Naval War College Review
Abstract
General William Westmoreland, the American commander of Military As- sistance Command Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 through 1968, remains one of the most contentious personalities of the Vietnam War, still the subject of intense debate among veterans and historians of the war. Prevalent still is the view that “Westy” could not see the forest for the trees, or vice versa, and disastrously lacked strategic vision and operational creativity owing to his parochial focus on employing Cold War “big unit” doctrine and attrition to combat an insurgent war of unification.
Recommended Citation
Allison, William Thomas
(2016)
"Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam,by Gregory Daddis,"
Naval War College Review: Vol. 69:
No.
1, Article 12.
Available at:
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/12
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