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Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World

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secured the ability not only to “leverage” the United States politically but also to command a seat at the geostrategic “top table.” Jones presents the Skybolt missile crisis of 1962 as an example of this nuclear-based political leverage over the United States. Aiming at updating Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the United States promised delivery of the Skybolt system. A nuclear, standoff, air-to-ground missile, Skybolt was designed to penetrate Soviet airspace in the face of an increasing Soviet antiballistic-missile (ABM) capability. When President Kennedy abruptly canceled the agreement in November 1962, he did so ostensibly on *technical* grounds. In truth, the United States opposed, on *political* grounds, *any* extension to the life of the U.K. nuclear deterrent. Seeing through this ruse, Prime Minister Macmillan was instrumental in resolving the crisis at the Nassau conference in December 1962—by hoisting Kennedy’s policy on its own petard. The United States was forced to concede the nature of its opposition to sharing Skybolt, and instead to offer a replacement—which paradoxically became Britain’s second-generation nuclear deterrent: the Polaris missile system. Not only had Britain’s first-generation deterrent *not* been curbed, but the United States in fact had become father to a second generation.

Volume 2 brings with it the advent of a new ministry in 1964, led by Harold Wilson and the Labour Party. The necessity for a Polaris Improvement Program takes center stage in this volume, since the Polaris A-3 missile was becoming obsolescent, just as the second-generation Polaris system was coming on line. There is a fascinating portrayal of the Whitehall bureaucracy at work in the constant race to maintain

a semblance of *qualitative* nuclear parity with the United States.

In the wake of the U.S. shift to the Poseidon’s advanced technology of the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), Britain under Wilson’s aegis set off alone to begin exploitation of an intermediate technology, Antelope, that the United States had developed but later abandoned in favor of MIRVs. The climax of the U.K. Polaris Improvement Program was reached with Chevaline, a unique configurational change to alter the front end of the Polaris missile, thereby rendering it all but invulnerable to interception by deployed Soviet ABMs. But the history of that program will have to await the projected third volume in this series.

Meantime, Professor Jones has written an excellent description of Britain’s quest for a sovereign and independent strategic nuclear deterrent. Completely mastering his sources, Jones has produced a compelling work of lasting significance. He has come full circle, following in the footsteps of his larger-than-life role models, Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold.

MYRON A. GREENBERG



Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World, by Stanley McChrystal, with Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell. New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015. 290 pages. \$29.95.

During the years he spent hunting Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and battling the forces of Al Qaeda in the streets and deserts of Iraq, General Stanley McChrystal turned the Joint Special

Operations Command into a remarkably lethal, efficient, and effective killing machine. To do so he performed an extraordinary feat of social engineering, one that required modification of very insulated cultures, delegation of very significant decision-making to very low levels of the organization, and widely sharing information in a manner few would have predicted possible.

Team of Teams makes it clear that this experience had a profound impact on McChrystal. In the ensuing years of reflection and serious study, the onetime four-star general has concluded that in a world of ever-increasing complexity, networks offer the best chance for organizational success. The book both tells the story of the joint interagency task force and shows how modern leaders can achieve similar results.

McChrystal argues that technologically linked, extraordinarily nimble networks increasingly will run rings around organizations built around nineteenth-century norms of hierarchy and efficiency. The quest for efficiency must give way to the pursuit of effectiveness. Yet speed is still a virtue, and the network must share vast amounts of information in short amounts of time. Accelerating the cycle of assessment, decision, implementation, and reassessment to a pace not previously considered possible will enable cutting inside the decision loops of the competition and ensure victory. In positing this, McChrystal does not lack for boldness.

As the title suggests, McChrystal's twenty-first-century organizational model constitutes a "team of teams." In a true team, the members fully understand and deeply trust one another. However, no small team, however gifted, can

deliver the expertise and products that the entire network demands. McChrystal's prescription involves cross-assigning team members, colocating previously isolated functions, and greatly increasing the sharing of information. Such connections are vital, for they build trust as well as what are described as organizational "neural networks."

To his credit, McChrystal identifies some potential weaknesses in running such a network. For example, the risk of massive compromise, as occurred with Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, is always present. McChrystal takes the bold and debatable position that the damage a Manning or a Snowden may cause is still a price worth paying, considering the benefits of a modern network.

With sweeping changes in organizational style come sweeping changes in leadership. In a modern network, decision-making is pushed down to a level where a leader may become uncomfortable with the degree of delegation. The results of those decisions flow to the leader, who, possessed of a more holistic view of the organization, can push information and context back down to leaders far lower in the chain of command.

Questions persist about whether McChrystal's model will work universally. A few organizations, such as NASA (for a time) or the Office of Naval Reactors, might be able to achieve and maintain the degree of dedication, reliability, and intense commitment that McChrystal expected and got from his operators, but these are rare examples.

The book does not address other essential aspects of organizations. How does a networked organization promote, reward, recruit, and retain its personnel?

How does a leader deal with a workforce that is increasingly transient and for which organizational loyalty is no longer a hallmark of professionalism? How are questions involving public relations, legality, and political involvement and interest handled? These problems are not unique to the military. There is no discussion of how leaders cope with periods of disruption, challenge, or failure.

Two other issues deserve mention. The first is the book's method of citation: there are no footnotes or traditional endnotes. This aids the casual reader but not the serious scholar, student, or executive who needs to delve deeper. Perhaps the publisher insisted on this methodology; if so, one hopes it is for the last time.

The other issue is more challenging. McChrystal goes to significant lengths to present *Team of Teams* as a collaborative effort. This is commendable, and there may be portions of the book that represent a collective effort that is so interwoven it defies any assignment of individual credit. However, McChrystal is the only author who truly can explain the senior leader's perspective and feelings. As such, his voice should dominate the work, or at least be given clearly identified and dedicated portions of the book to provide solely his point of view.

Despite these shortcomings, *Team of Teams* belongs on any bookshelf devoted to modern works on leadership. It asks important questions, has more than a few sensible recommendations, and provokes useful follow-on conversations. Its readability also will be a plus for business school students, who increasingly will be likely to find it on their list of required texts.

RICHARD J. NORTON



Gear Up, Mishaps Down: The Evolution of Naval Aviation Safety, 1950–2000, by Robert Dunn. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 224 pages. \$29.95.

The average American's view of naval aviation likely is informed by the movie *Top Gun* or, for those with some historical knowledge, the carrier battles of World War II in the Pacific. Unknown even to most naval aviators is a larger and equally dramatic story: the Navy's struggle to bring its aviation accident rate under control. The number of aircraft and aircrews lost to accidents over the course of naval aviation's history is staggering—in the tens of thousands, far more than ever were lost to combat.

A critical segment of that history occurred during the period that retired vice admiral Dunn reviews in his book. After World War II, tectonic changes occurred in naval aviation, including the introduction of jet aircraft and the advent of nuclear weapons. The pressure on the Navy to demonstrate the effectiveness of its aircraft carriers in the rapidly evolving environment of the 1950s and '60s was intense. The need to fight in Korea with new and inadequately understood aircraft technology, as well as to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent posture day or night, in almost any weather, produced horrendous accident rates. In 1954 alone the Navy and Marine Corps lost 776 aircraft to accidents, and 536 aircrewmen and passengers were killed. There was legitimate doubt that naval aviation would survive if that rate of mishaps could not be reduced.

But survive it did, through reducing accident rates—step by painful step. It is a complex, multifaceted story that