Abstract
The international community has been unsuccessful in establishing an effective legal framework for holding States accountable for cyber wrongdoing. Instead, official political attribution—collectively denouncing States for irresponsible conduct in cyberspace—has become a common substitute to encourage compliance with voluntary non-binding international norms. Since December 2017, the United States and United Kingdom, along with their closest allies, have embraced and implemented collective attributions and responses. They thereby seek to shape “rules of the road” for responsible State behavior in cyberspace and to enhance accountability and deterrence. However, these attributions rely primarily on the outcomes of American and British attribution processes that may not be perceived as sufficiently legitimate or credible. A review of the limited number of collective attributions announced as of January 1, 2024, barely reaching fourteen, suggests their effectiveness is limited. The analysis of these collective attributions raises critical issues and lessons, which the United States and the United Kingdom, as the driving force of this strategy, must consider, along with their partners in the “Five Eyes.” They should reevaluate their strategy and its effectiveness and conclude that a shift from official national attribution to collective multinational attribution would be more effective than a superficial change of brands.
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