1990


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march to the City of Mexico matched the grand offensive from Normandy toward Berlin. We have here, then, an embodiment of the shift of American military thought away from the emphasis on unconventional war engendered by the Vietnam experience, toward a renewed interest in conventional war. This shift obviously might go too far, but it springs in part from a healthy wariness about involvement in guerrilla and low-intensity conflicts.

The return of the focus to the elements of classical warfare in the Mexican War permits Eisenhower to better focus on the military figure he sees as towering above all others in 1846-1848, General Scott, "who may well have been the most capable soldier this country has ever produced...[but who] has never received the credit that was his due." Both of Eisenhower's assessments of Scott are on target. At the very least, he was the most capable American military commander between General George Washington and General Ulysses S. Grant. But he failed to receive acknowledgement, largely for reasons that lend a touch of irony to the praise he receives from the son of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. Scott's personality offended virtually everybody who came in contact with him.

John Eisenhower praises Scott not only as a strategist and tactician but also as a logistician. In general, Eisenhower is mindful of the logistical achievements of the United States in conducting a war so far from the national center of gravity in the 1840s. The emphasis on logistics also helps Eisenhower give proper attention to the navy's role in the war, although the book is primarily an army historian's study of what was mainly the army's war.

When it ventures beyond military history to the moral issues of the Mexican War, the book does not condemn the war out of hand as a simple act of aggression, as some conscience-stricken Americans have done. The author acknowledges Mexico's responsibility for bringing on the conflict: weak governments that failed to grasp the opportunities for a negotiated settlement of differences that President James K. Polk offered. Still, such opportunities did not amount to much, because there was never much over which Polk, his government, and the American public were willing to compromise in their territorial ambitions in the Southwest. "To the student of today the fate of Mexico is sad," Eisenhower writes, because Mexico represented a power vacuum that someone else was sure to fill. Eisenhower's sense of sadness over the grim realities of international power struggles, as exemplified by the United States against Mexico, underlies this book—rousing good military narrative though it is.

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Kaufmann, William W. and Korb, Lawrence J. The 1990 Defense

The works reviewed here are all offerings of The Brookings Institution’s studies in defense policy, and the authors are all experienced defense analysts. William Kaufmann is currently a lecturer at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and served as a consultant to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Lawrence Korb, currently a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program, has been an assistant secretary of defense and a faculty member of the Naval War College. Thomas McNaugher is also a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program and a lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Donald Pilling is a captain in the U.S. Navy and the former head of the Plans and Programs Branch of the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The combination of glasnost in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, federal budget deficits and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act requirements to reduce the deficit means that the defense budget will decline. The only questions are how much should it decline and which programs should be funded? Kaufmann and Korb’s study of the 1990 defense budget presents one way of answering these questions. They review the Reagan era defense buildup through the budget proposed for FY 1990 by Secretary of Defense Carlucci as modified by the Bush administration. This exercise helps put in perspective the budget and program status of the U.S. military establishment.

Kaufmann and Korb then outline a defense program which could be sustained within a no-growth budget. This is described as a “nominal freeze” program on the assumption that the defense budget will be kept constant in nominal terms and decline in real dollars (adjusting for the effects of inflation). Developments since Kaufmann and Korb’s monograph was published suggest that future defense budgets may be lower than present ones even in nominal terms.

The Kaufmann-Korb program would maintain the basic present size and composition of U.S. military forces, but defer the purchase of next generation weapon systems for five years. They would also make some cuts in the strategic nuclear program where they find duplication or impracticability, e.g. “Star Wars.” The Kaufmann-Korb program would allow for some modernization but would cut procurement more heavily than funds for research, development, testing, and evaluation relative to the Carlucci plan. Over a five-year period, they estimate that
their defense program would be about $340 billion cheaper than Carlucci's FY 1990-94 defense program.

The Kaufmann-Korb proposal, or something like it, will be essential if the United States is to avoid making defense budget cuts that weaken readiness by trying to sustain procurement at the expense of operations and maintenance. A substantial R & D program should also be kept as a hedge against the possibility of a deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union.

Thomas McNaugher's book addresses a perennial problem, how to acquire complex, technologically advanced weapons for the armed forces without waste and inefficiency. Scandals in defense procurement threaten public support for essential military programs. Minimizing these adverse effects is important no matter how generous the overall defense budget is, but has become vital in an era of budget stringency.

McNaugher provides an enlightening review of the history of the weapons acquisition process. He argues that a major problem with it, as presently constituted, is that American politics more than technological needs and opportunities have shaped acquisition strategies. One of the strengths of this book is McNaugher's use of a number of case studies such as the TV-Maverick air-to-ground missile to demonstrate how the present weapons acquisition process "errs systematically in the way it chooses new technologies, develops them into weapon systems, and rushes them prematurely into the field."

Efforts have been made to reform the weapons acquisition process, but McNaugher argues these reforms have failed to solve the problem. Some reforms, such as Robert McNamara's efforts to eliminate wasteful duplication, may have made the situation worse by making project management more political. McNaugher proposes to reform the weapons acquisition process through the use of extended competition. He would extend the competition between defense contractors beyond the design stage, directly into the early production models of a new weapons system. The winning contractor would be chosen only after the system was passed through operational as well as technical testing.

McNaugher's acquisition process would create a situation in the defense sector more comparable to the incentives working in competitive markets in other areas of the economy. R & D efforts would be improved by avoiding the rush for production presently created by organizational and political pressures as well as profit incentives. McNaugher argues that his proposed acquisition process would also give policymakers more real options in choosing among weapon systems. However, he notes that this reformed process would make R & D more costly, partly by recognizing the real costs of military R & D which are presently understated.
Donald Pilling’s monograph is the narrowest of the three works reviewed here. Pilling analyzes whether Pentagon policy and Congressional legislation, which mandated competition in weapons procurement, have actually generated the cost savings often claimed. Pilling shows that it cannot be demonstrated statistically that competition in procurement (generally by having a second source bid on part of a production program) has reduced program costs. The problem lies in the quality of the data available, and also in the fact that the learning-curve model used to estimate cost savings from procurement competition is inadequate for that task.

Pilling suggests an alternative model for assessing the benefits of competition in defense procurement. Pilling’s model, though interesting, is still too narrow to provide an adequate way of measuring the benefits of competition. The dynamics of defense contracting are too complex to be captured by a simple, cost-based model.

The Brookings Institution program in defense policy studies continues to produce quality work. These books should be of interest to anyone concerned about the economics of national security.

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If you’re a long-time International Security subscriber, the contents of this book might be familiar. All the essays in Naval Strategy and National Security have previously appeared in that publication. That said, the articles chosen for inclusion in this book do adequately define the title. Aspects of past and present naval technologies as well as disputes over the Maritime Strategy are discussed by the acknowledged experts: Linton Brooks, John Mearshimer, Barry Posen, Joshua Epstein, Michael MccGwire and Karl Lautenschlager, to name a few.

Divided into three parts, Naval Strategy and National Security first examines “Naval Strategy” with a quartet of articles that describe the case for and against the Reagan administration’s Maritime Strategy. Part II, “Naval Technology,” looks to the past and future with four articles discussing aspects of naval technology that bear on naval policy questions. Two articles by Karl Lautenschlager are most interesting; in the first, “Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare,” he makes a strong case that the fears of technological surprise are largely misplaced. Change can be dramatic, but it is usually evolutionary. The author warns against either projection of radical change or detailed rejection of anything but gradual change, suggesting a balanced