CIWAG Case Studies
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Description
Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq examines how the U.S. Marine Corps was able to learn from and adapt to conditions on the ground in Anbar province from 2006–2008 and develop a three-dimensional strategy that resulted in stability. Dr. Richard Shultz views this success through the lens of organizational theory, arguing that the Marine Corps’ organizational culture underscores learning and embeds lessons from its history into the Corps memory.
Publication Date
November 2012
Publisher
United States Naval War College, Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups
City
Newport, Rhode Island
Keywords
Adaptation, Iraqi War, Lessons Learned, Organization Theory, Case Studies, Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism, Learning, Marine Corps, Military Organizations, Military Training, Unconventional Warfare
Recommended Citation
Shultz, Richard H. Jr, "Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq" (2012). CIWAG Case Studies. 2.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/2
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