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
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SET AND DRIFT



THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EAST AFRICA: A KENYAN VIEW

by

Major J.R. Kibwana, Kenya Navy

The past 5 years have seen a dramatic increase in the level of military buildup in the East African states of Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya—a development that has, in certain cases, led to an extravagant diversion of very scarce human and financial resources. To understand this shift from that postulated by a great many African statesmen during those palmy days in the early independence period, when any military expenditure was viewed with great abhorrence, a brief overview of the history of the relevant armed forces is appropriate.

With the exception of the Tanzania military forces, which were rebuilt completely from scratch after the 1964 mutiny, and the Ethiopian forces, the rest of the East African Armed Forces were a legacy of the colonial regimes. They were essentially police instruments geared to internal security roles and frontier defense, external security having been the responsibility of the colonial power. As could be expected, therefore, the size, composition and doctrine of these forces were unimpressive, to say the least. Ill-formed and incipient, they had scant capacity to project military power effectively to their own borders, let alone sustain

This, then, was the situation with regard to the military forces of the newly independent states of Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya in the early 1960's. Lacking an industrial base with which to support themselves and hampered by financial and technological constraints, these institutions depended almost entirely on the former metropolises for military equipment, logistics, training and certain specialized supporting services. The overall effect of this continued dependence on the colonial power was stultifying in most cases, since any planned expansion or modernization of these forces was subtly tempered by the former metropolises' own perception of the military requirements of that particular country vis-a-vis their own political, economic or overall global strategic interests.

Little or no opposition over this overt limitation of arms supplies to their countries was voiced by the respective political leaderships. This was hardly surprising, considering that at this time civil-military relations were not particularly happy. An authoritarian military regime was in power in the Sudan; short-lived abortive military coups d'etat had erupted in December 1960 in Ethiopia in December 1961 in Somalia, and there had been the Tanzanian,

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Ugandan and Kenyan mutinies of January 1964.

Against this background, the notion of any military expansion was viewed with great hostility and in certain extreme cases even the abolition of the armed forces was advocated.¹ Several other factors were also contributory to this continuing relationship with the former metropolises:

- A general ignorance, albeit excusable, among African politicians (who had successfully followed the advice to seek first the political kingdom) not only of the function of the armed forces, but even in the vaguest terms, of their equipment, organization and capabilities.

- The external threat to national independence was viewed not so much in military terms as in politicoeconomic terms—the neoimperialist threat.

- The benefits of standardization accruing from a single source of supply of military hardware in terms of costs in maintenance and training.

Up to the beginning of the 1970's, the external political relations within East Africa were more or less stable. There had been general public acceptance of the three principles of co-existence. That no consideration—historical, geographical or ethnic, could permit any African State to claim sovereignty over another, or part of its territory; that colonial boundaries were fixed, and that self-determination was the only criterion for any change. This doctrine had been embodied in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) enjoining all signatories to respect "the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state and for its inalienable right to independent existence."²

However, the early 1970's heralded in almost all these countries difficulties of varying severity in the political, administrative and economic spheres, some of which were influenced by external forces and others arose from

pressures of rapid development on weak economies.

The facade of African unity and coexistence began, therefore, to show signs of cracks as each country began to reexamine its national interests vis-a-vis regional considerations. Differences stemming from dormant ideological convictions or unsatisfactorily defined borders now manifested themselves by giving rise to growing hostilities between individual countries. These difficulties sometimes culminated in the sort of border skirmishes that occurred between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The situation was further exacerbated by internal upheavals and subversion by political, ethnic or occasionally religious minorities, often supported from outside. In this regard, Kenya had to contend with the "Shiftra"³ insurgents supported by Somalia, while Ethiopia had the problem of the Eritrean separatist movement and the Sudan experienced a major rebellion by the Christian minority in the south. All these problems brought into sharp focus the need for military self-sufficiency at the national level in these affected countries.

Other factors that led to a great deal of attention being paid to the military establishment were:

- The painful realization of the African countries of their inability to participate effectively in major strategic military questions affecting the continent and more specifically the liberation of Southern Africa. This was particularly true of Tanzania, which had to face harassment and intrusion at her southern border by Portuguese forces in Mozambique.

- Pressure from the military elite, as in the case of Sudan, Somalia and Uganda, which had military governments. It is a peculiar phenomenon of the military governments to expand their armed forces independently of external threats. A study of military expenditures of these countries over the

period immediately preceding a *coup d'état* bears this fact out.⁴ With these regimes, the flourish of jet aircraft, the rumble of heavy tanks, artillery, etc., were sure symbols of power and authority.

With the initial goodwill of coexistence now eroded and the restraining influence of the ex-metropolises severed, all of these neighboring countries sought to improve their military capabilities according to their own perception of national security issues. More often than not, however, the relative sizes of their armed forces and their defense budgets indicated the importance placed by individual governments on the role of military power in their relationships with neighbors.

It should be noted here that even prior to this situation, the then level of military expenditures was a burden that these countries could ill-afford. Indeed, the subsequent military expansion would not have been possible without the assistance of foreign powers in the provision of military hardware as grant aid or on easy credit terms. Such arms transactions were, in most cases, out of all proportion to the defense needs of the recipient states and, in fact, tended to perpetuate the vicious circle of an arms "walk" in the region.

For instance, the U.S. aid to Ethiopia during the 1960's and early 1970's had a perceptible influence on Somalia's acceptance of military assistance from the Soviet Union (amounting to about U.S. \$32 million) and the subsequent Soviet military presence in that area.⁵ On the other hand, this sharp increase in Somalia's military strength was itself viewed by Kenya as a real threat to her national security, necessitating a re-assessment of her own defense forces.

Kenya's Armed Forces policy in the first decade of independence was directed towards fashioning a cohesive and balanced military force commensurate with the perceived needs and priorities of the new nation. It was

according to the government's defense policy, "not considered necessary to build up massive and unnecessarily large armed forces which would be an extravagant and wasteful drain on the country's scarce economic resources."⁶

In pursuance of this policy, the armed forces were kept at a low level, consisting of a 7,500-man army, an 800-man air force and a small 350-man navy.⁷ In comparison with her neighbors, this was modest, both in terms of numerical strength and in terms of military expenditure which remained in the area of 1-2 percent of the Gross National Product.

However, as could be expected, Kenya could not remain unresponsive in the light of an escalation of arms by her neighbors, made possible by assistance on a lavish scale from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. A brief overview of the military situation in these countries is given to illustrate Kenya's security problem at this time relative to the countries with which she shares her lengthy and permeable borders:

Somalia. Since its formation in 1960, the Somali National Army has expanded from 5,000 to a formidable well-armed force of 23,000 men in 1975.⁸ For a country with a population of only 3,150,000, the size of the force is quite out of proportion to its defensive needs. This situation is viewed with extreme suspicion by Kenya, in view of Somalia's irredentist claim to the North Eastern province of Kenya, and one can only assume that the level of Somalia military preparedness is linked to its continued policy of settling the border issues in one way or another.

Ethiopia. Although the Ethiopian Armed Forces are relatively large (a total figure of 44,800 in 1975,⁹) they are not considered excessively large for a population of 27,430,000, with potential enemies at almost every point

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around her circumference. Indeed, it was Ethiopia's vulnerability to concerted action by the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Somali dissidents in the east, not to mention the hostile regime in the Sudan, that led to an extensive modernization of the armed forces with assistance in the form of equipment, financial credits, grants and training from the Western countries, principally the United States. Furthermore, the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya signed a mutual defense agreement in July 1963 as a result of this common threat.

Nevertheless, the relations (from Kenya's point of view) with the present turbulent military regime are uncertain, and the treaty may not be much of an assurance to Kenya in the future.

Sudan. Although the Sudanese Armed Forces are formidable at 48,600 men for a population of 17,870,000¹⁰ relations between Kenya and Sudan are amicable to the point where Kenya administers roughly 30,000 square miles of Sudanese territory under mutual agreement. The length of the common border is under 100 miles and the chances of conflict between these two countries are remote.

Uganda. With the assumption of power by the military regime of General Idi Amin in 1971, the Ugandan Forces underwent a rapid expansion from 6,000 to the present level of 21,000 men.¹¹ The continuing instability in Uganda under the flamboyant leadership, often predisposed to military adventurism and bullyism,¹² has emerged as one of the more serious threats to Kenya's security. With the current relative imbalance in the arms level between these two countries, one could well visualize a situation where a limited armed conflict could ensue, perhaps as a result of an effort by the military regime to provide distraction from some severe internal crisis.

Tanzania. The Tanzanian Armed Forces were completely rebuilt from scratch following the 1964 mutiny and have grown steadily through the years to the present level of 14,600, a modest size for a country of a population of 15,110,000.¹³ Relations with Tanzania, once one of Kenya's closest associates, at the moment are cool, largely owing to diametrically opposed ideological philosophies, especially in the economic field. However, political and diplomatic agreements appear to be the future means of resolving conflicts between these two countries.

It is against this background of superior forces of her neighbors in a period of strained relations, that Kenya must examine her capabilities to offer credible deterrence. Even using the yardstick of effectiveness and numbers rather than the old yardstick of size and numbers of units as a measurement, Kenya's security appears to be wanting. It appears, for instance, that Somalia is the strongest naval power in East Africa, with Ethiopia second, Tanzania third and Kenya fourth. It seems prudent at this time for Kenya to pursue a modest expansion program of its armed forces and to acquire more advanced equipment to redress this imbalance. Indeed, it is desirable that this situation be addressed now rather than permitting it to develop to a point where the outcome of a possible conflict would be a humiliating and costly defeat.

The pattern of military development in East Africa to date indicates that the arms buildup will increase. Against this background must be viewed the increasing tendency to resort to force in civil conflicts, the emergence of violent military regimes and the impotence of the OAU in solving disputes. One other factor likely to assume a new dimension in the future is the commitment by OAU member states to a policy of confrontation in the liberation of South Africa.¹⁴ The policy of the 1960's of not to "build up Armed Forces which

are extravagant and a drain on the country's scarce resources"¹⁵ becomes redundant. Rather, it should be accepted that the goals of economic development and social justice can only be

expected where an atmosphere of security and stability exists. No price is too high for us where the preservation of the independence, liberty and freedom of the Kenyan people is concerned.

NOTES

1. Dr. Julius K. Nyerere, *Observer*, 30 August 1964.
2. Article III, Paragraph 3 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.
3. Shiftra- a term meaning bandit, used to describe the dissident of Somali ethnic region who sought to break away from Kenya and join Somalia in the 1960's.
4. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures* (Washington, D.C.: 1971), vp.
5. M.J.V. Bell, *Military Assistance to Independent African States*, The Adelphi Papers, No. 15 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), p. 14.
6. Kenya, Ministry of Defense. *Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 1970-71*, p. 2.
7. Irving Kaplan, et al., eds., *Area Handbook for Kenya*, 2nd ed. (Washington: American University. Foreign Area Studies, 1976), p. 399.
8. *The Military Balance, 1975-1976* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 43.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
12. John Worrall, "Mounting Dangers for Latest U.S. 'Ally' in Africa," *U.S. News & World Report*, 2 August 1976, p. 49.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
14. OAU Doc. CM/Res. 271(XIX), July 1967.
15. *Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1970-71*.

EAST GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY IN THE SEVENTIES

by

Stephen R. Bowers

Socialist national defense, as explained by Lt. Gen. Fritz Streletz, Secretary of the German Democratic Republic's National Defense Council, involves both externally and internally organized armed protection of the Socialist State and requires the efforts of the National People's Army (NVA), the border troops, the militia, internal security agencies, and civil defense. But, even more importantly, it demands that every citizen recognize "his place and his duty in the military defense of the Republic."¹

The policy of the German Democratic Republic reflects a unique

conception of national defense. Its foundation is the Leninist defense doctrine and its guiding forces are the Socialist Unit Party (SED) and the political-moral unity of the people and the army, that reliable symbol of German tradition. A study of GDR defense policy is important not only because of the GDR's formal role in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), but for what it tells us about the implementation of Leninist principles of defense, elements which supposedly provide guidance for all Communist Party states, and what it may reveal about the Soviet policy which the SED cites as its model.

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Although there are numerous facets of defense policy in general, this paper concentrates on those features which contribute most to the unique character of the GDR's "Socialist national defense."

Military Integration.

Ich schwore
An der Seite der Sowjetarmee
und der Armeen
der mit uns verbundeten
sozialistischen Länder
als Soldat der Nationalen Volksarmee
jederzeit bereit zu sein,
den Sozialismus gegen alle Feinde
zu verteidigen
und mein Leben zur Erringung
des Sieges einzusetzen.²

(I swear that I am ready at all times to do my duty as a soldier of the National Peoples' Army on the side of the Soviet armies and the armies of the socialist lands united with us, to defend socialism against all enemies and to be ready to give my life for the attainment of victory.)

With these words from the loyalty oath of the NVA, the recruit expresses the official East German conception of his nation's military place in Europe. Each soldier commits himself to the alliance with the Soviet Army and the other military forces of the WTO in order to protect socialism against its enemies. The policy of the SED is founded on the proposition that the German Democratic Republic is "inconceivable" without its close alliance with the Soviet Union and the other WTO states. A corollary of this belief is that the military integration of the NVA with the Soviet forces is a "decisive factor" in contributing to the GDR's increasing military capacity.³ Military and political leaders alike pay tribute to the role of the U.S.S.R. and the WTO in building an East German military with a

"combat value superior to that of the NATO armed forces" and possessing "qualitatively superior weapons." The SED and the GDR government always treat security and military policy as matters requiring collective decisions so that the NVA will function as a component of a united armed force.⁴ The same is true of the GDR People's Navy which Vice Admiral Ehm, deputy head of the navy, has described as a firm link of the Socialist navies of the Baltic. Ehm credits the U.S.S.R. with having made the People's Navy a modern fighting force through its contributions of missile speedboats, torpedo boats, coast guard ships, and submarine hunters. In addition, East German naval officers study at Soviet military schools, thus strengthening ties between the two military establishments.⁵

Although the fact of integration of East German with Soviet forces is familiar, the nature and extent of that process are less well documented. One feature of the process is the considerable emphasis on military collaboration. By 1973, numerous calls were being issued for East German combat training to be patterned after the Soviet model on a scale greater than ever before. This enterprise is not only politically and ideologically desirable, but is, in view of the GDR's use of Soviet weapons, it might be argued, a practical necessity.

In February 1973, *Volksarmee*, the main NVA organ for all services, boasted that cooperation between the NVA and the Soviet Army had reached the company level. Such concentrated cooperation, now carried out every 2 or 3 weeks instead of annually as in the past, is an impressive accomplishment rarely matched by Western forces. The result of this, according to *Volksarmee*, has been the development of uniform norms and provisions for combat training. "We cannot learn enough about intensive training from the Soviet comrades," Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann declared.⁶ Military integration

even affects the premilitary training for the Pioneer Organization, the GDR youth group for children aged 6 to 14 years. During the "Brothers in Class—Brothers in Arms" maneuvers in Ronneburg in 1974, Soviet personnel served as the advisors. A major stated objective of the maneuver was to give the Pioneers, who were organized into groups representing the WTO armies, a greater appreciation for the military role of the Soviet Union.⁷

Joint combat training is coupled with appeals by the NVA Political Main Administration for increased pressure on officers to learn Russian. Although the GDR military press translates many Soviet military studies, NVA authorities argue that officers at all command levels would benefit by being able to read Soviet journals in the original Russian. This would further satisfy the requirements of military integration while simultaneously giving East German officers the benefit of Soviet military science.⁸

The pressures for wider military integration and the study of the Russian language may be more than simply an effort to develop a unique defense system. An additional concern might be to mute the "nationalist tendencies" that journals such as *Militärwesen* have noted among the NVA officer corps, particularly the officer cadets. Precise manifestations of these tendencies are not made explicit in East German literature, but indications exist in the presentations of some authorities regarding military integration. For example, in evaluating joint GDR-Soviet training, Maj. Gen. Joachim Goldbach exhorted all commanders to "recognize the value of this training [and] not regard it as useless but as valuable help for stabilizing training results."⁹ Another reflection of nationalism was provided by a *Volksarmee* discussion of the "common German mother tongue." Responding to the apparent traditional nationalist feeling that the German

language is a basis for German unity, *Volksarmee* insisted that people are united not by common expressions for formulating thoughts and feelings but by a common class affiliation.¹⁰ The former obviously draws the East Germans toward the Federal Republic thus impeding GDR-Soviet military integration while the latter serves to unite them with the U.S.S.R. Western reports about a continuing East German distrust of the Russian soldiers stationed in the GDR support the view that both political and military considerations provide impetus for the military integration of the GDR and the Soviet Union.¹¹

The GDR's Sense of Threat. East German defense policy is based on the premise that the nation faces both internal and external threats. A guide for the 1973-74 political training program of NVA officers and NCO's reflects this in its call for special attention to conveying and strengthening a "real image of the enemy." The objective of the year's training was to enable members of the armed forces to "counter enemy arguments" that the West is peaceable and to overcome "illusions concerning . . . the danger of imperialism" and "hostile theories" about any common East-West German interests.¹² Numerous publications raised the possibility that the very détente to which the GDR was committed might endanger the NVA's "foe image."

The GDR presents its internal danger in terms of a sharpening ideological class conflict requiring that no cuts be made in vigilance against "hostile intrigues." The People's Police works to counter this "threat" by increased and more vigorous political-ideological training at duty stations and, perhaps betraying a fear that more than ideology is at issue, further restricting access to explosives, firearms, and poisons. Under 1974 regulations justified as a response to the "class struggle situation," only "aware" citizens have access to these materials

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when "social requirements" and private interests permit.¹³

The GDR's external threat is presented as both military and nonmilitary. Discussions of the nonmilitary threat generally refer to "psychological warfare" against the GDR through Western television and radio broadcasts. *Volksarmee* measures the magnitude of this "aggression" in terms of the number of FRG radio and television transmitters in the 50-kilometer-wide strip along the GDR-FRG border. Their programs, the journal charges, are directed against the authority of the SED and the GDR military forces.¹⁴ East German publications see NATO defense spending as quantitative evidence of Western malevolence. These expenditures are said to have reached "astronomical proportions" and exceed "anything the reactionary forces have ever been able to marshal against socialism."¹⁵ Imperialism and its military might, they insist, is both real and menacing. Even though spokesmen boast of Western reverses, they continue to warn that "imperialism" is so bold as to contemplate a nuclear first strike against the WTO forces.¹⁶ The West German Bundeswehr emerges as a major villain in all discussions of the "aggressive" and "desperate" moves of the Western military forces.

The conclusion that GDR military leaders reach after presentation of their grim litany is that, first, military strength and combat readiness are an absolute requirement for restraint of the "imperialist camp." There is no such thing as Western "goodwill."¹⁷ Second, they argue, "hatred for enemies of socialism" must be instilled in GDR citizens, especially youth. One demonstrates his love of socialism, it is said, by a display of hatred for its enemies.¹⁸

The GDR's Military Philosophy. East Germany's military philosophy is a response to the sense of threat exhibited by the nation's leadership. Traditional

military virtues compose a major element of the NVA philosophy and much attention is devoted to subjects such as discipline and combat readiness of troops. *Märkische Volksstimme* expressed the motive of this philosophy with its exhortation that the GDR military

Must always be better prepared for a confrontation than the armed forces of the aggressor. . . . The further détente progresses, the more combat ready must our armed forces be, the more pronounced must be the readiness and ability of all citizens of the GDR for defending socialism and peace.¹⁹

NVA leaders hypothesize that there is a link between the discipline that a person learns in the military and his ability to meet the requirements of citizenship. The army, they posit, is both a school of military mastery and a training institution of class-related education. Furthermore, this "patriotic military service," as they see it, is not the same as militarism so they can denounce service in the Western military and praise participation in their own without contradicting themselves in theory.

Immediate military requirements are characterized by an insistence upon "iron discipline and absolute military obedience" in order to maintain a high level of combat readiness. The "hardness of the class struggle," in their view, dictates such an approach²⁰ and the increasing technological sophistication of their weaponry demands an even higher quality of combat training. Physical, psychological, and intellectual standards are therefore increased in an effort to keep pace with new responsibilities and requirements. The rising standards for military physical fitness tests are an indication of this endeavor. The regular military multiple event matches offer the leadership an opportunity to measure its success in working for better physical performances by the

200,000 young people who participate each year.²¹ A major objective of all training of this type is the development of militarily necessary skills of movement. The Society for Sport and Technology (GST) has responsibility for encouraging the most intensive participation in these activities and its success can be seen by the fact that over 90 percent of all 16-18 year old East German males participate in GST pre-military basic training.²²

The intensity with which the military authorities approach these military tasks is not only a function of what they regard as an increasingly bitter ideological confrontation in Europe, but also a response to serious shortcomings evident during numerous inspections in recent years. In June 1973, Deputy Minister for National Defense Heinz Kessler referred to unspecified "deficiencies and inadequacies" noted during NVA inspections. Other officers provided specific details of failures by their references to unsatisfactory results in combat training, poor discipline and order, lack of a militant competitive atmosphere, dishonesty in military competitions, problems with NCO's, failures of infantrymen in mastering the formula for determining distances, antitank riflemen who have difficulty with the target formula, and failure to utilize squad leaders.²³ In addition to these stipulations, criticism was heaped on the SED-organized worker's militia for "soft training which does not resemble combat," militia leaders who inconsistently implement orders, and failure to enforce the SED's leading role in small units.²⁴

Discussions in military and party journals since 1973 reflect general satisfaction with the response to the call for an improvement in the military effort. The upgrading of the worker's militia is the most dramatic instance of the GDR's success in implementing its military philosophy. This was made possible by a more rigid regular accounting by militia commanders to party leaders,

stricter and more effective training of commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders by officers of the People's Police, more assistance by the GST for projects such as introducing realism into antiaircraft defense training, and closer coordination of training with the NVA and the Soviet forces.²⁵ By spending more money on the militia and rejuvenating its ranks by bringing in younger personnel, the SED created a 400,000-man force, armed with mortars, antitank guns, and heavy machine-guns, which will not be affected by East-West force reduction agreements since it is classified as a militia. Nationwide militia maneuvers in the fall of 1976, the largest ones ever, completed the ambitious 1973-76 training program and demonstrated the integration of the militia with the regular GDR military forces. By assigning this vastly improved force the responsibility for helping safeguard the GDR's western frontier, the SED has improved its defense capability while showing its faith in the once ridiculed factory militia.

The SED's views regarding the use of force were expressed by Heinz Hoffmann on the 20th anniversary of the NVA. Even though a nuclear war would bring "great suffering to all peoples, especially in the capitalist countries," such a war would, Hoffmann argued, be a "just war" because it would mean the end of capitalism. He continued by insisting that the GDR does not

... share the view which is held even by progressive people in the peace movement that no just war is possible in the nuclear age and that war with nuclear missiles is no longer a continuation of the politics of the warring classes, but would hence amount only to a nuclear inferno, to the end of the world.²⁶

Associating this view with Maoism, Hoffmann explained that even total war would be simply politics in another form. The GDR Defense Minister added

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that the employment of armed forces merely to threaten the enemy and "offer backing for negotiations" is also a continuation of politics by other means.

East German policy on the use of force is augmented by official emphasis on development of civil defense. Most discussions center on blast shelter systems rather than on evacuation procedures employed by the Soviet Union and military publications speak of the requirement that the population itself do much of the work, especially in preparation of respiratory and body protection equipment. In November 1973, *Militärwesen* boasted of an expanded civil defense effort, not passive in character, and designed to raise the defense readiness of the nation. This was supported by a directive from the State Secretariat for Vocational Training that more emphasis be placed on civil defense as part of the required education of all apprentices. Every instructor is now obligated to master civil defense techniques and incorporate training of civil defense into other educational topics. The success of this campaign can be measured by pronouncements of officials such as Werner Eidner, civil defense chief of Potsdam Bezirk, who recently described the "high level of readiness" achieved through implementation of new procedures involving wider public participation.²⁷ The inclusion of civil defense techniques into courses in health education is common today and the general population as well as civil defense personnel are required to have some special knowledge of the subject. Preparation of equipment and facilities is also included in the instruction. East German civil defense has been broadened to cover the execution of measures for protection and preservation of the operation of the economy.²⁸

East German Military Technology.

The credibility of the GDR's military

philosophy is enhanced by the implementation of modern technology in the nation's forces. Although in its first years the East German military was denied the benefits of technology, recent years have witnessed the equipment of the NVA with modern arms and the employment of sophisticated combat techniques increasing its effectiveness and combat readiness.²⁹ The application of technology creates no serious philosophical problems for the SED theorists who see it as a method whereby the soldier can multiply "the natural forces belonging to his corporeality." *Militärtechnik* explains that

As the working man increases his productive force by employing increasingly more perfect and effective means of work, so does the soldier achieve the necessary combat force by employing the powerful combat means created today. He uses the mechanical, physical, chemical properties of weapons and devices so as to let them work as a means of power on the weapons, order of battle, and other objects of the enemy.³⁰

The above reference to "chemical properties of weapons" raises questions about the extent to which the GDR seeks to exploit available technology. The recently disclosed case of Professor Adolf Henning Frucht, formerly of the GDR Institute for Labor Physiology, revealed some of the activities of the GDR in the development of a new type of biological weapon. Frucht, who feared production of the weapon he discovered by accident, sent a warning to the West so an antidote could be prepared in case the weapon was used. Following a highly secret trial in 1968, the East German scientist was given a life sentence.³¹ Meanwhile, GDR military publications describe the activities of special "antichemical warfare companies" in the NVA and efforts of the WTO forces to prepare for the use of chemical-biological weapons.³²

Other East German technical advances can be seen in more accepted research endeavors. A few will illustrate the high technological level of the GDR forces: the perfection of active-reactive artillery shells in 1972, the use of electronic computers for photo interpretation in 1973, and the application of modern computer and information technology to the troop command process in 1974.³³ These and numerous other innovations attest to the claim that the GDR has indeed thoroughly modernized its military forces.

Political Demands on the East German Military. GDR military philosophers do not believe that quality and quantity of weapons, technical equipment, or numerical strength alone can be decisive for victory in modern warfare. Rather, they speak of the necessity for an indissoluble dialectic unity and reciprocity of man and material achieved only through an understanding of the fact that the employment of force must always have a political purpose. This understanding is seen as the result of the soldier's political awareness and moral force, qualities that must be instilled by the party workers within the military.³⁴ This reasoning provides justification for the party's well-documented control over the military and the military's development into a pillar of the political establishment.

However, political control over the GDR military has apparently been shaken by the impact of technology. In the first years of the NVA, when the level of technology was low, the intellectual requirements of officers and NCO's were correspondingly low. As a result, political reliability was relatively easily achieved since there were few other considerations. The high incidence of SED membership among the officers, 99.2 percent were members, reflected this. By 1972, after 20 years of gradually increasing technological demands, the frequency of party members

dropped to 80 percent.³⁵ The official response to the rise of technology and its resultant diminution of political work was an effort to reassert political domination. In 1973 there were numerous criticisms of the political behavior of SED members in the NVA and the current troop indoctrination programs. A major complaint was the lack of command support for political work,³⁶ an apparent indication that some officers considered purely military training as more important than ideological efforts. The commander of the Thalmann Officer's School demonstrated the determination of the SED to fight this tendency. Of the qualifications for an officer, Maj. Gen. Leopold Gotthilf said,

Good grades in civics, history, mathematics, physics, or German are not enough. Just as important is active participation in the Free German Youth, in the GST, in political life. In short, theory and practice have to harmonize.³⁷

At the same time, *Volksarmee* announced that a unit's rating would be based not only on its ability in military training subjects but also on its political attitude.³⁸

The objective of the SED's political work in the military is to develop a unity of political creed and high military performance and a mental state characterized by an understanding of military tasks as political assignments. This creates a unique situation requiring the armed forces to fulfill not only military responsibilities but also always to be conscious of its class mission. Emphasis on the class mission makes it possible for the SED to pursue an ambitious program for militarization of the country while simultaneously condemning militarism. That which serves the interest of the masses cannot, by their definition, be militaristic. Thus, the relationship between the masses, the SED, and the military supports a positive attitude toward service in the armed forces.

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NOTES

1. *Berliner Zeitung*, 12 January 1976, p. 3.
2. *Handbuch Militärisches Grundwissen* (Berlin; GDR; Militärverlag der DDR, 1972), p. 25.
3. *Einheit*, 4/5, 1975, p. 461.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 461-462.
5. *National Zeitung*, 23 November 1975, p. 4 (supplement).
6. *Volksarmee*, No. 7, 1973, p. 3.
7. *Volkswacht*, 6 March 1974, p. 6.
8. *Volksarmee*, No. 6, 1973, p. 5.
9. *Ibid.*, No. 19, 1973, p. 1.
10. *Ibid.*, No. 47, 1974, p. 7.
11. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, supplement, 15 February 1975, p. 3.
12. Quoted in *IWE Tagesdienst*, 1 October 1973, pp. 1-2.
13. *Ibid.*, 13 April 1974, p. 1.
14. *Volksarmee*, No. 17, 1974, p. 6.
15. *Märkische Volksstimme*, 15 May 1976, p. 6.
16. *Einheit*, No. 8, 1976, pp. 839-840.
17. *Militärtechnik*, No. 11, 1975, pp. 481-483.
18. *Armeerundschau*, No. 1, 1974, p. 3.
19. *Märkische Volksstimme*, 15 May 1976, p. 6.
20. *Volksarmee*, No. 27, 1975, p. 3.
21. Discussions of East German physical training can be found in *Truppenpraxis* (Bonn), No. 8, 1976, and *Presse Informationen* (Berlin; GDR, 9 January 1976).
22. *Neues Deutschland*, 14/15 February, 1976, p. 15.
23. *Volksarmee*, No. 23, 1973, p. 5; No. 29, 1973, pp. 4-5; and No. 12, 1973, p. 1.
24. *Der Kämpfer*, May 1973, p. 2, and August 1973, p. 1.
25. *Ibid.*, June 1976, p. 4.
26. *Einheit*, No. 3, 1976, p. 356.
27. *IWE Tagesdienst*, 21 January 1976, p. 2.
28. *Militärmedizin*, May 1973, pp. 163-173.
29. *Berliner Zeitung*, 12 January 1976, p. 3.
30. *Militärtechnik*, No. 7, 1976, pp. 289-290.
31. *Die Welt*, 21 August 1976, p. 3.
32. *Armeerundschau*, No. 4, 1973, pp. 6-9; No. 10, 1973, pp. 76-77; and No. 10, 1975, p. 76.
33. *Volksarmee*, No. 45, 1972, p. 8; No. 2, 1973, p. 8; and *Militärtechnik*, No. 10, 1974, pp. 439-440.
34. *Militärtechnik*, No. 7, 1976, pp. 289-291.
35. *IWE Tagesdienst*, 5 July 1974, p. 1.
36. *Volksarmee*, No. 2, 1973, pp. 4-5.
37. *Berliner Zeitung*, 28 March 1973, p. 3.
38. *Volksarmee*, No. 5, 1973, pp. 4-5.

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