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This case is about an insurgency that apparently had all the essentials for success but never transitioned beyond Phase One, the proto-insurgency phase. According to Daniel Byman, the success or failure of a proto-insurgency depends in large part on the reaction of the state. This case examines a wide range of issues that worked against the Honduran governments success at extirpating the insurgency, including institutional indifference and preoccupation with external threats on the part of the Honduran Army, bureaucratic inertia on the part of the American in- country entities, and turf sensitivity by U.S. intelligence. In spite of these obstacles, the Government of Honduras (GOH) eventually neutralized the insurgent threat. The prevailing question is: How was this threat recognized?
United States Naval War College Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups
insurgency, Honduras, Counterinsurgency, Naval War College, Center of Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups
Waghelstein, John D., "Reading the Tea Leaves: Proto-Insurgency in Honduras" (2012). CIWAG Case Studies. 1.