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The beginnings of a dynamic process of American and European economic and cultural interaction with the Asian-Pacific states can be discerned. Such interaction promises to be of benefit to all parties. NATO will be obliged to demonstrate sufficient collective will to identify and pursue successful policies beyond its traditional geographic confines if it is to meet the many political and economic challenges ahead.

ASIAN-PACIFIC ALLIANCE SYSTEMS AND TRANSREGIONAL LINKAGES

by

William T. Tow

During the past few years the majority of Western and Asian-Pacific states* have become more concerned about the Soviet Union's extension of military power throughout the Far East. In February 1980 America's Secretary of Defense characterized the European and Asian theaters as now posing "an awkward set of circumstances" for U.S. security interests. He contended that only "moderate levels" of nonnuclear deterrence existed in both theaters and strongly implied that a linkage of pro-Western Pacific states might be required to rectify evident imbalances between Soviet and Western force capabilities.¹ All preliminary indications are that the present Administration concurs with these assessments.²

Soviet strategies may be related to satisfying a historical insecurity regarding potential Asian threats to the Russian homeland, or the U.S.S.R. could be pursuing geopolitical opportunities within the context of its "correlation of

forces" world view vis-à-vis a perceived Asian power vacuum created by a diminished Western strategic presence in the region. In the absence of significantly increased regional defense efforts with strong Western support, Moscow's long-standing proposal for an "Asian Collective Security System" may become a reality by default. Such an arrangement could become a warrant for the U.S.S.R. to enforce an imposed neutrality on noncommunist states of Northeast and Southeast Asia.³

Under such circumstances, Soviet Russia could finally achieve what Tsarist Russia never could when playing the

*For the purposes of this study, the term "Asian-Pacific" refers to that area including the Siberian, Transbaikal, and Far Eastern Military Districts of the U.S.S.R., the Korean Peninsula, China, Japan, the Indochinese peninsula including Burma, the ASEAN states of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and the Western Pacific area commonly referred to as "Oceania" stretching from Western Australia to

"Great Game" with the British Empire—a global strategic breakthrough by establishing Soviet outposts throughout the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean while successfully contesting the traditional American predominance in the Western Pacific. The resulting Soviet strategic reach would sharply challenge, if not compromise, Western security through increased deployments of offshore strategic power. As one Western analyst has recently observed, the traditional geopolitical notion that the interests of a state diminish steadily with distance was never totally true and "makes a particularly bad fit" for the current realities of world market interdependencies and today's military technology.⁴

Since the 1975 communist victories in Indochina, however, the ASEAN states and South Korea have not become "dominoes" as many Western observers had initially predicted. They have instead exercised reasonable management over their domestic economic and development programs and have displayed surprising acumen in building an image of regional cohesion. Therefore, the major security challenges now confronting the region are mostly external ones and, within that context, several emerging trends will be discussed. Initially, the nature of Soviet strategic penetration into the area will be reviewed under the assumption that it is now the most important determinant influencing the security perceptions of Asian-Pacific states and other key external actors. Two developing patterns of response to the Soviet challenge will then be examined: (1) current Japanese moves to relate its security concerns with those of NATO and America's Asian allies and (2) an emerging interest by other Asian-Pacific states to expand their existing security ties with NATO and ANZUS states into a widened forum for consultations and policy coordination. The potential inducement of such alliance consolidation by Soviet geopolitical

behavior makes for a compelling area of inquiry in Asian-Pacific affairs.

The Interplay of Soviet Political and Military Force. The rapid pace of the U.S.S.R.'s military deployments in the Asian-Pacific has been complemented by the Soviet use of intimidating political and strategic tactics to test the will of various states in the region. A striking example was the increase of Soviet air and naval movements around Japan immediately before and after Tokyo signed its Peace and Friendship Treaty with China.⁵ Soviet spokesmen pointed to the Sino-Japanese diplomatic negotiations and "the guise of '(Japanese) self-defense forces'" as "tendencies which run counter to the statements made by Japanese officials to the effect that Japan has no intention of becoming a major military power—[and which]—if not rebuffed are liable—to increase tension in the Far East."⁶ While a few individuals in Japanese political and academic circles argue that Japan and East Asia's security interests would be best served by adopting a more compliant posture toward Moscow, the majority of Japanese entertain a deep-rooted fear and distrust of Russia and support their government's present campaign to resist Soviet penetration into the Asian-Pacific.⁷

The U.S.S.R. continues to regard the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty, developing NATO-PRC ties, the warming of Antipodean-Chinese relations, and China's improved relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as steps in forming a "united front against Moscow."⁸ It can be argued, however, that the Soviet Union has contributed more to these developments than any other state by the pace and scope of its military buildup in the Asian-Pacific region. From 1965 through 1979, Soviet ground forces in the Far East—roughly from Lake Baikal eastward—increased from 15 divisions

34 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

with 150,000 personnel to 34 divisions with approximately 350,000 troops. If Soviet ground forces deployed in the Siberian Military District and other areas adjacent to the Chinese border are counted, Soviet ground force presence in the Asian-Pacific region now totals 46 divisions with 450,000 personnel.⁹ By comparison, U.S. ground forces have declined from a peak of 530,000 in 1970 (up from 100,000 in 1965 owing to the American involvement in Vietnam) to approximately 51,000 currently stationed in South Korea, Hawaii, and Japan. When the ground forces of probable Soviet regional allies are compared with those of countries most likely to align with the West, the quantitative imbalance is somewhat reduced, but still significantly in favor of Moscow.

Qualitative assessments of the Soviet ground force composition yield additional concerns. While only a few Soviet divisions in the Far East are at a "Category I" state of combat readiness with manning and equipment levels at or over full strength, significant numbers of T-62 battle tanks, BM-21 mobile multiple rocket launchers, 152 mm howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells, SA-8 and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles, nuclear mines, and *Hind* helicopter gunships have been added to the newly established Far Eastern Command.¹⁰ A particularly intense Soviet buildup has been occurring in the "Northern Territories"—with up to 12,000 Soviet personnel now deployed on the Japanese-claimed but Soviet-held island chain off the northeastern tip of Hokkaido. The Soviets have maintained a ground presence on Shikotan island since the summer of 1979, on Kunashiri and Etorofu since May 1978, with a division headquarters now functioning on Etorofu. An additional 18 Soviet divisions from Kamchatka, Sakhalin, and other points in the Soviet Maritime Provinces are within easy striking distance of Japanese territory.

Most Japanese military planners now believe that any Soviet ground attack against Japan would be largely amphibious with at least three divisions (35,000 men), 1,000 tanks and supporting airpower initially launched against Japan's Northern Army. The Northern Army's 5th Division could resist any such invasion directed toward eastern Hokkaido with only about 5,000 men, 266 tanks, and inferior firepower.¹¹ According to Gen. Hiroomi Kurisu, the Chairman of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) Joint Staff Council until forcibly retired in July 1978 for his outspoken views on Japanese defense shortcomings, the total of Japan's forces would be stretched so thin in such a defense that the Soviets could secure Hokkaido and all of northern Japan within a matter of days through one of four possible invasion routes: eastern Hokkaido, northern Hokkaido, the Soya or Tsugaru Straits, and along the northern coast of Honshu. He has concluded that the only question remaining in any current scenario of Japanese resistance against a Soviet attack without swift and decisive U.S. intervention would be "how could members of the Self Defense Force die most honorably?"¹²

While Soviet ground capabilities in the Asian-Pacific are formidable, the U.S.S.R.'s extension of its offshore presence in the form of naval and airpower could have the greatest long-term effect in altering the regional balance of power. Moscow has structured a multidimensional theater nuclear deterrent through its deployment of SS-20 IRBMs as well as long-range *Backfire* and *Bear* bombers. The U.S.S.R.'s conventional force presence in areas adjacent to Japan and in Vietnam will enhance any Soviet attempt to clear the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan for operating and launching of *Delta*-class SSBN launched strategic warheads with ranges sufficient to hit most U.S. and all Asian-Pacific targets. If

refueled in flight, Soviet long-range bombers can reach most Asian-Pacific targets north of Alice Springs, Australia using Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk as bases of origin.¹³

Soviet naval and air presence in the Vietnamese ports of Cam Ranh Bay and Danang has also improved the U.S.S.R.'s strategic reach by upgrading its "surge capability"—the ready availability of flexible and responsive offshore power in support of Soviet military operations in Asia, the Indian Ocean, and other Third World regions.¹⁴ The marked growth of the Russian's surge capability is demonstrated by the number of naval ship passings the Soviet Pacific Fleet now conducts through the Sea of Japan—about one a day. In the space of only 1 year—between 1979 and 1980—the U.S.S.R.'s Pacific Fleet has increased in size from 770 ships and 1.38 million tons to 785 ships and 1.52 million tons. During the Iran and Afghanistan crises, the U.S.S.R. was able to deploy simultaneously a minimum of 10 ships in the South China Sea, 30 in the Indian Ocean, and the *Minsk* carrier and the *Ivan Rogov* amphibious assault transport/dock ship to the Pacific Fleet. Limited open-water amphibious capability has also been enhanced over the past few years by the deployment of 4,500-4,800 Soviet marines into the Asian-Pacific region. Replenishment and resupply problems have been addressed by the expected introduction of the 40,000 ton *Berezina* fleet oiler. Many Western strategists contend, however, that Soviet offshore forces do not really need to maintain a forward presence far from anchorage points in order to fulfill their basic missions of protecting the Soviet submarine-based nuclear deterrent and interdicting Western naval and merchant shipping.¹⁵

The growth of Soviet airpower in the Asian-Pacific area has been commensurate with its increased naval development. Up to 20 *Backfires* are now thought to be assigned to the Far East—

many of them in a naval aviation role.¹⁶ While Soviet bombers and military transport aircraft still lack extensive support for refueling, their recently increased ranges will allow for attacks against Asian land and sea targets at significantly greater distances from their own home bases.

Soviet aircraft, however, have long since moved beyond surveillance and/or transport missions restricted to North-east Asia. By 1979, the Soviet air force was flying military supplies and hardware—including components for 60 *MiG-21* jets being constructed in Danang—from Tashkent and Bombay over Thailand to Hanoi in extensive support of Vietnam's war efforts in Indochina. The frequency of such flights has violated Thai airspace regulations and has become a matter of increasing concern to ASEAN defense planners.¹⁷ Similarly, Japanese Air Self-Defense Force "scrambles" against Soviet military aircraft have increased on the average from 360 to 600 per year since 1976.¹⁸ Moreover, the naval air arm of the Pacific Fleet has reportedly stepped up its regular surveillance of the entire ASEAN region including the U.S. Navy's Subic Bay installation in the Philippines with such flights originating from Danang.¹⁹

Surge capability also increases the U.S.S.R.'s options for potential interruption in the flow of oil and other critical resources to European or Asian states and for possible application of coercive diplomacy by Moscow. In noting Japan's reluctance to stand by NATO boycott policies at the outset of the Iranian embargo, it seems reasonable to assume that Tokyo would regard any serious threat to its 20 percent of the world's total trade volume as unacceptable to its economic well-being. The Japan Defense Agency has publicly admitted, however, that the Maritime Self-Defense Force cannot develop an adequate antisubmarine defense on its own against the modern Soviet attack

36 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

submarines or naval components that could be used to interdict Japanese sea lines of communication (SLOC), even though Japan is being pressured by Washington to assume a *greater* burden in ASW.²⁰ While Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and other ASEAN nations possess effective local naval forces and are or will be acquiring at least some modern ASW weapons (such as the *Harpoon* and ASROC missiles) and more advanced jet fighter aircraft such as the F-5E or even the F-16 or F-18, they cannot begin to match the overall maritime strike components of the U.S.S.R. because of financial or technological limitations.²¹

While the question of quantity versus quality in defense will continue to enter into strategic calculations, the establishment of geostrategic momentum, recognized and respected by both potential allies and opponents, is a more critical factor in the achievement and maintenance of regional influence. Indeed, the unmatched Soviet force buildups in the Asian-Pacific region has been decisive in forming the strategic perceptions of leaders heading Asian-Pacific states that the United States is committed to defend. By late 1979, Toru Hara, Director of the Japan Defense Agency's Bureau of Defense Policy, refused to acknowledge the superiority of U.S. Fleet deployments in the Pacific but was perhaps only following the lead of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) who, in congressional testimony the year before, estimated that the United States had only a "50-50 chance" of keeping vital SLOCs open in an Asian conflict.²² Washington's announced "1½ war" strategy (emphasizing the American defense of Europe and the Middle East) also fueled ASEAN nations' tendencies during the mid-1970s to downplay the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and other existing security ties with the West. This problem recurred in Japan during late 1979 and early 1980 with the announcement

of the so-called "swing strategy" allegedly prescribing the transfer of U.S. forces in the Pacific to the NATO theater during an emergency.²³

Similarly, the Soviet buildup in the Asian-Pacific region has produced a "spillover" effect into the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions that could affect future U.S. strategic access to those areas. The credibility factor of U.S. defense guarantees entered into the intricate negotiations leading to *limited* American use of Somalian, Omani, and Egyptian facilities. The same problem was evident in negotiations leading to the U.S.-Philippine base agreements of January 1979. In both the Middle East and the Pacific, U.S. allies entertained fears of being abandoned if U.S. defense "guarantees" were ever seriously tested.²⁴

Japanese Movement Toward Multi-lateral Defense Cooperation: A Qualified Approach. Article IX of Japan's constitution renounces that country's use of force as a sovereign right except in self defense. The overall depreciation of U.S. military strength relative to that of the Soviet Union during the past decade, however, has led to the concentration of remaining American power in Europe and the Middle East, leaving Japan's peripheries less secure than at any time since the Second World War. Any efforts by the United States to correct this imbalance will be time-consuming and subject to Soviet counteractions. Under such circumstances, the necessity for Japan to build and maintain credible military forces of its own with the world's eighth largest defense budget is now fully accepted by the government and a vast majority of the Japanese people.²⁵

In July 1980 a Comprehensive National Security Study Group (CNSSG), appointed by the late Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, issued its first report.²⁶ The CNSSG concluded that Japan would now have to become a more active participant in future

Western international security efforts by achieving true self-reliance in defense and by broadening its defense perspectives. The CNSSG's conclusions were reinforced by those reached in the 1980 Japan Defense Agency's "White Paper" and by leading Western foreign policy institutes. A recent joint study by American, British, French, and West German scholars concluded that Japan must be recognized as an important world power and encouraged to participate in the Western defense system although not in ways that risk antagonizing neighboring Asian states.²⁷ A highly publicized "Joint Working Group" of American and Japanese analysts was even more specific after completing its own 2-year study.²⁸ It recommended that Japan should provide airlift and sealift capability as well as financial support for increased Western military forces now deployed in the Middle East. Tokyo was also called upon to increase simultaneously its force levels in the Asian-Pacific region to compensate for any U.S. elements transferred from there to the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean.²⁹

To what extent Japan will actually restructure its security policies to comply with such recommendations remains uncertain. Japan still justifies its growing defense role within the guidelines of the "Basic Policy for National Defense" adopted in 1957, which stipulates that any external aggression against the country will be dealt with on the basis of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty.³⁰ Prime Minister Suzuki's recent directives forbidding speculation by members of his cabinet on the revision of Article IX and Japan's refusal to increase its defense budget more than 7.6 percent for 1981 despite intense pressure by Washington for a 9.7 percent expansion indicate that any Japanese moves to extend its alliances will be gradual.³¹

Until now, Japan has been highly cautious in its attempts to forge closer

political and security consultations with West European states. In early 1980 Japan announced that it would send permanent representatives to meetings of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA)—the parliamentary affiliate of NATO. A Japanese Defense Agency spokesman qualified this decision to an NAA visiting delegation to Tokyo by reminding it that constitutional restraints still prevent Japan from assisting another country with JSDF forces if Japan itself had not been attacked. Within this context, the prospects for Japanese-West European joint military action are still remote.³² This constraint was reiterated by Asao Mihara, Chairman of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party Security Affairs Research Council and the leader of the Japanese delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly's November 1980 session in Brussels. The Japanese parliamentarian said that there could be no direct Japanese participation in the type of joint international supervisory fleet envisioned by the Joint Working Group report—although Japanese *financial* support might be forthcoming if such a task force ever materialized.³³

It is also doubtful that most of NATO's decisionmakers are ready to incorporate Japan as a formal member of the alliance. In recent interviews and correspondence by the author with NATO officials in Brussels, the 1978 and 1979 visits of the Japan Defense Agency Directors to NATO Headquarters were regarded as "information activities" or "courtesy visits" that are commonly extended to all nationalities. A Japanese diplomatic communique released following Ganri Yamashita's 1979 visit emphasized that no arrangements for the actual exchange of defense information were discussed. NATO considered the development of *bilateral security ties* between its members and Japan as the best way to meet Japan's understandable desire for reassurances in light of the Soviet threat.³⁴

38 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Strategic developments in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia, however, have created a shared sense of urgency between Tokyo and NATO that may soon overcome both sides' reluctance to move towards higher levels of security cooperation. In October 1980 the Defense Agency disclosed that it no longer necessarily interprets the concept of "basic and balanced defense power" to mean "minimum defense power to be achieved in peacetime" as was the case when this criteria was adopted as Japan's defense planning principle in 1976. This could be an indicator of some movement toward greater Japanese willingness to enter into more advanced interregional security arrangements.³⁵

Some mechanisms already exist for this possibility such as Japan's membership in the Consultative Group- Coordinating Committee (COCOM), which regulates Western technology transfers to communist countries, and Tokyo's participation in the annual economic summits held by the industrial democracies in which political and security issues are also weighed.³⁶ While Japan continues to adhere to its three "non-nuclear principles" of no production, deployment, or presence of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, its strong interest in nuclear energy and proliferation problems complements EURATOM's concerns in this area.³⁷

European-Japanese cooperation in defense-related technology or in eventual outright weapons production cannot be discounted. In March 1980 West German Defense Minister Hans Apel journeyed to Tokyo to express the FRG's willingness to arrange for limited sales of military-related equipment with Japan. The imminent emergence of the Japanese aerospace industry could lead to consortium or coproduction arrangements similar to those now in effect for the *Tornado* jet fighter between several European countries—perhaps, in part, relieving the current problems now

being experienced with European nations' growing budgets. After Apel briefed Japanese officials, Japan Defense Agency Director-General Hosada observed that his country was already "spiritually tied to NATO."³⁸

Japan is also demonstrating a greater willingness to participate in bilateral and even multilateral military exercises with the United States and its NATO and ANZUS allies. Joint U.S.-Japanese exercises have increased under the auspices of the "Guidelines for U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation" (approved in November 1978) and the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee.³⁹ Similarly, British warships recently drilled with units of the Maritime Self-Defense Force near Oshima Island and in Tokyo Bay.⁴⁰ But the most significant Japanese participation in Western alliance military exercises to date was in RIMPAC 80, a 3-week multilateral exercise by American, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand naval units conducted from 26 February to 18 March 1980 off Hawaii. The Japanese contingent included two destroyers and eight antisubmarine patrol aircraft (P-2Js) with 690 naval personnel in attendance.⁴¹ The Japanese Government justified the presence of Japanese forces by interpreting it as an "educative" venture not specifically directed toward any potential opponent and in compliance with Japan's criteria of not possessing, producing, or deploying nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. The JSDF has already announced that the MSDF will take part in RIMPAC 82.⁴² As a result of the RIMPAC precedent and Japan's newly developed concept of "non-collective defense" rights, some future Japanese role in various European maneuvers occasionally conducted with various ASEAN states or in the Indian Ocean cannot now be ruled out.⁴³

There have been recent indications that the ASEAN states are becoming more willing to accept a greater

ALLIANCE SYSTEMS 39

Japanese security role in their region. ASEAN's major concern in this regard is that any growth in Japanese capabilities should occur under strict U.S. surveillance. Even with this condition fulfilled, the prospect of Japanese rearmament could quickly generate apprehensions throughout noncommunist Southeast Asia if Japan does not constantly reassure the area of its purely defensive intentions.

Singapore is probably the strongest ASEAN proponent of Japan increasing its military power. During a January 1981 interview with the *Asahi Shimbun*, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew observed that Japan has been "most reluctant" to increase its defense budget but that the Soviet buildup of power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans made it imperative that it do so as a complement to U.S. defense efforts in the area. Lee qualified his endorsement by contending that Japan should only strengthen its conventional defenses and never aspire to become a nuclear power.⁴⁴ Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos has also conveyed approval for increased Japanese defenses as a component of a tacit U.S.-PRC-Japan "united front" necessary to check Soviet military power in Asia.⁴⁵ While leaders of the other ASEAN countries have been more reticent to endorse Japan's defense efforts, they have all at different times expressed understanding of Japan's need to pursue increased self-defense efforts, at least within Japanese territory.⁴⁶

For its part, Japan has begun to explore avenues of potential security cooperation with its noncommunist Asian neighbors. In July 1979, Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda commented that Japan could only deal with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe on a basis of equality by allying itself with ASEAN.⁴⁷ During the past 2 years, Tokyo has initiated regional tours by JSDF officials to ASEAN states as well as to Australia

and New Zealand for consultations on defense matters. These activities culminated in a Japanese-Australian agreement, announced in March 1980, to upgrade their two countries' military personnel exchange programs.⁴⁸ In July 1979 Ganri Yamashita visited South Korea to enter into defense consultations with Korean defense officials and in October 1980 Seoul requested permission for a ROK naval training squadron to visit defense ports.⁴⁹ Finally, Japan's participation in the annual economic summits of the industrial democracies makes it a natural representative of Asian-Pacific interests at those prestigious forums, where global security issues are inevitably discussed.⁵⁰

Japan will most likely increase its regional military capabilities and activities to levels that it considers appropriate to the pace and scope of Soviet strategic penetration in the Asian-Pacific but not necessarily commensurate with levels preferred by Washington and possibly by Western Europe. Any Japanese buildup will remain tempered by other Asian states' lingering sensitivity to the specter of a remilitarized Japan. Prime Minister Suzuki's efforts during his January 1981 tour of the ASEAN states to promote a "comprehensive security" approach—the building of peace and stability throughout the region by emphasizing development assistance, freer trade, and conference diplomacy—was generally well received but also clearly illustrated Japan's difficulties for maintaining political credibility while simultaneously breaking out of a long-term situation of strategic self-restraint.⁵¹ In fact, however, most ASEAN leaders along with their counterparts in South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand understand that a credible regional security outlook must include a Japan that is capable of implementing region-wide defense missions if the need should arise.

40 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Developing Security Linkages of Other Asian-Pacific States and Extra-regional Actors. The projection of Soviet power into the critical SLOCs that traverse the Asian-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions has introduced a profound security challenge to the ASEAN states as well as to the entire Western alliance system. The potential ramifications of the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, the ambiguous nature of India's naval buildup along the Andaman Islands, and the Vietnamese Navy's recent acquisition of Soviet frigates as well as guided-missile craft are all regarded with justifiable concern by the nations of peninsular Southeast Asia.⁵² Revised intelligence estimates showing that North Korea's military capabilities and strengths were significantly greater than previously believed, coupled with the political instability of South Korea following the assassination of Park Chung-hee in October 1979, produced apprehensions in Tokyo and throughout the region about the vulnerability of the American deterrent in Northeast Asia.⁵³ Incursions of Vietnamese forces into Thailand that accelerated during the summer of 1979 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increased the willingness of most noncommunist states throughout the region to seek more extensive security arrangements from each other and from the West.

The United States and its NATO allies, as well as Australia and New Zealand, have responded with initiatives designed to increase their own strategic presence and military assistance to Asian-Pacific countries. While a revival of SEATO may still seem premature, the ASEAN states' receptiveness to the West's renewed strategic presence in Asia prompted the *Times* (London) to conclude that "... [the] repeated disclaimers that ASEAN would never become a military alliance are becoming less and less credible."⁵⁴

In retrospect, SEATO was not

completely irrelevant to Asian-Pacific security needs until the time of its demise in June 1977, but throughout its 23-year history, its Western and Asian signatories entertained different views of participation in the alliance (i.e., deterrence of external threats of preoccupation with counterinsurgency requirements) that prevented its evolution into a credible military arrangement.⁵⁵ While the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEACDT), better known as the "Manila Pact," is still in force, it remains unclear how or to what extent that covenant applies to the Malay Peninsula or to Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta have been traditional regional critics of Western alliance ties in the ASEAN region, but they have demonstrated inconsistencies in their own security postures and now search for *kejahanan*—"the ability to endure"—by implementing domestic anticommunist campaigns of questionable value and by military procurement programs that, until recently, lacked cohesion in their purpose and in planning.⁵⁶

Malaysia and Singapore enjoy some measure of extraregional security guarantees by hosting small contingents of Australian, British, and New Zealand forces under the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA). Despite its planned expansion, the FPDA continues to be a consultative mechanism rather than a formal pact. In the event of Soviet, Vietnamese, or possibly Indian military actions directed only against the Malacca Straits, Thailand, as a member of SEACDT, would have to become directly involved before U.S. military intervention would be automatic through Washington's regional treaty commitments. These realities, as Justus van der Kroef has noted, "tend to reflect something of the very need and purpose of SEATO."⁵⁷

In January 1980 Thailand did initiate consultations with U.S. officials on SEACDT's applicability to Vietnamese

encroachments against its territory. These discussions were later extended to include the leaders of Singapore and the Philippines, with Lee Kuan Yew reportedly offering to extend basing rights to U.S. forces.⁵⁸ Britain, Australia, and New Zealand also reaffirmed their commitments to the Manila Pact. While Malaysia and Indonesia publicly opposed the implementation of region-wide collective defense arrangements with external powers, Kuala Lumpur's approval for the FPDA's expanded activities and Jakarta's initiatives to commence joint military exercises with the Thais and to step up such Indonesia-Australian exercises were strong signs that all ASEAN members are gradually moving toward acceptance of trans-regional security cooperation perhaps even through the eventual creation of a formal alliance structure.

Unlike NATO, such an Asian-Pacific Security Organization (APSO) would initially function as a communications base rather than as a joint political and military command center. It could commence by integrating discussions of the FPDA's Joint Consultative Council (JCC) and the ANZUS Council. The ANZUS members (the United States, Australia, and New Zealand) have met annually to evaluate and act upon issues of mutual concern. The FPDA announced in November 1980 that the JCC will also convene once a year.⁵⁹ As members of both groups, Australia and New Zealand are in a position to promote mutual consultations between the FPDA and ANZUS on selected issues pending the approval of the United States, Singapore, and Malaysia. Under such circumstances, Washington and London could better identify and communicate any mutual defense concerns of NATO and Asian-Pacific states, particularly if such talks were eventually expanded to include the other ASEAN members.

The Philippines and Thailand already have existing defense ties with both <http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol34/iss5/5>

NATO countries through SEACDT as well as their own bilateral security arrangements with the United States (the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Security Treaty and the Rusk-Thanas Communiqué respectively). These affiliations could be readily expanded to justify their inclusion in APSO deliberations if Bangkok and Manila are willing entrants. Other NATO and Asian-Pacific nations could also become participants should they consider APSO membership to be in their own interests. In some instances, even France and Indonesia might welcome the opportunity to exchange views within such a council, either as "observers" or in some other status that would not compromise traditionally independent foreign policies.⁶⁰

Within the past year, the need for more coordinated security deliberations between Washington, its NATO allies, and Asian-Pacific countries has become especially evident.

The developing *ad hoc* character of NATO and ANZUS naval deployments is one area that such discussions might address. Avoidance of overlap between the missions of allied fleet activities there needs to be pursued. Australia serves as a case-in-point. During the February 1980 ANZUS Council meeting in Washington, Canberra committed its navy, with its long-range FB-111 strike aircraft, to more frequent deployments to the Indian Ocean in acknowledgment that over 9,000 miles of its 12,000-mile coastline faces that body of water. New Zealand was accordingly vested with greater defense responsibilities toward the island states of the South Pacific.⁶¹

During the ensuing months, the Australian Government *did* deploy a sizable task force led by the aircraft carrier *Melbourne* to the Indian Ocean, ostensibly in support of U.S., British, and French units already deployed there to offset the increased Soviet force presence. Notwithstanding its navy's increased physical presence, however,

42 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Australia was reluctant to contribute to America's Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) or to involve itself publicly in naval drills with its American and British allies.⁶² Australia cited its fear of disrupting critical "commercial relations" that it maintains with Persian Gulf states as the basis of its reticence. In retrospect, more comprehensive discussions probably should have been pursued in the ANZUS Council or other appropriate channels about the purpose of Australian naval deployments before they were carried out.

A promising development for Western security efforts was the West German dispatch of two destroyers into the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans for the first time in April 1980. While American efforts to involve the German units in spontaneous joint maneuvers with U.S. naval units were unsuccessful, the German ships did exercise with French units in the Mediterranean. This demonstrated that in the event of more careful allied planning, the *Bundesmarine* could either provide some units for Asian-Pacific contingencies or, more preferably, deploy greater numbers of combatants to the Baltic and North Seas, thereby releasing more experienced American and British naval units for peripheral area defense tasks.⁶³

The naval forces of other NATO members are also potentially available to APSO if used in ways that reflect advanced planning and coordination. Both the British and the Dutch have long maritime traditions in the East and Southeast Asian environment. For the past few years, the British have dispatched a 10- to 12-ship task force each May to the Far East, visiting Singapore and other critical ports.⁶⁴ Holland sends a similar, if smaller, task force to the Asian-Pacific area biannually. Dutch military contacts with the Indonesians that are now increasing are also valuable in encouraging Jakarta to continue perceiving its own national interests as

coinciding with those of the NATO and SEACDT powers.⁶⁵

Additionally, the French naval presence that spans from the Indian Ocean through the South Pacific is substantial. The French occasionally conduct joint maneuvers with ANZUS and ASEAN navies. During specific intervals, they could join an APSO naval arm that, with sufficient preparation and coordination, could largely supplement or replace American forces that were suddenly required to be elsewhere.

Currently, the British Government is weighing possible defense cuts that may further affect Britain's ability to sustain its offshore strategic deployments. Japan or various Persian Gulf states that envision British strategic presence in the critical SLOCs as serving their own national interests might wish to incur at least some of the expenses for their maintenance. APSO would serve as an appropriate institutional forum for Tokyo or the Gulf States to investigate such arrangements. These efforts could also be instrumental in allowing the United States to support better its 3rd and 7th Fleets in the Pacific theater during times of crisis.⁶⁶

If it proved capable of facilitating better transregional defense planning by serving as an effective communications instrument, the Asian-Pacific Security Organization could eventually address more specific regional defense problems with a commensurate authority carefully defined by APSO's participants to carry out policies addressing such problems. Doctrinal attention could be directed to the establishment of unified operational controls over Asian-Pacific and NATO air and naval elements active in the region and to such specific areas as air transport and airlift capabilities, tactical air missions, ASW procedures, and long-range surveillance and attack modes.⁶⁷ Three critical areas for consideration are base employment and logistical support arrangements, the reconciliation of political differences

between Asian-Pacific and NATO countries as they affect the climate of defense cooperation, and the utility of military assistance and sales.

The missions of American and allied bases and military installations still operating in the Asian-Pacific region might be reviewed to ascertain their relevance, efficiency, and acceptability to the host nation. A key consideration is how well such bases are able to function as components in the West's global deterrence strategies against identifiable and realistic threats.

The Subic Bay Naval Base, Clark Air Base, and San Miguel Naval Communications Station in the Philippines have been looked upon as the most important American installations in the region serving as support centers for the 7th Fleet and for much of CINCPAC's overall air and naval components, telecommunications, and cryptologic functions.⁶⁸ Since 1976, however, the bases' actual value for facilitating U.S. and allied forward defense in the Asian-Pacific region has been subject to increased scrutiny. In that year, Philippine-Vietnamese diplomatic relations were established and as a condition of normalization, President Marcos pledged "not to allow any foreign country to use one's territory as a base for direct or indirect aggression and intervention against the other country or other countries in the region."⁶⁹ Other criticisms have been directed against the bases' possible vulnerability to surprise attack by means of SLCMs or SLBMs, the tendency of all foreign bases to attract rather than to deter hostile military action, the irrelevance of the bases' repair and training facilities owing to modern airlift capabilities, and toward the bases' political unpopularity with various Filipino political opposition parties.

Regardless of their symbolic role in advertising American defense commitments in Asia, more pragmatic arguments for Washington's continued investment in the bases need to be

presented to America's European and Asian allies. A recent U.S. congressional study has contended, for example, that Subic Bay plays an integral role in supporting the 7th Fleet's presence around Japan and Korea. It also argues that Clark Air Base is vital in defending South Korea's security. Moreover, according to the study, the bases have designated support roles for possible operations in the Western Indian Ocean and South China Sea and could allegedly support U.S. military operations during a Middle East crisis.⁷⁰ Such arguments could be more credibly introduced in a setting in which the United States' Asian-Pacific allies could evaluate the bases' contribution to their own security interests on a constant basis.

The status of U.S. basing needs and rights concerning deployments of B-52 bombers at Darwin, Australia and on Diego Garcia (if its runways are extended) also need further clarification.⁷¹ The precedents for allied use of Australian air and naval bases already exist as Malaysia and Singapore's air force training units are routinely granted landing rights and U.S. naval elements frequently berth at Cockburn Sound and at other Australian ports. The B-52 negotiations and the possible use of American tracking installations in Australia imply a direct allied involvement in operationalizing the American nuclear deterrent.⁷² The United States and Australia might set a useful precedent for other transregional security arrangements by renegotiating current Memorandums of Arrangement (MOAs) so as to provide Canberra with greater access and input into the communications stations' missions, as was the case with the U.S.-Philippines base renegotiations, thus giving greater deference to the sovereign rights of Australia.

President Reagan has opted to downplay what his predecessor viewed as a serious human rights problem in South Korea, an approach that placed U.S.

44 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

forces stationed there in a compromised position. The use of South Korean combat units in their country's domestic power struggles after the Park assassination and the ROK's controversial trial of Kim Dae Jung put serious strain on U.S.-ROK relations. In February 1981, however, South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan became the first foreign head of state to be received by President Reagan. The meeting restored some normalcy to relations between the two Pacific allies and provided the occasion for Reagan to announce the resumption of full U.S. military assistance to Seoul and the restoration of regularly scheduled security consultations between American and Korean elements of the Joint Military Command in South Korea.⁷³

All of the ASEAN states as well as South Korea are now involved in sizable arms procurement programs, with the United States serving as their largest supplier followed by France, Holland, and Britain. While COCOM regulates Western arms sales to communist countries, there is a pressing need for NATO countries to coordinate better their sales to Asian-Pacific weapons markets so that their customers have the opportunity to move toward increased standardization of regional forces. The United States, Britain, and Australia might weigh expanding the role of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation to regulating bilateral and multilateral military assistance and sales programs instituted throughout the Asian-Pacific region.⁷⁴

Conclusion. Throughout history, policy decisions have emerged and then quickly faded before being fully understood by those charged with pursuing what were, in hindsight, clear national interests. Over the next few decades, a

dynamic process of American and European economic and cultural interaction with the Asian-Pacific states promises to develop in a manner that can be constructive to all parties concerned. Under such conditions, the stability of the Asian-Pacific region will become a greater concern for NATO.

In order to meet the many political and economic challenges now facing them, Western nations must generate sufficient collective will to identify and pursue successful policies of mutual survival. A critical factor that NATO is now obliged to weigh in this connection is the extent to which it will venture beyond traditional geographic confines to protect its overall security.

The Soviet Union, with its competing vision of a world order, will constitute the most formidable strategic challenge to both NATO and the Asian-Pacific region during their efforts to define common destinies in the years ahead. A strong interest in improved alliance management, seasoned by confidence in the worth of accumulated and shared values, is the best guarantee the allies have to weather the impending storm.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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California, earning the Ph.D. degree from the latter. Dr. Tow has published articles in several journals including *International Affairs*, *Asian Affairs*, and *Military Review* and is coeditor of the forthcoming *China, the Soviet Union and the West*.

TABLE I—SELECTED INTRAREGIONAL/INTERREGIONAL MILITARY EXERCISES AND SECURITY EXCHANGES

| Country | Time Period | Activity |
|--|--|--|
| Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore | 1970-Ongoing | Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) air defense tests, exercises—FPDA upgraded in Fall 1980 |
| Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.S. and in 1980 and 1982, Japan | 1971-Ongoing | “Rim of the Pacific” (RIMPAC) naval exercise with Hawaii as headquarters, testing sea control, weapons firing, forward defense capabilities |
| Australia, Indonesia | 1972-Ongoing | Australian Republic of Indonesia (RI) navies conduct joint exercises in Java Sea |
| Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore | April 1975-Ongoing | <i>Kris Mare</i> exercise with mechanized infantry training on New Zealand’s South Island. |
| Malaysia, Indonesia | August 1975/July 1977 | <i>Malindo Jaya</i> naval exercises to train for enforcement of joint archipelago boundary in Malacca Straits. |
| Malaysia, Indonesia | October 1975-Annual | <i>Elang Malindo</i> air defense exercises. |
| Australia, Singapore | October 1975-Intermittent | Singaporean army companies train in North Queensland, Australia for one month. |
| France, Singapore | January 1976 | French helicopter carrier <i>Jeanne D’Arc</i> and the destroyer <i>Forbin</i> conduct tactical maneuvers with missile ships of Royal Singapore Navy (RSN). |
| Singapore, New Zealand | April 1976/March 1980 | “Exercise Lionwalk” series at Bertram Military Camp, New Zealand—survival training. |
| Indonesia, Malaysia | 1977-Intermittent | <i>Cahaya Bena</i> joint anti-insurgency patrols, sea patrols on Thai-Malay border—refugee control—Joint Border Commission regulates “right of hot pursuit” and other aspects of exercise. |
| Indonesia, Malaysia | December 1977-Ongoing (usually annual) | <i>Kakr Malindo</i> series alternating between Malaysian and Indonesia territory in the Salawak Kalimantan area; these anti-insurgency exercises upgraded in 1980 (<i>Aram Malindo</i>) and 1981 (<i>Tatar Malindo</i>). |
| Australia, Britain, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand | February/March 1978 | Series of intermittent naval exercises with some of listed countries at different intervals, general intent seems to have been joint training directed at defending E. Indian Ocean/W. Asian and Pacific SLOCs. |
| France, New Zealand | (a) February 1978 | (a) New Zealand frigates stage exercise with French naval units in Hauraki Gulf. |
| | (b) November 1980 | (b) French/New Zealand joint naval maneuvers in greater South Pacific region |

| Country | Time Period | Activity |
|---|---|---|
| S. Korea, U.S. | March 1978 | U.S.-ROK Joint Military Command established to coordinate joint operations and exercises such as "Team Spirit" (annual) and the "Majex" naval task force exercise series. |
| Singapore, U.S. | (a) March 1978 (b) January/September 1980 (c) April 1980 | (a) Public disclosure that U.S. using Tengah military airfield in Singapore for Indian Ocean ASW operations with tacit consent of Indonesia and Malaysia. (b) Lee Kuan Yew offers U.S. naval facility access. (c) The USS <i>Constellation</i> task force participates in two-day naval exercise with RSN off Singapore. |
| Australia, Britain | June 1978 | Memorandum of Understanding negotiation for collaboration on defense-related sciences and technology |
| Australia, Japan, New Zealand | (a) April 1979 (b) July 1979 (c) March 1980 (d) March/April 1980 | JSDF Chief of Staff Takishima visits New Zealand. (b) Australia's HMAS <i>Torres</i> visits Sasebo and other Japanese ports. (c) HMAS <i>Swan</i> visits Sasebo and Kune. (d) Australia's Chief-of-Defense Force Staff visits Japan. |
| Japan, South Korea | July 1979 | Japan Defense Agency Director (Yamashite) visits South Korea for first time. |
| Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand | November 1979 | "SEA EX THERMAL I" joint naval exercise oriented toward straits and archipelago defense. |
| West Germany, Japan/ Australia/New Zealand | March/April 1980 | FRG Defense Minister Apel tours the Pacific—encourages defense purchases with Japan—probably discusses the Middle East and Indian Ocean security outlook with Australia and New Zealand (no details of Australia/New Zealand discussion given in Australia DOD public communique). |
| Australia, U.S. | April 1980 | U.S. Defense Department evaluation team surveys HMAS <i>Sterling</i> naval bases as Cockburn Sound to gauge suitability for U.S. naval operations. |
| U.S. | May 1980 | U.S. deploys 1,000 Marines at Diego Garcia. |
| Indonesia, Singapore | June 1980 | RI and Singapore hold 6-day joint air force exercise in East Java— <i>ELANG INDOPARA I</i> . |
| Malaysia, Thailand | August 1980 | First <i>major</i> joint naval exercise ranging from the southern tip of Malaysia to Thai port of Sattahip near Kampuchea—20 warships deployed, ASW and surface maneuvers were conducted. |
| Indonesia, New Zealand | September 1978/November 1978/January 1979 | Indonesian naval elements make a good will visit to New Zealand; the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) reciprocates by sending fighter contingents to train in Indonesia. New Zealand naval units later train in <i>Selindo II</i> with RI Navy with subsequent joint naval exercises also taking place into early 1980 |

| Country | Time Period | Activity |
|---|---|--|
| Australia, Thailand | (a) September 1978 (b) February 1980 | (a) Visits by Australian Chief-of-Staff to Thailand and other ASEAN states resulting in upgraded visits between Australian and ASEAN defense officials. (b) Visit to Bangkok by Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock results in an Australian commitment to "significantly upgrade" its weapons assistance and sales to Thailand. |
| Indonesia, Singapore Japan, ASEAN | September 1978 November 1978 | Singapore and Indonesia deploy four warships each in South China Sea. Japan Ground-Self-Defense Force Chief Nagano visits Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia for consultations. |
| Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand Philippines, U.S. | 1979-1980 January 1979 | RI Strategic National Command officials observe ANZUS "Kangaroo" series exercises. Base renewal agreements (Clark AB, Subic Bay, etc.) reverts sovereign control of U.S. bases to Philippines. |
| Vietnam, U.S.S.R. | March 1979 | Soviets step up construction of air control facilities at Danaang and flow of military advisors to SRV after Sino-Vietnamese War (February 1979). |
| Australia, Britain Britain, Japan | August 1980 September 1980 | Ninety Australian personnel participate in British NATO exercise. Eight British warships drill with Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) in Tokyo Bay and off Oshima Island, respectively. |
| Indonesia, Singapore | September 1980 | <i>Englek</i> naval exercise—four Singapore patrol vessels and two RI guided-missile equipped destroyer escorts. |
| Indonesia, U.S. | November 1980 | RI announces plans to build three air bases with assistance of U.S. Air Force training personnel. Announcement immediately follows tour of ASEAN states by Gen. Law Allen, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff. |
| Japan, U.S. | December 1980 | U.S. Congress examines option of asking Japan to construct U.S. warships in lieu of Tokyo's failure to meet 9.7 percent annual defense budget increase. |
| Indonesia, France | January 1981 | Contingent of Indonesian Marines trained in France for 5 weeks—familiarization with AMX tanks shipped to RI in February 1981. |
| Indonesia, Thailand | January 1981 | First joint air exercise—computer simulation only—no combat units involved. Combined with Indonesian ASW exercises in South China Sea. |
| Indonesia, Holland | January 1981 | Dutch Secretary of State for Defense meets President Suharto for talks on naval base/shipyard construction and on purchases of Fokker aircraft. RI indicates it wants expanded defense assistance relations with Holland. |
| Thailand, U.S. | January 1981 | Thai Foreign Minister calls for more efficient preplanning of U.S. weapons transfers to Thailand during emergencies—calls intermittently throughout 1981 for SEATO-type collective security ties. |

| Country | Time Period | Activity |
|------------------------------------|-------------|--|
| Australia, U.S. | March 1981 | Prime Minister Fraser announces to Australia's Northern Territory government that U.S. B-52s will use Darwin to refuel on surveillance trips over Indian Ocean—prior B-52 surveillance could only fly over—not land in—Australian territory. |
| Australia, Britain, New Zealand | Ongoing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — BRITANZ meetings annually in London and Canberra/Wellington attended by Chiefs of Staffs and occasionally by Defense Ministers. — Annual "North Star/Southern Cross" army exercises in Australia (May-June). — Occasional British participation in ANZUS "Westwind" naval exercises. |
| All Participants | Ongoing | <p>Military representatives train in various defense institutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Australian Staff and Joint Services College — U.S. Pacific Army Management Services — Jalore Jungle Weapons Training School (Malaysia) — National Defense College—Thailand |

Sources: Department of Defence, Australia Government Ministerial Document Service
 Ministry of Defense, Singapore (Public Affairs Division)
 Ministry of Defense, Malaysia (Public Affairs Division)
 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Reports (Asia and the Pacific)*
 Radio Australia News Bulletin, Daily Reports
 British Broadcasting Company, *Summary of World Broadcasts, The Far East*
 Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1980*
Asian Defense Journal
Pacific Defense Reportar

NOTES

1. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1981* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 29 January 1980), pp. 108, 112-114.

2. See "Remarks Prepared for Delivery by The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense to the 18th Annual Wehrkunde Conference (Munich, Germany)," *News Release* (Washington: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, 21 February 1981), pp. 5-6. On 9 March 1981, William Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in an unexpected visit to Japan, asked Premier Zenko Suzuki to increase Japan's economic assistance to Thailand and Pakistan and to assume a larger military commitment for joint defense efforts in Asia. *International Herald Tribune*, 10 March 1981, p. 2.

3. Recent statements by President Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress have updated the Soviet collective security approach for the Far East. For a text of his remarks, see *Pravda*, 24 February 1981, pp. 2-9. At least one Western interpretation of his remarks contended that they were directed as an offer toward Japan to correct what Moscow perceives as a regional power imbalance created by the August 1978 Sino-Japanese peace treaty; Bruce Porter, "The 26th Party Congress: Brezhnev and Soviet Foreign Policy," in RFE-RI 80-81, 23 February 1981 and reprinted in *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, 25 February 1981, pp. 4-5. For a Soviet theoretical treatment of collective security as applied to Asia, consult Ivan Kovalenko, *Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980). The authoritative Western background work on Soviet collective security strategy is Avigdor Haselkorn, *The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy* (New York: Crane-Russak, 1978).

4. Albert Wohlstetter, "Protecting Persian Gulf Oil: U.S. and Alliance Military Policy," Background Paper for the Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific Workshop, Tokyo, Japan, 23-25 January 1981, p. 18.

5. Hiroshi Kimura, "Japan-Soviet Relations: Framework, Developments, Prospects," *Asian Survey*, July 1980, p. 716.

6. N. Borodin, "Japan's Policy: Words and Deeds," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1978, p. 88.

7. For an example of the "soft-line" defense position, see Fukushima Shingo, "Japan's Wavering Defense Plan," *Japan Quarterly*, October-December 1978, pp. 399-406, and various discussions in *Bunji Sunjei* (U.S. Embassy translations) during 1979. See especially the debate between Michio Morishima of London University and Yoshihako Seki of Toritsu University in *Bunji Shunyu*, July 1979. Morishima advocates that if Japan is attacked by the Soviet Union, it should surrender immediately if it hopes to secure its political independence. A poll taken by the Prime Minister's office in late 1979 found that 86 percent of those questioned favored the existence of the Japanese Self-Defense Force and the *Yomiuri Shimbun's* November 1980 survey indicated that 70 percent of the 3,000 Japanese men and women chosen at random approved of discussion for debate on revision of Japan's war-renouncing constitution. *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 2 April 1980, p. 1 and *The Daily Yomiuri*, 26 November 1980. A similar survey by *Mainichi Shimbun* showed that 69 percent of those surveyed favored discussion and 55 percent of that total favored constitutional revision. An *Asahi Shimbun* poll showed 44 percent in favor of constitutional revision, 41 percent opposed. "Stepping Out at Last," *Asiaweek*, 20 February 1981, p. 27. The Japanese Socialist and Komeito ("Clean Government") parties are also taking a more pragmatic line against the Soviet threat. See *The Japan Times*, 11 January 1980, p. 1 and Ian Nish, "Japan's Security Occupations," *The World Today*, November 1980, pp. 421-427. In response to the prevailing Japanese sentiment, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov has warned that it would be "dangerous" for Japan not to enter into a peace and friendship treaty with the U.S.S.R. and to continue exacerbating "regional tensions"—an obvious reference to the Northern Islands dispute. *Pravda*, 2 September 1980, pp. 3-4. A Western account is in *The Financial Times* (London), 3 September 1980, p. 2.

8. For Soviet analysis of a perceived U.S.-PRC-Japanese "anti-Soviet front," see *Pravda*, 1 June 1980 and reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP)*, 2 July 1980, pp. 16-17, and *Pravda*, 6 December 1980, reprinted in *CDSP*, 7 January 1981, p. 17. On Soviet views of Sino-Japanese relations, see *Pravda*, 13 December 1979, and *Izvestia*, 16 December 1979, both reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter cited as FBIS), *Soviet Union (Daily Report)*, 21 December 1979, pp. C-1 and C-2 where the late Prime Minister Ohira's diplomatic trip to Beijing was regarded as part of a "hegemonist" strategy against the U.S.S.R. Soviet accounts of visits by Chinese leaders to Australia/New Zealand and by Antipodean leaders to China have also been vitriolic. One of the more comprehensive Soviet statements on Chinese-ASEAN relations was by V. Skosyrev, "Pressure on ASEAN" in *Izvestia*, 13 July 1978 and reprinted in FBIS, *USSR (Daily Report)*, 18 July 1978 at K-1. Cogent Western analysis on growing Soviet fears of encirclement is offered by Dusko Doder in the *International Herald Tribune*, 12 September 1980, p. 1.

9. Much of the data for Soviet force presence in Asia is taken from Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security*, 1980 (Tokyo: 1980), pp. 29-46 and Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1980* (English Version) (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1980), pp. 15-23.

10. *Asian Security*, 1980, pp. 30, 31.
<http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol34/iss5/5>

50 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

11. For a comprehensive breakdown of Soviet and Japanese force capabilities and options in the Hokkaido-Northern Islands area, see John Lewis, "Inadequate Bear Traps in the Japanese North," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter cited as *FEER*), 14 March 1980, pp. 22-24.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

13. Brown, p. 104; *Asian Security*, 1980, p. 4.

14. The term "surge capability" was used in the context of Asian-Pacific security problems by Adm. Maurice F. Weisner in testimony at hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, *Department of Defense Authorization Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980*, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Part 2), 20 February 1979, pp. 706-773.

15. See analysis offered in The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1979* (London: Spring 1980), p. 23.

16. IISS estimates that the Soviet Air Force now has 60 TU-22M *Backfire B* bombers while Soviet naval aviation units have an additional 70 units. The Japan Defense Agency estimates a lower total estimate of *Backfires*—about 80 with 2½ built per month. In early 1980, Denis Warner reported that 50 *Backfires* were stationed in Mongolia. "The World Around Us—A Strategic Overview," *Pacific Defense Reporter*, March 1980, p. 9.

17. Reports of Thailand's concerns on the Soviet overflight issue are in *FEER*, 5 October 1979, p. 16 and *FEER*, 29 February 1980, p. 10. Also see *International Herald Tribune*, 3 October 1979, p. 5.

18. *Asian Pacific Security*, 1980, p. 42.

19. *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 25 April 1980.

20. Senior U.S. officials reportedly have urged the Japanese to assume responsibility for SLOCs up to 1,000 miles from Japan's shores. *International Herald Tribune*, 15 January 1980, p. 2. See also Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Statement by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown," 30 December 1980, in which he states that "Japan is an economic power which could certainly afford much larger defense expenditures . . . [U]nder these circumstances, we have for some time been privately suggesting to the Japanese government that a steady and significant increase in defense spending is needed . . ." For a Japanese interpretation of the American position, see the *Asahi Evening News*, 30 January 1980. The Congressional Budget Office also released a study early last year calling for greater Japanese naval construction efforts for convoy-escort purposes according to *Asahi Evening News*, 2 January 1980. Adverse U.S. response to the Japanese decision to effect only a portion of the 9.7 percent increase in defense spending initially recommended by U.S. defense officials is comprehensively reviewed in reports by Henry Scott Stokes for *The New York Times*, 23 December 1980, p. A-9 and 28 December 1980, p. E-2.

21. Two notable assessments of Asian-Pacific states' naval capabilities are in Denis Warner and Peter Young, eds., *Pacific Defence Reporter Yearbook* (Victoria, Australia: Peter Isaacson Publications), pp. 57-64 and A.J. Wallis, "The Threat: Southeast Asia and Adjacent Waters," *Maritime Defence*, February 1980, pp. 43-51.

22. Weisner, p. 759. Also see his "The U.S. Posture in Asia and the Pacific: The View from CINCPAC," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1978, pp. 41-47. Weisner's successor, Adm. Robert Long, has concurred with the view that "U.S. Pacific forces are spread too thin to cover with confidence all existing trouble spots," *The Japan Times*, 2 February 1980.

23. A Japanese analysis of the implications of any such strategy on Tokyo's security is given by Takio Yamazaki, "How Will Japan's Security Be Maintained . . . What Will 'Swing Strategy' Bring About?" in *Jiyu*, May 1980 and reprinted in *Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines*, July 1980 (Tokyo: American Embassy Political Section, Office of Translation Services). Also see report on U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield's reassurances to Japanese officials in the *Asahi Evening News*, 9 September 1980 and on a subsequent Japanese announcement that it would build up its defense power because increased U.S. Indian Ocean commitments had reduced U.S. military power in the Asian-Pacific, *Mainichi Daily News*, 25 October 1980. The United States dropped its adherence (but did not necessarily eschew the option permanently) to "swing strategy" in the spring of 1980. See Richard Burt's report in *The New York Times*, 25 May 1980, p. 3, and John Edwards, "Washington's Pacific Thrust," *FEER*, 13 June 1980, pp. 38-40. For various military ramifications of the strategy, consult Paul Nitze, Leonard Sullivan, Jr., and the Atlantic Council Working Group on Securing the Seas, *Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), especially pp. 218-220.

24. On U.S. base negotiations with Somalia, see Michael Getler and Don Oberdorfer's reports for the *Washington Post* and reprinted in the *International Herald Tribune*, 13 August 1980, p. 1 and Colin Legum's analysis in *The Observer* (London), 17 August 1980, p. 8. Egyptian reluctance to sign a treaty for a permanent U.S. base presence at Ras Banas is reported by the *International Herald Tribune*, 20 January 1981, p. 5. For a report that increased Soviet activities in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam has concerned the Philippines because it would be involved in any superpower conflict with its American bases, see an Agence France-Presse dispatch reprinted in *FBIS, Asia and the Pacific, Daily Report*, 18 July 1980, p. P-1. Also see Franklin Weinstein, "The United States and the Security of Southeast Asia," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, December 1978, pp. 27-30 and Robert Pringle, *Indonesia and the Philippines* (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 71-72. Alvin J. Cottrell and Thomas Moorer take a dissenting position on the view that U.S. bases attract great power confrontation contending that host or potential host countries "... do not take their cues from anything resembling an objective reading of relative capabilities . . . but rather from the more visible evidence of action." Cottrell and Moorer, *U.S. Overseas Bases: Problems of Projecting American Military Power Abroad* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977), p. 8.

25. See Note 7. A comprehensive breakdown of Japanese budget and procurement stipulations and of the Self-Defense Force's Acquisition program is Edward C. Ezell, et al., "The Japanese Self-Defense Forces, 1980," *International Defense Review*, 13, No. 2, 1980, pp. 187-197.

26. The Comprehensive National Security Study Group (*Sogo anzen hosho kenkyukai*), Report on Comprehensive National Security (English Translation), 2 July 1980. For evaluation of the report, see Tadae Takubo, "Defense Awareness of the Japanese," *Asian Pacific Community*, Fall 1980, pp. 25-34.

27. Karl Kaiser, et al., *Western Security: What Has Changed? What Should be Done?* (Bonn, New York, London, Paris: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Aswartige Politik, Council on Foreign Relations, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1981).

28. Joint Working Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, *The Common Security Interests of Japan, the United States and NATO* (Washington, D.C. and Tokyo: December 1980). For a thorough evaluation and critique of this report, see *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 4 December 1980, p. 4.

29. Joint Working Group, pp. 36-37.

30. *Defense of Japan 1980*, p. 84.

31. On the Suzuki Cabinet subdual, see John Lewis, "Suzuki Applies the Gag," *FEER* 111, 27 February 1981, p. 15. The final budget decision on the Japanese defense budget for 1981 is ably covered by Derek Davies, "Suzuki Surrenders to Austerity," *FEER*, 16 January 1981, pp. 24-26. A Japanese editorial supporting Suzuki's position is in *Mainichi Daily News*, 5 January 1981. Also see *The Daily Yomiuri*, 11 January 1981, which supports Suzuki's defense posture while simultaneously calling for a clearer Japanese hard-line foreign policy against the U.S.S.R.—and implies that Japan should spend more on defense.

32. North Atlantic Assembly, *Common Concerns: Report on the Tokyo Meetings of a North Atlantic Assembly Delegation With Japanese Officials* (14-17 May 1980) (Brussels: 1980). Later in the year, Japan Defense Agency Director Joji Omura reiterated that the JDA had no intention of revising the Defense Forces Law to authorize the dispatch of Japanese troops abroad for rescue operations. *The Daily Yomiuri*, 11 October 1980.

33. The Japanese have been somewhat reticent in moving toward any commitment to foot part of the bill for the defense of Middle Eastern oil supplies. In late October, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa said that Japan's right of self-defense, under constitutional limitations, would not allow the favoring of any belligerents in a Middle Eastern oil conflict and this limitation would include sharing the expenses of an international fleet. *The Japan Times*, 22 October 1980, p. 1. At the end of the year, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials rejected the constitutionality of Japan financially assisting in the building of U.S. warships to compensate for the "less than expected" increases in Japanese defense spending. FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific*, 13 December 1980, p. C-1. In late November, however, the JDA revealed to the Japanese Diet that it had constructed contingency plans for a joint U.S.-Japan sealane clearing operations "on a southwestern route." *Asahi Evening News*, 28 November 1981. For a particularly enlightening Western treatment on possible Japanese options for defense contributions to a Persian Gulf force, see Zalmay Khalizad, "The Pacific Alliance and The Persian Gulf," Tokyo: The Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific Workshop, 23-25 January 1981.

34. English translation provided by the Japanese Embassy, Brussels.

35. *Asahi Evening News*, 22 October 1980.

36. A comprehensive review of Japan's activities in COCOM and East-West trade regulation is Stephen Sternheimer, *East-West Technology Transfer: Japan and the Communist Bloc* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980). For reports on the Japanese aerospace industry, see the *International Herald Tribune*, 15 September 1980, p. 1; and for a report on Tokyo's weapons production capabilities, see "Interest in Making New Weapons is Mounting in Defence Industry," *The Japan Economic Journal*, 2 September 1980, p. 4.

37. See especially Ryukichi Imai, "Non-proliferation: A Japanese Point of View," *Survival*, March-April 1979, pp. 50-56.

38. British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts* (hereafter cited as *SWB*), 25 March 1980, pp. A1/2. Also see accounts in *The Japan Times*, 26 March 1980, pp. 1, 4; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 25 March 1980; and *Frankfurt Allgemeine*, 26 March 1980.

39. *Defense of Japan 1980*, pp. 171-182.

40. FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific (Daily Report)* 15 September 1980, pp. C-3 and C-4.

52 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

41. Japanese discussion of RIMPAC is in *Defense of Japan 1980*, pp. 176-179. See also Ryochi Nishijima, "Participation of Maritime Self-Defense Forces in RIMPAC," *Asian-Pacific Community*, Winter 1980, pp. 43-53.

42. *Strategy Week*, 9-15 February 1981, p. 5.

43. The "non-collective defense" principle is outlined by Nishijima, p. 45 and meticulously evaluated by *The Japan Times*, 8 February 1980, p. 1. The exercise was not considered to have been linked with any alliance system but was entered into for "educational" purposes. The MSDF commander of the Japanese participants in RIMPAC, Capt. Tsutomu Yoshioka, assured the readers of *The Japan Times*, 27 January 1980, p. 2, that the MSDF units would "never come under the command of another country."

44. Government of Singapore, "Text of an Interview with Prime Minister Mr. Lee Kuan Yew by Asahi Shimbun's Foreign Editor, Mr. Kensaku Shirai, and Chief Correspondent (Asian General Bureau) Mr. Teruo Kunugi, on 5 January 1981 at the Istana Annex," *Press Release* (02-1/81/01-07).

45. "Marcos Calls U.S. a Dependable Ally," *The Southeast Asia Record*, 15-21 February 1980, p. 5. In late September 1980, Marcos contended that Japan was entitled to build up its defenses if done within the auspices of U.S. defense umbrella. FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific (Daily Report)*, 19 September 1980, p. P-3.

46. A Kyodo news dispatch reported that Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, after meeting with Japan's Premier Suzuki during the latter's January 1981 ASEAN tour, approved of Japan's self-defense efforts and that triangular relations between Japan, Australia, and ASEAN should be strengthened to promote assistance at *security levels* (emphasis mine). FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific (Daily Report)*, 12 January 1981, p. N-3. Thai and Malay officials reportedly favor a Japanese defense effort in the hope that it might shift some of the U.S.S.R.'s military resources from Southeast Asia to the northeast. See Michael Malik's report for Reuters in *The Asia Record*, September 1980, p. 2.

47. I.P.S.G. Cosby, "Disquiet in the Far East," *RUSI (Royal United Services Institute Journal)*, September 1980, p. 47.

48. *Radio Australia News* (Embassy Dispatch), 18 January 1980.

49. For concise accounts of the visit, see Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1979* (Tokyo: 1979), p. 174; and the *International Herald Tribune*, 24 September 1979, p. 10-S.

50. The most sophisticated treatment of this idea to date is James Morley, *Common Mutual Security Interests of the Major Industrialized Democracies* (Washington, D.C. and Tokyo: The Atlantic Council/RIPS Working Group on the Common Security Interests of Japan, the U.S., and NATO: June 1980).

51. Suzuki gave the fullest outline of the comprehensive security concept to date in the Diet on 26 January 1981 as reported by *The Japan Times*, 27 February 1981. Five broad components of cooperation are suggested: expansion of official development assistance (ODA), private level cooperation and trade, gearing aid toward the specific needs of recipient countries, encouragement of energy development in the Third World, and assistance in the development of human resources and self-sufficiency of target states. See also *The Japan Times*, 11 January 1981, pp. 1, 4.

52. Onkar Marwah cites the main objective of the Indian Navy's "Ten Year Plan" as to provide India with two blue-water navies, one each for the East and West Indian Oceans, able to operate independently of each other and to this end, Port Blair has become one of the biggest bases in the Indian Ocean. Onkar Marwah, "India's Military Power and Policy," in Marwah and Jonathan Pollack, eds., *Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 135. For a summary of the implications of the SRV's recent naval acquisition, see A.W. Grazebrook, "Maritime Threats," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, August 1980, p. 61.

53. Even several months before Park's death, Gen. John H. Cushman, former Commander of I Corps Group (from 1976-1978) was warning of the pending imbalance of military power between North and South. Cushman, "The Military Balance in Korea," *Asian Affairs*, July/August 1979, pp. 359-369. For a post-Park analysis on the visibility of the American deterrent on the Peninsula, see Jeffrey Antevil, "Fear of Giving 'Wrong Signal' Handicaps U.S. Policy on Korea," *The Asia Record*, August 1980, pp. 1, 21.

54. David Watts, "Pressure Grows for Overall ASEAN Defence Agreement," *The Times* (London), 7 January 1981, p. 5.

55. The best historical evaluation of SEATO's formation is Evelyn Colbert, *Southeast Asia in International Politics: 1941-1956* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 291-310. Other worthwhile studies include Astri Suhrke-Goldstein, *SEATO: Rethinking Regionalism*, Working Paper No. 10 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1969); and Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Lives of SEATO*, Occasional Paper No. 45, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, December 1976). Also see Robert D. Shuy and Larry A. Niksch, "The Role of SEATO in U.S. Foreign Policy," Library of Congress-Congressional Research Paper, in the appendix of Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *U.S. Commitment to SEATO*, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1 March 1974.

56. These problems are well covered by Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke in *Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States* (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978), pp. 143-169, 193-231; and by Michael Leifer, *Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia*,

ALLIANCE SYSTEMS 53

Adelphi papers, no. 162 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1980), especially pp. 31-33. Also Donald E. Weatherbee, "The United States and Indonesia: New Realities in Southeast Asia," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1980, pp. 56-63.

57. van der Kroef, p. 3.

58. *Asian Security* 1980, pp. 158-159. By July, Thailand had softened its appeals with Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila indicating to U.S. Secretary of State Muskie that SEACDT should not be invoked at that time because the Vietnamese were not expected to launch imminently a large-scale invasion against Thailand. Francis Daniel, "ASEAN, Western Friends United in Response to Vietnamese Foray," *The Asia Record*, July 1980, pp. 1, 4.

59. Announced by the office of Mohammed Yusuf Bin Abdul Rahman, Defense Minister Secretary-General and cited in BBC, *SWB FE/6633*, 22 June 1981, pp. A3/6.

60. France retains interests in the South Pacific region including its nuclear testing activities at Mururoa and a usual contingent of 15 ships in the Indian Ocean. Consultations with regional powers could serve French interests by familiarizing Asian states traditionally tied to Washington or the Commonwealth with French security perceptions on a more frequent basis.

61. The ANZUS Communiqué of 27 February 1980 (Washington: Dept. of State reprint) noted that the "composition and level of forces in the Indian Ocean that would be appropriate to demonstrate allied support for security of the area and determination to deter further Soviet adventurism . . . [was discussed]." For details of the Australian Indian Ocean commitment, see John Edwards, "Where Australia Fits Into the Pacific Power Balance," *The Bulletin*, 12 August 1980, pp. 78-83; Edwards, "The U.S. Rethinks Its Pacific Strategy," *The Bulletin*, 1 July 1980, p. 87; Robert Darroch's interview with Gen. Sir John Hackett in *ibid.*, pp. 88-90; and *Radio Australia News*, 2 February 1980, 19 February 1980, 9 May 1980, 30 July 1980, 9 November 1980, and 14 November 1980. Ross Babbage, *Rethinking Australia's Defense* (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1980), pp. 20-21, assesses refueling capabilities and problems for the F-111 and B-52 for Indian Ocean missions. The majority opinion among most of the alliance's observers is that New Zealand's primary area responsibilities within the alliance remain in the South Pacific in accordance with the stipulations of the New Zealand Ministry of Defence's 1978 *Defence Review*. For extended interpretations of New Zealand's role, see *Reports of the Ministry of Defence*, published each March, and Henry S. Albinski, "New Zealand and ANZUS: A United States Perspective," in John Henderson, et al., eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland, N.Z.: Methuen, 1980), pp. 46-51. For more skeptical views of New Zealand's military role, see John Henderson, "The Changing Objectives of New Zealand Defence Policy," in Stephen Levine, *An Alternative View of ANZUS*, and Peter Jones, "Defence: A Radical View," in *ibid.*, pp. 41-45, 52-61, and 61-66, respectively and also Henderson, "The Burdens of ANZUS," *New Zealand International Review*, May/June 1980, pp. 2-3.

62. *Radio Australia News*, 2 March 1980. Also see *Strategy Week*, 3-9 November 1980, p. 11 and Brian Toohey's report in *The Australian Financial Review*, 11 March 1980.

63. *Frankfurt Allgemeine*, 8 April and 29 April 1980.

64. For background see Dov S. Zakheim, "Of Allies and Access," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1981, pp. 97-105; Zakheim, "Towards a Western Approach to the Indian Ocean," *Survival*, January-February 1980, pp. 7-14; and *Frankfurt Allgemeine*, 10 December 1980.

65. For a report on the visit of William F. van Eckelen, Dutch Secretary of State for Defense to Jakarta in January 1981, see BBC, *SWB FE/6627*, pp. A/1-A/2.

66. For development of the Japanese financial/physical contribution thesis, see Khalizad, pp. 13-15. For the Persian Gulf states' security perspectives, see Koichi Tsutsumi, "Efforts to Prevent Unrest in the Persian Gulf Area," Tokyo: The Security Conference in Asia and the Pacific Workshop, 23-25 January 1980.

67. Noel Gayler, "Security Implications of the Soviet Military Presence in Asia," in Richard H. Solomon, ed., *Asian Security in the 1980s*, RAND-2492 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, November 1979), pp. 65-67 expands on these points within an Asian alliance context.

68. Cottrell and Moorer, pp. 46-50.

69. President Marcos reiterated this commitment in July 1980, saying that the United States cannot use the Clark and Subic facilities for "offensive purposes" without first seeking approval of the Philippine Government and that this matter had been approved by both the Philippine and U.S. Governments. Agence France-Presse report reprinted in FBIS, *Asia and the Pacific (Daily Report)*, 9 July 1980, p. P-1.

70. The Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations* (prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate) (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979), pp. 147-150.

71. In March 1981 Prime Minister Fraser related to Paul Evringham, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory, that U.S. B-52s could use Darwin as a refueling base for surveillance flights over the Indian Ocean. *International Herald Tribune*, 10 March 1981, p. 2. See *Radio Australia News*, 3 February, 7 July, 12 July, 19 September 1980, and 14 January 1981, as well as *The Age* (Melbourne), 15 January 1981, p. 1, and

54 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 January 1981, p. 2, for background on the B-52 issue. Fraser's guidelines were that the Australian Government would have to be consulted if the aircraft carries nuclear weapons. The American Government's position has always been not to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on its B-52 missions. As of this writing, it is not clear what specific compromises had been reached prior to Fraser's announcement of the agreement.

72. Two definitive sources exist for background on American tracking and surveillance installations in Australia; Desmond Ball, *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, November 1980) and Defence Science and Technology Division, Department of Defense, *Summary of Official Statements on the Joint Defence Research Facility Pine Gap Near Alice Springs and the Joint Defence Space Communications Station Nurrungar, New Woolmera* (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1 May 1978). Also see *Hansard's*, Australia House of Representatives, 19 October 1978, pp. 1658-1663.

73. Shim Jae Hoon, "Strength to Strength," *FEER* 111, No. 9, 20 February 1981, p. 12.

74. Background on this fund is to be found in a Report submitted by a Special Study Mission to Asia and the Pacific, 2-22 January 1978 under the auspices of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, *Prospects for Regional Stability: Asia and the Pacific* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978), pp. 74, 77. Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka are also affiliated with the Commonwealth and would probably not wish to participate in this form of military assistance regulation with the Asian-Pacific members.

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