discuss
his student years, when he worked
with Ferdinand Eberstadt on the Daily
Princetonian. His enthusiasm for
boxing, his unhappy marriage, his
naval service in World War I, and his
years of success with the Wall Street
brokerage of Dillon & Read were
preliminary to the nine productive
years of dedicated public service as
Under Secretary of the Navy (1940–
1944), Secretary of the Navy (1944–
1947), and Secretary of Defense

One senses that it was indeed the
tireless Forrestal who engineered the
building of the mightiest navy during
the Second World War. This effort
involved changes in the Navy's
procurement practices as well as over-
ruling naval conservatives to assure
honorable treatment for blacks in the
service, the upholding of civilian con-
tral over the Navy by curtailing the
ambitions of such strong-willed offi-
cers as Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King,
and the joining with marines during
the assault on Iwo Jima.

Most compelling are the chapters
on the years 1945–1949, when
Forrestal's energies were finally ex-
austed by his struggle to build a vi-
able national defense system in the