The New Georgia Campaign pitted new elements of the emerging U.S. strategies of joint and amphibious warfare against a determined and tenacious enemy in the imperial Japanese Navy and Army forces occupying the Central Solomon Islands. During the campaign, the limits of U.S. joint capabilities were tested as green National Guard Divisions were committed to intense jungle fighting under conditions that they were unprepared to cope with. The campaign quickly became a grinding battle of attrition for the Army Divisions committed to seizing the key Munda Airfield on New Georgia having to battle the terrain, the elements, the Japanese defenders and the psychological costs exacted on the soldiers committed to the battle. This article illustrates the challenges, mistakes and issues regarding combat effectiveness that the U.S. Army’s XIV Corps and the South Pacific Area command structure had to work though in order to fully bring the joint capabilities of unified ground, air, and naval action to bear against the Japanese occupying force.
"New Georgia Campaign: Hard Lessons in Expeditionary Operations,"
MOC Warfighter: Vol. 1
, Article 5.
Available at: http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/moc-warfighter/vol1/iss7/5