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  The Maritime Fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia and Malaysia Respond to China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea

  Scott Bentley

  China now is attempting to expand its control to the southernmost extent of its nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea, in waters ever closer to Indonesian and Malaysian shores. This area of the South China Sea, spanning from Indonesia’s Natuna Islands to the South Luconia Shoals, has greater strategic importance than the Spratly or Paracel Island chains farther to the north. Whereas the Spratlys have for centuries been regarded as “dangerous ground” and commercial mariners have avoided them, the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans flow through this part of the southern South China Sea. Therefore, these areas are far more vital to international commerce and navigation than the dangerous grounds closer to China’s Spratly Islands outposts.

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  Chinese Nationalism and the “Gray Zone”: Case Analyses of Public Opinion and PRC Maritime Policy

  Andrew Chubb

  This volume examines the role of popular nationalism in China’s maritime conduct. Analysis of nine case studies of assertive but ostensibly nonmilitary actions by which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has advanced its position in the South and East China Seas in recent years reveals little compelling evidence of popular sentiment driving decision-making. While some regard for public opinion demonstrably shapes Beijing’s propaganda strategies on maritime issues, and sometimes its diplomatic practices as well, the imperative for Chinese leaders to satisfy popular nationalism is at most a contributing factor to policy choices they undertake largely on the basis of other considerations of power and interest. Where surges of popular nationalism have been evident, they have tended to follow after the PRC maritime actions in question, suggesting instead that Chinese authorities channeled public opinion to support existing policy.

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  Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy

  Ryan D. Martinson

  On April 10, 2012, two Chinese law-enforcement cutters on joint patrol in the South China Sea received orders to proceed immediately to Scarborough Shoal, a disputed cluster of rocks 140 nautical miles west of Subic Bay, the Philippines. Earlier that day, a Chinese fisherman aboard one of several boats moored in the lagoon had transmitted an alarming message to authorities in his home port in Hainan: “Philippine Navy ship number 15 heading this way.”

  Ship number 15 was BRP Gregorio del Pilar, an elderly former U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) cutter now serving as a frigate in the Philippine navy. Not long after the first message arrived in Hainan, sailors operating from the ship entered the lagoon and approached the Chinese boats. At this point, the fisherman sent a final message: “They’re boarding.”

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  China's Evolving Surface Fleet

  Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson

  The missile fast-attack craft and amphibious fleets of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) have undergone significant modernization over the past fifteen years. The capabilities of both categories of vessels have improved even if their actual numbers have not increased dramatically. Examined from the perspective of PLA doctrine and training, the missions of these forces represent the PLAN's past, present, and future.

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  Beyond the Wall: Chinese Far Seas Operation

  Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson

  This volume is the product of a groundbreaking dialogue on sea-lane security held between People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and U.S. Navy scholars at the Naval War College in August 2013, with additional material from a related conference, "China's Far Seas Operations," hosted by the China Maritime Studies Institute in May 2012. At that time the political climate in China was uncertain, in the shadow of the Bo Xilai crisis and of the impending transition of power between the Hu and Xi regimes; accordingly the PLA Navy, though invited to participate in the "Far Seas" conference, ultimately declined to do so. This was not entirely surprising. Attempts by various agencies of the U.S. Navy up to that time to engage in discussions to advance maritime cooperation between China and the United States had been met with lukewarm responses at best. But at a maritime security dialogue in Dalian in September 2012 Senior Capt. Zhang Junshe of the PLA Navy Research Institute, a key contributor to this volume and to the success of the academic cooperation between our two institutes, approached Peter Dutton to tell him that everything had changed.

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  The Recruitment, Education, and Training of PLA Navy Personnel

  Kenneth Allen and Morgan Clemens

  Looking back at the parlous state of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the early 1980s, Liu Huaqing, its former commander, wrote, "All areas [of the navy] required significant strengthening, but I believed the key was developing capable personnel." Indeed, during Admiral Liu's tenure (1982-88), the PLAN embarked on a major effort to improve the quality of its officers and enlisted personnel an effort that continues to this day.

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  China Near Seas Combat Capabilities

  Andrew S. Erickson, Ryan D. Martinson, and Peter A. Dutton

  The capstone U.S. Defense Department study on the future operational environment declares, "China's rise represents the most significant single event on the international horizon since the collapse of the Cold War. Understanding and assessing changes in China's traditionally defensive naval strategy, doctrine, and force structure are of obvious importance to the U.S. Navy (USN) and other Pacific navies concerned with the possible security implications of that rise. This chapter examines the development of the Chinese navy's Houbei (Type 022) fast-attack-craft force and its roles and missions in China's near seas and discusses implications for the U.S. Navy and other navies in the region.

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  No Substitute for Experience

  Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange

  The twenty-sixth of December 2012 marked an important date in Chinese military history—the fourth anniversary of China's furthest and most extensive naval operations to date, the ongoing antipiracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden. In the first-ever simultaneous three-fleet public display, China's North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet all held "open day activities." The guided-missile destroyers Qingdao, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen and guided-missile frigate Zhoushan, together with their associated helicopters and personnel, were visited by more than eight thousand people "from all sectors of the society" at the port cities after which they are named.

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  Not Congruent but Quite Complementary: U.S. and Chinese Approaches to Nontraditional Security

  Lyle J. Goldstein

  U.S.-China relations, difficult in the best of times, have lurched in a dangerous direction since 2009. Against the backdrop of a weakened global economy and sharpened ideological tensions, there has been a disturbing new atmosphere of crisis in East Asia over the last two years, with incidents occurring in greater frequency and sowing serious doubts about the sustainability of the "long peace" that this region has enjoyed for decades. Indeed, any one of the following incidents could have escalated into a serious regional crisis: the sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan; the collision between a Japanese coast guard cutter and a Chinese fishing trawler and the ensuing Chinese restrictions on the export of rare-earth minerals; and a string of confrontations between Chinese patrol ships and vessels from both Vietnam and the Philippines.

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  A Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debate and Discussion in China

  David Curtis Wright

  The Chinese are increasingly interested in the effects of global climate change and the melting of the Arctic ice cap, especially as they pertain to emergent sea routes, natural resources, and geopolitical advantage. China seems to see the overall effect of Arctic climate change as more of a beckoning economic opportunity than a looming environmental crisis. Even though it is not an Arctic country, China wants to be among the first states to exploit the region’s natural resource wealth and to ply ships through its sea routes, especially the Northwest Passage.

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  Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons

  Peter A. Dutton

  On the wall in the entranceway to the personal offices of the Commander, Pacific Fleet, there hangs prominently displayed a life-size portrait of Adm. Chester William Nimitz, the legendary architect of the American naval victory in the Pacific sixty-five years ago. The painting is specially lit, giving the admiral's thoughtful gaze a lifelike glow as if he were present, judging the decisions and actions of his successors in command as these officers find means to preserve regional peace and guard American interests. In the painting's background are the objects of naval war, standing as striking reminders of the heavy price in American blood and treasure paid for the nearly three generations since then during which the Pacific Ocean has been an American lake. It has been this freedom from serious threat that has provided room for American strategic and operational maneuver during the Korean conflict, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War, that has afforded an avenue for the movement of forces during conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the capacity to deter conflict in East Asia, the access needed to assure the security of allies and partners, and the ability to provide support to populations devastated by disaster.

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  Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities

  Lyle J. Goldstein

  In an age of delicate maneuvering among the great powers, coast guards have taken new and leading roles on the world stage. When Washington wanted to demonstrate conviction and bring supplies to beleaguered Georgia without escalating already simmering tensions around the Black Sea, the USCGC Dallas, a large U.S. Coast Guard cutter, was quickly dispatched. The trend has long been visible in Asia. Tokyo's most extensive use of deadly force in the postwar era was an action by the Japanese coast guard against a North Korean surveillance vessel.

  More recently, a Japan Coast Guard cutter sank a Taiwanese fishing vessel in a collision near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea, prompting a relatively serious diplomatic incident. These most powerful coast guards are spawning imitators. India, for example, announced a bold new purchase of long-range patrol aircraft for its coast guard in the fall of 2008. South Korea's improving coast guard, meanwhile, has invited foreign reporters to a tour in the vicinity of islands that are administered by South Korea but claimed by Japan, accompanying the visit with belligerent rhetoric.

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  U.S.-China Maritime Confidence Building Paradigms, Precedents, and Prospects

  David Griffiths

  As two great powers that will influence much of the immediate future of our small and vulnerable planet, China and the United States are in a marriage of sorts—united for the purpose of living together, in the words of the Oxford English Dictionary. Like it or not, the two societies depend on each other. Environmental degradation, social unrest, economic problems, or pandemic outbreak in one must inevitably affect the other. Both must be active contributors to a peaceful, prosperous, sustainable, global community. Both governments emphasize their commitment to a positive and constructive mutual engagement. At sea, however, that engagement is not always trouble free. Confrontation happens—and when it does, events do not always unfold in the way that policy makers might have intended or preferred. Like a married couple, both sides prefer to downplay to the outside world the extent and nature of quarrels. But despite this public posture, those in command of naval and maritime air forces understand only too well the potential risks of damage, injury, and even death at the tactical level. More worrying is the inherent risk of unintended consequences and the potential for an uncontrolled strategic-political spiral of unwanted escalation. It is bad policy and in no one's interest to perpetuate a relationship in which an innocent mistake at sea can trigger an unwanted political crisis. At sea, however, that engagement is not always trouble free. Confrontation happens? and when it does, events do not always unfold in the way that policy makers might have intended or preferred. Like a married couple, both sides prefer to downplay to the outside world the extent and nature of quarrels. But despite this public posture, those in command of naval and maritime air forces understand only too well the potential risks of damage, injury, and even death at the tactical level.

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  Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era

  Nan Li

  This study addresses two analytical questions: What has changed in Chinese civil-military relations during the post Deng Xiaoping era? What are the implications of this change for China's crisis management and its naval modernization?

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  Scouting, Signaling, and Gatekeeping: Chinese Naval Operations in Japanese Waters and the International Law Implications

  Peter A. Dutton

  In October 2008, a month after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan stepped down and the more hawkish Taro Aso took office, a Chinese flotilla of four People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships transited from west to east through Japan's narrow Tsugaru Strait en route to the Pacific Ocean. The vessels were observed together in the Sea of Japan, headed east toward the strait, by a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) P-3C patrol aircraft; they were about twenty-five nautical miles west-southwest of Tappizaki, the cape at the northern tip of the Tsugaru Peninsula, where the Sea of Japan enters the Tsugaru Strait between the islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. The flotilla consisted of a Sovremennyy-class missile destroyer-one of four China bought from Russia between 1996 and 2002 a supply ship, and two Jiangkai frigates, one of which was a newly commissioned Jiangkai II. Apparently the Sovremennyy and one of the frigates had recently paid a friendly visit to a naval base in the Russian Far East before joining the other two Chinese naval vessels in the Sea of Japan and proceeding on through the strait to the Pacific Ocean.

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  Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy 'Assassin's Mace' Capability

  Andrew S. Erickson, William S. Murray, and Lyle J. Goldstein

  After a lengthy hiatus-lasting nearly six centuries—China is reemerging as a maritime power, this time with an emphasis on undersea warfare. Between 1996 and 2006, the Chinese navy took delivery of more than thirty submarines.

  These vessels include two new classes of nuclear submarines-the advanced Song-class diesel submarines and the Yuan class of diesel boats which, according to some reports, was a surprise for U.S. intelligence. Above and beyond this ambitious naval construction program, the People's Republic of China (PRC) received during 2005-06 an additional eight formidable Kilo-class submarines (and associated weaponry), which were purchased in 2002, to add to the four it already operated. A new nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island may well herald a new era of more extended Chinese submarine operations.

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  A Comprehensive Survey of China's Dynamic Shipbuilding Industry

  Gabriel Collins and Michael C. Grubb

  China's dynamic shipbuilding sector now has the attention of key decision makers in Washington. During testimony before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives on 13 December 2007, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Gary Roughead observed, "The fact that our shipbuilding capacity and industry is not as competitive as other builders around the world is cause for concern." Pointing directly to Beijing's new prowess in this area, he concluded, "[China is] very competitive on the world market. There is no question that their shipbuilding capability is increasing rapidly." The present study aims to present a truly comprehensive survey of this key sector of the growing Chinese economy. In doing so, it will provide decision makers and analysts with the clearest possible picture of the extraordinary pace of activity now under way in China's ports, as well as the commercial and strategic implications flowing from this development.