Abstract
Combating sabotage of submarine cables and pipelines is a matter of law enforcement, subject to the international law of the sea. However, such acts may also constitute the use of force and an armed attack under Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. The application of these concepts requires clarification of the “international relations” in which the use of force takes place and identification of the State against which the armed attack occurs. This article argues that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the sabotage may be presumed to be directed against the States connected to the targeted cable or pipeline. Whether they may resort to self-defense raises further questions. From the perspective of U.S. doctrine, the right of self-defense is available against any illegal use of force. If, however, it is accepted that only the "most grave forms” of the use of force constitute an armed attack triggering self-defense, it may be argued that the longer-term non-physical consequences that can reasonably be expected to result from the sabotage must also be taken into account. It is possible that, in the face of increasing threats, States will adopt such an interpretation. This would allow them to act more robustly even in maritime areas where the law of the sea, as traditionally understood, does not provide sufficient enforcement powers.
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