CMSI Notes

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  CMSI Note 14: Bridges Over Troubled Waters: Shuiqiao-Class Landing Barges in PLA Navy Amphibious Operations

  J. Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart

  CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways

  • The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) Offshore & Defense Engineering Company (COMEC) has developed three specialized self-propelled landing barges that link together to form an 820-meter (2690 foot) composite relocatable pier.
  • In early March 2025, the first set of three barges conducted sea trials and formed a relocatable pier on a beach near Zhanjiang, Guangdong, in southern China.
  • A second, identical set of three landing barges is still under construction in southern China.
  • Analysts have dubbed this class of barge “Shuiqiao” (literally “water bridge” (水桥) in Chinese), tentatively categorizing it as “landing platform utility” (LPU).
  • Based on their function, paint scheme, and lack of Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions, the barges are very likely PLA Navy auxiliaries and not civilian vessels.
  • Three types of landing barges with extendable “Bailey bridges” may be classified by their length in meters: Shuiqiao-110, Shuiqiao-135, and Shuiqiao-185 class LPUs.
  • The landing barges are the latest in a series of rapidly evolving capabilities that significantly improve the PLA’s ability to conduct over-the-shore logistics in a Taiwan invasion scenario.
  • While these landing barges help address a critical PLA requirement, they may create additional problems for the PLA in terms of amphibious landing throughput. That is, the potential volume created by the barges may result in challenges moving equipment and materiel out of a landing area in highly restricted and potentially contested terrain on Taiwan.
  • Considering these landing barges in the context of other developments related to amphibious operations suggests the PLA may have significantly advanced its timetable to have sufficient capabilities to conduct a large-scale cross-strait operation against Taiwan in accordance with Xi Jinping’s 2027 centennial military building goal (建军一百年奋斗目标).

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  CMSI Note 13: PLA Navy Enhances Realistic Combat Training: Observations of PLA Navy Operations Around Taiwan

  K. Tristan Tang

  Key Takeaways

  • Chinese activities around Taiwan in the first two months of 2025 indicate that the PLA is strengthening realistic combat training around the island. This trend aligns closely with the PLA’s emphasis in recent years on using peacetime interactions with foreign forces to achieve training outcomes, a practice it calls “using the enemy to train the troops.”
  • The PLA has exhibited a noticeable increase in the daily number of naval vessels operating around Taiwan, as well as increased frequency and scale of joint combat readiness patrols and maritime-aerial training exercises, when comparing January and February of this year to the same period in previous years.
  • Noteworthy among these PLA Navy activities was an exercise conducted by a Type 075 (LHD) task force in the vicinity of Taiwan in February 2025. This episode was remarkable for the size of the task force (the largest publicly disclosed LHD task force ever to have operated near Taiwan), the location of the exercise (southwest of Jia Lu Tang Beach), and its occurrence very early in the annual training cycle.
  • This acceleration of realistic combat training near Taiwan likely reflects efforts by the PLA to develop the capabilities needed to achieve “national unification” before its centenary in 2027.

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  CMSI Note #12: Finally, A PLA Navy Missile Gap?

  Ian Easton

  This month a PRC government-owned defense magazine published a special report on one of the U.S. Navy’s newer missiles, calling it a “huge threat” and predicting it will “massively change” the future of naval warfare. The missile? The AIM-174B, an air launched variant of the Navy’s Standard Missile 6 (SM-6). What is it about this weapon that warranted a special report by PRC experts?

  CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

  • A PRC government-owned defense magazine has called the U.S. Navy’s AIM-174B missile a “huge threat” and game-changer for the future of naval warfare.
  • The PRC source says the American missile could shoot down high-value assets at “a shocking distance”, possibly causing the PLA’s operational system to “verge on collapse.”
  • Some defense experts in China believe the U.S. Navy fielded a weapon system that could undermine the PLA Navy’s ability to achieve air and sea control.

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  CMSI Note #11: Admiral Miao Hua's Fall: Further Navy Fallout?

  Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher Sharman

  Pending investigation, Xi Jinping’s protégé Admiral Miao Hua (苗华) has been suspended from his duties as a member of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and Director of the CMC Political Work Department. This decision was made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Central Committee, Defense Spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian announced at the scheduled monthly People’s Liberation Army (PLA) press briefing on 28 November 2024, because Miao is “suspected of serious violation of discipline.”2 By the time such CCP investigations become public, conviction is a foregone conclusion. Miao’s fall thus raises three principal questions: Why is he being removed, will his cronies suffer similarly, and what does it mean for China’s navy and military?

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  CMSI Note #10: China's Summer of 2024: The Missing Chapter

  Ryan Martinson

  Key Takeaways:

  • In the summer of 2024, two Chinese oceanographic survey ships—the Xiang Yang Hong 01 and Kexue—conducted marine scientific research activities in the Bering Sea. Their actions represented a significant expansion of PRC marine data collection in this region.
  • The Bering Sea is a key segment in the sea lanes connecting China with the Arctic Ocean. Thus, the operations of these two vessels should be understood as part of the unprecedented ramp-up in Beijing’s Arctic endeavors that occurred in 2024.
  • The main purposes of the two Bering Sea cruises are unknown. However, both ships were built to meet military requirements, at least in part. Even if they were just conducting basic marine science, the data they collected is inherently dual-use and will be shared with the Chinese military, improving its awareness of the operating environment.
  • The Xiang Yang Hong 01 operated in Russia’s EEZ and visited a Russian military port, demonstrating a high degree of Russian support for PRC activities in the region.
  • Both ships conducted marine scientific research in waters above the U.S.-claimed extended continental shelf. If their operations involved surveys of the seabed, they would constitute a direct challenge to the U.S. maritime claim.

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  CMSI Note #9: On the PLAN's "Core Operational Capabilities"

  Ryan D. Martinson

  Key Takeaways:

  • The PLAN is prioritizing the development of what it calls “four core operational capabilities.” These capabilities include 1) integrated near seas operations, 2) far seas mobile operations, 3) strategic deterrence and counterstrike, and 4) amphibious warfare.
  • Analysis of Chinese writings suggest the focus of these efforts is on prevailing in a high-end conflict involving the U.S. military.
  • The PLAN seeks the ability to dominate the near seas, strike U.S. bases and sea lines of communication in waters east of the first island chain and in the Indian Ocean, achieve “reliable, credible, and effective” deterrence against the U.S. through SSBN patrols within and beyond the first island chain, and execute sophisticated multi-domain amphibious operations against U.S. allies and partners.

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  CMSI Note #8: Recent Changes in the PLA Navy's Gulf of Aden Deployment Pattern

  Dennis J. Blasko

  Key Takeaways:

  • Since December 2008, the PLAN has deployed 46 counter-piracy escort task forces (TFs) to the Gulf of Aden on a UN-authorized mission.
  • Most TFs have included two combatants—a combination of destroyers, frigates, and amphibious transport docks—and a supply ship. Starting with the 33^rd TF, which departed China in August 2019, every TF has comprised one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054A frigate, and one supply ship.
  • One TF generally is on station near the Horn of Africa at all times, while for less than half that time another TF is either on the way to relieve it or returning home after completing its mission.
  • Until recently, the PLAN had normally dispatched three TFs per year, at roughly four-month intervals.
  • However, the 45^th and 46^th TFs departed China on five-month intervals, suggesting a shift in deployment patterns.
  • The PLAN has not explained the rationale for this apparent shift in its deployment pattern. It is possible that more onerous requirements for its surface fleet in operations around Taiwan and in the South China Sea have forced the PLAN to draw forces away from the Gulf of Aden mission, at least temporarily. Or it is possible that the PLAN may be desirous of keeping its ships clear of waters threatened by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

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  CMSI Note #7: PLA Navy Reserve: Out of the Shadows and into the Forefront?

  Tiffany A. Tat

  As a part China’s goal to build a fully modernized military by 2035, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is improving its reserve forces through increased defense spending, critical policy changes, and organizational restructuring. Reserve forces (后备力量) encompass the PLA Reserve (预备役部队) and paramilitary forces, such as the militia, which fall under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and can be mobilized by the National Defense Mobilization Department to support combat. The many components that make up China’s fighting force such as active-duty PLA forces, China Coast Guard, and the militia have been studied in depth; however, the PLA Reserve remains an understudied and underreported topic. While the PLA Reserve represents a fraction of the force structure of their active-duty counterparts, recent changes in military reform specific to the PLA Reserve highlight the importance of this relatively small force and the evolving role reservists (预备役人员) may play within the PLA.

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  CMSI Note #6: Sharpening the Sword: Chinese Navy Aircraft Carrier Battle Group Defense Zones

  Daniel Clayton Rice

  Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

  • Chinese state media’s Channel 7 recently released a series of videos that described China’s aircraft carriers and the carrier battle groups, including their history, composition, and operational theory.
  • The videos describe the carrier battle group (CVBG) “Outer Defense Zone” (外防区), also called the “Depth Defense Zone” (纵深防区), as 185 km to 400 km away from the aircraft carrier.
  • The “Middle Defense Zone” (中防区), or the “Area Defense Zone” (区域防区) is described as 45 km to 185 km away from the aircraft carrier.
  • The video details the “Inner Defense Zone” (内防区), otherwise called the “Point Defense Zone” (点防区), as 100 meters to 45 km away from the aircraft carrier.
  • According to the videos, air operations from the carriers are generally divided into two types of flight operations: the “Split wave operational pattern” (分波作业方式) and the “Continuous operational pattern” (连续作业方式).

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  CMSI Note #5: Admiral Wang Renhua: Exemplifying Jointness and Oversight for China’s Navy amid Xi’s Grade-and-Rank Reforms

  Andrew S. Erickson

  CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

  • Admiral Wang Renhua’s promotion is the latest indication of efforts to synchronize grade-andrank promotions at the full admiral/general level (three stars in the PLA).
  • Wang’s role may be best understood as a military loyalty enforcement boss.
  • A key responsibility for Wang may well be to root out and destroy Xi’s enemies within the PLA.
  • A potential component of Wang’s portfolio in the navy realm could be to maintain a tight grip on the wardrooms aboard China’s growing fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
  • Having Wang serve in the Navy, and currently as head of the CMC’s powerful Politics and Law Commission, helps the PLA shift to a more joint force as part of Xi’s post-2015 reforms.
  • Wang is not originally from the Navy and does not represent the institutional interests of the PLA Navy.
  • It is not uncommon for a PLA Army political officer to switch uniforms to the Navy and retain them from that time forward, as Wang has done.

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  CMSI Note #4: Deck Cargo Ships: Another Option for a Cross-Strait Invasion

  Conor M. Kennedy

  CMSI Perspectives and Key Take-Aways:

  • In addition to RO-RO ferries, the PLA also uses another class of RO-RO ship, the deck cargo ship, in sea transport training exercises.
  • Deck cargo ships are widely used in China’s ocean engineering and construction industry, constituting an existing and large-scale volume of lift capacity.
  • The simple design and relative ease of construction of deck cargo ships means they can quickly be built in large numbers.
  • These vessels may be tasked to bring in large columns of logistics and follow-on forces to consolidate landing areas, possibly in waves not far behind landing assault forces.
  • Deck cargo ships can distribute the risk for many units making transits and force an adversary to find suitable kill solutions to strike numerous lower value targets.

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  CMSI Note #3: “Choose the Right Person, Choose the Right Path”: Taiwan’s Cross-Strait, National Security, and Defense Policies Under a Lai/Hsiao Administration

  Julia M. Famularo

  CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

  • The incoming William Lai/Bi-khim Hsiao administration almost certainly intends to continue to execute and deepen President Tsai’s defense reforms. Lai has also stated his support for the implementation of an Indo-Pacific Strategy concept.
  • Lai has an opportunity to leverage the national security experience of President Tsai’s outgoing advisors, who may potentially help his administration calibrate Taiwan’s responses to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military provocations in and around the Taiwan Strait.
  • The Lai administration likely would prove receptive to U.S. and partner overtures that contribute to Taiwan’s ability to strengthen its maritime domain awareness and security; enhance maritime law enforcement and search and rescue capabilities; conduct maritime patrols; and improve information sharing.
  • Lai intends to maintain the cross-Strait status quo, and has stated that he is willing to conduct dialogue with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the basis of mutual respect and equality.
  • Lai almost certainly will seek to continue President Tsai Ing-wen’s policy of diversifying Taiwan’s economy and expanding sustainable trade partnerships with democratic nations. He has stated that overdependence on the PRC leaves Taiwan vulnerable to economic coercion, and thus opposes pursuing further economic agreements with China under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) or a potential Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (CSTSA).

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  CMSI Note #2: Admiral Dong Jun Engages Friends and Foes: China’s First Naval Defense Minister Brings Joint Operational Experience

  Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher Sharman

  On 29 December 2023, Admiral Dong Jun (董军) was appointed China’s 14th Minister of National Defense (国防部部长) at the seventh meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress. He replaced the previously deposed Army General Li Shangfu, ending a four-month leadership gap. Admiral Dong is the first PLA Navy (PLAN) officer to head China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Previously the 9th People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Commander, he was likewise exceptional in achieving this position from a background in theater joint operations.

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  CMSI Note #1: Admiral Hu to the Helm: China’s New Navy Commander Brings Operational Expertise

  Christopher Sharman and Andrew S. Erickson

  China’s Navy, the world’s largest by number of ships, has a new leader. On 25 December 2023, Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping, in his capacity as Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman, promoted Vice Admiral Hu Zhongming (胡中明) to Admiral and appointed him Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (海军司令员). 2 Hu’s predecessor Admiral Dong Jun (董军) attended the promotion ceremony, suggesting this is an orderly and expected transition—unlike recent removals of the PLA Defense Minister and the former Commander of China’s Strategic Rocket Forces.