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*Prior to World War II the people of Iceland were, to a great extent, isolated from world affairs. The occupation of their island in 1940 by the British began three decades of controversy in Icelandic politics over the presence of a foreign military force. Today the continued presence of the U.S. Defense Force in Iceland—a key facility for projecting U.S. antisubmarine warfare power in the Atlantic—is directly dependent upon the interaction of this issue with internal domestic politics in Iceland and the quality of the U.S. Armed Forces' community relations program there.*

## THE INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS ON THE DEFENSE POLICY OF ICELAND

A research paper prepared

by

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In any political system, domestic issues have an important bearing on the management and substance of foreign policy. The internal and external affairs of nation-states do not exist in separate compartments but are related products of the same leadership and have their origin in the same basic national purposes.

Three groups of factors are inherent in the formulation of national purposes. The first group comprises conditions arising from a nation's physical, economic, and human geography; its commitment to history and tradition or ideology; and the status of its technology. The second group involves the internal conditions of a country; its domestic, economic, and military policies; its public opinions and pressure

groups. The third group is concerned with such intangibles as the national mind and national morale—factors which make up the so-called national character.<sup>1</sup>

In this study of the defense policy of Iceland, only selected factors will be considered in the examination and analysis of domestic politics on that policy. These factors are:

(1) The physical and political geography, the strategic significance of Iceland and its role in conflicts between other nations.

(2) The military and domestic policies and public opinion.

(3) The intangible known as the national mind and its associated complex of nationalism, neutralism, and xenophobia.

Whether there is such a thing as an identifiable national mind has long been a matter of controversy. Yet a nation's history produces not only stereotypes of behavior, but attitudes which common experiences amplify and which are transmitted from generation to generation. This behavior consists of national likes and dislikes, do's and do not's, and what psychologists term favorable and unfavorable associations.<sup>2</sup>

The discussion of such factors is intended, in this paper, to go beyond a mere catalog of matters over which Iceland has been divided in the period under investigation. It will be cast in sufficiently general terms to encompass past and future conflicts as well as the present situation. The factors which determine domestic political influence are derived from the history of Iceland, and, after extensive examination, they prove to be more deeply interrelated than is at first apparent.

The stereotypes of behavior contributing to the national mind are the consequence of the natural and social environment and the political atmosphere which prevailed in history. They are also the result of the physical and political geography of the country and its role in the concert of other nations; they are brought forth not only in national customs but also in fairly consistent attitudes toward the outside world in general. Altogether this heritage has produced friendships and enmities and has created deeply ingrained predilections and prejudices.

Interrelationship of factors is reflected in Iceland's geographic position which has, ever since A.D. 930, required an arduous struggle for survival because of the harshness of the climate. This struggle has been a strong basis for nationalism, as the Icelanders are a people shaped not so much by their environment as by their determination to overcome it. Their geographic position has fostered an insulation from external contacts which is evidenced by

a language and culture protected to this day from the derogating effects of outside influence. The isolated location has resulted in a sense of security from external aggression and, due to this, a lack of any military force. Historic prejudices due to these foundations of nationalism thus shape the national character of the Icelandic people and influence the views of the elite in responsible policymaking positions. Inheritance of atavistic attitudes, positive and negative, cannot easily be neutralized by rational judgment.

We see from the foregoing discussion that the selected factors form, in effect, a coherent system of phenomena. It becomes apparent that the foreign policy problem of providing for the defense of this isolated island is inextricably tied with its geographic position, its desired military policy, and a strong feeling of nationalism.

After a visit to Iceland in 1872, the British political philosopher, Lord Bryce, observed: "Iceland had a glorious dawn and has lain in twilight ever since; it is hardly possible that she should be called on to play a part in European history."<sup>4</sup> Indeed, the nation remained far removed from the mainstream of European affairs and from Great Power politics until the advent of the air age. If Lord Bryce did not foresee the change that technology would make upon the Icelanders, neither did they; for prior to 1939 Iceland had little interest in world affairs and still less in matters concerning the defense of the country.

In 1940, therefore, Iceland was ill prepared to carry the burdens which the war thrust upon her, and, at the conclusion of the war, the nation was even less willing to accept the responsibilities that its newly discovered strategic position dictated. It was inevitable that the question of national defense should become a major national issue and that politicians would seek to gain political advantage by playing upon the strong nationalistic sentiments of Icelanders.

Since the United States had become the principal protector of Icelandic interests during World War II, it was to be expected that U.S. leaders, realizing the strategic importance of Iceland in the developing East-West detente, would wish to have defense facilities in Iceland to assure the security of North America. When Icelandic nationalism thus came into conflict with the strategic requirements of the United States, the ingredients were present for a momentous debate within this newly independent nation. The question was whether Iceland should return to the defenseless isolation of the prewar period and take its chances with world politics or accept the protection of a friendly, powerful neighbor and the responsibilities that are inherent in a military alliance.

The role of domestic politics in defense policy becomes apparent when the course of Icelandic politics since 1940 is examined. The relevant factors are best revealed in the vacillation of the Progressive Party on matters of national defense. The party's background stems from rural sources—commonly accepted to be those associated with the elements of nationalism and isolationism in international politics<sup>5</sup>—and it has been in a position to influence the Government's policy throughout the period by exercising veto power, whether as a member of the Government or when relegated to the opposition.<sup>6</sup> This position stemmed from the fact that, prior to 1959, the Independence and Social Democratic parties did not have sufficient strength to overcome both Communist and Progressive Party opposition in defense matters.<sup>7</sup>

Of extreme interest to those in a position to formulate strategic policy concerning the North Atlantic and Western Europe is whether or not defense support in Iceland will continue to provide NATO and the United States with facilities in this area. In the following sections of this paper, the influence of domestic politics on the defense

policy of Iceland is analyzed in some detail in order to develop criteria which might help in determining what the prospects are for a continued Icelandic defense policy in line with NATO and U.S. interests.

**Out of Isolation.** Iceland's lack of interest in foreign affairs and defense prior to 1940 has been cited previously. As far as Icelanders were concerned, the country's status prior to World War II remained what it had been for centuries—a remote and forbidding country about which the Great Powers could not have cared less. The neutrality policy laid down by the Act of Union with Denmark in 1918 was thought to be a course of action which would serve the best interests of the country for years to come.<sup>8</sup>

Four provisions of this agreement were of special importance to Iceland's future foreign and defense policies:

(1) The relationship between Iceland and Denmark was declared to be that of "free and sovereign states united under a common king."

(2) Denmark was to administer Iceland's foreign affairs on behalf of Iceland.

(3) The agreement was to run for 25 years; after 1940 either nation could demand negotiations for its revision. If negotiations were not fruitful, either country could decide, by a two-thirds vote of its parliament and a three-fourths majority of the electorate, to cancel the agreement.

(4) The final provision dealt with Iceland's international status. It provided that Denmark would give notice to foreign powers that Iceland had been recognized as a sovereign state that declared itself permanently neutral.<sup>9</sup>

The advent of war in Europe forced Iceland to assume the responsibilities of a fully independent nation earlier than anticipated, although there was little doubt among Icelanders that their nation would elect to cancel the Union

agreement anyway when the 25-year period had expired. As early as 1937 the Icelandic Parliament (the Althing) had passed a resolution which authorized the Government to begin preparations for handling the nation's foreign affairs, "when Icelanders make use of the abrogation clause of the Union Act and take over the carrying out of all affairs of the country."<sup>10</sup>

When Hitler's armies invaded Denmark and Norway in April 1940, Icelanders became concerned that their undefended country might also be attacked. The country felt that the proclaimed policy of neutrality would not be much of a deterrent and one of the belligerents might seize Iceland in order to gain a strategic advantage. The leaders of the Government, while expecting an invasion, were completely surprised when British forces landed on 10 May 1940. The British Government advised them that its forces had occupied the country to prevent an invasion by the Germans and agreed to pay for any damage that resulted from occupation. Although the Icelandic Government formally protested this violation of its neutrality, the Government and most of the population were pleased that the occupiers were British rather than German.<sup>11</sup>

The Icelandic Government consisted of a coalition of the Progressive, Independence, and Social Democratic parties under the premiership of the Progressive leader, Hermann Jonasson. The sentiments of the Government parties and the large majority of the population toward the occupation were summed up in a radio speech Prime Minister Jonasson made to the nation on the evening of 10 May. After reviewing the events of the day and assuring the nation that the British Government had pledged not to interfere in Icelandic matters, the Prime Minister asked the people to accept the situation with calmness and patience.<sup>12</sup> The three Government newspapers supported the Prime Minister and called the

invasion a necessary expedient in time of war. Progressive *Timinn* contended that neutrality was no longer feasible as a national policy.<sup>13</sup> Social Democratic *Althyðubladid* referred to the occupation as a "necessary evil" and asked the nation to make the best of the situation.<sup>14</sup> The Communist press, however, strongly condemned the Government for its policy. *Thjodviljinn* voiced its opposition in these terms: "We did not ask for this protection. We stand as one man against this violation of our country."<sup>15</sup>

**The Defense Agreement of 1941.** As German forces swept across Western Europe in the summer of 1940 and gave every indication that they would attempt to conquer Great Britain, the Icelandic Government became concerned over its defense. It became apparent that British forces would be recalled to England should the situation in Europe deteriorate further. This led to a frank and direct meeting in December 1940 between Stefan J. Stefansson, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. consul in Reykjavik. Stefansson pointed out his fears of what would happen if Great Britain were overrun by Germany and speculated that the British forces would be withdrawn, leaving Iceland without protection. He asked that the United States consider taking over the defense of the country from the British and expressed the desire that "Iceland be included in the Monroe Doctrine area."<sup>16</sup> As a result of this request and further discussions between the Governments involved, the United States and Iceland concluded a defense agreement on 1 July 1941, which provided a legal basis for the protection of Iceland by U.S. forces for the duration of the war.

This agreement contained eight provisions which defined the safeguards to Iceland's sovereignty. The most important dealt with the relationship between the military forces and the Icelandic

Government and stated that, "the United States promises not to interfere with the Government of Iceland neither while their armed forces are in the country nor afterwards."<sup>17</sup> In addition, "the United States promises to withdraw all their military forces, land, sea, and air from Iceland immediately on the conclusion of the present war."<sup>18</sup> This provision turned out to be the most critical due to a misunderstanding over the interpretation of the term "present war." On all other points there is reason to believe that the Icelanders were satisfied over the way in which the agreement was implemented, especially the economic and political commitments made by the United States.

Discussion in the Althing in July 1941 when the agreement was ratified showed that a large number of the members believed that the Government had no choice but to conclude the arrangement, but there were feelings expressed that the Defense Agreement signaled the end of Iceland's neutrality policy. The Communists were not so concerned over the departure from this policy as they were over the possibility that Iceland might lose its independence to the United States. They felt that if the country must accept outside help, the Soviet Union should also be included in the agreement.<sup>19</sup>

The Defense Agreement was subsequently passed by the Althing with only the Communists voting against its ratification. Despite their opposition, the Communists felt that it was necessary to assist in the efforts to defeat Germany because of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union.

Press reaction followed the lines taken by the parties in the Althing. The strongest support came from *Timinn*, which stated that the Government had adopted the best policy for the nation and it was perfectly natural to conclude an agreement with the nation in the best position to guard Iceland's security.<sup>20</sup> In a later editorial, *Timinn* attacked the

policy of neutrality and called on all Icelanders to turn their backs on isolationism and accept the international obligations which had been thrust upon the nation.<sup>21</sup> This Progressive Party attitude will be seen to radically change in future events.

The impact of World War II on Iceland was enormous. New-found prosperity had far-reaching effects on the economy, the attitudes of the people, and the way of life. New political forces were emerging which catered to popular demand and looked to the future rather than the past for their inspiration. In 1942 a decisive shift occurred in the fortunes of the two contenders for supremacy in Icelandic politics—the Independence and Progressive parties. While it was caused by a change in the electoral law rather than the presence of foreign occupation forces, the consequences in terms of Iceland's postwar foreign policy were great. The Progressive Party, which had dominated Icelandic politics since 1937, was reduced to a poor second behind the Independence Party. The losses suffered by the Social Democrats during this election, which were traceable to an increase in Communist support, reduced that party to the smallest in the Althing and deprived it of its leadership of the Icelandic labor movement. The elections of 1942 marked the end of an era in Icelandic politics, and the determination of the Progressive Party to regain its preeminent political position has strongly influenced its policy on both foreign and domestic issues during the postwar years.

When the war in Europe came to an end in the spring of 1945, Icelanders expected that the military forces would be withdrawn in accordance with the promises made by the United States in 1941. Many believed that the nation could return to its prewar policy of neutrality and concentrate on building a prosperous society. Only a few agreed with the later Prime Minister, Bjarni

Benediktsson, who had written in 1943 that the Defense Agreement with the United States marked the end of Iceland's neutrality and ushered in a new era wherein Iceland would be forced to choose between competing blocs of world power.<sup>22</sup>

The adaptation of the Icelandic people to the new conditions of the postwar period was complicated by the fact that the Government consisted of a coalition of the Independence, Social Democratic, and Communist parties. It could be expected that the Communists would follow the desires of the Soviet Union in foreign affairs and oppose additional security arrangements with the United States. The Progressive Party, which had championed the Defense Agreement in 1941, was now in the opposition and would take a more critical view of foreign policy commitments. In view of this, when the United States requested base rights in Iceland in 1945, the stage was set for a difficult decision on the part of the Icelandic government.

Despite the clear pledge that the United States would withdraw its forces upon conclusion of the war, Icelanders had doubts that the strategic position would be given up. The Icelandic Government position had been stated in 1944 by Foreign Minister Villjalmur Thor: Iceland would not grant any nation military bases, and the Government expected that the United States would abide by its promise to withdraw its forces as soon as peace was declared. "We are a nation of individualists," he added, "and we did not establish our republic to become less independent. We intend to own our own country, all of it, without any foreign interference."<sup>23</sup>

On 1 October 1945, the Icelandic Government received a U.S. request for negotiations on the leasing of military bases under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Security Council as Iceland's contribution to world peace when

it was accepted to United Nations membership. The United States assured Iceland that it would assume all costs in connection with the maintenance of the bases and fully respect the sovereignty and independence of Iceland.<sup>24</sup> No official announcement was made to the public, but rumors soon spread that the United States had offered Iceland a huge sum of money for a long-term lease of bases. In the public mind the question of whether the small nation would be forced to bow to U.S. demands assumed the role of a test of Iceland's independent status.

Political reaction in the press was mixed. The papers of the two democratic parties in the coalition were silent, following the example of their leadership. The matter was first brought to public attention by the Communists, who expressed doubt that the rumors were true even though certain Icelanders would be willing to sell Icelandic territory for economic gain.<sup>25</sup>

The Progressive *Timinn* criticized the official silence and berated the Government for leaving an opportunity to the Communists to jeopardize Icelandic-American relations. The silence of the Independents indicated a split within the party over the U.S. request.

The issue came to a head in April 1946, when the matter was eventually discussed in the Althing. The leaders of the Progressive Party attacked the Government for its 6-month silence, charging that the refusal to make the facts known had harmed Iceland's relations with a friendly nation and indicated that the Government was divided on the matter.

The debate resulted in the first official statement on what had actually occurred. Prime Minister Thors outlined in detail the Government's deliberations, the exchanges with the United States, and the eventual decision to refuse the request. The spokesmen of the other coalition partners supported the Prime Minister and indicated that

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there was no basic divergence of views within the Cabinet.<sup>26</sup> The crucial point revealed in the Althing's debate was that the Government asserted Iceland's independence, which had been challenged by the most powerful nation in the world. It was clear that the decision had the support of all Icelandic political parties—one of the few times that the nation has been united on a foreign policy issue.

Aside from the substance of the decision, three conclusions concerning domestic influence and the future course of Iceland's policy in security affairs may be drawn from this debate: (1) Although the Government had agreed to refuse the U.S. request, there was a disagreement on how to do it. (2) The Prime Minister was in a difficult position with respect to the general elections scheduled for 1946; being caught between the need to uphold the policy of his country and maintain the friendship of the United States. (3) The Government failed to keep the matter out of the public eye until after the elections, due largely to the efforts of the Communists, who attempted to exploit the silence of the Government to bolster their own election prospects. It is also of interest that the Progressive Party during the debate carefully avoided committing itself to any definite policy in security affairs, which might have lessened its chances to participate in a new government.

**Membership in the United Nations and NATO.** The general elections of 1946 were eventually decided on domestic issues alone, as the only foreign policy issue had been eliminated by the Government's refusal to allow foreign bases in Iceland. The results of this election were favorable to the Independence and Social Democratic parties, increasing their representation in the Althing.

The major task of the Government after the elections was to work out an

arrangement with the United States that would bring about the withdrawal of the remaining military forces and give some assurance that an undefended Iceland would not become a power vacuum that would invite political and economic pressure from the Soviet Union.

The Progressive Party, after suffering serious losses in the election, found it increasingly difficult to keep in check those elements within the party that desired a strong nationalist/neutralist policy in foreign affairs. An important debate on foreign policy now occurred over the details of U.S. withdrawal, which ended in the dissolution of the Government and enabled the Progressive Party to join the new Government. The first round of this debate came in connection with the Althing's discussion, in July 1946, on the possibility of membership in the United Nations. This question had a direct bearing on the problem of defense, as Icelandic leaders believed that United Nations membership would be an acceptable solution to the problem of defense incurred when the request for bases was refused.<sup>27</sup>

At issue in the Althing debate was whether membership in the United Nations would entail an obligation on the part of Iceland to accept foreign troops during peacetime. Most outspoken on this point were the leaders of the Progressive Party, who requested that the application for membership be accompanied by a declaration to the effect that "membership would not require Iceland to station foreign troops on its soil."<sup>28</sup> Although this proposal was defeated, Prime Minister Thors agreed to send an explanatory note to the United Nations which would outline the position of the Icelandic Government with regard to article 43 (3) of the United Nations Charter.

The political significance of this debate was the shift in Progressive Party policy. The nationalist/nationalist faction of the Progressive Party, whose strength had greatly increased, believed that the



maintenance of Progressive influence relative to that of the Independence Party required a more dynamic policy which would attack the Government strongly on domestic and foreign policy matters.

It was the second round of the debate that led to the collapse of the Government. At issue was the "Keflavik Agreement," which arranged for the final withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iceland.<sup>29</sup> The political discussion that took place during October 1946 over the ratification of this agreement was one of the most intense national debates ever witnessed. The positions adopted by the four political parties indicated how greatly domestic political factors influenced the nation's decision. Unlike the earlier question of granting bases, which had found all parties in agreement with the Government's decision, the "Keflavik Agreement" split the Progressives and Social Democrats whereas the Communists strongly opposed it. Only the Independence Party was united behind Prime Minister Thors and supported the ratification on the provision that the agreement was the best that the Government could hope to achieve and still maintain friendship with the United States.

The agreement was in the end approved, only because several Progressive Party members voted with the Government. The immediate effect was the withdrawal of the Communists from the Government. Prime Minister Thors submitted his resignation a few days later, and the resultant quest for a new government was one of the longest in Icelandic history. It was not until February of 1947 that Stefan J. Stefansson succeeded in bringing together a coalition of the Social Democrats, Progressives, and Independents—the same parties that had governed Iceland during the years 1939-1942. There was, however, a significant difference in this Government's attitude on foreign and defense policy. Whereas in 1941 the

Government had taken a forthright stand, the Cabinet formed in 1947 found it difficult to agree on foreign policy issues. The change in political fortunes during the war and the actions of the Progressive Party when it was in the opposition contributed to this disunity.

By 1949 the international situation had deteriorated considerably. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin had made a deep impression on the Icelandic public and again raised the question of whether Iceland could afford to remain defenseless. When it became known that Iceland would receive an invitation to join the proposed North Atlantic Alliance, most Icelanders had little doubt that acceptance would have far-reaching effects on the nation's future relations with its European and North American neighbors. Yet the Progressive proponents of neutralism and nationalism, whose influence had strengthened since 1946, were determined that the nation would not abandon its traditional neutrality to become a partner in the cold war. The clash of the internationalists and the neutralists on the issue of membership in NATO constituted the climax in the postwar debate on Iceland's policy of neutrality.

The debate on NATO was primarily concerned with the question of stationing troops in Iceland in peacetime. The question had become a matter of principle for the Progressive Party and eventually became the adopted policy of the Icelandic Government. A major factor in the decision to explore the possibilities of NATO membership was an announcement carried by *The New York Times* on 9 February 1949, that membership in the North Atlantic Pact would not require the establishment of bases in Scandinavian countries.<sup>30</sup>

In essence, there was no difference in the position of the three Government parties at the end of February: All three, at the insistence of the Progress-

sive Party, had agreed that Iceland could not accept foreign troops in peacetime but were not opposed to joining the alliance. Only the Communists were opposed, stressing a policy of complete neutrality. Consequently, unlike the situation that existed in the 1946 debate on the "Keflavik Agreement," there was little doubt that if NATO accepted the stipulation on troops, entry into the alliance would be approved in the Althing. The essential difference lay in the Progressive Party's support. When the stipulated assurance was received, voting on the treaty took place, and the Government's motion was carried on the afternoon of 30 March despite a Communist-precipitated riot outside the Althing building.<sup>31</sup>

The major internal political development that followed Iceland's decision to join the North Atlantic Pact was another change in the Althing representation of Icelandic political parties as a result of the general elections of 1949. In a campaign dominated again by domestic issues, the Independence Party and the Communists held their strength, while the Social Democrats lost support and the Progressives gained.

At the end of 1949, three important results of the election were evident. Communist strength lay in supporting the cause of the workers. This strength had not been impaired during the period 1946-1949 even though the party stand on foreign policy had not always been appreciated. The Social Democratic Party, due to the loss of the labor vote, was a declining force in Icelandic politics. The Progressive Party was once again a contender for leadership. The Progressive Party's leaders were convinced that they had found the formula for political success—supporting a pro-West foreign policy but opposing the establishment of military bases in the country.<sup>32</sup>

**The Defense Agreement of 1951.**  
The outbreak of hostilities in Korea in

the summer of 1950 produced a change in Icelandic public opinion on the question of national defense. Following the Chinese intervention in that conflict, Icelanders began to show increasing concern over their exposed and undefended country in the case of an outbreak of general war. The fear that had been expressed in 1949—that membership in NATO would necessitate the stationing of foreign troops on Icelandic soil—was now giving way to the conviction that being without defenses in such critical times was a risk that Iceland could not afford. The domestic political situation facilitated this change of opinion. The Progressive Party had emerged from the elections of 1949 with increased political strength and had joined with the Independence Party to form a strong coalition Government. The influence of the nationalist-neutralist faction within the party had been reduced, and the party's leadership was in a position to assume a more positive attitude in defense matters than had been the case earlier.<sup>33</sup>

During the first 4 months of 1951, there was speculation outside of Government circles that an American defense force would be sent to Iceland. A resolution passed by a group of aviators and air enthusiasts petitioned the Government to ask the West to provide Iceland with defense and declared: "Iceland is a defenseless country and open to aggression. This meeting held by proponents of defense calls upon all loyal Icelanders to launch immediately an energetic campaign for the dispatch to Iceland of a military force from our allies in the Atlantic Alliance."<sup>34</sup> A similar statement made 1 year earlier would have drawn immediate denunciation from most political quarters; in 1951 only the Communists criticized it.

Due to the existing international situation and the expectation by the Icelanders that some kind of NATO Defense Force would be sent to protect the island, the arrival of the first con-

tingent of a military force at Keflavik on 7 May 1951 came as no surprise. On the same day the Icelandic Government made public the text of a defense agreement with the United States, signed in Reykjavik 2 days earlier. In addition, the Government explained its desire for U.S. protection in a news release. This release was an obvious effort to obtain public support for an agreement, the legality of which was somewhat in doubt because the consent of the Althing, required by the Icelandic Constitution, had not been obtained.<sup>35</sup>

The Defense Agreement of 1951 stated in general terms the obligations assumed by the two countries.<sup>36</sup> The United States would carry out the defense of Iceland in accordance with its responsibilities under the North Atlantic Treaty, and the composition of these forces would be under the control of the Icelandic Government. The United States agreed that it would keep "always in mind that Iceland has a sparse population and has been unarmed for centuries."<sup>37</sup> Finally, provision for revision or termination of the agreement was provided:

Either government may, at any time, on notification to the other government, request the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to review the continued necessity for the facilities and their utilization, and to make recommendations to the two governments concerning the continuation of this agreement. If no understanding between the two governments is reached as a result of such request for review within a period of six months from the date of the original request, either government may at any time thereafter give notice of its intention to terminate the agreement, and the agreement shall then cease to be in force twelve months from the date of such notice.<sup>38</sup>

This section proved to be a key when subsequent actions by the Icelandic Government resulted in a request for termination of the agreement.

The agreement of 1951 was unique among all concluded since 1941, because it found the three non-Communist Parties in complete unanimity on defense matters. As there was, consequently, no reason for a public debate on this agreement between the democratic parties, the reaction of the press is of special interest. It was to give full support to the Government's decision and ignore the arguments of the Communists. In doing so, the non-Communist press prevented the presence of the Defense Force from becoming a public issue. The views of *Timinn* are of significance because they reflected the unity of the Progressive Party. The newspaper emphasized the grave international situation, Iceland's obligations to its Scandinavian neighbors, the unanimity of the democratic parties, and the necessity of accepting foreign forces despite the personal feelings of Icelanders. Seldom had the case for defense of Iceland been stated in clearer terms.

The Defense Agreement was finally submitted to the Althing for ratification in October 1951. Compared to the heated debates on security affairs which took place in 1946 and 1949, the discussion on the agreement failed to attract much public attention—an inevitable situation, as the Althing was ratifying an accomplished fact whereas in the earlier debates it was determining national policy. The vote ended in a legal sanction for the entry of foreign military forces. The action amounted to tacit approval of the same issue which had caused the collapse of the Government in 1946 and disgraceful riots in 1949.

Continued cooperation of the democratic parties in defense policy became difficult as the impact of foreign troops on the culture and people of Iceland increased. This impact resulted in a

growing attitude of resentment and hostility to the U.S. forces. In 1952 the nationalistic elements of the Progressive Party became more opposed to the continued presence of troops on the island, and the Government leaders saw that they would be affected politically if tighter controls were not taken to reduce the effect of the Defense Force on the national culture. The Progressive Party may have had reason by 1953 to regret the political risks assumed in 1951, when a strong position relative to the Independence Party enabled it to deal effectively with its nationalistic element. Due to increasing nationalism, the Progressive Party was forced to reconsider its position on defense.<sup>39</sup>

**The Request for Withdrawal.** During 1955 it became increasingly apparent to many Icelanders that the threat of war was receding. This new optimism led them to speculate that the United States might be persuaded to withdraw the Defense Force. As a result of nationalist pressure, the Progressive Party changed its attitude toward defense in anticipation of general elections in 1956. Social Democratic leaders, likewise, believed that opposition to the Defense Force would be a good political move.

The erosion of popular support for defense was accompanied by a significant alteration in the balance of political forces within Iceland. The Social Democratic Party had come under a new radical leadership. A newly formed nationalist party, which campaigned exclusively on a platform of opposition to the Defense Force, had received enough electoral support in the 1953 elections to elect two members to the Althing. The Progressive Party, which had suffered a loss of strength in that election, agreed to enter a coalition government with the Independence Party only on the condition that there would be a sharp revision of the Defense Agreement to restrict the freedom of the Defense Force. Thus, by the end of 1955, the

ingredients for a change in political alignments were present. Finally, the changing fortunes of domestic politics had forced the Progressive Party to adopt a position opposed to providing for defense in peacetime altogether.

When the Progressive Party decided in March 1956 to withdraw support from the Government and seek new elections, its new stand on defense matters was expressed by the leader of the party, Hermann Jonasson, as follows: "It is important from the national point of view, that we hold to the previous declarations that we have made in connection with our foreign policy."<sup>40</sup> The Progressive leader was referring to his party's opposition to the Defense Agreement. Iceland's future policy was to be based on the declaration of 1949 (that there would be no foreign troops in Iceland in peacetime), and the indefinite continuation of the Defense Agreement would have been in conflict with that policy.

The Progressive Party advised the Prime Minister on 26 March 1956 of its decision to withdraw support from the Government. After the Government had submitted its resignation but prior to the final adjournment of the Althing, a resolution on defense was submitted for adoption in the Parliament. It read, in part: "The Althing resolves to declare that the foreign policy of Iceland should as hitherto be formulated so as to ensure the independence and security of the country . . . [and] that the Defense Force be withdrawn."<sup>41</sup> The reasons for bringing up this explosive matter at the last moment are not clear. Evidence points to the fact that the two parties (Progressive and Social Democratic) believed that it would be politically advantageous during the election campaign, insofar as nationalist votes were concerned, to show some initiative regarding the future withdrawal of the Defense Force.

After heated debate and a great deal of hedging on the part of the Independ-

dence Party, which wished the subject delayed until after the election, the resolution was passed. Support for the nation came from the Progressive, Social Democratic, and Communist parties, and the passage insured that defense policy would remain an important issue during the election campaign.

The election results of June 1956, with defense the primary issue, were an unmistakable indication that public sentiment in favor of defense was much stronger than anticipated by political leaders. The Progressive and Social Democratic parties received the largest bloc of seats, but the prodefense Independence Party lost only slightly. The slight loss of the Independents indicated that only a few supporters of a pro-Western defense policy were swayed by the Progressives' nationalism.

Following the elections, a coalition was formed which included the Progressive, Social Democratic, and Communist parties. The principal problem ahead of the new Government was the implementation of the withdrawal of the Defense Force in the face of the facts that popular support for its retention had continued and that other NATO countries had become alarmed.

When the Government notified the United States that it wished to begin negotiations on the revision of the Defense Agreement to implement the Althing resolution, it also asked the NATO Council to study defense requirements in Iceland. The Council was not expected to take a firm stand in favor of the continuation of the Defense Agreement nor challenge the substance of the resolution. The Council's reply was a concise and carefully worded statement of the strategic importance of Iceland in the defense of the North Atlantic:

The North Atlantic Council, having carefully reviewed the political and military situation, finds continuing need for the stationing of forces in Iceland. The Council

earnestly recommends that the Defense Agreement between Iceland and the United States be continued in such form and with such practical arrangements as will maintain the strength of common defense.<sup>42</sup>

The Council's unanimous conclusion had a profound effect on Icelandic public opinion and the domestic political situation, causing the Government to seek a face-saving formula to reverse the withdrawal resolution.

The solution was offered when the Soviet invasion of Hungary refuted the view that the world situation had become peaceful enough to demand the withdrawal of the Defense Force. The new public mood caused the leadership of the Progressive and Social Democratic parties to undertake to persuade their followers that a change of course was required.<sup>43</sup> The first clear indication of this change came from an article in *Timinn* which admitted that the international situation had changed and that it was essential for all nations to reconsider their policy.<sup>44</sup>

Iceland's Foreign Ministry announced in December 1956 that accord had been reached concerning the problem of the Defense Force. The Government stated that the "recent development of world affairs and the continuing threat to the security of Iceland and the North Atlantic Community call for the presence of defense forces in Iceland under the existing Defense Agreement."<sup>45</sup> Thus, for the time being, the Althing resolution of 28 March was ignored. Each of the Government parties had to retreat on the defense issue to preserve the coalition, but, compared to a collapse of the Government, this strategic retreat was by far the least unpalatable of the alternatives available.

**The Situation in 1968.** The Progressive government of Hermann Jonasson

collapsed in December 1958 because it could no longer cope with the nation's growing economic problems. After elections in 1959, a new Government was formed consisting of the Independence and Social Democratic parties. Until 1968, defense issues were secondary to economic issues, which remained beneath the surface of Icelandic politics, waiting to be seized upon by political forces at the next opportunity.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the approaching 20th anniversary of NATO caused the question of defense to be raised once more. The majority of Icelanders expressed shock and dismay at the Czech invasion, and this public feeling indicated to the Government the need for membership in NATO and the continuation of the Defense Agreement. The Communist press, however, stated that what had happened in Czechoslovakia was an indication of the dangers inherent in military alliances and urged both the withdrawal of the Defense Force and the termination of NATO membership.<sup>46</sup>

The Progressive Party, hoping to recruit support from that portion of the population that retained misgivings about the need to maintain the alliance, encouraged doubts about the effectiveness of NATO and denounced the Defense Force. It was evident that the Progressive Party was still basing the need for defense on the existing degree of world tension. The Progressives completely disregarded past mistakes by resuming the stance that international tension had diminished and that it was no longer necessary to maintain military defenses.

The Government's conviction that a majority of Icelanders desired retaining the Defense Force was substantiated by a public opinion poll conducted by *Visir*, an Independence Party newspaper, in which 57 percent of those queried favored the continuation of the Defense Agreement.<sup>47</sup> The internal controversy raged, and the Progressives con-

tinually insisted that "the development of international affairs has been, and will remain, such that it is urgently necessary to work towards the withdrawal of the Defense Force from Iceland."<sup>48</sup>

The debate reached its peak in 1969 when, on a radio program, one Aron Gudbrandsson proposed that the Icelanders should try to make money out of security affairs by leasing the defense facilities in Iceland to the United States. He proposed an arrangement similar to the treaty between the United States and the Spanish Government. The Progressive Party immediately came out to urge the Government to give consideration to this plan, arguing that its adoption would benefit the nation's economy. There were indications that public support could be generated by stressing the economic aspect. In the Progressive view the proposal would also give Icelanders another wedge to force the Defense Force out of Iceland at the country's pleasure.

The Progressive Party realized its error when the nationalistic sentiments, which the party had so loudly championed, reacted adversely to the proposal. A poll conducted by *Visir* indicated that there was no majority of feeling either way on the matter.<sup>49</sup> But the Social Democrats called the plan a "dismal theory which aims at destroying the ethics and honor of the nation,"<sup>50</sup> and the Communists attacked it as "indicative of the corruptive influence of the long lasting American occupation of Iceland."<sup>51</sup> The Independence Party closed the debate when it stated in *Morgunbladid*, "Icelanders participated in the founding of NATO in order to insure their security and admitted the Defense Force for the purpose of strengthening the mutual defenses of the alliance. We have done this because of our own vital interests and not to make money out of it."<sup>52</sup>

The importance of the defense issue was thus reduced again, and the

attempts of the Progressives to utilize it to consolidate their domestic position backfired. The appeal to the national interest did not take into account the factor that Icelanders would rather renounce the money and the Defense Force than allow the force to remain under conditions suggesting national susceptibility to bribery.

**Summary and Analysis.** The review of Icelandic policy since 1940 shows a definite pattern of fluctuations in Government and party attitudes toward providing for an effective defense. This pattern is graphically portrayed in figure 1.


Iceland followed a policy of neutrality until 1941 when it signed the first Defense Agreement with the United States to provide protection during World War II. At this time the Progressive Party was the largest party in the Althing, and it strongly supported the agreement. After the war the Government rejected a continuation of the Defense Agreement and refused a U.S. request for bases. The Progressive Party was in the opposition during this debate and strongly objected to the use of bases and the stationing of foreign troops in the country. In 1949 Iceland joined both NATO and the United Nations. The Progressive Party was in a weak parliamentary position, but, as a member of the coalition Government, it opposed membership in NATO by withholding support from the Government until it was assured that foreign troops or bases would not be located in Iceland in peacetime. The Progressive Party, on the basis of this issue, gained support in the election of 1949 and subsequently formed a Government with a Progressive Party member as Prime Minister.

In 1951 the lack of adequate defense was reevaluated, and the Progressive government supported a new Defense Agreement which allowed the United States to station forces in Iceland. The elections of 1953, however, indicated to

the Progressive Party that the Icelandic public was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the presence of the Defense Force, and the Government was forced to reconsider its defense position. In anticipation of the 1956 elections, the Progressive Party joined with the Communists to ask for the withdrawal of the Defense Force, only to reconsider this request a few months later when the world situation made the Icelandic public aware of the need for defense once again. After a period of relative quiet in defense affairs, the Progressive Party was quick to jump on the question of continued membership in NATO in an attempt to win domestic support and make possible their return into government. This attempt, as we have seen, failed when the nationalistic sentiment overruled the Progressive action in a manner the party did not expect. The record thus shows that the Progressive Party has played a key role in the fluctuations which have occurred in Icelandic defense policy. This role has been determined largely by domestic political factors.

**Prospects for the Future.** Two aspects of Icelandic defense policy will now be considered. First, what is the strategic importance of Iceland? Has the need for bases there been reduced by improved technology? Are there aspects of the defense problem which require a U.S. presence in the North Atlantic area? Second, what is the relationship of present domestic politics to the defense policy of Iceland?

The problem of defense in Iceland is related to the fact that it is in the center of an area of great strategic importance. As a result of its position with respect to the North Atlantic sealanes, the importance of Iceland was established prior to World War II. The Soviets, as early as 1920, realized that the island would be important. Lenin stated at a meeting of the Comintern that "Iceland would have a strategic role to play in



- (P) . . . . . Althing resolution on this issue passed.
- (F) . . . . . Althing resolution on this issue failed.
- - - - . . . . . Independence Party
- — — . . . . . Progressive Party
- - - - . . . . . Social Democratic Party
- · - · - . . . . . Communist Party

\*Subject to stipulation that no foreign troops would be stationed in Iceland in peacetime.

**Fig. 1—Comparison of Icelandic Political Party Positions on Defense Matters, 1940-1968**



future wars, particularly as regards air and submarine warfare."<sup>53</sup>

The Atlantic Ocean is both a path and a barrier—the connecting link between the NATO nations of Europe and North America or a vast gap between these nations if free passage of the Atlantic should be impaired. In the northern reaches of the Atlantic, Iceland represents the keystone in a defensive arc enabling necessary surveillance to be conducted in the Iceland-Faeroes gap. This surveillance is an essential function for the United States and NATO in view of the expanding operations of the Soviet Navy. The new policy of the Soviet Union, which envisions predominance in such areas as the Iceland-Faeroes gap, was announced by Marshall Zakharov, the Soviet Chief of Staff, at a press conference on 16 February 1968: "The time when Russia can be kept out of the world's seas is gone forever. We shall sail all of the world's oceans; no force on earth can prevent us."<sup>54</sup>

Iceland's strategic importance in the present is due to her geographical position, which makes it possible for forces operating from her territory to detect and, if necessary, attack Soviet submarines and surface forces attempting to gain access to the North Atlantic by passing through the Iceland-Faeroes gap. The Icelanders take small comfort in the knowledge that whatever importance they have in today's world is not due to who they are, but where they are.

The survey of the history of Icelandic defense policy has indicated that the fluctuations in this policy can be attributed to the cyclic attitude towards defense policy of the Progressive Party. This attitude, in turn, can be accounted for by the strategy of exploitation of the changing moods and opinions of the Icelandic people by the Progressive Party in its continuing bid for control of the Government.

To visualize the direction that future Icelandic defense policy will take, it is

advantageous to utilize a linkage theory. A model proposed by James N. Rosenau in his paper, *Of Boundaries and Bridges*,<sup>55</sup> can be used to depict the interaction of several political factors and portray their effects on the whole. This model is used here to place the political factions that make up the political entity of Iceland in an inter-related chain. The overall concept of the chain depicts defense policy and links the defense ideologies of the political parties. The theory also allows the determination of the effects of any portion of the model by examining its relationship to the basic issue of defense policy.

From the analysis of past party policies, it is apparent that the central link of the model is the position occupied by the Progressive Party. From this position the party's influence in defense matters may be easily applied to either side of the defense policy spectrum. The other political parties are distributed to either the right or left of the central link, based on their more persistent attitudes and past actions. The fully developed model is depicted in figure 2. From figure 2 it may be determined that any faction or group of factions which places control of the Government to the right of the neutral line will be amenable to a defense policy favorable to the United States and NATO. The position of these policies within the entire spectrum will become evident as the present attitudes toward defense of each are examined.

In the period encompassed by this study, it has been impossible for any single political party to form an Icelandic Government. Thus, the discussion relating to future prospects for defense will consider the possible combinations capable of forming coalition governments. The first combination to be considered exists at the present time. The Independence and Social Democratic parties have maintained control of the Government since 1959 and com-




Fig. 2—The Linkage Model of Icelandic Defense Policy

prise the right side of the linkage model.

The Independence Party strongly supports the maintenance of close NATO ties and the continued presence of the Defense Force. The degree of support is indicated by remarks of the Prime Minister of Iceland, Bjarni Benediktsson, in June 1968:

It is the overwhelming opinion of Icelanders that the country's defenses should be secured through continuing membership in NATO. We hold the view that distances have become practically non-existent and, as a consequence, there would be little or no time to make important decisions. Iceland cannot remain without military forces any more than other countries. There is a constant stream of traffic by all types of craft on the sea, below the sea and in the air surrounding Iceland. There is, in effect, very little difference than if the country were placed somewhere in Central

Europe or in some other similar position which no one would dream of leaving open and defenseless.<sup>5 6</sup>

These views of the Prime Minister reiterated his earlier statement in an address to the Rotary Club of Sjoeland in Copenhagen on 20 February 1968, when he said: "If the United States were to withdraw from Iceland a dangerous vacuum would develop in the North Atlantic in which case the island would become a completely dismantled and isolated advance post."<sup>5 7</sup>

The prodefense attitudes of the Independence Party are thus rather clear. Due to its long history of Western cooperation and the complete embracing of the aims of NATO, its attitude regarding defense should be assumed to continue. The outlook for the future was expressed during a debate between members of the Young Independence Party and the Young Progressive Party by Hordur Einarsson:

Peace prospects are, unfortunately, far from great today and least of all do these prospects allow us to leave Iceland undefended, for our own sake and for the sake of our allies and their interests. We Icelanders cannot maintain minimal defenses except by establishing an Icelandic armed force which is a burden we have not been willing to undertake. For this reason we must, for some time to come, trust the American armed forces which are here in behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to provide defenses for our country.<sup>58</sup>

The attitudes of the Social Democratic Party are more difficult to categorize. This is due mainly to the fact that the party has been able, because of its past vagueness in foreign policy statements, to embrace whatever doctrine was required to enable it to have a voice in the formation of a government. It does not have sufficient support to become a majority party, but its views are generally pro-NATO. The present Foreign Minister, Emil Jonsson, is the leader of the Social Democrats, and he best brought out the party's view in his Report to the Althing on Foreign Affairs on 24 February 1969:

We Icelanders do not intend to terminate our membership in NATO any more than other neighbors, including our Nordic neighbors whom we, as a rule, consult when we try to judge the international situation and form our foreign policy. We must constantly reevaluate all aspects and consider if changes are desirable in the handling of these matters. It is not only the political situation in the world at large which must be watched carefully and considered, we must also consider the alterations in the strategic importance

of Iceland which are due to the country's location. The decision concerning the maintenance of a foreign armed force in Iceland and also our participation in NATO is a political decision. On this, the majority of the nation must rule, if and when the Althing decides upon a change in the policy so far pursued in the security and defense affairs of Iceland.<sup>59</sup>

These then are the attitudes of the governing parties. They indicate that the defense policy established by their coalition, despite the ambivalence projected by the Social Democrats, is likely to coincide with the interests of the United States and NATO. It should be stressed, however, that the ever-present factor of nationalism has not been disregarded by these parties and, should it be required to please the public opinion, the defense arrangements could become a matter of debate again.

What then would be the effect on public opinion should other political parties become leaders of the Government? The Progressive Party is the second largest political party. (See appendix I.) The possibility exists that an increase in nationalist tendency or some important domestic issue could arise which would enable this party to form a coalition government with the Social Democrats or Communists or both.

The 10-year period that the Progressive Party has been in the opposition with the Communist Party has had a serious effect on the outlook of the Progressives. As partners these parties find more areas in which they agree than disagree in their efforts to upset the Government and bring about a new one. The slow drift to the left has had the undesirable effect of strongly cementing the party's views on defense into a position of inflexibility. The major political influence, should this coalition exist, would lie to the left of the political spectrum. Radical changes

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in defense policy, similar to what occurred in 1956, would then take place.

Evidence supporting this contention can be seen in various statements made by the Progressive Party on defense matters. Thorarinn Thorarinnsson, a member of the Althing for the Progressive Party, delivered a rebuttal to the Report on Foreign Affairs to the Althing mentioned earlier. In this speech he outlined the policy of the Progressive Party on defense:

The Progressive Party approves of Iceland remaining in NATO as long as conditions do not change. This must not prevent revision of our disposition as regards NATO in light of any improvements in international affairs. The strategic importance of Iceland is diminishing due to new military technology. We have now had armed forces in the country for thirty years and this force will become a habit if it continues. For this reason we ought to start preparing plans for the withdrawal of the Defense Force. The Defense Agreement and Iceland's membership in NATO are two separate issues.<sup>60</sup>

The same attitude toward defense has become firmly entrenched in the minds of the members of the Young Progressive Party which would seem to indicate that the prospects for the future with a Progressive government would be dim. Their resolution passed at the 12th Convention of the Federation of Young Progressives stated: "The 12th Convention of the Federation of Young Progressives is of the opinion that the Defense Agreement with the United States must be terminated as soon as possible and that the Defense Force will leave the country."<sup>61</sup> This strong feeling toward defense has not diminished. On 4 February 1969, a Young Progressive leader said: "The

stay of the American armed forces in Iceland endangers the political, economic and cultural independence of Iceland. It must be a matter of principle for each independent nation to have no foreign armed forces in its country in times of peace."<sup>62</sup>

As a result of this attitude on the part of the Young Progressives and the determination of the party to insist on the observance of the NATO stipulation, the following was published as a portion of the platform of the Progressive Party:

Politically, the Defense Agreement has great influence towards impairment of the self determination right of the Icelanders because the defenses of the country are placed in the hands of a foreign state. With an unchanged international situation we are solemn advocates of membership in NATO, but we are against the stay of the Defense Force.<sup>63</sup>

It is thus apparent that the aims of the Progressive Party collide with both the interests of NATO and the attitudes of the Independence Party insofar as defense policy is concerned.

The Communists have consistently supported the Soviet party line, embellished with a large dosage of Icelandic nationalism to encourage popular support. Their attitude has been and is likely to be developed around any anti-NATO, antidefense theme. This may be seen by a quotation from their latest available diatribe:

In the spring of 1951, members of the Althing were called to Reykjavik and at secret meetings they agreed to make a treaty with the United States on new military stations and a new occupation. These agreements were a violation of the Constitution but regardless of this an American armed force

stepped ashore here a few days after the secret meetings were held and this armed force remains here today. The same people today prefer that the country be taken with aggression than have its right guaranteed with the negotiation of a treaty.<sup>64</sup>

It may be seen from this examination of the attitudes of the parties that the possibility of insuring an adequate defense policy in Iceland would be greatly reduced should these parties gain control of the Government.

One combination of political parties has not been covered. Speculation exists as to what would happen if the Progressive and Independence parties were to form a grand coalition. Although this is theoretically possible, there are extreme differences of policy that would have to be overcome, as evidenced by the political attitudes discussed above. In addition, a great amount of bitterness exists between Progressive and Independence party leaders over past battles that would make any hope of reconciliation difficult.

From the foregoing discussion of what has occurred in the past in Iceland and the prospects for the future insofar as the political structure is concerned, it is apparent that nowhere does the smallness of the state appear more significantly than in foreign affairs, particularly in the area of defense affairs. Nations such as Iceland must realize their weak points, recognize the facts concerning their weaknesses, and then manage their affairs in such a manner that these weaknesses will not be exploited. Defense affairs are not a matter where the consequences of a mistake can be easily eliminated. In order to maintain an adequate defense posture in Iceland, the domestic political situation plays an important role. The attitudes of the political parties, influenced by the population from which these parties gain their support, determine the degree

to which NATO and the Defense Force will be supported.

The Progressive Party has, throughout the postrepublic period, exploited these defense affairs and used declarations on the matter as the sole means of reconciling the diverse views of its members and influencing public opinion to gain support for political aspirations.

Icelanders have generally considered that the continued presence of foreign troops threatens important aspects of their national life, and, like most culturally inbred peoples, they are jealous of that way of life. These nationalistic factors work to sustain a markedly neutralist inclination in spite of the declarations of the internationalists in Iceland. An Icelandic move toward neutralism is likely to grow, rather than decline, unless the international situation continues to accent defense needs in a manner that reduces other concerns to secondary importance. The feeling toward eventual neutrality can be found in the attitudes of all political parties, and even the Independence Party has stated: "It is without a doubt healthiest

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## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Comdr. Craig S. Campbell, U.S. Navy, received his undergraduate degree in liberal arts from the University of Utah in 1958. After serving in two patrol plane squadrons and receiving instruction in engineering from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., he was assigned to the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Oslo, Norway. In 1969 he came to the Naval War College as a student in the School of Naval Command and Staff. During the course of the academic year, he participated in a group research project which examined the relationship between the people of Iceland and the U.S. Defense Force stationed there. Lieutenant Commander Campbell is currently assigned to the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

for us to maintain a foreign armed force in our country for as short a time as possible. It is for this reason that we must constantly reevaluate all conditions and study whether changes are desirable in these affairs and their arrangements."<sup>65</sup>

Because Iceland continues to play a key role in North Atlantic strategic planning, defense policy remains an important facet of Icelandic politics. Until a stabilized world political scene or a breakthrough in surveillance technology allows the withdrawal of the Defense Force, the continuation of a

prodefense government in power, providing NATO and the United States with base facilities, is necessary. There is little doubt that domestic politics will continue to influence the defense issue if Icelandic political leaders relate control of the Government, gained by influencing or exploiting the traditions of the nation, to the question of security.

The short-term prospects for a defense policy favorable to the interests of the United States and NATO appear favorable. The long-term prospects are difficult to predict.

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## APPENDIX I—RESULTS OF ICELANDIC GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1942-1967

## Althing Seats

	July 1942	Oct 1942	1946	1949	1953	1956	June 1959	Oct 1959	1963	1967
Independence	17	20	20	19	21	19	20	24	24	23
Progressive	20	15	13	17	16	17	19	17	19	18
Social Democrat	6	7	9	7	6	8	6	9	8	9
Communist*	6	10	10	9	7	8	7	10	9	10
Other	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—

\*Since 1956 the Communists have run under the label of Labor Alliance.

Source: *Althingiskosningar*, (Election Statistics), published by the Statistical Bureau of Iceland for each of the general elections cited.



## APPENDIX II—ICELANDIC POLITICAL PARTIES

The parties are arranged in order of their relative size.

**Independence Party.** Formed by a fusion of the Conservative and Liberal parties. It stands for a liberal economic policy and a program of internal economic stabilization. Represents primarily commercial and fishing interests. In foreign affairs it supports the continued presence in Iceland of NATO military forces and international cooperation. Political views are expressed in the newspapers *Morgunbladid* and *Visir* (circ. 38,000 and 16,000 daily).

**Progressive Party.** Advocates improvement in agriculture and extension of the cooperative movement. Represents rural and cooperative interests. In foreign affairs it expresses qualified support for NATO and advocates withdrawal of NATO forces from Iceland. Political views are expressed in *Timinn* (circ. 18,000 daily).

**Labor Alliance.** Founded in 1956 when elements of the Social Democratic Party combined forces with the Communists to run joint slates of candidates, the Labor Alliance in late 1966 converted itself to a more traditional type of party. Its domestic and foreign policies are dominated by the Communists.

**Communist Party.** Advocates a radical, socialistic program in internal policy. It does not run candidates under its own label but offers joint slates under the banner of the Labor Alliance. In foreign policy it advocates removal of the NATO forces from Iceland and a return to "neutrality." Represents labor interests. Political views are expressed in *Thjodviljinn* (circ. 9,000 daily).

**Social Democratic Party.** Advocates a program of internal economic stability, national development and increased social welfare. Its ideology is moderate socialism. In foreign policy, it advocates continued support for NATO but eventual replacement of the NATO forces. Political views are expressed in *Althydubladid* (circ. 8,000 daily).



The most sincere neutrality is not a sufficient guard against the depredations of nations at war.

*George Washington: To Congress,  
7 December 1796*