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## The Arrogance of Power

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Fulbright, J. William. *The Arrogance of Power*. New York: Random House, 1966. 264p. (E 744 .F886).

Senator Fulbright's beliefs have made him the nation's chief dove or, in the words of Max Frankel, "a hero of the New Left." In his own words, the Senator believes that "there are two Americas. One is the America of Lincoln and of Adlai Stevenson; the other is the America of Teddy Roosevelt and the modern superpatriots" and "the inconsistency of American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of . . . [these] two distinct sides of the American character." He holds that America must now decide which side is to predominate. He says that the "superpatriots" are now in control and that the United States is therefore guilty of what he calls the "arrogance of power." This collective phrase the Senator uses to express "a psychological need that nations seem to have in order to prove that they are bigger, better, or stronger than other nations." Force, as the proof of superiority, is seen by the Senator as implicit in this drive. Although he does not see the United States embarked on an imperialistic campaign to dominate the world, he fears that she will overcommit her great strength in secondary and nonvital areas and disputes leading to her ultimate destruction through exhaustion. It is this idea that the United States is the world's policeman that the Senator criticizes in his short, but far-ranging, text. With regard to domestic policy, the Senator fears that the continued immersion of the United States in foreign affairs is denying Americans at home their fair share of the nation's wealth. Foreign nations might better be influenced to the United States' way of life by examples of what can be done at home.

for the war in Vietnam deserves careful analysis. Before presenting this solution, he specifies three rather important conditions: first, Americans must accept the fact that a nationalistic revolution is not necessarily unacceptable just because it has been captured by communism; second, because of America's great power she can afford to be — and indeed must be — magnanimous in her settlement of disputes; and third, the Vietnam situation must be settled quickly because of the unacceptable "fallout" it causes both at home and in areas of real or prime foreign policy interest, such as Europe and NATO. His solution, very briefly, is as follows: 1. The Government of South Vietnam must seek bilateral peace negotiations with the National Liberation Front. 2. Simultaneously, the United States and the Government of South Vietnam must seek quadripartite cease-fire negotiations between the United States, the Government of South Vietnam, the Government of North Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front. 3. The United States must terminate all bombing, freeze force levels in Vietnam, and unilaterally reduce the scale of military operations. 4. The United States must pledge the ultimate removal of all her forces from Vietnam. 5. In addition to the cease-fire negotiations, the four-party effort must be directed toward plans for self-determination in South Vietnam. 6. When cease-fire and self-determination plans have been completed, a multination conference should be convened to guarantee the referendum and to plan for a future referendum on unification of the North and the South. 7. This international conference should then neutralize South Vietnam and make plans for the neutralization of all of Southeast Asia. 8. Finally, if the first seven steps don't work, then the United States must retreat into

enclaves and stay there until the Communists decide they have to negotiate to get rid of her. Finally, the Senator feels that the real problem in Southeast Asia is not the dispute between North and South Vietnam but the contest over dominance of the area between the United States and China. He believes that China must be recognized and brought into the community of nations, but that this can be accomplished only after a long period of disengagement between China and the United States. A neutral Southeast Asia is the sole way to accomplish that.

The reviewer believes that the Senator's position can be defended only if one accepts certain assumptions that have not been validated by his arguments. These assumptions are as follows: 1. The international Communist conspiracy is dead and indeed may never actually have existed. 2. The domino theory is invalid. 3. The Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam — and, in consequence, the Front for the Liberation of \_\_\_\_\_ (fill in the blank) — is a spontaneous, locally organized, developed, and supported, true voice of the Vietnamese (or, fill in the blank) people. 4. The Geneva agreements of 1954 were not a victory for Ho Chi Minh in which he gained half a country, but a defeat in which he was denied half of what was legally his. 5. The antiwar activity in the United States has not given Ho Chi Minh reason to believe that he will ultimately get exactly what he wants simply by waiting for American-based support for his cause to force the government to capitulate. 6. Although the National Liberation Front is free of Hanoi in the decision-making process, the Government of South Vietnam is not free of the United States. 7. While the government in Hanoi is a completely legitimate government which

cannot be questioned at this point by an internationally controlled referendum, the Government of South Vietnam is illegal and must be subjected not only to an internationally controlled referendum on self-determination, but to an internationally controlled referendum on reunification, with the North. 8. Mark Twain is America's foremost philosopher.

This book is important — especially to all who formulate, execute, or influence national policy. It should particularly be read by those who would try to understand the "New Left," the antiwar dissenters, and Senator Fulbright.

The Senator must be applauded for going beyond criticism and proposing a solution. This is indeed a refreshing trend which the New Left could well espouse. But again, like so many who tackle this problem, the Senator has failed to go to the root. He speaks of things that are vital to the United States, but he does not attempt to define them — to define her vital national interests — and to go from there to a solution.

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Mao, Tse-tung. *Basic Tactics*. New York: Praeger, 1966. 149p. (M 240 .M28 1966)

Mao Tse-tung has produced three works on guerrilla warfare, all of which were written during the first half of 1938. English translations of two of these, *Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War* and *On Protracted War*, have been available to the Western world for many years. The third, *Basic Tactics*, has just been translated by Stuart R. Schram and published by Frederick A. Praeger. *Basic Tactics* was originally presented as a course of lectures. The lectures were given at the Anti-Japanese Military-Political Uni-